‘Play, don’t tell’:

A phenomenological critique of the semantic paradigm of British radio dramaturgy

Farokh Soltani Shirazi

Submitted for PhD examination

Royal Central School of Speech & Drama, University of London

December 2017

DECLARATION OF AUTHORSHIP

I, Farokh Soltani Shirazi, declare that this thesis is composed by me and that all the work herein is my own, unless explicitly attributed to others. This work has not been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification.

……..

Farokh Soltani Shirazi

Ideas from this thesis have been provisionally accepted for publication as part of the following book chapter:

Soltani Shirazi, F. (2018) "Inner Ears and Distant Worlds: podcast dramaturgy and the theatre of the mind" in Berry, R., Fox, N., & Llinares, D. (eds.) *Podcasting: New Aural Cultures and Digital Media*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

ABSTRACT

This thesis contributes to debates on radio dramaturgy by drawing from the philosophical discipline of phenomenology to question a number of prevalent ideas in radio theory and practice. The intention is to shift the basis for comprehending the experience of radio drama from theoretical systems such as semiotics, and abstract metaphors such as 'visual imagination' and 'theatre of the mind', toward a model that understands it in terms of perceptual, bodily experience of a holistic, graspable world. Such a perspective, I argue, allows for a critique of the conventional mode of radio dramaturgy.

I begin by examining available theoretical models of radio drama, questioning their phenomenological accuracy. I then present my own model: performing a phenomenology of radio listening, I posit that radio drama works because the sonic structure created through its dramaturgy expresses the perceptual experience of encountering the auditory world – the experience of radio drama, then, is a 'listening to a listening', and radio dramaturgy can be understood as a process of structuring sounds that listen to the dramatic world. I then use this insight to explore the conventions of British radio dramaturgy, positing that they generate a mode of listening focused on the referential meaning of the sounds, rather than their sonic, musical, or affective qualities; I label this the *semantic paradigm* of British radio. I then explore the history of this paradigm, arguing that its emergence is the product of contingent cultural and technological factors; these factors, I suggest, have changed radically due to the rise of digital technologies, allowing for a paradigm shift. Finally, I explore cases where the semantic listening mode gives way to what I term a *resonant* manner. By moving away from the practices of the semantic paradigm, I conclude, radio can move toward a resonant dramaturgy.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Title Page……1

Declaration of Authorship……2

Abstract……3

Table of Contents……4

Acknowledgements……7

Introduction – The Problem of Radio Drama……8

A. First remarks……8

B. Radio drama: a problematic definition……9

C. Radio drama and ocularcentrism……15

D. Ocularcentrism and representation……18

E. Representation and radio dramaturgy……21

F. Radio dramaturgy and phenomenology……23

G. Phenomenology and sonic experience……27

H. About this thesis……29

I. Closing remarks……32

Chapter 1 – Radio Thinks, Radio Sees: Theories of Radio Drama……35

1.1. Opening remarks……35

1.2. *Theatre of the mind* and mental projection……35

1.2.1. The semiotic approach to radio drama……39

1.2.1.1. The problems of decoding and interpretation……41

1.2.1.2. The phenomenal field and signs……43

1.2.2. The *visual medium* approach to radio drama……46

1.2.2.1. 'Visual imagination': a definition?……47

1.2.2.2. Radio drama as vision and as perception……48

1.2.3. *Theatre of the mind* and the body……53

1.3. The 'Degradation Theory'……56

1.3.1. Data and details: ocularcentrism in the 'Degradation School……56

1.3.2. Degradation and conventional dramaturgy……58

1.4. The 'Imaginative Spectacle'……60

1.5. Radio drama as invitation……62

1.6. Closing remarks……65

Chapter 2 – Radio Listens: A Phenomenological Model of Radio Drama……67

2.1. Opening remarks……67

2.2. A phenomenological model of what? ……68
2.3. The dramatic world and the body……74
2.3.1. The dramatic world as expression……81
2.3.2. The radio-body……86
2.4. Radio and the auditory schema.. ……92
2.4.1. The sounds of the world……93
2.4.2. The body and resonance……98
2.4.3. Auditory attention. ……102
2.4.4. Modes of listening ……104
2.5. Encountering the radio-body……107
2.6. Closing remarks……109
Chapter 3 – How Does Radio Listens: The Semantic Paradigm of British Radio Dramaturgy and Its Problems……110
3.1. Opening remarks……110
3.2. Radio and 'semantic listening'……110
3.3. British radio practice as a paradigm. ……118
3.3.1. Writing the radio play……120
3.3.2. Performing the radio play……124
3.3.3. Producing the radio play……126
3.4. Paradigm or principles?……129
3.5. A resonant alternative to the semantic paradigm……131
3.6. Closing remarks. ……141
Chapter 4 – Radio Learns to Listen: A Genealogy of the Semantic Paradigm……143
4.1. Opening remarks……143
4.2. The early years: drama on the radio and radio drama……145
4.2.1. Settling into the new body……147
4.2.2. Two visions of radio……151
4.2.3. A paradigm emerges……155
4.2.3.1. A theatrical heritage……156
4.2.3.2. Bureaucracy and personality……158
4.2.3.3. The listener at home……163
4.2.3.4. Dramaturgy and the War……166

4.2.3.5. A paradigm in place: the case of *The Man Born to Be King*……168
4.3. The semantic and the resonant in the post-war years……171
4.3.1."Sound Radio?": *The Art of Radio* and the case of *All That Fall*.172
4.3.2. Institutional practices……177
4.3.3. Technologies, techniques, listeners……180
4.4. High Fidelity: the contemporary era……182
4.4.1. Semantic listening without words: the case of *The Revenge*……184
4.5. A digital age: the current conditions……186
4.5.1. Conditions of distribution and production……186
4.5.2. The new listener……188
4.5.3. A paradigm in crisis…. ……190
4.6. Closing remarks……191
Chapter 5 – Radio Listens to Itself: Resonant Radio Dramaturgies……193
5.1. Opening remarks. ……193
5.2. An emerging paradigm? ……193
5.3. Radio listens to itself in music……196
5.3.1. Musicking background: the case of *The Stroma Sessions*……202
5.3.2. Musicking movement: the case of *The Trial of Superman*……210
5.3.3. Musicking reaction: the case of *Dirk Gently's Holistic Detective Agency*……219
5.4. Radio listens to itself in ambiguity……230
5.4.1. Ambiguous space: the case of *Seaburn*.. ……232
5.4.2. Ambiguous sound: the case of *Scherzo*……236
5.6. Closing remarks……242
Conclusion……244
A. A summary……244
B. Contributions to new knowledge. ……246
C. Areas for further research……248
D. Final remarks……250
Bibliography……251
Appendix A: Clip repository link and index……266

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A page is never enough to thank – with as much sop as appropriate – the many wonderful people who helped me, taught me, challenged me, comforted me, laughed with me, and saved me during this researched project – but I can try:

My thanks go to the amazing PhD community at Central, past and present: Charlotte Bence, Amelia Cavallo, Dr Rachel Cockburn, Simon Dodi, Silvia Dumitriu, Sherril Gow, Adelina Ong, Joe Parslow, Alejandro Postigo, Lazlo Pearlman, Will Pinchin, Evi Stamatiou, Dr Lisa Woynarski, and everyone else; their support was essential and their company a joy. Special thanks to Deirdre McLaughlin who drew me into the PhD world when I was but a MA student, and look where that got me.

I am grateful to the staff at Central, who gave me assistance, encouragement, critique and knowledge, formally or during random chats in hallways: Dr Joel Anderson, Dr Sylvan Baker, Dr Tom Cornford, Prof Maria Delgado, Dr Steve Farrier, Prof Sally Mackay, Ian Morgan, Dr Jane Munro, Dr Gareth White, and everyone else. During a few such chats, Dr Lynne Kendrick gave me insights that changed my trajectory of thinking about the thesis, sound, and beyond – for that I am particularly thankful.

I thank all of the students with whom I've had the chance to work as a lecturer, whose energy pushed me forward during difficult times. Thanks, too, to everyone who gave me opportunities to develop as a pedagogue. Much gratitude goes to Dr Experience Bryon, Dr Sarah Grochala, and Dr Amanda Stuart-Fisher for their invaluable support, and for trusting me as a teacher more than I trusted myself. I am also immensely grateful to Dr Jessica Hartley, who helped me find my way around the field, and continues to do so.

More thanks go to the staff at the IBD clinic and PITU at the Royal Free Hospital, without whom this thesis would simply not be physically possible: Dr Maria Jaboli, Dr Edward Despott, Prof Mark Hamilton, Kay Greveson, Lorna, Lucy, Ruth, and Maya, who were metaphorical – and at one point, literal – life savers.

Endless thanks go to my second supervisor Prof Ross Brown, whose knowledge and critical insight revealed the important questions, and whose kindness and support helped me attempt answers. I am also eternally grateful to my primary supervisor Dr Tony Fisher, without whose patient, supportive, reassuring, and learned guidance during this project and long before it even began, neither this thesis nor its writer would exist in anything near their current shape and form.

A quarter of this thesis is dedicated to my beloved Kimberley Daal, who gave me all the love, joy, space, inspiration and care that I needed to do this, and only got a fiancé in return. The second quarter goes to Lior Lerman, who has probably been wondering why she has not featured in the second paragraph, and whose friendship has been a great pleasure, support measure, and vent for hour-long philosophical rants. The two remaining quarters I dedicate to my mother, who is my greatest source of peace, advice, and trust, and to my father, from whom I have inherited my lifelong obsession with knowing, as consolation in case he may be forced to share the title of Dr Soltani soon.

INTRODUCTION:

THE PROBLEM OF RADIO DRAMA

A. First remarks

This is a thesis about radio drama. In it, I aim to examine and critique the ways in which the art of creating drama out of sound alone is theorised, propose a new framework for understanding it, and then apply this framework to the conventional practices of making radio drama in Britain, in order to critique them, and to point to alternative possibilities for practice.

This thesis is also about philosophy. In it, I posit that a greater theoretical and practical understanding of radio drama can be achieved through a shift in the basic philosophical assumptions made about the art form, its makers, and its audience. In particular, building on contemporary debates in radio theory and sound studies, I argue that phenomenology – the school of philosophy that aims to understand the world through first-person experience rather than abstract theorisation – can provide a more reliable critical lens with which to approach radio drama. By developing a systematic framework for understanding radio drama through phenomenology, I propose, in essence, a philosophy of listening to radio drama.

This thesis is also about sound. In it, I argue that both theoretical debates around radio drama, and its conventional practices, can benefit from a change in their philosophical approach toward sound and sonic experience, postulating that in order to understand how drama can work solely through auditory experience, sound has to be understood and analysed as fundamentally bodily, rather than a mental or intellectual, phenomenon. By drawing from phenomenology and sound studies, I make auditory experience central to my philosophy of radio drama.

Finally, this thesis is also about practice. In it, I attempt to understand the production, broadcasting and consumption of radio drama as practices contingent to cultural, historical, and technological contexts, rather than abstract theoretical or natural constructs. I posit that the practices around radio drama can be understood,

critiqued, and improved in a new light by adopting a sonically-minded philosophy of radio drama.

This introduction serves to establish and outline some of the key questions, concepts, and frameworks that underlie my examination of these topics. First, in the next section, I present a definition of radio drama in order to highlight the problematic nature of the term; the next three sections sketch out a theoretical analysis of the problem and its most common solution. Then, I present a framework with which to critique this solution, followed by some remarks about the terms and methods used in the thesis. Finally, I outline a summary of each upcoming chapter, and highlight how the findings of my research contribute to new knowledge.

B. Radio drama: a problematic definition

In this section, I want to begin to set out the key purposes of this thesis with a simple question: what is radio drama?

Since its birth in the 1920s, and throughout its commercialisation, expansion, popularity, challenges due to the rise of television, and ultimately establishing its own niche output on various broadcast and distribution media, radio drama has seen significant output facilitated by the ease and relative cheapness of production – as an example, Verma estimates that five million shows were broadcast in 1937 in America alone (Verma 2012:4). Although few such broadcasts have survived and the pace has certainly slowed down – more so in the United States than in Britain – radio drama is still being produced in abundance; on the BBC, for instance, the Afternoon Play on Radio 4 alone commissions 190 plays annually (Pitt 2009). Uniting this catalogue of sound objects and thoughts under a single description of 'radio drama' would be a difficult task. Many overlapping terms and concepts, such as audio drama, audiobook, sound drama, and radio theatre, exist to describe what might also be labelled radio drama. A working definition of the term, then, is the first necessary step in beginning this thesis. Yet, delineating and defining radio drama can be a difficult task, as the definition is inexorably linked with the contingent and shifting cultural ideas and practices that form it. To remedy this, let us first approach the term in abstract, isolated from its history and context and in a purely etymological sense: what does 'radio drama' mean?

First, let us consider 'drama' – rooted in the Greek *drao*, meaning 'doing' or 'acting' – to the source of its current use, Aristotle's *Poetics*. The poet, Aristotle explains, can use one of three 'modes': she can either narrate in her own voice, or narrate in the voice of a character, or she can present the 'characters as living and moving before us' (Aristotle 1898:13) – the first two modes constitute *diegesis* (narration) while the third is *mimesis* (imitation). [1] He goes on to name the mimetic mode, which encompasses both comedies and tragedies, *drama*. Keir Elam elaborates on how the mimetic mode functions. When characters are presented 'living and moving' before the audience, they allow for the construction of 'a fictional dramatic world characterized by a set of physical properties, a set of agents and a course of time-bound events' (2002:87) – what we can identify colloquially as setting, character and action. 'Dramatic worlds', Elam writes '[…] are presented to the [audience] as "hypothetically actual" constructs, since they are "[perceived]" in progress "here and now" without narratorial mediation' (2002: 98). Based on this, radio drama can be defined simply as the presentation, through radio, of a dramatic world that is – like our own world – actual, physical, and perceivable.

Now let us consider the word 'radio', which is more difficult to define. As Andrew Dubber points out, while the field of radio studies has 'a shared (though contested) understanding of what radio is as a cultural institution and technological form, the idea perpetually sidesteps the question of definition' (2013: 10). For the purpose of this definition, however, let us once more leave aside the cultural institution, and focus on the technology of radio broadcasting – that is, the unilateral transmission of sound from a source to multiple receivers. This means that in radio drama, the audience's sensory access to the dramatic world is solely through the sense of hearing. Implicit in this function is a degree of presentational ability: our world, after all, contains sounds, which the medium can reproduce. The natural sounds, speech, music, and synthetic noises that we hear on the radio can in turn reflect certain properties of the dramatic world through background atmospheres and incidental effects, and it can also allow us to listen in to the voice of active agents engaged in a progressive series of events – a story. In other words, radio has the

[1] I should note that here I use the word 'imitation' only to follow Aristotle's terminology. Defining the dramatic world as imitative presupposes an original, authentic source which it imitates – a positions to which I do not adhere. The dramatic world is imitative only insofar as it is recognised as a world similar to one's own by the audience. Any mentions of mimesis or imitation in this thesis is meant to convey this definition.

capacity to present a dramatic world in the form of a series of sounds interspersed through time. In this way, radio drama can be defined as a structure of sounds that presents a dramatic world. This classification does not have the ambiguity of Arnheim's general 'sound art'; it excludes narrative presentations, such as readings and audiobooks, the transmission of the real world in news bulletins, discussions, interviews and similar sound events, and abstract sounds like music from the category of radio drama, as none of these present a dramatic world to their audiences. [2] This definition is still loose; for instance, it permits Verma – who conceives of radio drama similarly, as 'acting out on the radio' – to claim that 'the ancient Greeks may have practiced a primitive form of radio drama' (2012: 5) because they projected their voices to the back rows of auditoria with sound-amplifying masks.

Such interpretations are ruled out when other qualities of sound broadcasting are considered. Apart from its unisensory nature, radio forces other limitations on dramatic presentations. Radio broadcasting is, in most drama programmes, unilateral, in that the people on the radio cannot hear or see the listener. This is certainly optimal for dramatic presentation where, according to Elam, 'the [audience member] can "[perceive of]" the dramatic world, but [her] context is not in turn "[perceived]" by the inhabitants of that world' (2002:98). This, along with the broad range that is implied by the term 'broadcast', suggests that the broadcaster cannot determine the exact location or situation of the receiver. This means that it would be futile for radio drama to base its intelligibility on the audience occupying certain spaces or receiving certain sensory elements not contained in the sounds; if to be perceived, the dramatic world requires its audience to sit down, or look at a certain image, or sit in the back rows of an ancient Greek auditorium, then it may not be suitable for radio broadcasting. Therefore, by this definition, radio drama has to present its world solely through the sound structure it presents, and without resorting to other stimuli.

[2] A detractor may object to this exclusion on the grounds that the line between such programmes and those which fall within my definition of 'drama' are not as clearly demarcated as I assert: a diegetic audiobook may include moments of dramatic reading, and a radio play may be 'told' through a narrative voice. I do not question this; as it will become apparent, however, my discussion of this definition is to show the problems inherent within the concept of 'drama on the radio' – be it manifested in a homogeneously dramatic presentation or be interspersed with the diegetic mode which, unlike mimesis, is not conceptually paradoxical when transferred to the radio.

This factor also implies transferability beyond radio broadcasting: if the sound structure represents the dramatic world without resorting to the physical and chronological conditions of its reception, then it can be recorded and reproduced without losing the ability to fulfil its function. This appears to detach the notion of radio drama from its medium; if a radio drama can be transmitted through other sonic media – a gramophone, for example, or a telephone set – then it is no longer confined within the term 'radio drama'. In fact, media corresponding to the definition above precede the commercialisation of radio; Crook traces this back to the 1890s where the Compagnie du Théâtrophone began broadcasting the sound of Paris theatres through the telephone lines and into homes (1999: 16); '[L]isteners enjoyed the theatre phone despite the fact that it only provided a partial account of performance' (Curtin 2013:220) indicating that the Théâtrophone was successful in representing dramatic worlds through structures of sound. It was also relayed to many homes, and although the nature of the technology would force listeners to sit still at the device and there were no copies produced after the performance ended, it is conceivable that if a performance was to be recorded from the Théâtrophone and broadcast on the radio, it would be understood by the listener, in the same way that a DVD version of a cinematic feature is still understandable away from the setting of a film theatre. Today, digital media facilitate the production, reproduction and distribution of radio drama in the form of podcasts, downloads and streaming audio; giants of broadcasting such as the BBC; small-scale production companies like Bafflegab and Big Finish, and amateur productions like those showcased on the *Radio Drama Revival* podcast, compete alongside each other to attract listeners without a single radio device being involved. It is perhaps for this reason that Crook opens his book on radio drama with a history of *audio* drama, divided into six ages, in which he charts the beginning of the form not with the advent of radio, but from an indeterminate point in the ancient past; indeed, it is not until the fourth age that radio broadcasting makes an appearance (1999: 22-29). The point of this rather counter-intuitive history is that sound drama is not limited to radio broadcasting, and that radio broadcasting is not limited to sound. The term 'audio drama' may be a more fitting term for the etymological definition to which I have arrived, 'a reproducible structure of sound presenting a dramatic world'.

It is at this point that I should acknowledge the long, rich and diverse heritage of drama on radio that I chose to leave out temporarily at the beginning of my conceptualisation. My insistence that this thesis is about *radio drama* is because my focus is on the *way* in which sound is structured to represent dramatic worlds, in the practices, conventions, traditions, and methods developed within the cultural institutions formed around radio broadcast technology. The Théâtrophone was able to transmit the sounds of an auditorium into homes, but the structure of those sounds was determined the requirements of stage representation; in fact, as I shall argue, so were the first broadcasts of drama on the radio. It was only after practitioners began to produce drama *for* radio that sets of medium-specific conventions and techniques arose for representing the dramatic world. [3] Today such conventions, developed in response to the unique logistic and technological properties of radio broadcasting throughout its history, are in use both on the radio and in *audio drama*; this is why, for example, a wholly off-radio audio production such as the *Eighth Doctor Adventures* created by Big Finish Productions (2013) can be transferred seamlessly to Radio 4 Extra.

It is for this reason that although a large portion of this thesis is devoted to ideas that can be equally applied to *audio* drama – that is, any sound structure that presents a dramatic world – I continue to use the term radio drama. This is intended as a reminder of the historical and aesthetic link between the broad theoretical definition of the idea of drama in sound, and certain sets of practical conventions that have developed to realise it – a link that is obscured by the label *audio drama*. The usage is not meant to confine radio drama to what is broadcast on the airwaves, nor does it imply that the conventions developed on radio *define* radio drama or that sound representations of dramatic world *must* follow such conventions to be considered radio drama – as a matter of fact, the whole point of this thesis is to argue otherwise. The term simply applies in the way I can apply the moniker 'film' to a home video copy of the animated feature *Shrek*, even though celluloid has had little role in its production and my consumption of it. Both applications are simply a reminder that the conventional ways in which their respective practices function are ultimately tied to the history and technology of a practice: cinema for *Shrek*, and

[3] The fourth chapter of this thesis presents a summary of the development of such conventions in Britain.

radio in the case of radio drama. When I speak of radio drama in this thesis, then, I am referring to any reproducible structure of sounds that presents a dramatic world to its listener through solely aural means, acknowledging that the formation of that structure usually follows a set of conventional practices.

This conception, however, carries within it an apparent contradiction, which I can best illustrate by revealing that in my discussions above, I have made significant alterations to the passage quoted from Elam's writings on the dramatic world: within the texts, I have replaced the words 'audience' and 'perceived' for the original terms he uses in his account – 'spectator' and 'seen'. This is because Elam's elaboration of Aristotle's definition of the dramatic mode equates the idea of characters *living and moving* before the audience with the living and moving being *seen*. Of course, his focus on *seeing* might be justifiable as his subject is not just drama but the semiotics of theatre, and he does mentions *hearing* several times – albeit always following 'seeing' in brackets as an act of 'the spectator' (Elam 2002: 87, 100, 122). Still, the inferred assumption that visibility is a key condition of the dramatic world *living and moving before us* is not limited to Elam – in fact, Aristotle himself believed that action is best understood through visualisation, advising the aspiring dramatist to 'place the scene, as far as possible, before his eyes. In this way, seeing everything with the utmost vividness, as if he were a spectator of the action, he will discover what is in keeping with it' (1898:61). Interestingly, in the translation of *Poetics* provided by Kenneth McLeish, the sentence 'living and moving before us' is instead interpreted as 'physically doing what is being *shown'* (1998: 5, italics mine). This understanding follows a simple and seemingly convincing logic: the dramatic world, Elam explains, 'is necessarily based on the [audience member's] actual world' (2002:92). It is generally assumed that the average audience member – if sighted – understands her 'actual world' chiefly through visual means; hence, the dramatic world presented by sound is devoid of the primary sensory channel through which a world is normally encountered. This means that unlike all other dramatic media, the world as presented through radio cannot be accessed through sight – so how is it possible to experience it fully?

The fact that the seemingly vital worldly ingredient of vision is missing sets radio apart from all other dramatic media: by virtue of being solely auditory, radio drama is by definition problematic. This is not to say that it is impossible to produce

or experience radio drama, but that to understand radio as a dramatic medium, and to create pieces of drama for it, it is first necessary to address this problem. As I shall argue throughout this thesis, the problem of radio drama is a key issue – if not *the* key issue – in theoretical debates around radio drama, and also plays an important part in the development of the practices of the medium. It is also the central driving force of this thesis; my statement in Section A, that this thesis is about radio drama, refers to the fact that I aim to critique available solutions to this problem, propose my own framework for understanding it, and show how practitioners have responded to it throughout the artform's history.

To pursue this, let us examine the key idea that underlies the problem of radio drama: namely, that the world is perceived primarily in visual terms. In the next section, I explore this claim in detail, and assess its philosophical basis.

C. Radio drama and ocularcentrism

The fact that the sense of sight plays an important role in human life, particularly in Western culture, is difficult to dispute. Close your eyes, for example, and you will not be able to navigate your way through unknown spaces with ease, watch a silent film, enjoy a beautiful landscape, appreciate a painting by Henry Matisse, recognise the colour blue, or read the rest of my argument. Metaphors based on or rooted in sight permeate our language – we speak of *insight*, *visionaries* and *ideas* (from the Greek *idein*, meaning *to see*) and ask if others *see what we mean*; Martin Jay demonstrates this by filling the opening ten lines of *Downcast Eyes* (1994:1), his book on the history of vision in philosophy, with twenty-one visual metaphors, many rooted in Latin and Greek. [4] Of course, similar examples denoting the importance of other senses can also be offered. But there appears to be a hierarchy of reliability among sensory channels; a 'sense ratio', as McLuhan calls it (1962:245), according to which the sense of vision has privilege over others. [5] Jay labels this tendency *ocularcentrism* (1988) – a term that the Dictionary of Media and

[4] As a speaker of Persian, I can detect the same ocular structures in my native tongue – an Eastern language little influenced by Greek and almost not at all by Latin.

[5] My aim here is not to engage with McLuhan's ideas, which at times are rather problematic, but solely to highlight his observation that the sense ratio of Western culture is biased toward the visual.

Communications defines as a 'perceptual and epistemological bias' in favour of sight, prevalent in Western cultures (Chandler and Munday 2011: 301).

As an example of ocularcentrism manifesting itself in language, take the word *show*, which can mean "to make something visible", but also "to prove". If I were to *show* that there is an elephant in the room, or that there is a tendency in Western culture and thought to consider visual information more reliable, I would be proving these facts by making them visible, either through examples that you could observe or by direct demonstration. Consider, however, the equivalent verb in other sensory modes. I can make the existence of the elephant 'audible' by *telling* you about it – that is, making the sound of the word 'elephant' – but this does not prove that the object is there. Even if I make the elephant emit a noise by striking it, what I am making audible for you is 'an elephant being struck' and not the elephant itself, detached from my interactions with it. Furthermore, the sound of an elephant protesting my physical attack may as well be the sound of a trumpet or a dinosaur. Here, the visible has privilege because it *proves* that the elephant exists in the world, whereas the audible simply alludes to it. Of course, this paragraph itself does not *show* the prevalence of ocularcentrism, but *tells* of it. To make the concept more visible let us examine, very briefly, epistemological accounts of vision in philosophy.

The tendency to put vision at the top of a hierarchy of senses features in many of the epistemological systems of classic and modern philosophy. Jay traces the history of the ocularcentric scopic regime from its ancient Greek roots, to its heights in the Cartesian perspectivalism strongly associated with modernity, and to the 20th century where the privilege of sight comes increasingly under attack. According to Hans Jonas, Plato and Aristotle believed vision to have privilege over other senses, but neither of them 'seems to have really explained by what properties sight qualifies for these supreme philosophical honours' (2001:135), simply treating the centrality of vision as a given and presenting the briefest of arguments for it. The former distrusts the senses in general, but still uses visual allegories in abundance and claims that unlike other senses, sight was created with the soul (Jay 1994:26) – an issue that I will revisit – and the latter simply asserts that vision is the better sense as it 'yield[s] the most knowledge and excel[s] at differentiation' (Jonas 2001:135). During the medieval period, 'the metaphysics of light […] kept alive the assumption that vision was the noblest of the senses' (Jay 1994:44).

With the approach of the modern age, it is Descartes who solidifies the philosophical foundations of ocularcentric bias – specifically where in his study of optics in *Dioptrique,* he provides an epistemological basis for the reliability of sight. Recounting his experiments with the eye as a physical organ – which reflects an upside-down picture of what it faces even when dead and detached from the body – he argues 'it is the mind that senses, not the body' (Jay 1994:75); were it not so, our view of the world would be the upturned images seen through our eyes. Descartes posits that unlike the sense organs, the rational mind can be trusted to sense the world correctly; using the example of perspective in painting, he claims that the intellect can surpass defects in the sensory organ, and create the correct representations. Descartes does not argue that this reliability should be translated into a hierarchy of the senses; he even uses the analogy of a blind man finding his way through the haptic sense of vibrations from his walking stick (Jay 1994:74) – but vision is still the most privileged of senses for Descartes: he opens his arguments by stating that 'sight is the most comprehensive and the noblest of [senses]' (in Jay 1994:71) – an assertion that is already assumed to be self-evident. Jay states that the ocularcentric Cartesian view of vision provides 'a short-hand way to characterise the dominant scopic regime of the modern era' (1994: 70). [6]

Jay follows his account by arguing that this scopic regime has been identified and problematised by a broad range of 20th-century thinker, but this thesis is not concerned with the majority of such challenges, and does not intend to question the important role that vision plays in Western culture and everyday life. [7] At this stage, my interest is simply the assertion that ocularcentric bias is present in Western culture, as this has a direct impact on the problem of radio drama: if our engagement with the world is ocularcentric, then to relate to the dramatic world of characters who 'live and move before us', we would have to *see* it, and although the medium of radio is capable of presenting structured sounds denoting settings, characters and

[6] This assumption, of course, is not completely a matter of consensus. Crary (1992), Erlmann (2010) and Sterne (2003), for example, contest the idea of the homogenous hegemony of the ocularcentric scopic regime associated with modernity by questioning the history of the idea. Jay himself accepts that 'domination did not mean uniformity' (1994:45), and does not claim the hegemony of vision to be an absolute totality. The concern of this thesis, however, is not with ocularcentrism, but its underlying epistemological assumptions, which are discussed in the next section.

[7] For one thing, doing so in writing would be hypocritical, and shouting my critique out in the atrium of the Royal Central School of Speech and Drama would be a mere transient public nuisance and not a contribution to knowledge.

plot, it is unique among media in its incapacity to appeal to the eye. Therefore, any dramatic world presented through the apparatus of radio is fundamentally flawed, lacking as it does the most important sensory element through which a world is perceived. In other words, ocularcentrism is the foundational assumption of the problem of radio drama.

As I pointed out previously, however, ocularcentrism mostly appears as a self-evident assumption and so, like any other unexamined bias, begs the question: is an ocularcentric hierarchy of senses justified? If the answer here is not in the affirmative, then radio drama cannot be said to be problematic. In the next section, I explore this question in more detail.

D. Ocularcentrism and representation

To assess the pro-ocularcentric argument, let return to Plato, whose philosophy is fiercely dismissive of the senses – including the sense of sight – as a means of knowing the world; such knowledge, he argues in *Theaetetus* (2008), is transient and incomplete, and thus cannot be true knowledge, but mere opinion. In *Timaeus* (Plato 2009: 42), the title character goes as far as to posit that during the early life of humankind, those 'light-minded men […] who thought to pursue the study of heavens by sight' may have regressed from humanity to become birds. Here, we can ask the question: if sense data is unreliable, why then should we regard the senses as hierarchical at all? Still, Plato praises sight for its affinity to light, uses an abundance of ocular metaphors, and although he believes in the value of the intelligible world over the sensible, he claims that '"the soul is like the eye" […] and things in the intelligible domain "can only be seen with the eye of the mind"' (Kavanagh 2013:65)? Despite his general distrust of sensory experience, then, Plato still privileges the visual eye of the soul over, for example, the auditory *ear* of the soul.

Hans Jonas' essay on *The Nobility of Sight* explores the basis of this privilege by comparing descriptions of perception through the three senses of sight, hearing and touch. He concludes that there are 'virtues inherent in sight' (Jonas 2001:152) – namely simultaneity, neutrality and distance, that allow the spectator to separate the 'forms' of the object in its field of vision. These forms can then be transferred into the observer's mind and imagination, where she can interrogate them at will

and correspond them back to the objects themselves, making the creation of abstract 'theoretical truths' (Jonas 2001:147) about them possible; hearing and touch on the other hand, deal directly, temporally, and in a respectively immersive and connected manner with what is being perceived – unlike sight, they cannot comprehend a range of objects and their qualities fully, simultaneously and in a stable state.

Let me demonstrate this by going back to the example of the elephant: I can observe the animal continuously while it is present in my field of vision, without interacting with it or it interacting with me. It is still there, separate from me, whenever I look at it, without any effort on my part – a quality that allows me to locate it, separate it from the rest of the objects I can also see, and examine its features – the colour, the shape, the texture of the skin, the movement of the snout as it ruminates hay, and in short, everything that makes the object an elephant– and even assign the name 'elephant' to it. These features still match the elephant in my presence; I can continuously look back at it and to relate the features that I have collected in my mind to the object itself. I have, in other words, created an 'idea' corresponding to the elephant in my mind by looking at it. It is difficult, however, to imagine how one can form such an idea by hearing the elephant directly without prior knowledge of it, for instance through someone sighted. The sound of an elephant is not distant from me, but is heard directly with – in – my body, meaning that I cannot separate it from myself or from any other sounds that might be taking place simultaneously. It also impacts me by vibrating my eardrums in a certain way, while the silent object of a quiet or sleeping elephant has to be somehow made audible through interaction in order to emit sound; the elephant itself can be present in my world without being in my field of audition. Most importantly, the sound of the elephant is evanescent: I can only hear it *while* the animal is making the noise. Even if I am able to distance myself mentally from my mutual interactions with the animal's sound, enough to learn of its features and form an 'idea' of it, I cannot then correspond that idea to the sound that has formed it, as it has taken place temporally and is no longer in my field of audition. Vision, it thus appears, has the upper hand in turning sense data into 'ideas'. Jonas' analysis explains why for Plato, whose disaffection from the sensible world stems from its transience and changeability, the eye naturally rests at the top of the hierarchy of senses.

Furthermore, Jonas has succeeded to present an argument in favour of ocularcentrism: vision can create the most complete representation of its field of perception in the mind.

For Descartes, too, separating the forms of objects is the modus operandi of sight. In the process of seeing, he claims, the mind is not the simple receiver of visual stimuli that perfectly resemble their sources; 'there are no images that must resemble in every respect the objects they represent – for otherwise there would be no distinction between the object and its image' (Jay 1994: 76). Instead, the 'mind's eye' translates those stimuli into images that are representative of their objects, and correspond to them with varying degrees of similarity and recognisability – like icons, indexes, signs, words, or as Jonas puts it, 'forms'. Then, the mind can comprehend the world intellectually by understanding these representative images. The Cartesian idea of vision opens the way to what Foucault calls a 'great epistemic shift' to a theory of knowledge 'that introduced signs, which needed to be read by the mind' (Jay 1994: 80), heralding a representationalist approach to knowledge of the world, as opposed to a theory in which knowledge is gained through resemblance or similitude; for if it is the mind's eye that comprehends the world through representations, then the world itself could be comprehended in visual representations and metaphors.

Following these thoughts, it appears that the ocularcentric bias does have some epistemological justifications: compared to other senses, vision possesses higher capabilities of creating representations out of the world it perceives. But what effect does this have on the problem of radio drama? Initially, the arguments detailed in this section might appear to bolster the claim that the world is understood above all through vision – rather than other senses that do not have the same representation capacity – and therefore the dramatic world will lack a certain degree of comprehensibility if it is not seen; but it also offers a solution to the problem of radio drama: if the mind 'sees' and understands the world through representations rather than mere sensation, then radio drama can overcome the representational shortcomings of the sense of hearing if its sounds are structured in a way that corresponds to the visual aspects of the dramatic world. The task of creating radio drama, according to this thinking, involves choosing and arranging

sounds in a manner that represents the elements of the world of drama in the same manner as that of the neutral, simultaneous and distant sense of vision.

Here, I should return to my initial definition of radio drama: as I mentioned in Section B, the sound structure of radio drama follows certain principles developed specifically for the medium. Should we accept the representationalist position, then, one can conclude that the purpose behind these principles is to order the sounds of radio drama in a representational structure – that is, a structure through which sounds stand in for the elements and objects out of which the dramatic world is constructed. In next section, I discuss the fact that the British conventions of radio drama production – what I term *radio dramaturgy* – at least, do seem to follow this representational model.

E. Representation and radio dramaturgy

I should first clarify what I mean by dramaturgy – another key concept for this thesis. Mary Luckhurst's study of the historical development of the role of the dramaturg begins with the assertion that '[t]he meanings of the words *dramaturg* and *dramaturgy* are unstable, sometimes bitterly so' (2006: 5), before describing and tracing several – sometimes contrary – definitions of the term. My use of the word refers to the function denoted by the Greek meaning of the word, which is 'to write a text in the dramatic form' (2006: 5). Based on my previous reading of Aristotle, 'putting into dramatic form' implies the presentation of a dramatic world to an audience. In this sense, according to Luckhurst, theatrical dramaturgy does not deal with 'the internal structure of a play text […] – plot, construction of narrative, character, time-frame and stage action' (2006: 10), but concerns:

> external elements relating to staging, the overall artistic concept behind the staging, the politics of performance, and the calculated manipulation of audience response […]. This [sense] marks interpretation of the text by persons like those now known as directors, the underlying reading and manipulation of the text into multidimensional theatre (2006: 10-11).

In this sense, a dramaturg employs the theatrical toolkit available to her in order to transform a text into a dramatic presentation. Similarly, my use of the word *dramaturgy* in relation to radio refers to the practical process in which a dramatic world is presented using the capabilities offered by the medium: anticipating and

addressing the listener's experience of the piece, editing and adapting the text to make it presentable through sound, controlling the type and the style of voices, creating, arranging and manipulating effects and music, mixing, and any other task that results in the construction of the sound structure of radio drama. Radio dramaturgy, in short, is the set of practices that, guided by an underlying logic, construct the sound structure of radio drama.

As detailed in the previous section, radio can surmount the limited ability of the sense of hearing in perceiving a representation of the dramatic world if its sounds are structured representationally – in which case, radio dramaturgy would involve employing and manipulating the medium's toolkit of sounds in order to create a representational structure to present this world. Indeed, the briefest surveys of the practice and theory of radio drama reveals the ubiquity of such an approach. [8] There exists a strong consensus among most theorists and practitioners (Crook 1999: 54; Crisell 1994: 6, 148-50; Rodger 1982:10; Drakakis 1981: 6; McInerney 2001: 4; Pownall 2011: 20, among others) that radio drama is fundamentally dependent on the pre-established code of the spoken word – sounds that are primarily representational, standing in for concepts and ideas. Audible objects are also represented using sound effects that recognisably refer back to the sources themselves, while inaudible elements are describes verbally. This structural logic necessitates certain dramaturgical practices. In the process of writing – that is, the conception of the elements and events within the dramatic world – it imposes certain considerations for the dramatist to observe, namely the need to avoid blatant exposition. Practitioners have invented various tropes to deal with this issue; from Richard Hughes setting his *A Comedy of Danger* (1924) – the first British radio-specific play – in pitch darkness to make the characters' visual commentaries plausible, to Crook – among many others – employing a narrator to fill in the visual information in his adaptation of *Heart of Darkness* (1999: 191). Additionally, as Alan Beck states, every 'sound event' requires a verbal 'description' to provide context and fill in the details that are 'blind' to the listener 1998: 3.2) – in other words, not represented in the sound effect – such as spaces, colours, objects etc. In production, principles such as the separation of foreground and background, neutral acoustics,

[8] I am aware that here that a brief survey is not at all enough to make this case. Indeed, a significant part of this thesis – Chapters 3, 4 and 5 – is devoted to making this argument.

fixed sound centre and perspective, and other features of the standard production as detailed by Beck (2005) all serve to create an 'aural paradise': a sound environment in which the words and the effects can create a representation of what would have been the visual field of the dramatic world.

The mode of dramaturgy described here, then, appears to be the solution to the problem of radio drama: a structure of sound can represent a dramatic world if it adopts the governing logic of representation. The theoretical foundations that I have explored seem to support the dramaturgical conventions, while the conventions themselves create sound structures that functionally present a dramatic world despite the absence of vision, illustrating the validity of the solution. The conventional dramaturgy of radio, one can conclude, is the *correct* mode of dramaturgy, as its key quality – a representational structure – derives from the inherently unisensory nature of the medium. This, in a brief outline, is the current paradigm of radio drama.

It is here that we arrive at the reason that this thesis exists: I propose to question this paradigmatic solution from a philosophical perspective. I want to argue that the representationalist model for understanding the world is reductive and incomplete, and the mode of radio dramaturgy resulting from it thus displays the same qualities. To do so, in the next section, I explore, in brief, some critiques raised against this attitude in the philosophical school of phenomenology.

F. Radio dramaturgy and phenomenology

Let us return briefly to Jonas' justification of the 'nobility' of sight. In close examination, Jonas appears to adopt a certain 'way' of seeing: when he describes sight, he is standing still at a distance, consciously surveying. He does not interact with the objects in his visual field, as he would were he hearing or touching [9] – nor do they interact with him; the distinguishing feature of sight, he states, is 'the complete absence of [a] dynamical situation, of any intrusion of causality into the relation [between the seer and the object]' (Jonas 2001:146). More importantly, he investigates the phenomenon of sight separately from other senses – when he describes seeing, he is not simultaneously hearing or touching. It is this way of

[9] Jonas follows his essay with an appendix (2001:152) on sight and movement, in which he attempts to correct this omission; the other issues, however, still stand.

seeing that allows him to construct representational images of the objects in his line of vision. By doing so, Jonas has completely detached sight from its context. In our normal, day-to-day experience of the world, seeing is always happening in combination with other sensory, physical and mental activities which create a fundamentally 'dynamical situation'; for example, Jonas himself mentions how while observing, sound can engage him dynamically by 'strik[ing] [him] whether I choose it or not' (Jonas 2001: 146), while objects beyond his control can engross his sense of touch. Hans Jonas' sight, abstracted and detached from his experience, body, and world, might be able to stand outside the 'dynamical situation', but Hans Jonas himself cannot. Therefore, for Jonas' sight to be as 'noble' as he claims, it will need to be separated from its original grounds – the experience of the world. The nobility of vision, then, though logically and theoretically coherent, is not reflected in actual experience. My analysis here, however, is valid only if we accept that a world is understood first and foremost through what we initially experience, rather than Jonas' 'forms' and 'theoretical truths' or Descartes' 'representations' – a stance that characterises the philosophical school of phenomenology.

Phenomenology is, first and foremost, a method of investigation: a phenomenology of any given topic – time, perception, or radio drama, for instance – is a systematic examination of one's experience of the phenomenon in question, to understand how it is encountered in basic, concrete experiential terms, before it is abstracted by theoretical concepts and mental representations; in essence, a phenomenology stands in opposition to a theory: where a theory of a phenomenon attempts to *explain* why one experiences it through structures that are not present in the experience itself, a phenomenology begins with what is there in the experience itself, *describing* the phenomenon to understand the structures present within it. As Taylor Carman describes it,

> [Phenomenology] is an attempt to describe the basic structures of human experience and understanding from a concrete first person point of view, in contrast to the reflective, third person perspective that characterizes both scientific knowledge and received opinion (Carman 2008: 14).

Phenomenology can also refer to the philosophical school of thought which, beginning in the early 20th century with the works of Edmund Husserl, attempted to formulate the investigative method of phenomenology in order to use it to build the

foundation of philosophical systems on conscious experience rather than abstract theorisation – in other words, to take phenomenology as first philosophy, and base responses to key philosophical questions on it; Martin Heidegger, for example, drew from it to understand the conditions for the possibility of *being,* while Jean-Paul Sartre based his ideas on existence and freedom on phenomenological investigations. Both the investigative method of phenomenology, and the ideas developed within the philosophical movement around it, form the key critical tools of this thesis.

A phenomenological investigation is merited here because a phenomenologist does not seek to understand the phenomenon – here radio drama – with abstract concepts already known to her, but by systematically exploring and describing what she experiences first-hand, discounting previous judgements. Jonas' descriptions of the senses then, for her, is incorrect in beginning with an assessment of the senses of sight, hearing and touch, as the division of sensory experience into those of the eye, the ear and the skin does not occur while she is looking and hearing and touching, but only makes sense if she reflects on what she has experienced and on her own body and sense organs, and distinguishes between what she has perceived through each organ. Experience, from a phenomenological point of view, is not formed as a result of a *combination* of these senses, or even through an amalgamation of the sense data and the thoughts and memories they invoke; instead, it is always of some holistic content which then may be divided into sense data, thoughts, memories, abstractions and other derivatives through reflection. To go back to a previous example, when I see an elephant, I do not first experience it as a series of shapes, movements, colours, textures, sounds, smells and memories, before putting all of these together and recognising that the object before me is an elephant: my initial experience *is* of the elephant. Should I then direct my attention toward each element described, and deliberatively break down the elements that together make the elephant, then I am, by definition, no longer experiencing the elephant, but those individual elements and details. Abstractions and 'theoretical truths', too, are simply parts of my experience: should I create a mental representation of the elephant by referring back to the image of it as Jonas does, for example, then I am, again, no longer experiencing the elephant itself, but a mental representation of it; what may be labelled *mind* is not itself experienced

apart from when experiencing such representations. From a first-person, phenomenological perspective, then, the experience of the world is constituted not of mental representations and ideas, but of things themselves; to use the philosophical term, experience is *intentional* – it *intends* toward its object. From a phenomenological standpoint, clearly, the ocularcentric bias does not have the theoretical basis described in Section C: if I experience the world through intentionality and not representations, then different senses are simply different ways of intending rather than distinct channels. If the way I make sense of the presence of an elephant in my world is not through creating a representation of it, but by intending toward it, then my eyes are not privileged over my other senses: I 'hear' an elephant in the same way that I 'see' an elephant: through the intentional structure of experience. To be aware of an elephant in my world, I do not need to form an 'idea' of the elephant, and then correspond my idea to the world. Therefore, the direct, immersive and temporal sense of hearing is just as capable of allowing me to intend toward the elephant. In the absence of a justification for ocularcentric bias, the definition of radio drama can no longer be considered problematic: there is nothing that fundamentally hinders a solely-auditory medium from presenting a dramatic world.

How, then, can radio drama be understood not through representation, but through the phenomenon itself? This is the gap in knowledge that this thesis highlights and aims to address. Accepting what I have proposed above requires a philosophical shift, from a representational understanding of the world to a phenomenological one. My statement in Section A, that this thesis is about philosophy, refers to its goal of building on previous explorations of phenomenology as a tool to understand radio drama – for example, in Scannell (1996), Cazeaux (2005), Beck (2000), Crook (1999), and Home-Cook (2015) – to formulate and systematise this change of philosophical frame, and to present a phenomenological model for the study, analysis, and critique of radio drama. This, however, raises a simple question: why? In the next section, I outline the some of the outcomes of this shift in philosophy.

G. Phenomenology and sonic experience

As sketched above, the representationalist understanding of experience underlies the conventional practices of radio dramaturgy. Therefore, questioning the basis of such an understanding of radio drama leads directly to a questioning of these conventions. Approaching radio drama from a phenomenological perspective, then, allows this thesis to critique the practices of radio from new angles. What, one might ask, would this critique entail? After all, advocating against the practice of creating representational structures of sound – that is, where sounds stand for elements of the world – becomes problematic rather easily: even when regarded as intentional, experience contains many objects that cannot be heard and would therefore require representation. There is no theoretical model that could render a silent elephant audible – the idea of enabling a listener's experience to intend toward inaudible content directly through sound, without some sort of representation and substitution, is logically impossible. What new avenues of critique, then, will this new philosophical angle provide?

To respond, let us return for the last time to Jonas' description of senses. It is notable that those qualities of sight that elevate it in the hierarchy of senses according to a representationalist understanding of experience – simultaneity, neutrality and distance – are those that maintain a separation between the object and the seer's *body*; indeed, as I pointed out, Jonas' description of vision is possible only through an abstraction of vision from its grounds of bodily existence. Also notable is that those qualities of hearing that, as he argues, render it less suitable for creating representations – temporality, affectivity and immersion – all emerge from the fact that the encounter with sound is an encounter between bodies and movements. The sound of an elephant, apart from my understanding of it as being the noise that this particular animal makes, also impacts me and my body – it shakes my eardrums, and may make me jump, or evoke impressions of rhythms or patterns. Furthermore, although I may perceive the elephant's trumpeting as coming from a certain direction, it does not allow me to pinpoint the location of the creature; it simply appears in the environment in which we are both immersed – an environment which may also contain other sounds. As it also takes place in time, I am not able to control the occurrence of the sounds or my perception of them, unless they take place continuously so that I can focus on one – and still, the other sounds will be present in the background. These qualities make the relation between

hearing and the heard object – that is, sound – 'dynamical' and therefore not as capable of creating a representational image of the world as vision – a quality which relegates it below vision in an ocularcentric hierarchy. They are also qualities than emerge fundamentally from sound's engagement with, and effect on, the body. The mode of seeing that results in mental representation, in other words, is achieved at the expense of the abstraction of bodily experience.

In *Listening and Voice* (2007), Don Ihde details how an ocularcentric approach toward the world can ignore the significant role of sound's bodily qualities in one's perception of the world. According to Ihde, the dominance of ocularcentrism and its particular understanding of vision have reduced a fully-rounded experiential grasp of the world to visual comprehension, and also reduced the sense of sight itself into the dominant paradigm of representational, intellectual image - this he labels a 'double reduction' of vision. This reduction necessarily removes certain aspects of one's experience and relations to the world – including the key quality of bodily existence – from representations of it; these aspects can nevertheless still be accessed through phenomenological investigation. He argues that to have a wider philosophical understanding of the world, a turn to auditory dimension is required:

> [This turn] begins as a deliberate decentering of a dominant tradition in order to discover what may be missing as a result of the traditional double reduction of vision as the main variable and metaphor. This deliberate change of emphasis from the visual to the auditory dimension at first symbolizes a hope to find material for a recovery of the richness of primary experience that is now forgotten or covered over in the too tightly interpreted visualist traditions (Ihde 2007:13).

The benefit of turning to phenomenology as a framework for studying radio drama, then, is that it allows us to make this auditory turn. Unlike critical lenses reliant on a representational understanding of the world, which focus on what the structured sounds of radio drama stand for in the mind, a phenomenological model can account for the workings of the medium in relation to how the sound encounters the listener's body. My earlier statement, that this thesis is about sound, refers to the fact that the phenomenological exploration of radio drama can position the bodily experience of sound, rather than simply the visual element or the mental idea that it might represent, at the centre of its understanding – a possibility not afforded by representational models.

The conception of radio drama as a bodily experience, in turn, opens the way for a critique of dramaturgical practices. As outlined above, the conventional practices of radio dramaturgy prevalent in the UK demonstrate a representational attitude. Indeed, from a representationalist perspective, the structure emanating from these dramaturgical practices is the inevitable, natural form of any attempt at sonic dramatisation: a structure that allows for each element to be represented clearly, avoiding the temporality, immersion, and affectivity that characterises sound, which would hinder the representation. A critique of representationalist accounts of radio drama, then, is also a critique of these conventions of practice, questioning their basis and imagining alternatives. Furthermore, considering radio drama's engagement with the body can also point to new potential modes of structuring radio sound, which may make use of what, as Ihde points out, may be covered or forgotten, in order to present the dramatic world. My statement that this thesis is about practice means that it attempts to uncover and question the representationalist bias of dramaturgical conventions, hypothesise their origins, and sketch out new possibilities of dramaturgy based on the phenomenological features of sonic experience, rather than those based on what Ihde terms the double reduction of vision. In simpler terms, where radio dramaturgy attempts to use sound to *show* or to *tell*, I argue that it can *play*.

What I have charted to this point is the raison d'etre of this thesis: I have presented the key theoretical problem at hand, and introduced phenomenology as my framework for a solution, and some of its benefits. In the next section, I outline the manner in which I utilise this framework: I present a brief summary of the thesis, outlining each chapter and highlighting my contributions to knowledge.

H. About this thesis

In the next five chapters of this thesis, I pursue the aims outlined above through a number of investigative avenues, with a mixed methodology. I first use ideas drawn from the philosophical school of phenomenology in order to critique available models of radio drama. I follow by presenting my own phenomenological model of analysing radio listening, which I then apply to a variety of modes of dramaturgy in Britain, both contemporary and historical, to highlight and problematise conventional practices, and point to alternative possibilities.

I begin the arguments of the thesis by surveying and critiquing theoretical models of radio drama – in other words, answers to the problem of radio drama – in Chapter 1. I begin with the theoretical frameworks reliant upon a representational approach, grouping the key models and arguments under three main categories, and critiquing them one by one, drawing on ideas from phenomenology; this also allows me to unpack some key concepts and ideas. I start with the model that understands radio as the *theatre of the mind*, questioning whether a (dramatic) world can be experienced through the mind, and instead positing perception, as described phenomenologically in the works of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, as the key to the experience of radio drama, as it can allow us to understand radio as a bodily phenomenon. I then examine the two common mechanisms through which the *theatre of the mind* is usually understood: the *semiotic approach* and the *visual medium* approach; I posit that each of these can be critiqued from a phenomenological perspective. Following this, I turn to models that are more open to, or directly drawn from, phenomenology. I posit that these models, too, are open to critique in that their descriptions of the experience of listening to radio drama can be problematised. I close the chapter by positing that to develop a phenomenological model of radio drama – that is, an accurate description of how radio drama works when one listens to it – requires a phenomenological investigation. The critique of available models of radio drama is the first piece of new knowledge that this thesis contributes to current debates.

I devote Chapter 2 to detailing a phenomenological model of listening to radio drama – that is, experiencing a dramatic world through sound. I highlight the fact that listening to radio drama can be described as the experience not of sounds, codes, images, or thoughts, but of a world that is holistic, interconnected, and accessible to me perceptually like my own. It is, however, not my own world, in that my bodily access to it is limited. Drawing from Merleau-Ponty's idea that perception and expression are reversible, I posit that what I experience when being a listener of radio drama is not my perception of the dramatic world, but an expression of the dramatic world as perceived by a body that shares with me its (auditory) ability to perceive. I argue that a dramatically-structured sound, when played through a device, can be encountered by the listener as a body like that of her own – for which I coin the term radio-body. This body is similarly able to perceive the world and to

share its perceptions with the listener; in simpler terms, the radio listener is essentially listening to an act of listening. I conclude that the sound structures of radio drama can be framed and analysed as modes of listening: a piece of radio drama can be understood through its mode of listening to the world, and what it listens to – and *for*. This analytical tool, developed phenomenologically, is the thesis' second contribution to knowledge, and its key method of analysis.

In Chapter 3, I apply this phenomenological framework to the conventions of British radio dramaturgy, in order to draw attention to the fact that these codified practices – briefly mentioned earlier in this introduction – serve to construct a particular mode of listening: one that listens for what sounds stand for within a representational system. Through an exploration of practitioner accounts, guidelines, and educational material regarding writing, production and post-production, I posit that these conventions constitute a *semantic paradigm* of radio dramaturgy. I critique this paradigm by drawing from the philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy, positing that the semantic mode of listening is assumed by maintaining a separation between the listener and the world, where the act of listening maintains one direction: the listener listens to the world. I argue, however, that radio drama can move beyond semantics by creating, through dramaturgy, a radio-body that expresses how it is itself affected, bodily, by the dramatic world; this, I argue, can be achieved through what I term *resonant* listening. The systematic outlining and critique of the semantic paradigm is another contribution of new knowledge. .

It is this context that I explore in depth in Chapter 4, where I trace a genealogy of the development of the semantic paradigm throughout the history of British radio dramaturgy. Beginning from the early experiments on the radio, I chart the emergence of practices geared toward creating radio-bodies with different modes of listening, and show that for various reasons, the semantic mode became dominant, and resonant dramaturgies were marginalised. As a central example, I compare the attitudes of two key pioneers of radio drama, Lance Sieveking and Val Gielgud, in order to point to the contingent historical, cultural, and technological factors that led to shaping the semantic paradigm. I then continue to trace the paradigm through three distinct eras of the history of radio drama performing a series of case studies to demonstrate how the mode remains extant through the history of British radio drama. Through this, posit that the current historical era,

where radio is giving way to new media as the primary carrier of radio drama, is particularly open to a shift in the semantic paradigm of radio drama. This reframing of the history of British radio drama is another contribution to debates in the field.

Finally, in Chapter 5, I examine how radio drama can move beyond the semantic paradigm through resonant approaches to dramaturgy. I perform a number of detailed case studies, divided into two key categories, where dramaturgical use of sound allows the radio-body to listen to itself in a resonant manner. I first examine how specific uses of music can express the radio-body listening to its own mood, movement, and reactions, and then explore how ambiguous sound can express the radio-body's encounter with the dramatic world. These case studies allow me to argue that there is a direct link between how these resonant effects function and the practices that create them; in other words, a new resonant dramaturgy is possible only if practical conventions open themselves to flexibility, experimentation, and integration. I propose that this resonant dramaturgy can form the next paradigm of radio dramaturgy. This point, which concludes the thesis, is my final contribution to new knowledge.

I. Closing remarks

In this introduction, I examined the key theoretical problems that motivate this thesis, and outlined the gaps in knowledge that it aims to address. I then introduced, briefly, the framework through which I respond to these problems, and then sketched out my solutions through a chapter-by-chapter summary of the general arguments of the rest of the thesis. Before moving on to the first chapter, I should address some of the limitations of the thesis.

This thesis is grounded in phenomenology, and as such, my arguments in it are generally open to the critiques levelled against it as a method and as a school of philosophy. Phenomenology has been critiqued, particularly from structuralist and post-structuralist perspectives, for its focus on attempts to understand experience at the expense of understanding the grounds for the possibility of experience or any reflective understanding of it – for example, social, cultural, historical and linguistic

contexts that can determine what experience is like. [10] My understanding of how I experience phenomena is limited to what I can understand – which, from a structural perspective, is grounded in my situation in contingent contexts and discourses; in other words, the problem of phenomenology is that it attempts to take intentionality as the object of its intention, with the result that the grounds for the possibility of intention itself remain inaccessible to it. Within the context of the topic of discussion, however, phenomenology can still function in my arguments for two reasons: firstly, my arguments rely mainly on the works of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Martin Heidegger, who both acknowledged and attempted to address this problem.

In this thesis, I draw from a wide range of – at times disparate – sources, fields and disciplines, many of whom have developed in different directions and in relative isolation, resulting in concepts and terminologies that may at times diverge or overlap. In order to avoid ambiguity in my usage, I generally rely on one definition or interpretation of each of the key terms throughout my arguments; although this decision comes at the expense of exploring the multiple meanings of multi-disciplinary terms, it allows me to navigate the complexities of linking disparate ideas and fields. Furthermore, I coin a number of terms that, by virtue of being based on interdisciplinary arguments, my not connect entirely with available terminology in each of the base disciplines. Although such conceptual tensions are unavoidable, I have attempted to integrate the new terms as much as possible within the fields of radio drama, philosophy, sound, and practice.

Some issues can also arise because in this thesis, I attempt to discuss concepts and experiences that are inherently difficult to explain within the realm of language. Indeed, a key argument in this thesis is that experience cannot be boiled down to linguistic or semiotic constructs; if the linguistic description of sounds, for example, could be equivocated with the sounds themselves, then there would be no need for this thesis to be written. To remedy the issues that may arise out of the ineffability of some descriptions or ideas, I have attempted to maintain clear definitions of terms, and to use as many examples as possible to illustrate ideas that

[10] Some examples of such critiques can be found in Jacques Derrida's *Speech and Phenomena* (1973), Pierre Bourdieu's *The Logic of Practice* (1990), and John Searle's "The Limits of Phenomenology" (2000), among others.

may be difficult to express in the abstract. Furthermore, to avoid reducing the radio programmes that I analyse to their transcripts and my descriptions of them, I have included the relevant excerpts in audio form in an online repository for readers (Appendix A).

Throughout the thesis, I focus on British examples of practice – in other words, British responses to the problem of radio drama. There are several reasons behind this decision. Firstly, the limit helps to keep the scope of the argument at a manageable level: making the same argument about various strands of dramaturgy developed in different contexts would require research time and word count far beyond this thesis. Secondly, due to the BBC's long-held monopoly on the broadcasting of radio drama, the trajectory of the development of British radio dramaturgy is more centralised, and also better documented, than similar histories in Germany, the U.S. and other radio heritages, making it a more reliable case study. Thirdly, as mentioned in Section B, Britain is one of the leading producers of English-language radio drama in the world, and therefore any developments in radio dramaturgy are more likely to be observed in its field than more limited contexts. Finally, as a research project undertaken at a British institution, and by an avid listener to British radio, the thesis was created within, and as a response to, the context of radio dramaturgy in Britain.

CHAPTER 1:

RADIO THINKS, RADIO SEES: THEORIES OF RADIO DRAMA

1.1. Opening remarks

In this chapter, I categorise and review the available theoretical literature that respond to the problem of radio drama, as outlined in the Introduction. The chapter is divided roughly into two parts. In the first part, I deal with the most common understanding of the workings of radio drama: the idea that it is experienced through the *mind*. I critique this by drawing from Martin Heidegger's concept of *world*, positing that a dramatic world cannot be understood through mental representation. I then critique the two most common theoretical explanations for the *theatre of the mind*: that the listener *decodes* radio drama from auditory signs, and that the listener *sees* radio drama. Simultaneously, my critiques put forward an alternative understanding of experience, focused on the role of bodily existence in the world, by drawing from Maurice Merleau-Ponty's ideas on perception. I then move on to examine a number of approaches to radio that, to some extent, move away from these conceptions. Here, in each case, I demonstrate that there is more to be done to describe and frame the experience of radio drama with more accuracy. Given that the main focus of this thesis is radio dramaturgy, I also underline the link between the underlying assumptions of the theoretical approaches and their uncritical treatment of the conventional structures of radio drama sound, and therefore the process of dramaturgy which creates it. In fact, my goal is to show that current theoretical understanding of radio drama *necessitate* a representational mode of dramaturgy. This means that in order to critique radio drama conventions, these models require alteration and extension – a task that this thesis then undertakes in the next chapter.

1.2. *Theatre of the mind* and mental projection

In theoretical discussions of radio drama, a particular label is applied often: radio is said to be *the theatre of the mind*. Marin Esslin, articulates the term explicitly in *The Mind as a Stage*: '[The radio] play comes to life in the listener's own

imagination, so the *stage* on which it is performed *is the listener's own mind.* He himself […] is an active collaborator with the producer' (Esslin 1971:7). Andrew Dubber calls the term a 'useful cliché, repeated by practitioners and radio educators alike' (2013: 101), while Hand labels it 'clichéd but apposite' (2017:351). The idea that radio drama occurs in the listener's mind is rather ubiquitous in the discourse around the art form: John Drakakis describes the listener creating 'mental pictures' (1981: 20). Crook argues that radio creates a multisensory 'imaginative spectacle' (1999: 64) for the listener. Crisell posits that the listener uses the sonic codes of radio to create a 'mental picture' (1994: 8). The phrase is used by Crook (1999: 61), Bray and Gray (1985: 292), Stanton (2004: 94), Verma (2012:1), and Kisner (2013:1). As early as 1926, the then-head of BBC drama, R. E. Jeffreys, called attention to how radio is seen in 'the mind's eye' (1926: 309). The mind, according to this approach, is the key to the problem of radio drama: it sees the dramatic world of radio, rendering it accessible, instead of the eye. Key contentions in debates around radio drama – save for some exceptions discussed in the second part of this chapter – focus on how the concept of mind itself is conceived, and accordingly, the mechanism through which it accesses the dramatic world. Before discussing the two most common explanations for this mechanism – visual imagination and semiotic codes – let us explore the concept of the theatre of the mind itself: what is it about the phrase that has made it such a frequent cliché?

One way to answer this question, and to clarify what is meant here by *mind*, is to point out that the label *theatre of the mind* is rarely applied to theatre itself. Behind the phrase lies the assumption that the mind, however it may be defined, is required when understanding radio drama, but not drama as performed and seen on stage. This attitude is demonstrative of an ocularcentric bias: the eyes can give the audience direct access to the dramatic world, while the ears require the mind to gain access. This, of course, may seem logical according to the theoretical basis examined in the introduction: on stage, the presence of vision allows for the elements of the dramatic world to be separated, identified and processed, and thus the audience member does not to resort to doing so through mental activity. The radio does not provide the listener with such an access to the elements that constitute the dramatic world, meaning that to encounter the world, the listener first needs to actively engage in the reconstruction of the elements through a mental process. Radio, then, has to happen in the *theatre of the mind* in order for the

dramatic world to be accessible. Here, however, I want to interrogate the key governing logic of the *theatre of the mind*: that the world is understood through the mental representation of the individual elements that constitute it; as argued previously, without this assumption, the ocularcentric hierarchy of senses that require mental activity would be invalid. The key contention here lies in the definition of *world*. As this concept is fundamental to the rest of my arguments, let us first expand some more on how it is understood.

The conception of the world as a series of separate, distinct, and identifiable mental representations is problematic from a phenomenological perspective, in that from a first-person, phenomenal perspective, I understand and navigate the world without resorting to mental representation. My everyday experience of the world is not of individual thoughts, ideas and other forms of mental representation that together create my understanding; while acts of identification, separation and distinction of ideas certainly feature in my daily life, they do not precede the world, but are embedded in it. The world, from a phenomenological perspective, is not what is thought or conceived, but first and foremost, what is perceived and lived. This morning, for example, I woke up, and was aware that it was 7AM. This did not mean that I first had to look at the clock, noting its hands, calculating the number to which they referred, and then forming a projection of the time in my mind. Neither did it entail creating a mental representation of the number 7, the word 'seven', or a clock with the hands on the correct times, in my mind. If I may have at some point thought consciously about how it was 7AM, this act of thought itself could not have been the way through which I had understood what time it was, as my ability to consciously construct a mental representation of the fact could only follow the fact that I knew the time. Indeed, my experience was not of me being aware that it was 7AM, but simply the fact of the time of day; before any acts of thought, my experience of the world contained neither mental representations, nor an awareness of my own mind, as the site of such representations. I then got up, walked to the door, and left the room – once again, without forming a mental representation of the door, room, outside, or myself. I did have a series of thoughts and mental projections as I was doing so; they did not, however, concern my actions, or what I could see or hear or touch, but were in fact preliminary sketches of this very paragraph. Nevertheless, the world that I was experiencing did not consist of this paragraph, as proven by the fact that by the time I stopped considering my writing,

I had managed to navigate my way toward the kitchen – again, without forming any mental representations of my steps; in other words, phenomenologically, the world is not constituted by the elements that my mind identifies, distinguishes, and represents.

What, then, is a world? In *Being and Time*, Martin Heidegger explores this question by problematizing representationalist attitudes toward the world through an examination of everyday experience, as I did in the previous paragraph. His issue with defining the world as the sum of mental representations is that, as we observe in first-hand experience, this takes for granted – or perhaps ignores – the fact that a tacit practical understanding of the world exists before any conscious representation is formed in the mind. Any act of identification and representation of individual elements can only be grounded in this understanding. For Heidegger, whose project aims to describe this pre-reflective world, its key characteristic is its 'referential totality' (1962: 99) – that is, the world is not a collection of many elements which can be understood individually by the mind, but the entire context that makes the understanding of any individual element, including the mind, possible. This context is the site of one's practical existence: I did not need to create individual mental representations of myself, the clock, its hands, my steps toward the door, or my purpose for leaving the room, in order to perform my morning routine, and yet I knew, without explicit acknowledgement to myself, that I had successfully left the room; this is because any conception of any of these elements is predicated upon my understanding of the world: my knowledge of what a clock is, or of the act of walking, or of the need to leave the room after waking up, or who I am, all derive from my implicit, primordial practical understanding of what everything, including me and others, is and how it relates to every other thing. For Heidegger, 'the world is always 'there'. Whenever we encounter anything, the world has already been previously discovered' (Heidegger 1962: 114). This quality, Heidegger terms *worldhood*: the pre-reflective referential totality of what exists, and is possible.

Should we approach the *theatre of the mind* with this conception of world in mind, a key problem becomes apparent: if an understanding of world precedes mental representation of it, then the dramatic world of radio cannot be understood through the mind. Conceiving of every individual element present within the sound

structure in the mind, after all, does not lead to the experience of a world, in the same way that creating a mental representation of a clock does not make me aware of the time. Furthermore, if the world is experienced as a whole, rather than through the identification of individual ideas or theoretical truths, then the absence of vision in radio drama does not make its world any less understandable than the world on the stage. If representation is derivative of the world, rather than constitutive of it, the ocularcentric hierarchy is not valid. If access to the world is not representational, then the experience of the dramatic world is as accessible through the ear as it is through the eye, and there is no need to resort to the mind.

My critique here, of course, rests on a key assumption: that the dramatic world is a world as defined above, in that it is characterised by its worldhood. This is a claim that I posit and refine in various ways throughout this thesis. A detractor, however, may instead argue that there are fundamental differences between the referential totality of my pre-reflective understanding on one hand, and the hypothetical world on the stage on the other. The two key overlapping trends that can be observed in theories of how radio drama works base their positions on this fundamental difference: one trend, which I have labelled the semiotic approach, understands the world of radio drama in terms of codes, signs and texts, and the other, which I term the 'visual medium' approach, understands it in terms of visual imagination. In the next two sections, I address both of these, questioning the foundations of each and instead proposing my own phenomenological perspective, before returning to the idea of the *theatre of the mind* for a final critique.

1.2.1. The semiotic approach to radio drama

One solution to the problem of radio drama is to accept that in the absence of vision, the medium needs to address the mind somehow, to present it with the mental representations necessary for the understanding of the world. Radio, being 'blind', instead needs to convey those representations to the listener's mind through a series of pre-defined auxiliary sonic codes and symbols – key among them, words – to 'fill in' the gaps left by the absence of visuals. A systematic presentation of such accounts is presented in Andrew Crisell's *Understanding Radio* (1994), who draws on the semiotics of C. S. Peirce to explain how radio uses codes and signs to communicate with the audience, who use the given signs to reconstruct the mental picture. Huwiler (2005) and Lutostanski (2016) draw from narratology – that is, the

semiotics of storytelling – to understand the signs of radio drama. Rattigan (2002) and Hill (2000) both draw from Patrice Pavis' ideas around the semiotics of theatre in order to understand radio drama within the same framework. All these discussions have in common an understanding of the world of radio drama as a series of discrete signs, encountered through interpretation. Raban (1981) argues passionately that the sounds of radio drama should be understood not as objects, effects, and things, but as symbols. In fact, Elam (2002), from whom I have borrowed the term dramatic world, also bases his understanding of it on a process of semiotic reading, rather than a holistic totality that may precede it: for him, the dramatic world only arises when the spectator 'work[s] hard and continuously at piecing together into a coherent structure the partial and scattered bits of dramatic information that he receives from different source' (2002:87). Instead of the referential totality of world, Elam sees 'dramatic content whose expression is in fact discontinuous and incomplete' (2002: 88). In other words, although he does not employ the term, for Elam, from a semiotic perspective, theatre too is the *theatre of the mind*: it is comprised not of a pre-reflective totality, but of signs and codes to be interpreted.

From the perspective of the semiotic approach, the sound structure of radio drama is essentially a series of combined codes and signs, each standing for a particular element, which the listener then interprets in order to reconstruct a mental representation of the dramatic world. Radio signs can include speech, the 'primary code of radio' (Crisell 1994: 53) and its 'dominant sign system' (Lutostanski 2016: 118). After all, speech minimises the ambiguity that sound possesses by virtue of the qualities of immersion, affectivity and temporality, because it allows for a conventional, rather than sonic, link between the sound and the element of the world that it represents – in semiotic terms, signifier and signified. Non-verbal sound effects and music, of course, are also useful as codes, both to refer to objects and to moods or atmospheres; the sound of the hoot of an owl, for example, can be a sign standing in for the bird itself, or as Crisell points out, 'it may evoke not merely an owl but an entire setting – an eerie, nocturnal atmosphere' (1994: 46). These, however, can be considered to play an 'ancillary role and necessitate "textual pointing" and "anchorage"' (Lutostanski 2016: 118). Even sonic structures – that is, dynamic combinations of voices and effects – can become signs; Huwiler, for example, describes the gradually increasing blurriness and

unintelligibility of a dialogue as a sign that the character party to the dialogue has stopped listening: a complex series of sounds which, together, stand as code for one idea (2005: 55). In this way, the problem of radio drama can be solved: the world may be visual, and radio may be 'blind' to its vision, but the dramatic world of radio can be created through 'a process of "transcodification" – the replacement of one code or set of codes, in [the case of theatre,] visual ones, by another, in [the case of radio,] auditory' (Crisell 19994: 146) – a term also used by Rattigan (2002: 9).

The semiotic framework, in essence, theorises the mechanism of the *theatre of the mind*. It is, however, open to a number of critiques once we take into account the fact that in the experience of listening to radio drama, the process of decoding and interpretation does not feature prominently. In the next section, I expand on this critique.

1.2.1.1. The problems of decoding and interpretation

The claim that drama on the radio consists of codes, and that to understand it, one has to decipher transcodified signs through active, reflective contemplation and deliberation is open to a phenomenological criticism: my experience of listening to radio drama does not involve deliberative reflection. Take Crisell's example of the hoot of an owl (1994: 46): that the sound of an owl can be interpreted as the night. If he is correct about the way listeners make sense of radio, the following process should take place in my thoughts when a new scene in a play opens with an owl-hoot: I notice that there is silence, understand that it indicates the end of the previous scene and clear my mind of its elements. Then arises a sound with which I am familiar due to previous exposure, and can distinguish as the hoot of an owl. I recognise this as the acoustic signifier of the concept of 'an owl', and with effort, recall it from the array of codes that I have accrued. Therefore, I am now aware of the presence of an owl in the scene. I also delve into my cultural knowledge of the many radio programmes in which the sound of an owl has been employed, to recall its extended signification: night-time, an open space – perhaps a forest – and an eerie atmosphere. Knowing that I am listening to a piece of drama, I 'begin to brace [my]self for darkness and mystery' (Crisell 1994:46).

What appears in my experience, however, can be better described in quite different terms. When I listen to the scene described above, my reaction to the silence at the beginning is simply to wait and pay attention for the scene which will follow without deliberation. Then, instead of hearing a noise that I recognise as the sound of an owl's hoot and reflecting on its extended signification, I simply hear an owl in an open space during an eerie night. Indeed, I am not even aware of my own awareness of the fact that *I* am hearing the owl – a better description of my experience might be that there is an owl, and that it is night. In short, I do not actively and consciously rebuild the elements of the scene based on the codes I extract from sound – it is the sound itself which automatically and effortlessly situates me within the world of the drama. The sound does not merely *signify* the owl – it simply *is* the owl. Furthermore, it does not imply an eerie night, but *makes it present* – evidenced by the fact that there is no delay between the hoot of the owl and my experience of the night. Of course, should I then pause and reflect, I can note with ease that the reason that I have experienced a night is that I have heard the sound of the owl; doing so, however, is not necessary for my experience – in fact, it is only after encountering the night in my experience that I can identify the hoot of the owl as its starting point, and conceive of the latter as the signifier for a former. The description above can be explained if we understand my experience in phenomenological terms, as *intentional* – that is, my consciousness directing itself toward what I experience – rather than in theoretical terms, as representation, in which my consciousness only understands what it experiences indirectly, through acts of identification. From a phenomenological perspective, hearing an object – a hoot - or *about* an object – the words 'the hoot of an owl' – is not merely a reference to the object, but a conscious intention directed toward it. Here, my intention toward the sound of the owl is not of it as a sound, or as an owl on the radio, but as an owl in the night of the dramatic world.

Against the criticism of the reflective understanding of radio codes, a detractor may argue simply that the deciphering process does take place, but unconsciously and automatically; the acts of comparison and identification may happen, as Hill argues following Pavis, 'in an unconscious, preverbal situation inside the [audience's] imagination' (Hill 2000: 111-2). On a superficial level, this merely serves to prove my point: if the listener is not conscious of the activity, then by

definition, then she is not actively reflecting on the meaning of the sounds of radio drama, and therefore processing signs does not form a part of listener experience. Despite this, I intentionally hesitate to use the adjective 'unconscious' to describe the process of making sense of radio drama, as it connotes that the drama is indeed understood through a series of signs which are deciphered into meaning in the mind, even though the process may lie outside the listener's conscious experience. This is because I want to argue that the experience of radio drama is not the experience of a distinct series of signs, but of a holistic world, encountered directly in perception. To explain what I mean by perception, in the next section, I make a slight detour through Merleau-Ponty's thoughts on the subject.

1.2.1.2. The phenomenal field and signs

In *The Phenomenology of Perception*, Merleau-Ponty aims to challenge prevalent attitudes of the way human beings make sense of the world. Questioning the two prevalent attitudes of intellectualism and empiricism, which take our basic understanding of the world to be founded on judgement and sense respectively, he shows how the basic structure of perceptions, approached phenomenologically, is not of sense data or mental representation, but always already constituted of at least 'something' against other things – a figure against a ground. This, he labels a *phenomenal field* of experience. In the phenomenal field, figures are always already given as a whole Gestalt rather than individual elements there to be put together by the mind in order for perception to occur. In the example of the hoot mentioned above, for instance, I do not need to process the sensation of the sound of its whistle and hiss, distinguish them from other sounds, and recall it from past experience, or to contemplate and actively judge it to be the hoot of an owl and therefore during nocturnal hours, in order to be aware that it is night – as mentioned before, I simply hear an owl at night. In fact, Merleau-Ponty would argue that to consider what I have heard *the sound* of an owl would be an 'experience error, which means that what we know to be the things in themselves' – in this case, the sensory stimuli emanating from the night – for example, the owl – 'we immediately take as being in our consciousness of them' (Merleau-Ponty 2002: 5), whereas I have actually heard an owl at night and not a hoot. [11] This understanding of perception is key to my

[11] Cazeaux (2005) and Beck (1997) also posit this in different ways; I shall explore their ideas further in this chapter.

criticism of semiotics: I want to argue that the experience of individual elements – figures, or signs signifying them – can only be possible against the ground of the world; in other words, it is not a structure of signs that create the dramatic world – it is the world that gives them meaning.

The first fact that I should note about the phenomenal field of perception is that it is ' not an "inner world"[;] the "phenomenon" is not "a state of consciousness", or a "mental fact", and the experience of phenomena is not an act of introspection on an intuition […]' (Merleau-Ponty 2002: 66) – it is the most basic, pre-reflective understanding of the world. When I perceive a world, I am not separate from it, observing from afar. My phenomenal field exists by virtue of my presence and involvement in the world through my intention toward it, and any reflection on what I perceive in my field of perception is only retrospective. This bolsters my claim about the non-deliberative encounter of the listener with radio drama; in the example of the owl, any conscious awareness that I may have of the bird or the scene – the reflective inner monologue proposed above – can only follow my perception of the scene itself.

The second quality of the phenomenal field which should be mentioned here is that the figure and the ground cannot be understood apart from in relation to each other: the figure appears to me because it appears against the ground, and the ground makes it possible for there to be figures. For example, let us consider, again, the hoot of the owl. When on its own and played to me at a reasonable volume, I hear it as an owl present in an empty open space with me. Should I hear it in high volume on a background of the sounds of the jungle, however, it *becomes* an owl in the jungle. Should it then gradually decrease in volume, it may fade into the background and simply become part *of* the jungle. Should it momentarily fall silent, it is still present within my phenomenal field as part of the jungle. Should it be followed by the words 'turn that television off' and then silence, it becomes a jungle on television. At any point, the properties of the sound – duration, pitch, harmonics – have remained mostly the same, but as this sound is only presented in the phenomenal field as a given whole, the way I make sense of it at every given instance relates to the totality of all other elements present in my field of perception. The signifier of the owl, then, only makes sense according to the grounds of the world in which I experience it.

Of course, a critic may argue that what I am describing is merely more signs: the silence could be simply a sign of the open empty space, or for proximity, the sounds of the jungle a sign for the jungle, and the verbal queues a sign for television. Each of these signs would in turn lead to the unconscious re-interpretation of other signs: the hoot first signifies an owl, until the line of dialogue changes its reference to that of an owl on the television. In this way, the sound structure continually presents new signs through which others can be interpreted and re-interpreted. This, I question on two grounds. Firstly, not all of these signs appear to me in the same manner: some, such as the sound of the owl and the line about the television, appear directly in my perception as figures; I become aware of them and direct myself toward them. Other parts of the sound structure do not present themselves to me as figures, in spite of the fact that they are present in the phenomenal field: I hear an owl, rather than an owl and a jungle. Secondly, although the sonic structure of radio drama may develop and expand with each new sign or interpretation, my experience of it is, from the very beginning, a holistic world.

Let us expand on this second point by considering the simple example: an extremely minimal scene in a dramatic world, where a man looks at a clock. From a semiotic perspective, the elements of this world can be signified and coded into *man*, *looking*, and *clock*. The following script, then, presents these codes to the audience:

F/X A CLOCK TICKS.

MAN: Oh look! A clock!

If listening to radio drama is a process of interpreting signs, consciously or unconsciously, then in such a scene, the effects and the word 'clock' signify the clock, the voice of the man signifies the man, and the line of dialogue is code for looking, allowing me to reinterpret the man as the person who is looking at the clock, and the clock as the object of the man's gaze. In my experience of the scene, however, from the moment that the sound of the clock appears as a figure in my phenomenal field, it is already *somewhere*. By this, I do not mean simply that I am aware of its spatial position, although this may be the case. I am referring to the fact that I am aware of the varieties of the possible relationships that the figure of clock can have

with all possible elements: I know without thinking, for example, that it can be looked at to tell the time, or that it can be broken, or that it can be mistaken for a metronome; in fact, I can only understand what a clock is because I can understand these possible relationships – in other words, the referential totality of *worldhood* is the grounds of my perception of the clock *as* a clock. When the man speaks, I become aware of him, and of the fact that he is looking at the clock; this does not mean that I reinterpret the sound of the clock as *the clock being looked at by the man* – the initial appearance of the clock it happens within a referential totality within which being observed by someone is not a new fact requiring a shift in understanding, but already an implicit possibility in the ground of the phenomenal field. In short, my experience of even one auditory sign already implies a perceptual world.

It should be noted here that this atomistic understanding also directly supports the conventions of radio drama as detailed in the introduction: if the sounds of radio drama are structures of codes and signs, the process of creating a piece of radio involves, in essence, choosing signs to stand in for the elements of the dramatic world, and ensuring that the signs can be interpreted correctly. The importance of each sound and its place within the sound structure, in short, derives from its point of reference, rather than the sonic qualities that direct the listener toward said point of reference. Hence, the code of speech – where the relation between the sound and what it refers to, that is, the world, requires little effort in identification – can become key, while other sounds can perform auxiliary roles as long as their positions within the referential framework, and the elements of the dramatic world to which they refer, remains clear for the listener. In this way, the semiotic approach offers limited scope for a critique of conventional dramaturgy.

1.2.2. The *visual medium* approach to radio drama

Let us now move on to another theoretical response to the problem of radio drama. Although, as mentioned before, it is common to characterise radio as the 'blind medium' (a label used by Arnheim 1936, Crisell 1994, and Drakakis 1981, for example), there also exists widespread claims that radio does present its listener with visuals by evoking mental images in her mind. Indeed, in Esslin's previously-discussed description of radio as the *theatre of the mind*, the role of the mind is

understood as 'provid[ing] the visual component, which is undeniably present in any true dramatic experience transmitted by radio' (Esslin 1971:7). This understanding – which I shall label 'the visual medium' approach – is pursued and argued for rigorously by Shingler and Weiringa in addition to Esslin himself, but can be found in a wide variety of writing on radio: Drakakis describes the listener creating 'mental pictures' (1981: 20); Verma sees radio drama as happening in the 'theatre of the mind' (2012: 2); Crook believes that radio creates an 'imaginative spectacle' for the listener, which contains the visual aspects of the world of the drama as well as senses such as odour and movement (1999: 64); Rattigan envisions 'mental visualisations as real and as vivid as the listener's imagination allows them to be' (2002: 118); McInerney instructs writers to create 'mental picture […] sequences' through the use of words (2001: 3). These examples demonstrate the prevalence of the *visual medium* stance, which posits that the absence of vision is not a hindrance to radio's dramatic capability, as sound – in the form of music, sound effects, and most importantly, words – is capable of evoking visual imagination for the listener, who uses her 'stock of visual experience and memories' to recreate the visual dimension of the dramatic world in the form in her mind (Shingler and Weiringa 1998: 79). This reliance on the audience as participants in the process of creating gives radio drama the unique capability of presenting each listener with a different – and ultimately more pleasing – vision of the drama, as 'each listener will automatically see *his* ideal before his mind's eye and thus be satisfied' (Esslin 1971: 5). In other words, where the semiotic approach argued that the mind *interprets* the dramatic world, the *visual medium* approach's solution to the problem of radio drama is to posit that the mind *sees* its dramatic world. The two attitudes, of course, are not mutually exclusive: even Crisell, who is adamant that radio is the *blind* medium believes that the listener uses the deciphered codes of radio sound to create a 'mental picture' (1994: 8).

In the next few subsections, I argue that the *visual medium* approach to radio drama arises from an ocularcentric bias, which in turn leads to a representational approach to the dramatic world. Our understanding of the world, I posit, comes not through images, but through perceptual experience embedded in worldhood.

1.2.2.1. 'Visual imagination': a definition?

I want to begin my critique of the account detailed above with its main pitfall: namely, it begs the question: how does one visualise without seeing? Surely, we do not actually see the radio drama with our eyes and visual faculties, or the BBC would have been subject to numerous lawsuits from listeners who have suffered accidents after turning the radio on while washing dishes and suddenly finding themselves within a scene of swordfight happening in the play. I therefore take Esslin's suggestion that perceiving radio drama is 'akin to the experience one undergoes when *dreaming*' (1971:5) as metaphorical. Where, then, does this *imagination* occur? A common answer, such as that presented above by Esslin, is that imaginary vision does not happen to the eye, but to the mind. If this is the case, then one can question the distinction between a mental image and a thought or mental representation: what is it about visual imagination that makes it particularly *visual*? A key quality of vision is its openness to the qualities of distance, neutrality, and simultaneity; whether these are possessed by the visuals appearing in the mind, however, can be questioned.

Take the two examples presented by Esslin and Shingler and Weiringa. Esslin discusses a battlefield; no crowd, no matter how populous, would provide a satisfactory representation of an army on stage, whereas '[in] radio the mere sound of a vast crowd easily suggests these multitudes' (1971:5). Similarly, Shingler and Weiringa open their arguments with a description of what the listener sees while listening to the first scene of Dylan Thomas' *Under Milk Wood*, 'they can not only "hear the houses sleeping in the streets […]", but can also "see, in the blinded bedrooms, the coms and petticoats over the chairs, the jugs and basins, [etc.]"' (1998: 74). Nonetheless, in both of these cases, whether such imagination is specifically visual can be a matter of debate. It is not possible, for the listener to visualise the army on the battlefield or the petticoats over the chairs in extensive visual details in the instant of listening – after all, the act of observing such details would have to take place through time; for example, visualising the face of each man in the ranks or the stitches on the petticoat, would far outrun the duration of the sounds that evoke them. Furthermore, such a visualisation would not be simultaneous: one can imagine the face of one warrior only at the expense of the wider battle. Plus, what, one might ask, do these visual imaginations consist of? Do they appear as outlines, shapes, forms and colours? These by themselves would not,

on balance, be capable of the vivid, satisfactory and ideal representations that Esslin and Shingler and Weiringa ascribe to the *theatre of the mind.*

Yet another question is raised by the status of sounds that do not at all have a visual equivalent – for example, the subjective experience of 'the landscape of the mind' suggested by Esslin, or 'the sudden appearance of an infinite number of monkeys' (Shingler and Weiringa 1998: 90) in *The Hitch-hiker's Guide to the Galaxy*. What reaction would such situations, which can be presented through sound but are impossible to visualise, solicit from the imagination? According to the *visual medium* argument, this would result in no less than the disappearance of the visual aspect of the dramatic world for the duration of the situation. If mental images can look beyond the possibilities of the eye, then why is the label of 'visual imagination' necessary?

The questions raised above, of course, do not pertain simply to radio drama, but have been part of what Michael Tye labels 'the imagery debate' (1991:1) in philosophy and psychology: the question of whether the images in the mind are comprised of language, pictures, or outlines has been debated extensively. Tye traces the history of this debate, beginning from Plato and Aristotle, to the enlightenment and beyond, into psychology and cognitive science (1991: 1-30). Conceptions of what a mental image is range from pictorial copies of perception, to 'weak percept[s]' (Tye 1991: 7) – outlines or ambiguous representations of vision – to linguistic constructs (Tye 1991: 64); Tye even proposes his own take on mental images by combining various aspects of these ideas, positing that they are 'interpreted symbol-filled arrays' (1991: 116) – that is, relatively language-like, but arranged in schemata that are beyond linguistics. This thesis does not aim to engage in this debate; [12] the purpose of the criticisms I posed above is not to problematise the manner in which the *visual medium* approach hypothesises the mechanism of the mental image, but to posit that the world of radio drama is not understood

[12] A range of sources are available on the imagery debate. Kosslyn (1996) and Pinker (1984) discuss the idea from a cognitive perspective; the former's career, up to the present day, is generally focused on mental images. Gilbert Ryle (1949) presents a philosophical critique of the idea of mental images, which is broadly similar in conclusion to what I propose here, although his reasoning – based on the 'ordinary language' school of philosophy – is slightly different. Interestingly, the debate presumes the universality of visual imagination, a position that has been questioned as far back as the late 19th-century by Francis Galton who, as Mitchison (1996) recounts, studies the occurrence of mental images through quantitative questionnaires, only to discover that they are experienced by some, but not all.

through mental images, but as a world in the phenomenal field of perception; The formation of any mental image is only possible against the ground of worldly experience. Should we approach the idea of *visual imagination* from a non-ocularcentric, phenomenological perspective, it does indeed have some merits: it reveals the process of listening to radio not as a solely sonic experience, where one hears a structure of sounds, but a *perceptual* experience where the listener perceives the world of the drama intentionally, in a holistic and synesthetic manner, which includes visuals along with a vast network of sensory, semantic, cultural and physical senses, making sense of the dramatic world through its worldhood.

1.2.2.2. Radio drama as vision and as perception

To examine how the idea of the phenomenal field can help us understand the *visual medium* approach, let us go back to the example of the battle. When I listen to a scene on the radio involving a battle, I do not see a battle before my eyes. Furthermore, as argued in the previous section, I do not see the battle in my mind, in that my experience of it is not akin to vision. It would even be inaccurate to describe the experience as listening to the sounds of the battle; while I know that what I am hearing is a structure of shouts, swords, screams and footsteps, what I experience is neither these individual elements, nor their sounds. The sounds of a battle do not merely serve as the trigger for my visual imagination or mental picture – they *are* the battle. Indeed, I am not even aware of the fact of my awareness of the battle: "there is a battle" may be a better description of my experience than "I perceive a battle".

This description, I posit, can be understood better as a phenomenal field, rather than a mental image. In the phenomenal field of perception, things are perceived as a whole *prior* to a division of senses, which is not given in perception itself. The battle, with its sounds, and images, and bodily effects, and cultural significance, and every other aspect that can make sense of a battle within the referential totality of the world, is before me. I may of course be able, through subsequent reflection, to divide what I know as the battle - its perceptual gestalt – into the sense stimuli which have presented it to me. I may identify numerous such sense data: the general visual outline, the distribution of colours in the scene, the individual fighters, the smell of smoke, the cacophony of cries, hooves and stabs, and

possibly even the taste in my mouth. These parts, however, are always a derivative of the fact that I know what a battle is, because the battle is initially given to me in the perceptual field of experience, where each sense is simply part of one's access to the world, rather than a separate channel for the flow of information to the mind. Clive Cazeaux, who also appropriates Merleau-Ponty's ideas as a means of understanding radio drama, neatly summarises the significance of this approach to sensory channels thus:

> Sound is not something that just happens to be emitted by our contact with objects, but part of the experiential fabric out of which the human being's engagement with the world is formed [. It] is a form or a texture that is thoroughly intertwined with the physical and emotional events that make up the world of the play(Cazeaux 2005: 162).

Understood phenomenologically, then, the experience of radio drama can indeed be said to have some sort of visuality involved, in that it appeals to perception on a pre-reflective level, before it is broken down to sense modalities; the experience of the battle, in other words, precedes the experience of the sight of the battle. The mistake of the *visual medium* approach to radio drama is to take one of these sense modalities as fundamental, and the rest as auxiliary. As mentioned in the last section, Merleau-Ponty warns of *the experience error*, whereby what we know to be the cause of our experience is taken as the experience itself. It appears that the *visual medium* approach suffers from an ocularcentric variety of this error: it assumes that as I have perceived certain elements within a dramatic world, and as an ocularcentric bias dictates this world to be inherently ocular and visual, therefore what I have perceived is the sight of these elements and a vision of the dramatic world. As no visual stimulus is actually present, however, the concept of *visual imagination* – some of the problems of which was noted above – is created as a replacement. Esslin's assertion that 'man is primarily a visual creature' (1971:5), for example, necessitates the idea that radio drama *must* be visual somehow or it will not be intelligible – hence, the resort to the construct of the *mental picture*, which I have critiqued in this section.

Understanding the radio experience as happening in the phenomenal field can also shed light on how the perception of the dramatic world develops and changes: after all, the elements of the dramatic world occur in a referential totality. In the example of the saxophone as described in the previous section, for instance,

the sound of music does not link directly to the image of a saxophone, but can be perceived through the phenomenal field as a variety of figures, or become the grounds for other figures: when the scene begins, the sound is the ground against which the figure of woman appears, while the detective's line directs my perception toward it as a figure. This is because in the referential totality of the world, the saxophone is not understood according to the image of the instrument, but through its myriad possibilities: as an object, an instrument to play, or as a type of music associated with husky-voiced women in detective dramas. The detective's line, then does not create a new image, but simply shifts the phenomenal field toward a new aspect of the world. The phenomenal field can also be a better framework for understanding visually-impossible scenes in radio drama: a scene set within a mind or in the presence of an infinite number of monkeys may not be accessible visually, but are still possible within the referential totality of the world.

My criticism of the *visual medium* solution to the problem of radio drama might at first glance appear somewhat pedantic: it can be argued, for example, that seeing with the mind's eye is simply a metaphor for the effects of radio on the listener's phenomenal field, which I have mistakenly taken literally in my attempt to locate its exact visual and imaginary dimensions. The ocular nature of this metaphor, however, directly affects the stance of this approach toward radio dramaturgy. In the introduction, I posited that reducing perception to visual components lends itself to a certain degree of representation due to vision's qualities of neutrality, simultaneity and distance. In the *visual medium* account, the visual takes centre stage in the phenomenal field, and the purpose of the sound structure of radio drama is to recreate it. Therefore, the sounds which radio drama presents to its listener's phenomenal field are ultimately derivative of the representational elements of vision, much like the semiotic approach. This attitude toward radio drama, therefore, is also supportive of dramaturgical conventions. For example, Esslin mentions how, unlike vision, sound does not have the capacity to present numerous objects simultaneously and permanently (1971: 8) – a claim repeated in similar terms by Shingler and Weiringa (1998: 82). Regarding the sonic structure of radio drama, Esslin states that unlike vision, sound does not refer directly back to the object – a cotton mill and a toy factory, for instance, would both sound the same – and therefore, to enable the imagination to form visuals, effects

should be used sporadically and be clearly signposted by verbal cues (1971: 10). In another instance, Shingler and Weiringa suggest that 'when radio's sounds fall outside the listener's experience', the listener finds it difficult to draw on visual memories and has to construct the unfamiliar imaginary vision only through 'lengthy description (often in minute detail)' (1998: 79). Therefore, they suggest that radio should limit itself to familiar sounds and everyday situations. Esslin, writing at the dawn of stereophonic sound, even goes as far as to warn producers against extensive use of the new technology, as its strength in evoking visual imagination, coupled with sound's weak referentiality to objects, might cause confusion; a stereophonic interior scene, for example, might evoke such strong spatial imaginations in the listener that, were it to be followed by an exterior scene set by the river, 'it will seem to them that a river has started to flow where a settee used to be[.]' (1971:10). In general, sound in the *visual medium* is not employed as a stimulus with its own aural properties, but as a stand-in for visual elements.

By pointing to these examples, in which the *visual medium* approach to radio drama condones the conventional dramaturgy of radio, I am suggesting that there are limits to its ability to take a critical stance toward and the conventions of dramaturgy because of the representationalist assumptions behind the ocularcentrism that is presupposed here. A shift toward a model of perception in which a hierarchy of senses does not apply – such as the one I have proposed by drawing on Merleau-Ponty – would allow for a more effective critique than that offered by either the *visual medium* approach or the semiotic approach.

1.2.3. *Theatre of the mind* and the body

In my exploration of two major theories behind the *theatre of the mind*, I argued that the encounter with the dramatic world of the radio is not mental, but that of a world, characterised by a pre-reflective referential totality that forms the ground of a phenomenal field, and precedes any identification or representation of each element. How, one might ask, can this theoretical shift help the aims of this thesis by allowing for a critique of radio dramaturgy?

The key significance of the phenomenological understanding lies in the fact that it shifts the site of the encounter with radio drama from the mind to the body:

Merleau-Ponty's central argument is that the phenomenal field of perception exists by virtue of the fact that the perceiver has – or rather, is – a body. This does not mean that the body is a source of information *providing* consciousness with content, or that it is a biological *tool* with which to perceive; instead, intentional experience of the world arises from the fact that one *is* a body. Furthermore, one's body already has an intentional structure toward the world: as Carman explains, Merleau-Ponty's claim is that '[t]he phenomenal field is neither caused nor defined, but *constituted* by the sensorimotor structures and capacities of the body. The structure of perception, we might say, just *is* the structure of the body' (2008: 81). In short, the world is *a world* to me because I am located in it bodily.

I make more extensive use of the idea of bodily perception in the next chapter; here, however, I want to point to the key difference between this account and what I have explored above: whereas from the perspective of the *theatre of the mind*, the sound structure of radio drama addresses the listener's mind with either signs or mental images, from the phenomenological perspective, the sound structure addresses the phenomenal field of the listener's body. The listener of the *theatre of the mind,* as described above, is assumed to encounter sounds as already translated into signs or images – that is, something other than sound – whereas that through my bodily field of perception, I engage directly with the sound, and the sound with me. From this angle, sound is not a mental phenomenon, but an *aural* one – that is, encountered through the body's ability to perceive sounds in the phenomenal field.

The aural possibilities of the sound of radio, beyond its reference to codes or images, was noted in Rudolf Arnheim's assessment of radio in 1936, just as different trajectories of the development of the artform's conventions were taking place. Arnheim argued for 'terms and rules for a new artistic phenomenon' based on its raw material: sound (1936: 17). He advocated the use of the affective, bodily powers of sound:

> The most elementary aural effects […] do not consist in transmitting to us the meaning of the spoken word, or sounds which we know in actuality. The 'expressive characteristics' of sound affects us in a far more direct way, comprehensible without any experience by means of intensity, pitch, interval, rhythm and

> tempi, properties of sound which have very little to do with the objective meaning of the word or the sound (Arnheim 1936: 29).

Arnheim, noting that the dramaturgies of the day are moving toward the representational model discussed earlier, blames this on radio practitioners who 'do not possess this simple instinct for sensuous qualities of their raw material, whether it is that they are simply incompetent or that they think they are doing a service to the meaning of the word' (1936: 28). In Chapter 4, I put forward my own understanding of the trajectory of this development. Here, I simply want to note that the theoretical framework that understands radio as the *theatre of the mind* does not take into account the embodied sonic experience of the dramatic world, and is therefore not equipped to theorise and support the dramaturgical function of sound.

This can be best exemplified by considering music, which, according to Crisell for example, can be used in radio plays as 'a clue to the characters' feelings or thoughts' (1994: 51) – this means that when I listen to a fight scene in a radio play and hear a piece of music that I know to be energetic through cultural codes or previous memories, I comprehend and process it, consciously or unconsciously, as a description or image of the high-action mood of the scene. This understanding of the music's function as symbolic description or visual trigger, however, neglects the fact that my initial perception of the music is not as a mental image or symbol in the mind, but as the grounds of perception in the body: sound is not distant or neutral; it affects me directly, involving me in the dramatic world. I am not merely *told* of the heightened action of the scene, but also *perceive* it in, through and with my body. The rhythm is not a distant figure in my perception, to be observed, analysed and understood by the mind; instead, the sound reverberates and resonates with me and the music presents itself in my phenomenal field. The beat of the music does not simply *indicate* the fast tempo of the scene, but by virtue of occurring directly in my body, forms the background against which I make sense of characters and events, and thus *is* the high-speed scene as much as other sounds. To reduce the music to simply a sign with a referential content in the mind disregards the fact that its sound is not understood through the mind, but through the body.

While the general approach of the *theatre of the mind* and the proposed mechanisms of semiotics and visual imagination are the most common understandings of radio drama, there are a number of theoretical approaches that

are more open to the non-representational approach in favour of which I have argued. In the next few sections, I explore some of these ideas in order to expand on how a phenomenological perspective can build on their approaches.

1.3. The 'Degradation Theory'

Alan Beck's ideas on the workings of radio drama are based on a similar approach to the one I have presented and argued for throughout this chapter: that radio is received 'more akin to how the phenomenal field operates in real-life perception' (Beck 1999: 1.9). This conception of radio drama is separate to an extent from the idea of the *theatre of the mind*, in that involves the body; for example, Beck draws an analogy between radio drama and the experience of wayfinding (Beck 2000). In this section, however, I want to critique some of the assumptions that hinder such a conception from departing entirely from the *theatre of the mind*. Such assumptions are particularly evident in Beck's assertion that radio's effects on perception are not on par with other media:

> I emphasize radio's filtering out, its considerable degradation of data, in comparison with representation in the sight/sound media. I pleasurably recognise also that radio's blindness is limiting, that it is less of a gestalt experience for the listener (employing less of the sense modalities) while it also imposes more tasks onto the individual in processing radio data (Beck 1999:1.4a).

For Beck, what characterises radio drama is what it does *not* present to the phenomenal field: visual data, spatial coordinates and arrangements, the details of movements, etc. – which is why he too chooses to use the adjective 'blind' for the medium; instead of fully-rounded wholes, radio drama presents its objects 'in their relatively simple, emblematic, perhaps at times almost abstract properties or outline Gestalts' (Beck 2000:10.1). This incompleteness of data, he states, forces the listener to actively engage in the process of making sense of the world of the drama. He does not make it explicit whether this activity is conscious and deliberate or pre-reflective and perceptual. As I have dealt with the claim of conscious understanding previously in section 1.3.1, I shall focus on his main proposition: that the listener's perception of the world of radio drama is basic, abstract and somehow incomplete.

1.3.1. Data and details: ocularcentrism in the Degradation School

Following my previous discussions of the phenomenal field, it should be apparent that I do not see 'data' as the unit of perception: what I perceive is first given to me *as* a whole – or a Gestalt, to use Beck's term. In fact, the sense data I receive from any of my encounters with the world serve first and foremost to present me with this whole within a referential totality. As the example of the man and the clock in Section 1.2.1.2. indicates, even the simplest of elements – a ticking clock – brings with it not data, but the holistic totality of a world that is already there. There is no doubt that radio's sensory input differs from other media, but I still make sense of what it presents to me in a worldly way. If visual stimuli are not present, the world perceived by me may not be a visual world, but it will be a world nonetheless – my perception is not 'less' of an experience. Here, Beck too commits a certain 'experience error': as the world is normally presented to our phenomenal field through visual data, he takes this data to be an essential part of what is perceived. In perception, however, the visual data already makes sense only as the given whole of the world.

As a demonstration of this 'degradation of data', Beck performs a cognitive-perceptual analysis a scene from the 1929 radio play *Ingredient X*:

> 447. FX: (THE STORM SOUNDS ARE NOW VERY LOUD. ALL DIALOGUE MUST BE SHOUTED.)
>
> 448. CAPTAIN: Clear up the port boats!
>
> 449. DEAN: Number One's stove in, sir.
>
> (Beck 2000: 9.3)

Here, Beck proposes that radio has filtered out much of the data available in this scene: the shape of the ship, the raindrops falling down on characters, the tumbling movements of the waves, the details of the character's faces, the ropes swinging in the wind, and many more such details. He concludes that radio presents him with 'abstract geometry (lines and planes – outlines only) rather than […] ecological geometry (surfaces and edges, substantial and textured – to be seen)' (Beck 2000: 11.3). The assumption underlying this assertion is the 'experience error' that were I to watch the scene, my perception would be of those visual particulars, whereas if presented to my phenomenal field, these in turn would only

serve to contribute, albeit in another form, to the gestalt of 'ship on a stormy night' – the details in themselves are not individually perceived, but appear only within the totality of the world. Here, I perceive this whole because of other details: the sound of the storm, the loudness of the characters, and nautical terms used in the dialogues. As I am continuously navigating throughout the dialogues, the stormy ship serves as the ground to the figures of the captain and the dean in the same manner that visual details would have functioned, had they been present.

Of course, this argument should not be understood as the claim that sounds can present the exact equivalent of vision in the phenomenal field. The visual details above do indeed help form a perception of the world that is different from the aural world of radio – many of the detail are difficult to present through sonic means. To label what I perceive on the radio as less real or less of a whole Gestalt, however, could only be possible as a result of a preference toward the sense of vision. Beck's assertion above can only apply if one adheres to the ocularcentric assumption that what one sees is somehow more real, and that a world without visual data is incomplete and 'degraded'. This hierarchy of senses, although not explicit in Beck's treatment of radio, is manifest in the manner in which he approaches his case study of *Ingredient X*: he presents a phenomenological account of his perception of the play, but then discusses it in clearly visual terms: he visualises 'the scene on the ship's bridge in LS or long shot' and the dialogue between the characters is 'akin, somewhat, but only somewhat, to the shot-reverse-shot of film dialogue' (2000: 9.3). It is no wonder that Beck find the world presented through radio abstract: he is attempting to map the perceptual whole presented by radio drama as a visual representation of it; such an attempt leaves gaps which either have to be filled by a metaphorical construct such as *visual imagination* – which, as previously discussed, is problematic – or labelled as radio's 'degradation' of data. This may point out to one of the reasons why this solution to the problem of radio drama may lead to a conception of it as abstract: the main ingredient of the medium, sound, still seems to be disregarded in place of concepts, codes and vision; it is not given a role further than a disengaged figure in the phenomenal field – an object of inspection, rather than perception. In the next section, I argue that it is this very attitude toward sound that may cause the perception of a 'degradation' in Beck's analysis.

1.3.2. Degradation and conventional dramaturgy

Although I object to Beck's claim that the absence of visual data on radio creates a more abstract Gestalt in the phenomenal field, here I want to present an alternative claim: that the abstraction perceived here is not due to the 'blindness' of the medium, but down to the restricted scope of the conventional dramaturgy of the pieces that he explores; the fact that radio appears as less of a rich experience to Beck, I posit, is due to the radio play's particularly abstract dramaturgical structure of sounds, and not its lack of vision.

It is interesting to note Beck's choice of example: *Ingredient X*, by L. du Garde Peach, dates back to 1929; as radio plays were broadcast live at the time, no records exist to indicate how it would have sounded. Beck, instead, bases his analysis on the script; what Beck is analysing, then, is not the play *as heard*, but as read. This is based on the assumption that what matters with regard to sounds is what they stand for in the mind, rather than how they engage with the body: reading the words 'stormy sea', after all, does not present itself in the same way in my phenomenal field as that of hearing a stormy sea. How does Beck know what to interpret, aurally, from the sentence 'the storm sounds are very loud'? The presumption behind this approach is that there are certain sets of sounds which, when heard, immediately recreate a stormy sea – any stormy sea – in the listener's perceptual field; therefore, Beck need not hear the particular sounds of *Ingredient X*, as he is aware of – and can recall – the general set of sound belonging to 'the stormy sea'. But this approach to sound assumes that the range of sonic stimuli which could lead to the perception of 'stormy sea' are limited – here, presumably, to an indexical 'atmos' recording of a storm – and that the effects of the nuances of these sounds on the listener's phenomenal field are negligible. Here, then, Beck is conforming to the conventional dramaturgy that, as he details, results in a structure with a 'relatively limited stock' (2000: 10.2) of sound effects, 'dialogue in the foreground balanced against an atmos background […], or dialogue in a neutral acoustic' (2000: 10.3). Beck's assumption that the sounds of the radio drama do not affect the perception of the dramatic world beyond what they represent – as evidenced by his choice of example – is, as mentioned before, shared by dramaturgical conventions.

Now let us consider the details that radio has, according to Beck, 'filtered out'. As I claimed previously, the effect of those details on the phenomenal field is to contribute to the dramatic world perceived as a whole: in a visual presentation, the

ropes hanging from the deck swinging in the background, the violent motions of the ship as it braves the high waves, the rain filling up the surface of the bridge, all increase my overall awareness of the world and contribute to the ways in which I make sense of the scene; Beck believes that the absence of such contributions is the root of radio drama being perceived as 'less of a Gestalt' (1999:1.4a). Beck does not, however, consider sound as a possible remedy for this absence. As I argued in the introduction and in Section 1.2.3. – and continue to argue through this thesis – the sound of radio drama appears in the phenomenal field of the body, and engages it directly in the dramatic world: a low slow drumming can contribute to the perception of the movement of the ship, the staccato of shouting voices of the crew can generate a sense of urgency and stress, and the movement of the characters around the sound centre can increase the dynamism of the scene; these effects, together, may increase the listener's awareness of the world in the same manner as the missing visuals. After all, these visual and sonic aspects of the world are all part of the holistic perception of the world; their effect on the listener derives not from the amount of 'data' they present to her mind, but from how they feature in her phenomenal field. What is absent and degraded here, then, could equally be the sonic qualities of his experience; had Beck been listening to the play, and had the dramaturgy of the play made use of such sonic qualities, the analysis may have been different.

1.4. The 'Imaginative Spectacle'

Tim Crook also conceives of radio drama in terms that fall outside the limits of the *theatre of the mind*. While some of the terms of his approach broadly the *visual medium* approach – for example, he too speaks of seeing 'with the mind's eye' (1999: 54) and of the listener's imagination being her 'film camera' (1999: 64) – nevertheless, several key differences validate a separate mention of his thoughts on radio drama. Firstly, he specifically argues against a hierarchy of senses (1999: 54) – a position that I share and have previously discussed. Secondly, his characterisation of the experience of the listener is more holistic, involving various senses, significations and a 'sense of feeling' (1999: 63) which makes his account receptive of my ideas. Finally, he details a few experiments which support the cases that I have put forward in this thesis.

Crook categorises the elements of radio drama into five types: words, sound effects, music, archival material, and the *imaginative spectacle* - the last element consists of what takes place in the listener's mind, and 'has the power to recreate a full spectrum of experience: colour and visual depth, olfactory perception, touch and texture, imaginary sound and taste' (1999: 62). This, again, I interpret as the perception of radio in the phenomenal field: what the sound offers me I perceive as a given whole which will include a certain degree of the sensations not presented to me. The *imaginative spectacle* also highlights the bodily aspect of the experience of radio drama. Therefore, in one sense, my account serves to support Crook's notion.

I question, however, the position that the imaginative spectacle is a *part* of what radio presents to me alongside the other four kinds of elements mentioned above – in my interpretation of radio drama, what is referred to as the 'imaginative spectacle' *is* the way in which I perceive and make sense of all of these elements in relation to each other. In other words, the identification of words, effects, music, and archival materials may be possible through an act of thought, but the experience of radio drama itself is, at a pre-reflective level, solely of the imaginative spectacle. The difference may at first appear insignificant, but its importance is in the way it affects the dramaturgical practices which create the structured sound of radio drama: the underlying assumption here is that the perceptual effects of radio drama are separate from, though caused by, a representational array of words, music and sound effect, as opposed to them working as a relational whole to create the 'spectacle'.

I can best demonstrate this by looking at an interesting experiment detailed by Crook (1999: 67-9). He recounts playing a short non-descript monologue to a group of workshop participants and asking for a description of the person speaking. The replies are different, disparate and unrelated to Crook's own description of the character. But when he accompanies the same monologue with a musical excerpt from the *Dance of the Sugarplum Fairies*, the descriptions become more alike and begin to resemble the original character visualised by Crook: 'of the fifteen workshop participants, twelve [are] able to match 80 percent of the character's textual description' (1999: 69). Crook's analysis of the results is that of 'a character being defined by voice and music' (1999: 68). In this example, Crook's analysis understands the listener's experience as separate encounters with elements

representing different aspects of the speaker: the listener hears the voice which represents a certain set of properties, understand the words which have certain semantic contents, listens to the music which affects her in a certain way, and alongside these emerges an 'imaginative spectacle' of the speaker which arises from this particular combination of these elements. I posit instead that the imaginative spectacle is the phenomenal experience of the interrelated effects that the elements have on each other: the simultaneous occurrence of words, voice and music transforms all three in my perception – the music I hear is no longer simply *The Dance of the Sugarplum Fairies*, but the ground which surrounds the voice and the words of the character. The character, too, has a new sense for me by virtue of appearing against the particular background of the music. The combination is perceived as a whole. Should a new element enter the phenomenal field, it would not simply add its own element to the 'imaginative spectacle' – it would transform what is perceived and give it new sense.

The importance of this becomes apparent when exploring the dramaturgical possibilities of radio drama. In a dramaturgical process that follows British conventions, characterised by an array of words, sound effects, sound positions and music, creating and maintaining 'the imaginative spectacle' would be achieved through manipulating each of the elements – using different sound effects, changing the music, employing different voices; the imaginative spectacle is the *outcome* of these components. From the perspective of this thesis, however, these elements are interrelated and continuously affect each other as parts of a holistic world. The manipulation of the phenomenal field through sound, in other words, is not merely confined to altering each of the individual sonic components of radio drama, but involves a greater array of relations and combinations which gives these elements new senses and meanings. Therefore, Crook's imaginative spectacle solution to the problem of radio drama, although open to a perceptual interpretation, is also open to a representational understanding of radio drama by virtue of separating the listener's perception from the other elements of the sonic structure which creates it. In the next section, I examine Clive Cazeaux's use of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology to present a more integrated framework for understanding radio drama – a position upon which this thesis aims to build.

1.5. Radio drama as invitation

Clive Cazeaux's brief but significant interjection in the debates on radio drama presents an account close to the one for which I have argued in this chapter. Cazeaux takes the problem of radio drama as his starting point, he proceeds to defend the art form against the charge of blindness by drawing from Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of perception. After problematising the idea of the incompleteness of radio and defending sound as an 'opening onto' (2005: 162) the world, Cazeaux moves to explore its aesthetic possibilities. The work of art, he argues following Dufrenne, 'operates as a series of invitational relationships between its material elements' (Cazeaux 2005: 166) – that is, the material has the capability of becoming an opening onto the world through its encounter with a perceiver: clumps of paint on a canvas can open themselves to my perception as the night sky due to their myriad structural relationships, which I can perceive as part of the world. For Cazeaux, radio drama has aesthetic significance by virtue of being purely auditory, as for him, 'sound is a particularly invitational modality of sensation' (2005: 172); this, in the terminology of this thesis, can be ascribed to the fact that due to its temporality, immersion, and affectivity, sound has less of a referential ability – a fact that opens up the invitational relationships between sonic elements. My arguments have been, in general, broadly aligned with Cazeaux's; some of my assertions in this chapter and the next are supported by his arguments.

Here I want to expand on Cazeaux's account by questioning a key implication: that the experience of radio drama – and indeed, drama in general – is that of experiencing an aesthetic object within my world; instead, I posit, the primary experience is that of the dramatic world *as* a world. The aesthetic experience, of course, is present; however, the perception of it – what Cazeaux describes as 'the cognitive, interpretative transitions we are invited to make [in the case of theatre] between set, script, and performance' (2005: 166) – is secondary to the holistic, pre-reflective experience of the world. The invitational character discussed here, after all, can be said to also exist in a narrative song, or a piece of sound art, or an audiobook, whereas there does exist a degree of difference, in that I do not perceive these as occurring in a dramatic world, but as objects in my own world. Let us consider Cazeaux' example of the musicalized remix of *Phedre*, where he argues that:

> This scene is particularly musical in its construction, relying on rhythm and crescendo. One word is abstracted from a

> monologue, repeated, and made increasingly resonant. Combined with the urgency in the switching monologues and the growing background presence, the word is transformed from being one moment in a taunt to a symbol of the power struggle between Theseus and Hippolytus. On its last utterance, it hangs in the air, an object alone, and its decay ushers in a silence which prepares the ground for the tragic events that are to follow (Cazeaux 2005: 168).

I do not object to this analysis; on reflection, these interpretive relationships can indeed be observed in the invitational structure of the piece. I do, however, contend that there is a difference between the sound structure here as a piece of music, and the same sound structure as a piece of drama: while the former may appear to me as a sonic object in my world, transforming and inviting me to perceive it as its many possibilities, the latter only appears to me as part of the fabric of an entire world – one in which Theseus and Hippolytus are not simply voices or characters, but beings situated in the referential totality of a world that is, to borrow from Bert O. States' description of theatre, 'at the bottom, […] not a matter of the illusory, the mimetic, or the representational, but of a certain kind of *actua*l' (1987: 46). This world, like mine, appears to me in its totality, and without recourse to reflection; in fact, I am not even aware of my own awareness of it: if I suddenly hear the doorbell while listening to the scene, there is a moment of readjustment in which I suddenly become aware of myself, and of the fact that what I am listening to is the sound of a play – before this my experience is pre-reflective and primordial.

Of course, a critic may contend that the difference between this musical segment and the dramatic structure of which it is a part is that the latter contains more elements, and thus more invitations to the perceiver: the stories of Theseus and Hippolytus, their previous exchanges, the voices, sounds, and themes, all simply extend the scope of invitation. I do not object to this point in principle, but posit that certain invitational arrays can lead to the perception of an object of aesthetic experience within my world – for example, a statue – while others, such as a piece of radio drama, invite my perception as a *kind of actual* world. Within the context of this world, I am able to experience the musicality of the scene above not as a sound structure expressing intensity and tragedy in my world, but as the intensity and tragedy of a world. It is this fundamental worldhood of the dramatic world, rather than the invitational structures that can become possible within it, that is the key to

an understanding of how the art form functions. In other words, the solution to the problem of radio drama – how I can experience a world on the radio in the absence of vision – lies within the possibility of the sound structure of radio drama being perceived as a world.

How then, the question arises, does a sound structure become open to being perceived as a holistic world, rather than an object in my world? How can these structures be identified and employed in order to analyse radio drama? Here, I posit that Cazeaux's account can be advanced by examining the experience of radio drama through a phenomenological lens. Cazeaux's project aims to question some of the presuppositions of the problem of radio drama by drawing from phenomenological perspectives on the structures of perception and aesthetics, but does not investigate the phenomenon of radio drama itself. In other words, Cazeaux examines the relationship between phenomenology *and* radio drama, rather than presenting a phenomenology *of* radio drama. In the next chapter, I pursue this aim by presenting phenomenological insights into the experience of listening to radio drama.

1.6. Closing remarks

In this chapter, I engaged with key theoretical attitudes toward radio drama and their responses to the problem of radio drama, and argued that a phenomenological perspective of the workings of the medium – in which the world of radio drama is understood through the phenomenal field of perception as a referential totality – serves as a less problematic model. At each juncture, I also highlighted the links between the theoretical assumptions made and the conventional dramaturgy of radio. I began with the broad umbrella term *the theatre of the mind* to critique the idea that radio is understood through mental representation; instead, I posited that radio is experienced through intention, as a world with the characteristics of *worldhood.* I then critiqued the two most common ways in which the mechanisms of the *theatre of the mind* are described, the semiotic approach and the *visual medium* approach. I posited that critiquing the *theatre of the mind* can open the way toward the understanding of radio drama as a bodily phenomenon. Following this, I examined theoretical approaches that move beyond the *theatre of the mind*, arguing that they could benefit from expansion from a phenomenological perspective.

In the next chapter, I investigate the structure of the experience of listening to radio drama from a phenomenological perspective, with the aim of presenting a model how the experience of the dramatic world is made possible. Such a model, I contend, opens up the possibility of critiquing dramaturgical conventions from a more bodily, and thus sonically-minded, perspective.

CHAPTER 2:

RADIO LISTENS: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL MODEL OF RADIO DRAMA

2.1. Opening remarks

In the previous chapter, I asked: how does radio drama make it possible for the listener to make sense of its world in the absence of vision? Examining and critiquing available responses to this question, I posited that a phenomenological model of the listener's bodily experience of radio drama as a world can provide a critical tool with which to approach radio drama, and modes of radio dramaturgy. In this chapter, I continue my line of argument by providing a phenomenological account of the experience of radio drama. My key argument in the chapter is that should we avoid theorisation, and instead assume a phenomenological stance, the listener's encounter with radio drama reveals itself as the experience of listening to a world that is already being *listened to* by the radio itself; what is presented to me on the radio is not simply the sounds which occur in the dramatic world, recorded and played back by a device, but sounds selected and structured in a manner that implies that what I hear from my radio device – whatever kind of technology it may be – is heard by an embodied being similar to me, with the ability to make sense of the world *as* a world, by listening to it through its technological body. When I listen to radio drama, I am listening to the radio *while it listens*.

This claim that *radio listens* may at first appear somewhat counter-intuitive, and even bizarre, but the aim of this chapter is to expand upon this idea and put forward a case for it. First, I present a phenomenological account of listening to radio to argue that the world of the radio play is perceived by the listener in a manner similar, but not identical, to one's own world. From this I conclude that the world of the radio is not perceived directly by the listener, but indirectly through the perception of another being, who shares with the listener a way of understanding the world through sound – that is, the ability to *listen*. I detail how radio drama does indeed share the listener's manner of auditory perception – what I term the *auditory schema* – and can thus be said to *listen* to the dramatic world. Finally, I explore how the listener encounters radio's *listening* to the dramatic world through her own process of listening through radio technology.

I conclude the chapter by suggesting that the process of radio dramaturgy is not one of structuring sounds to stand in for elements of the world, but consists of creating a sound structure of dramaturgical listening. It is this hypothesis that allows me to continue the general argument of this thesis: in the upcoming chapters, I argue that the mode of listening prevalent in conventional British radio dramaturgy generally stays within the confines of what Chion (1994) labels *semantic listening*, and posit that other modes of dramaturgical listening can be observed in contemporary radio that expands the aesthetic toolbox of radio dramaturgy by moving beyond this type of listening.

2.2. A phenomenological model of what?

Let us begin this chapter's arguments by examining one available phenomenological investigation into the experience of listening to radio drama. In the course of his phenomenological investigation into the experience of listening in theatre, George Home-Cook (2015) presents two in-depth phenomenological accounts of listening to radio drama, attending to the examples of Beckett's *All That Fall* (1957) and *Embers* (1959) to detail his experience of designed sound and silence. To do so, Home-Cook suspends theoretical assumptions about what the sound structure that he encountered is designed to do; the resulting description of his experience of radio drama reveals that:

> The listener, by paying attention, plays a vital role in the process of (re)shaping the radiophonic 'soundscape'. Whilst radiophonic sound may well be meticulously designed, autonomous and objectively distinct, this pre-given structure is nevertheless subject to perceptual variation and phenomenal reshaping. What we perceive is phenomenally dependent on the particular mode of attention that we adopt, and radio drama is no exception to this: attention shapes aesthetic experience (Home-Cook 2015: 60).

To put this in terms discussed in the previous chapter, the listener directs herself toward the sound structure of radio drama in different ways, bringing different figures into her phenomenal field against the background of others; the listener may at one point listen for the voices to hear the dialogue, while at another point, directing her attention toward the musicality of their tones. At each point, the sound structure remains the same, but the listener's mode of intention differs. Home-Cook's key assertion is that the manner in which the sound is structured and

the way in which the listener directs herself toward this structure together make the experience of radio drama possible. This account can shed some light on the question of how a dramatic world on the radio is possible: should the listener attend in a particular manner, directing her phenomenal field toward the sound structure *as* a world, then a world will appear to her. If instead she directs herself toward the sounds in another manner – for example, listening for particular voices and noises – then what appears to her is the individual aspect toward which she intends. In short, the sound structure requires a particular mode of listening – that is, bodily orientation of the phenomenal field – in order to be perceived as a world. This, of course, is to be expected; the sound structure of radio drama is not universally and automatically perceived even as radio drama. For example, should my neighbours listen in silence to a piece of domestic radio drama in their room, my encounter with the sound is probably not of a dramatic world, but of the neighbours having a row. The experience of radio drama, then, does not emanate from a particular sound structure itself, but a particular mode of encounter with a sound structure.

Regarding the nature of this particular mode of listening, Home-Cook is silent, as his project is directed toward the sound structure of radio drama as an aesthetic object; the experience that he investigates, consequently, is that of the act of listening for particular sounds, rather than the experience of a dramatic world. When discussing his phenomenology of *All That Fall*, for example, he begins his description thus:

> On listening to the […] excerpt [of the play] for the first time I make no attempt to perform a phenomenological reduction of the experience, my attention being focused, as is naturally the case, on the narrative meaning inscribed in the sound(s) that I perceive (Home-Cook 2015: 65).

This brief section describes the basic, pre-reflective experience of a dramatic world for the listener. Home-Cook, however, moves on swiftly, and instead focuses the rest of his investigation on what occurs when he 'listen[s] to the same extract again […] and with the expressed aim of bracketing or 'singling out' speech-*as*-*sound*' (2015: 65). In other words, Home-Cook takes the referential totality of the dramatic world in which speech exists as granted, and instead directs himself toward particular sounds – in doing so, in fact, he ceases to direct himself toward the drama as a dramatic world, and instead perceives it as sounds; in doing so, what he experiences is no longer the dramatic world, but a reflective abstraction of the

sonic experience of it. As a result, this investigation, while valuable in illuminating the aesthetic mode of listening, does not describe the basic grounds for the experience of radio drama – in other words, a *dramatic* mode of listening.

Contrary to Home-Cook, what I take to be the most important and basic mode of listening to radio drama is mode that he mentions in passing in the beginning. In this mode, he is aware of the characters, the setting, the events, and his own perspective on the dramatic world; in other words, he finds himself encountering a dramatic world, within a referential totality already given to him. It is in this mode that he is encountering characters *moving and living before* him, as per Aristotle's definition of drama; any analytical approach toward this dramatic world is only made possible as a result of this pre-reflective, primordial perceptual experience. To reveal the key structures that make radio drama possible, I contend, a phenomenological model of listening to radio drama should concern itself first and foremost with the possibility of experiencing a dramatic world in a pre-reflective, perceptual, holistic manner, before it questions the aesthetics of the sonic structures that make this possible.

To demonstrate why a phenomenological account of the listener's encounter with the dramatic world can be beneficial, let us take the following short radio scene as an example – one to which I shall refer throughout the chapter:

ATMOS:	QUIET NIGHT, CRICKETS CHIRPING
F/X:	FOOTSTEPS ON THE GRASS
WOMAN:	Look how the lake reflects the moonlight; isn't it beautiful?
MAN:	Yes… but maybe we should get back to the house; Andy might be worried!

While listening to this scene, I am fully aware of the events that take place: I know that I am listening to a conversation that is occurring physically (as opposed to written correspondence, for example), during a moonlit night, in a physical space outdoors, between a man and a woman, near a lake. I am also somewhat aware of the woman's relaxed attitude and the man's slightly anxious demeanour. Furthermore, I know that there is a house located nearby, where Andy is waiting for the two to return. Finally, I am aware of my position: on one hand, I am hearing this

from a point close to the characters, within that environment – but on the other hand, I am aware that I am sitting in my room, at my computer, hearing them through my radio speakers, not seeing or otherwise sensing them. Still, this awareness does not misplace the scene for me; I am aware of the man and the woman not as people inside my radio speakers, or actors in some distant recording studio transmitting their voices into my radio receiver, but as the couple walking by the lake in the night. [13] In short, I am instantly conscious of the world within the scene *as though I am there.* And yet, as I have argued in Chapter 1, it would be incorrect to assume that when listening to this scene, I 'see' the scene in visual form with *my mind's eye*, or that I analyse the signs given to me as I listen – deciphering crickets and the word *moonlight* as references to the time, footsteps as denoting walking, and so on. The question therefore remains: how am I possibly aware of the world of this scene?

But what if, instead of asking for an explanation, or constructing auxiliary theories, we assume a phenomenological standpoint, and accept the experience of listening described above as the starting point? In that case, the question is rendered meaningless: I simply *am* aware of the world of the scene; the fact that the dramatic world of radio makes sense to me as a given whole, as apparent in my experience, need not be validated by a theory, but is instead the basic *feature* of my encounter with radio drama. Should we begin by taking this feature as given, we can describe the radio play as a world perceived by the listener through sound – instead of a series of codes or visual cues – and I, the listener, as the kind of consciousness who can experience the sounds of the play as a world, as opposed to a reflective decoder or a converter of sonic data into visual images.

Indeed, according to Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the ability to experience the world as a given, interconnected whole that makes sense antepredicatively – that is, without needing an act of explicit understanding – is a characteristic of the type of consciousness that I am, as my perceptual consciousness of the world is characterised first and foremost by its intentionality: to be conscious always means being conscious of *something*, which already has meaning before any acts of reflection; 'the unity of the world, before being posited by knowledge in a specific act of identification, is 'lived' as ready-made or already there' (Merleau-Ponty 2002:

[13] This scenario is, of course, hypothetical, as is the scene itself.

xix). As I posited in Section 1.2, by drawing from Heidegger, this lived unity is what makes the world *a world*, as opposed to discrete sensations, ideas or signs. When I encounter the world in my perception, it is already meaningful: I do not need to begin by identifying rhythms, frequencies and movements, follow by recognising them as specific objects through association or judgement, and then comprehend particular objects by relating them to others, and to myself, and to what I know about the world; all of these interrelations are already tacitly known to me as I perceive the world – in other words, the world has *worldhood*, in that it is already there and known to me before any particular act of knowing. For example, I can only understand a certain noise as that of a cricket because I encounter it within a world, in which I already know of the cricket through its relation to other entities – late nights, outdoors, the word *cricket*, my fear of insects, and everything else. Merleau-Ponty's project attempts to understand this worldly, meaningful mode of being through a description of the basic perceptual awareness of the world – which, drawing from Husserl, he labels the 'natural attitude' (2002: vii) – moving away from the analytical, theoretical understanding that views the world in terms of knowledge of elements, not noticing that the being who is capable of identifying these elements must be the type of being for whom these elements first feature in experience before the acts of identification. [14]

It is easy to identify the analogies between Merleau-Ponty's take on the natural attitude and my experience while listening to the scene described in the beginning of the section. In my encounter with the radio scene, I do not need to identify *crickets, moonlight, woman, man* or other elements from the frequency of the sounds heard or the dictionary definition of the words uttered before I am able to understand what is occurring; neither do I have to put the ideas of *crickets* and *moonlight* together to force my perception into understanding that the scene occurs during night-time. When the man utters his line, I am aware that he is a man, and that he is on a moonlit stroll. When woman begins to speak, I do not suddenly create a new perception where the scene includes two people as opposed to one. In short,

[14] It should be noted that Merleau-Ponty's appropriation of the term *natural attitude* leads him to a radically different conception from Husserl's. Merleau-Ponty himself posited that his idea of intentionality was based on Husserl's later work; however, as Carman points out, 'any careful reading of the two immediately reveals deep methodological and systematic differences between them' (1999: 206).

everything I perceive in the scene occurs in the lived unity of a world, characterised by *worldhood*; indeed, the isolation of each of these elements from this unity, as in the descriptions provided in this paragraph, is an act of identification that, as Merleau-Ponty argues, is secondary to, and only made possible by, my primordial understanding of the scene: for example, I am only able to separate and identify the word 'moonlight', spoken in the scene, as a sign that the man uses to refer to the light from the moon – as opposed to a verb or a reference to Beethoven's *Moonlight Sonata* – because during the process of locating and comprehending it individually, I reflect upon a unified world, within which I have already made sense of the word as part of a broader holistic context. I can make sense of this unity primordially – according to Merleau-Ponty, I am the kind of being who, by virtue of being in the world, is '*condemned to meaning'* (2002: xxii). A phenomenological model of radio drama recognises that the listener is first and foremost a perceiving being, fundamentally engaged with the world; hence, her encounter with the dramatic world of the radio has to be understood, described and analysed within the realm of the natural attitude – the experience of direct consciousness – and not through the theoretical approach demonstrated by current debates in radio theory.

This shift of attitude is a useful interjection in radio drama scholarship for several reasons. Firstly, as Merleau-Ponty argues, the natural attitude is characterised by intentionality, and thus recognises the holistic quality of the world – a recognition that is lacking in theories of radio drama as shown in Chapter 1. For him, the perceptual experience of the world is primary, whole, interconnected and rich, and any reflective analysis of experience is necessarily a reductive abstraction of it. A phenomenological understanding of radio drama avoids this abstraction by describing the experience *of* radio drama, as opposed to the experience of the elements that can be identified in it. Secondly, from a phenomenological stance, the ocularcentric hierarchy of the senses that features in many radio drama theories can be problematised. After all, the hierarchy depends on there being separate sense in the first place, whereas Merleau-Ponty argues that the separation of senses does not feature in the natural attitude, and is 'gained only when one assumes a highly particularised attitude, and this cannot be of any assistance to the analysis of direct consciousness' (2002: 262).

Finally, the most important advantage of a phenomenological understanding of radio for this thesis is the idea, put forward by Merleau-Ponty, that the perceptual experience of the world, as featured in the natural attitude, is fundamentally corporeal: my existence as a perceiving being arises from, and is structured by, the fact of my embodiment. The significance of this idea is to highlight the importance of aurality, that is, the embodied 'heard-ness' of sound, in the understanding of radio drama; while previously-mentioned theories of radio conceive of the encounter between the listener and the drama as an exchange of ideas, codes or 'images', simply facilitated through sounds, a phenomenological account of radio drama allows the aural, bodily effects and qualities of radio sound to be taken into consideration. It is this factor that provides the phenomenological framework with the ability to critique the conventions of radio dramaturgy: as I argue in the rest of this thesis, the conventional dramaturgy neglects the body's involvement in act of listening to radio drama in the natural attitude, and instead assumes that the encounter as will be a theoretical, analytic, reflective affair. This, of course, does not mean that, consequently, the listener has to encounter pieces created through this dramaturgy in a reflective manner; as I have argued here and in Chapter 1, the experience of a dramatic world *as* a world occurs necessarily in the natural attitude. The result of this assumption is instead a mode of practice that is not focused on utilising the dramaturgical possibilities of the bodily qualities of experiencing sounds – in other words, a dramaturgy addressed to the mind rather than the body.

This idea of the centrality of the body in perception also has the potential to problematise my description of the encounter with radio drama as the perceptual experience of a world: after all, my bodily perception of the world around me is unlike my perception of the dramatic world of radio in many instantly-noticeable ways. In the next section, I elaborate upon these issues in detail.

2.3. The dramatic world and the body

In the previous section, I described the listener's experience of the dramatic world of radio as characterised by intentionality, similar to the listener's experience of her own world. It is clear, however, that the perception of the world of radio drama differs from the experience of one's own world in several respects. The first of these, one which has become a constant theme in radio drama scholarship, is that the world of the radio drama is devoid of vision. In response to this, Cazeaux

presents two convincing arguments: first, citing a debate between philosopher Brian Magee and his blind colleague Martin Milligan, he demonstrates that the absence of vision changes, but does not diminish, the experience of the world, and argues that 'each person' – even for those without access to sight – 'within the range of sensory phenomena made available to them, enjoys a comparatively rich and varied experience' (Cazeaux 2005: 158). He supports this argument with help from Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology: for Cazeaux, it is possible to have a world without sight because intentional experience is fundamentally synaesthetic – 'while each sense has its own particularity, and can be individuated distinctly from the others, it does not exist as a channel that can be wholly isolated from the others but exists rather as a region in a fabric or grid' (Cazeaux 2005: 163). Intentional experience of the world, therefore, does not rely specifically on vision. This argument, however, still does not take into account some of the differences between my experience of the dramatic world and that of my own world. For one thing, while I know that the scene occurs in a perceivable world, I can nevertheless not access it physically, regardless of its invisibility: I know that it is a moonlit night and that I am outdoors with the characters, and yet I cannot feel the cold breeze, or sense the proximity of the bodies of the man and the woman, or walk away from the couple and toward the house.

This point becomes significant when we consider that, for Merleau-Ponty, the experience of intentional perception is made possible only through the body. This does not mean that the body is a source of information *providing* consciousness with content, or that it is a biological *tool* with which to perceive; instead, experience arises from the fact that one *is* a body. Furthermore, one's body already has an intentional structure toward the world: as Carman explains, Merleau-Ponty's claim is that '[t]he phenomenal field is neither caused nor defined, but *constituted* by the sensorimotor structures and capacities of the body. The structure of perception, we might say, just *is* the structure of the body' (Carman 2008: 81). In short, the world is *a world* to me because I am located in it bodily. Here, 'the body' does not refer to the physical and biological descriptions of the human body as regarded theoretically, but to the pre-reflective, perceptual, experiential *lived body*, as understood with the natural attitude: an intentional structure that is in the world, perceiving it through *motor intentionality* - acts of bodily orientation; sensing, looking, moving, approaching, distancing, expressing, and so on. Merleau-Ponty

argues that such pre-reflective acts, and the body's abilities in performing them, constitute a *body schema.* As Carman explains, the *body schema* is 'the set of abiding noncognitive dispositions and capacities that orient, guide, and inform our bodily sensitivities and motor actions. […] Our bodily skills and dispositions carve out a perceptual world' (2008: 132-3).

This description further highlights the problems of the idea that the dramatic world of the radio is perceived intentionally: when listening to the radio, I know that I am not located bodily within the world of the drama. Neither am I able to orient myself bodily, with the full capacities of my body schema, in order to perceive the world the way I perceive mine: while I am able to listen, I cannot look, or smell, or move around, or turn my head toward the direction of a particular sound. How, then, could I have a perception of a dramatic world that is invisible, inaccessible to my body, and is contained in my own "real" world, within which I find myself? How can I possibly perceive the world of the scene *as a world* if I do not have direct embodied access to it, with the whole of my body schema, to perceive the moon, the characters, the lake and the night through the experience of my lived body?

And yet, my experience, as described in the previous chapter, shows that I distinctly perceive the dramatic world *as a world*. But if we accept the evidence of my phenomenological experience of listening to radio, and admit that my awareness of the dramatic world is an intentional one, then the same problem applies in a different way: if the structure of my perception depends on my being in the world as a body, then how is it that, when I perceive the dramatic world intentionally, I can recognise the fact that my body is not in that world, listening to the characters speak at night, but in my room, next to the computer? If my body is oriented toward that world, how is it that I know I am not in it? After all, I am aware of the very fact that the dramatic world on the radio is not 'my' world – hence, why I describe my perception with the sentence *as though I am there*, and not *while I am there*; indeed, going back to Elam's definition of the dramatic world as a '*hypothetically* actual construc[t]' (Elam 2002: 98, italics mine), the world could not be considered dramatic if it were my world.

It may appear that the solution to this problem is the idea of *representation*: that what I hear on the radio is not itself a world, but an imitation of a world that *stands in* for one. From a phenomenological perspective, however, this approach is

questionable. I experience the dramatic world *as* a world – as an intentional, unified, pre-reflective, given whole; therefore, although it is certainly not *my* world, it would not be valid to consider what I encounter as something other than a world, in the form of a representation or imitation of one. In my experience, the dramatic world does not stand in for the world, in that in its intentional coherence in my perception, it does not refer to or represent something that is external to it: when I hear the couple converse in the moonlit night, there is nothing in my experience to suggest that the people or the crickets present in my perceptual field are not people or crickets, but things that stand in for or refer to people and crickets outside the dramatic world that I perceive. The concept of representation itself is not present in my experience, but is a theoretical device to explain how I can perceive the worldhood of the dramatic world and differentiate between it and my own.

One attempt at reconciling the duality of worlds present in my phenomenological account is made by Jean-Paul Sartre in *The Imaginary* (2004). There, he posits that consciousness has the ability to assume an 'imaging attitude' (Sartre 2004: 24), whereby the object, due to resemblance or affective quality, can be intended towards as something other than it is: as a conscious being, Sartre claims, I have the ability to encounter the radio scene in an imaginative mode, where I take the sound of the crickets to be actual crickets in the intentional contents of my consciousness, and understand the voices of actors recorded in the studio as words being spoken on a late-night stroll through a field. For Sartre, these sounds would be considered 'a certain matter that acts as an *analogon*, as an equivalent of perception' (2004:18) – seeing as what I am conscious of is not presented to me in the manner to which my perception is accustomed: my 'real' perceptual experience of people and crickets involves direct encounter through senses, whereas I experience the sonic analogons as an immediate 'imaginary' whole without resorting to direct bodily access through the senses. At first glance, this seems convincing: I listen to the radio with an imaging attitude, and subsequently can make sense of the sounds as an analogon for a world, rather than as a perception of one; in the encounter with radio, like Sartre's description of the experience of theatre and novels, 'we are in the presence of a world and we attribute to that world […] a complete existence in the irreal' (2004: 63): the sounds that I hear in the 'real' world cease to become recorded sounds produced in a studio, and become the imagined sounds of the scene.

Sartre's rationale for making this distinction between the modes of perception and imagination is his description of their respective characteristics of *observation* and *quasi-observation*: the object of perception, he claims, is encountered from one perspective and allows for multiple possible perspectives, and therefore new details and understandings, while the object of imagination is given all at once, without details, and has 'a kind of essential poverty[;] the different elements of an image maintain no relations between themselves: those, for example, that I could note, or those that it is presently important to retain' (2004: 9): I can imagine a cricket, but I can never scrutinise my imaginary insect and be surprised by the fact that it is male, whereas I had initially thought it female – such a discovery would only be possible were I to reconceive of my imaginary cricket as a new, female image. In this regard, Merleau-Ponty seems to agree with Sartre, citing him directly and suggesting that:

> In the realm of imagination, I have no sooner formed the intention of seeing than I already believe that I have seen. The imaginary has no depth, and does not respond to our efforts to vary our points of view; it does not lend itself to our observation. We never have a hold upon it (Merleau-Ponty 2002: 377).

While this statement can certainly apply to the imagination of individual objects, its application to the experience of dramatic worlds can be queried; a piece of radio drama is not simply an arrangement of imagined or imaginary objects, but presents a world of its own, in the totality of its worldhood, and from a dynamic, constantly-unfolding temporal perspective. When I listen to the radio scene, my stance toward the words of the scene changes as it progresses: when I hear the crickets and the footsteps, I perceive the night. Then, my position changes as I discover that those present are a man and a woman, and that the moon is shining. Later, I locate myself in relation to the house when it is mentioned by the characters. Hearing the intonation of their voices changes my perception of them through time. Yet, I do not perceive these as separate elements, but as an interconnected given whole, consisting of backgrounds and figures: as the scene unfolds, the couple appear against the background of the night, and against each other, and against the presence of the house in the distance. When the man speaks, I am aware of someone there, but it is only when the woman speaks that I recognise her as a woman – a new figure, that changes my perception of the whole of the scene. Furthermore, there are no splits, delays, or processes between my bodily grasp of the material presence of

the sound of the radio and my perception of the world presented to me; I do not need to re-imagine the scene when the voice of the woman appears, in order to place her among the other elements of the world – her figure simply emerges and places itself in the given whole of the dramatic world, adjusting my perspective unto and my awareness of the scene. Throughout the scene, these individual elements appear to me not as immediately-grasped independent wholes, but as changes in the inter-related totality of objects – a world onto which I have a perspective: to access the woman in my imagination, for example, I first have to separate her from the backdrop of the man and the night, and from the voice through which I am aware of her presence. While my position regarding this world does not allow me some of the possible variances in perspective that my body schema enables me to assume in my own world, my perception is still not complete at the moment of intention: it shapes and forms through time, through the interrelation of old and new elements and changing perspectives.

While I do not have bodily access to the material world of the scene in the same manner as my own, I still have a material grip on it the form of being able to hear its sounds, through time, and in an opaque manner, in that my awareness of the interconnected elements of the world expands as new figures and backgrounds emerge. Hence, my experience of the radio play is described better by Merleau-Ponty's account of perception than by Sartre's idea of imagination: what I hear is not an image of the dramatic world heard in the imaginary mode, but the dramatic world itself, encountered perceptually in the natural attitude. Indeed, my encounter is best described not by the passage cited above, but by the way in which the passage continues, comparing perception to imagination:

> In every perception, on the other hand, it is the material itself which assumes significance and form. If I wait for someone at a door in a poorly lit street, each person who comes out has an indistinct appearance. *Someone* is coming out, and I do not yet know whether I can recognize him as the person I am waiting for. The familiar figure will emerge from this nebulous background as the earth does from a ground mist. The real is distinguishable from our fictions because in reality the significance encircles and permeates matter (Merleau-Ponty 2002:377).

The question, then, still remains: if, as I have argued, my experience of the dramatic world *as* a world is not a representation, or an object of imagination, or

the direct encounter of my lived body with a world, then how do I still experience it as a world?

Here, I want to present a description that may at first appear somewhat eccentric: should we agree that I experience the dramatic world of the radio as a world being perceived as I would perceive it with my body, and considering that I am not embodied in that world, I posit that we can describe the dramatic world as being perceived *by the radio itself*. After all, why should we create intermediary concepts like representation and imagination to explain how I can have a perspective on the dramatic world, when in my experience, the perspective is clearly being offered to me *by* the radio? The radio play does not present itself to me as an imaginary object or an analogon, but – to use a term Merleau-Ponty employs to describe cinema in *Film and the New Psychology* – as a 'perceptual object': a material presence that expresses a perception, and which I perceive as perception (1964: 54). When I listen to radio drama, I am listening to a world, but it is not *my* world because I do not perceive it directly through my lived body; nevertheless, I still make sense of it *as* a world, because it is being perceived by the structure of sound that I hear. In other words, I do not listen to the dramatic world directly, but listen to the radio itself, while it is engaged in the act of perceiving the dramatic world through listening. In doing so, I am aware of my world because I am present in it, and I am aware of the dramatic world, because *the radio* is listening to it. The radio is present in both worlds: it has a perspective in the dramatic world, actively perceiving it by listening, and it is simultaneously in my presence, expressing its perception of the dramatic world by making its own listening audible to me. In short, radio listens, and I listen to it listen.

This claim seems to be open to two obvious critiques: firstly, that it rests on the seemingly counter-intuitive postulation that radio drama is a being that has the ability to listen to the world *as* a world, just like I do, indicating that it would have to be similarly-embodied being in that world like I am in mine, and secondly, that I am assuming that this being's perception of the world can be directly perceptible by me – that is, I can perceive its world *as* a world – which itself would be grounded on the idea that my perception and another's can be directly expressed, perceived and exchanged. These foundations, however, can be supported by the phenomenological account given by Merleau-Ponty in his later works, where he argues that both the

fundamental separation of perception and the perceived, and the assumption of the unidirectionality of the relationship between the two, are invalidated in the experience of the world in the natural attitude. In the next section, I expand upon this concept and its relation to my claim.

2.3.1. The dramatic world as expression

In *The Visible and the Invisible* (1968), Merleau-Ponty presents an even more fundamental basis for the description of being given in *The Phenomenology of Perception*: while the latter argues that perception is only possible as a result of being embodied *in* the world, in the former, Merleau-Ponty moves further away from the distinction between the body and the world, arguing that the precondition for the body's perception in the world is that the body is *of* the world; that is, has the same qualities of perceptibility as that of the world. He introduces the metaphor of *the flesh* to describe this precondition: he argues that in the most basic, primordial phenomenological description of the experience of the world in the natural attitude, the perceiver and the perceived are not separate types of being, but share the fundamental quality of perceptibility – they are made of the same *flesh*. The world and bodily existence in, and perception of, the world are therefore, in Carman's words, 'related to one another not as situation and reaction (not to mention stimulus and response), but as a single woven texture' (2008: 124). Merleau-Ponty's name for this relationship is *chiasm* – an intertwined, reversible bond, rather one with separate roles for the perceiver and the perceived.

The pertinence of these ideas for the problems discussed in the last section becomes clear when we note that it blurs the boundaries between *my* world, *another's* world or *the* world; after all, I, the other, and the world all share the same fundamental perceptibility of the flesh – as Merleau-Ponty puts it, if 'we no longer make belongingness to one same "consciousness" the primordial definition of sensibility' (1968:142), but agree that all forms of consciousness are first determined by the characteristic of being *flesh*, then the world is not simply limited to the world of *my* consciousness, but can include that of others as well, without the need for translation or adaptation. To highlight and clarify how this idea can explain the experience of radio drama, let us look at the example, given by Merleau-Ponty, of how perception can surpass the boundaries of individual consciousness:

> It is said that the colours, the tactile reliefs given to the other, are for me an absolute mystery, forever inaccessible. This is not completely true; for me to have not an idea, an image, nor a representation, but as it were the imminent experience of them, it suffices that I look at a landscape, that I speak of it with someone. Then, through the concordant operation of his body and my own, what I see passes into him, this individual green of the meadow under my eyes invades his vision without quitting my own, I recognize in my green his green, as the customs officer recognizes suddenly in a traveller the man whose description he had been given. There is here no problem of the *alter ego* because it is not I who sees, not *he* who sees, because an anonymous visibility inhabits both of us, a vision in general, in virtue of that primordial property that belongs to the flesh (Merleau-Ponty 1968: 142).

The key function of this example is to demonstrate how one's presumably-inaccessible perceptual experience – that is, the intentional understanding of the world from the perspective of the other's lived body – is understandable, immanently and not representationally, to another, because they are, in Merleau-Ponty's terms, fundamentally of the same *flesh* as each other and the landscape they face. The boundaries between the two perceiving parties are blurred: when the 'I' speaks of the green, the 'other' does not perceive the speaking 'I' referring to the green, but his perception of the green itself. This can present a solution to one of the critiques raised in the previous section, of how it is possible for me to perceive another's perception as a world: the world that I hear on the radio is, by virtue of being perceptible, of the same flesh as I am, and is thus directly perceivable by me. I do not perceive the radio expressing its perception of the dramatic world, but simply the perception itself. If I focus my attention, reflectively, on the radio device and the sounds it emits instead of the dramatic world, I may be able to stop perceiving the world and instead identify and examine individual sounds as they leave the speaker, in the same way that the 'other' might have stopped listening to the description of the green and focused instead on the grammatical structure of the words or the elements of the speaker's face – however, this would require me to assume a reflective attitude toward the world, the radio and the speaker.

The second significant point lays in the fact that the sharing of this perception occurs when the 'I' in the example *speaks of* the green – that is, expresses a perception – to the other. What follows is not a process of decoding, or understanding, speech by the other, through which the content of the expression and thus the original perception are retrieved, but the imminent perception of the

green as expressed. When I listen to the radio, I am not only in the presence of the sounds of a world, but I hear the world being expressed: out of the infinite sounds audible in the world, I hear particular ones – the crickets, the footsteps, the voices – that expresses one perspective and rules out all others. The individual sounds I hear within this perspective express a perception of a night, of outdoors, of wet grass under the feet of the couple. Similarly, when I listen to the characters talk of a lake and a house in the moonlit scene, without resorting to an analysis of signs or acts of identification, I know of the lake and the house – they are part of the dramatic world as much as the people and the sounds to whom I listen. The world that I hear when I experience this structure is heard from a specific point and with a particular intent – here, to listen to the couple in the moonlit night – which implies that it is being listened to not from any general stance, but from a perspective assumed by a specific listener. In short, my experience of the dramatic world of radio *as* a world occurs when I direct myself toward its sound structure not as sound, but as the expression of the perceptions of an *other*.

At this point, it would be useful to recall Home-Cook's idea that how the listener experiences radio drama is dependent on how she directs herself toward it. Critiquing this in Section 2.2, I argued that the structure of this mode of direction should be investigated. Here, I am positing the result of this investigation: that the particular mode of listening that leads to the experience of a holistic, pre-reflective dramatic world in the listener's phenomenal field – in other words, radio drama – is one where she directs herself toward the radio not as a device, or a particular set of sounds or codes, or a noise in the background of her daily life, but as an *other* akin to that in Merleau-Ponty's example, expressing an embodied perception of a dramatic world.

At first sight, it may be assumed that by this *other*, I am referring to the dramaturge who has arranged this structure of sound in order to present this perspective. This, however, can be problematised: the expressed perception that I encounter is of a dramatic world that, by virtue of being fictitious, is equally inaccessible to the dramaturg's body; she, too, can only encounter it through directing herself toward the sound structure that she has created as the expression of an other's perception. Furthermore, when I encounter the scene, I may not know of the dramaturge, or her intent in the construction of the scene, and yet I still

encounter the dramatic world. It takes an act of reflection to remind me that the sound structure that I perceive is only there due to a creative and practical process; should I direct myself toward particular sounds as evidence of choices made during the process of dramaturgy, I stop perceiving the dramatic world *as* a world. As my perception of the dramatic world is arising directly from my encounter with the radio sound rather than its creator, in describing it phenomenologically, ascribing my experience to its source – the radio – seems a more accurate statement: it is not the radio practitioner to whose listening I listen, but the radio.

This conclusion, of course, has not addressed the first problem raised at the end of the previous section: unlike the 'other' mentioned in Merleau-Ponty's example, radio drama is not a human being, and is thus unable to either perceive or express the dramatic world in the way that I the listener – another human being – can share. In response to this, it should first be asserted that assuming that only a human being can express a perception would be to disregard the key basis of the idea of *the flesh*: the perceptibility of an expression does not rely on it being expressed by a specific type of being – after all, all perceptible beings, whether conscious or not, whether human or not, are not fundamentally different, but strands of the same flesh. By virtue of being perceptible, I can understand the perception of all perceptible things within the natural attitude: my perception of what surrounds me – for example, the walls, the door, and the computer – is only possible because I am similarly perceptible by them; indeed, I am only aware of my position in relation to my surroundings, and my perspective towards them, because I am aware of their relation and perspective toward me.

It is true, however, that as discussed previously, the perception of the world *as* a world relies on bodily presence in the world; the third significant issue to note in the example is that the shared perception is achieved through the concordant operation of the two similar bodies, in a way that would not be possible with, for example, a sandwich: the sandwich and I are of the same flesh, and so I can perceive it, touch it, and move it around, but it cannot perceive the green of the landscape. Even a dog, who can run with me in the field, or perceive me from the other side of the field, or be aware of its own perspective toward the field, cannot understand me if I tell it of the green of the landscape, seeing as our bodies differ widely in our ability to perceive and express the world. This leaves open the question: how can I

possibly make direct sense of the world expressed to me on the radio, if it is not an embodied being?

Here, I argue, the question is asking for an explanation rather than a description: should we remain with phenomenological description, the fact that the sound structure of radio drama becomes perceptible to the listener *as* a world reveals that it is perceived by an embodied being; the sound structure of the drama expresses a bodily encounter with the world, which is structured like my own sonic encounter with the world. When I listen to the scene examined in the previous sections, I listen to the expression of a perceiving being who is listening to the world from a particular auditory perspective: it is there, in the world, listening to the couple walk on the grass in the moonlit night. I know this because I too have an auditory perspective on the world, in that I can be in the world, listen to it, make sense of it, and position myself within it – listening is an essential part of my mode of bodily existence. The fact that I can understand radio's expression as the perception of a world reveals that, like the *other* in Merleau-Ponty's example, the radio drama and my body are operating in a concordant manner, resulting in a sharing of the perception of the dramatic world: I hear the couple walking on the grass on a moonlit night in the dramatic world.

It is important to highlight the significance of such a position for this thesis: if the dramatic world makes sense to me by virtue of radio's auditory perspective within it – in other words, the way the world is being listened to – and if this perspective is achieved through the sound structure of the radio drama, then the process of radio dramaturgy can be described as structuring, orchestrating, and realising this act of listening. In this case, the radio dramaturge's task is to determine how the radio play listens, and how it expresses its own act of listening. This assertion is in contrast to the theories assessed in Chapter 1, where radio dramaturgy could be defined as a process of arranging signs or creating visual images through sound; where the idea of *theatre of the mind* implies that this type of dramaturgy leads to a sound structure necessitated by the medium, the position put forward in this chapter understands its outcome simply as one particular mode of listening.

But first, there are questions to address: how is radio drama able to listen to the world in a way that is perceivable by me? In other words, what is it about radio

drama that differentiates it from any other sound that I may hear, and transforms it into a structured expression of the perception of a dramatic world? After all, there are sounds that appear to me from a particular point of audition – for example, what I hear through the telephone, or during a news broadcast – but that do not appear to me as a world. To address this point, in the next section, I draw from a phenomenology of film experience to argue that by virtue of its dramaturgical mediatisation, radio drama gains an embodied quality, which allows it the expression of a lived body perception. Radio drama, I want to argue, has an invisible, yet perceptible – *fleshed* – radio-body, that in turn allows it to have a body schema.

2.3.2. The radio-body

In *Address of the Eye* (1992), Vivian Sobchack draws from Merleau-Ponty's ideas to make a similar assertion about film to that which I have claimed: '[w]hat we look at projected on the screen […] addresses us as the expressed perception of an anonymous, yet present, "other"' (Sobchack 1992: 9). She then discusses the manner in which one experiences being in the world through vision, in order to show that the structures of cinematic expression follow the same patterns: just like the spectator, the film looks, listens, moves, follows, and generally has an intentional relationship with the world it perceives. The film on the screen, she argues, is both viewing a world and being viewed by the spectator: hence, 'there are always two embodied acts of vision at work in the theatre, two embodied views […]. The film's vision and my own do not conflate, but meet in the sharing of a world […]' (Sobchack 1992: 24). This is a similar argument to the one I made Section 2.3.1: while I listen to the radio's expression of the dramatic world to which it listens through its sound structure, and through the act of listening, share the perception of that dramatic world, I do not give up my perception of my own world in exchange for the dramatic world. As to how this is possible, Sobchack makes this proposition:

> The film […] is more than "pure" vision. Its existence as a "viewing-view/viewed-view" implicates a "body." Realised by the physical presence of the camera at the scene of the cinematography yet not the same as the camera, the film's "body" need not be visible in its vision—just as we are not visible in our vision as it accomplishes its visual grasp of things other than itself (Sobchack 1992: 133).

After all, if to have a world, one must be a body, then the fact that cinema presents a world can be explained by understanding film *as* a body. She continues this by arguing that unlike the bodies of others – such as the 'other' looking at the

meadow in Merleau-Ponty's example – film's "body" expresses its perception in an intrapersonal, 'inside out' form (Sobchack 1992: 138). While the 'I' and the 'other' in Merleau-Ponty's example both face the same landscape for their shared perception, using gesture to express the green, the film's "body" expresses its perception by making visible what it views, in the same way that it views, and with a manner of viewing that is shared with the spectator. Again, as per my similar argument in the previous section, it should be pointed out that as the 'inside' and the 'outside' – that is, the perceptible body and the generally imperceptible perception – are, according to Merleau-Ponty's metaphor of *chiasm*, not separate realms inaccessible directly to each other, but reversible sides of the same *flesh*; as such, the film's "body" is perceived as a lived body due to the type of perception it expresses.

It would not be difficult, following previous discussions, to conceive of an analogous "body" for radio drama: radio has a perspective on the dramatic world; although structured through a process of radio dramaturgy – in the example used frequently in this chapter, the recording and mixing of sounds such as crickets and footsteps, and the composition of dialogue – and expressed through a playback device, this perspective is nevertheless not perceived by the listener as the perspective of the producer, the writer, the microphone, or the device. Instead, I listen to a lived body as it expresses what it perceives in the act of listening to the dramatic world; a body who presents its own perception 'inside-out', allowing me to hear what it hears.

It is essential to highlight the fact that what is referred to here as 'the lived body' should not be mistaken for the 'body image' – that is, body as perceived, known and analysed *by* me: limbs, flesh, brain functions, neurons, etc.; after all, it is clear that the body of the human listener and the mechanics of the radio's apparatus are fundamentally different. 'The body' here instead refers to what Merleau-Ponty dubs 'body schema', which consists of the antepredicative awareness, possibilities and capabilities of operational intentionality (2002: 239) – separating figure and ground, looking, listening, moving, performing, expressing – which *I* have, by virtue of being in the world as a body, and which allow me to have a grasp on the world, perceive it, and make sense of things, including my own body image. From a phenomenological perspective, it is the body schema, and not the body image, which

allows me to intend toward the world: before I know that I am looking with my eyes, I am aware that I *can look*. The radio, therefore, need not share my body image in order for me to make sense of its perception as a lived body – it simply needs to have the same body schema; the same grasp on the world. I shall examine and argue for the existence of this shared body schema extensively in the next section. I should first address the fact that to have a body schema, I first need to be embodied and perceptible: The foundational basis of my ability to perceive with my body schema is the fact that I am incarnated in the world; that I am flesh. Here, it can be asked: how can radio drama, a body-less temporal flow of sound, be considered embodied? Where, in other words, is the material body that makes it possible for radio to have any kind of body schema at all?

Here, Sobchack's account continues with another useful suggestion: she posits that the film's body is both expressed and is manifested through, and shaped fundamentally by, cinematic technology. Here, she draws from Ihde's (1986) idea of 'instrument-mediated perception' (Sobchack 1992: 171): when I look through a camera to see a view, my perception is *of* that view, and not of the camera, but the camera itself is never completely incorporated into my perception, and always leaves an 'echo focus', a tacit externality, in the way that it structures my view (Ihde in Sobchack 1992: 186). Sobchack argues that in the encounter with film, the spectator's perception is mediated in layers: firstly, what is perceived – the world expressed by the film – is perceived through the instrument of projection that, although effective in that one can perceived the perception being expressed, nevertheless cannot be fully incorporated, and has an *echo focus* in the form of the spectator's awareness of the rectangularity of the screen, the seats of the cinema and so on. Secondly, the world expressed by the film is in itself produced through the mediation of instruments: the camera, the editing suite, the mixing deck and the general apparatus of cinematic production employed by the filmmaker to perceive the world of the film, each of which leaves its own *echo focus* effect. These instances of *echo focus* in cinematic expression mean that it would be incorrect to assume that the spectator perceives what the filmmaker or the camera has perceived; instead, 'the *radical* and *primary* perceptual correlations that is visible as film' – that is, the spectator's perception of the world as expressed – 'is a correlation not *mediated* by instruments, but *enabled* by them' (Sobchack 1992: 204). She goes on to claim: 'in a sense quite different than relating cinematic technology to our own human bodies,

the mechanisms and technological instrumentation of the cinema can be understood as the *film's body*, functioning as its sensing and sensible being at and in the world' (Sobchack 1992: 205). The film's various instruments of perception are not simply mechanical and theoretical, but have their own body schema, structured in accordance with the perceptual capacities of these instruments – seeing, moving, hearing, attending – which is shared to some extent by the body schema of the spectator, but is nevertheless unique due to the *echo focus* of the instruments.

Here, again, analogies can be drawn between the idea of the film's body, and the technological instruments of radio recording, mixing and broadcast, and manners of structuring sound through them. The microphone, the recording studio, the ability to fade in or out, or to approach characters, and other features of the sound structure afforded to it by the apparatus, and the particular instruments through which the sound reaches the listener, each leave their own echo focus on the final structure of the sounds that I encounter when I listen to radio drama, as well as the means through which I encounter them. This combination of the sound structure and the technological apparatus, together, construct a body, with a body schema like mine - this is what allows me to direct myself toward the radio not as a source of sound or a device, but as a lived body like my own, and from the same *flesh*. The radio device through which I listen to the radio drama is the material site of both the perception that is expressed – like Merleau-Ponty's green landscape – and the perceiver expressing it, the speaking 'I'. The dramatic world is both perceived and presented to me through the technological apparatus of the medium, but only when I encounter it not as pieces of technology and practice, but as an embodied *other*. I shall label this phenomenon the *radio-body* – the technologically-embodied being that listens to the dramatic world, and expresses its listening to me.

It is important to highlight that I am not arguing that the mere presence of a particular sound structure as encountered through the radio apparatus results in the perception of a radio-body. As noted in Sections 2.2. and 2.3.1. the possibility of the listener's encounter with the dramatic world rests on a particular mode of direction. If I listen to the scene of people walking in a field at night while speaking to my mother on the phone, I may not experience the radio-body expressing its perception, even though I am hearing every sound that emanates from my device. In fact, even if the sound of the piece is all I can hear, I may still be unable to

experience the radio-body if I am listening for particular sounds – for example, if my concern is not to experience the dramatic world, but to identify the type of cricket in the background. The ability to direct myself toward radio *as* the radio-body, then, is part of my body schema.

This point also highlights another important aspect about listening to radio drama: it would be incorrect to assume that the particular mode of listening that leads to the perception of a radio-body is somehow an essential bodily ability – after all, the body schema itself is not an essential structure, but as Merleau-Ponty observes, contains within it particular modes of bodily direction that have become part of it due to repetition – what he describes as *sedimentation*; as he remarks, the body schema is 'precisely that familiarity with the world born out of habit, that implicit or sedimentary body of knowledge' (2002: 277). My ability to walk, to speak English, and to play the guitar – all part of my body schema in that they are modes of pre-reflective bodily directedness toward the world – have all been sedimented within it in different stages of my life. I am, however, unable to drive, despite the fact that my body is able to perform every move that is required of a driver; this is because the ability to direct myself toward the world as a driver in a car is not sedimented in my body schema. Similarly, one's body schema may or may not have sedimented the ability to direct oneself toward the sound structure played on the apparatus of radio in order to perceive it as a radio-body. Should I, for example, play the short scene of the moonlight walk to someone who has never encountered a radio before, her experience may not be of a dramatic world, but merely of a device of out which the voices of people can be hear. The radio-body, then, emerges out of the abilities sedimented in the body schema in contingent cultural and historical contexts.

The idea of the radio-body is central to this thesis not only because it describes the listener's perceptual encounter with the dramatic world of radio beyond the limits of theoretical constructs, but because it can provide a new perspective on the structure of the radio drama sound, and thus, the process of radio dramaturgy: after all, not all ways of structuring sound may create a radio-body; a recording of a music performance, or an audiobook, or even of a radio panel show, while using the same technological instruments as radio drama, do not present

them in a dramatic world [15] – while listening to them, the listener employs the radio device solely as an instrument of perception, because the sound presented through the device has not been structured to express a lived body perception of a world. In the previous section, I posited that radio dramaturgy can be described as the structuring of sounds in order to realise an act of listening – here, this description can be refined: the process of radio dramaturgy is one of creating, structuring and controlling the schema and the actions of the radio-body that listens to the dramatic world. In this case, what, one might ask, are the structures that allow radio drama to gain a body schema and become a radio-body?

Here, Sobchack's project can suggest some guidance for ways to answer this question. Firstly, by giving the apparatus of the medium an essential role in the formation of the film's body, she makes it clear that the structure of the world as presented by the medium and its technology are inexorably linked. In the case of radio drama, understanding the sound structure can only make sense in the context of the technological possibilities available in the process of dramaturgy, and in the mode of transmission and playback. Secondly, in order to explore how the spectator encounters the film's body through sight, Sobchack first explores, in depth, how one exists in the world, and has a world, in vision. After all, the film's body's expressions are perceptible as expressions of a dramatic world because the film's body, too, exists in the world in vision. Sobchack argues that understanding the experience of film requires a comprehension of 'how the act of seeing is entwined intimately with the act of being, how seeing *incarnates* being and connects it with the visible world in a living engagement' (1992: 51).

It is here that Sobchack's project becomes somewhat problematic: although she explicitly rejects a separation of senses and discusses the synaesthetic nature of experience (Sobchack 1992: 76), she nevertheless concentrates on vision as the

[15] This point can also shed some light on the distinction between diegesis and mimesis posited by Aristote, which has already been discussed in the Introduction. As Wittkower's (2011) phenomenology of the audiobook shows, there are many ways of directing oneself toward an audiobook: I can listen to the voice, accent, or inflections, or instead direct myself toward what is being read, but in all of these instances my experience is directed toward a body speaking rather than a body perceiving. Of course, I can then attempt to imagine, by directing myself toward the speaking body's words as analogons for perception. This, however, occurs in what Sartre terms the *imaging mode*, rather than the perceptual mode that, as I have argued, characterises dramatic experience. This is evident in the fact that in order to imagine the words of the speaker as a world, I need to maintain this mode consciously; as Sartre points out, after all, 'only a formal will can prevent consciousness from slipping from the level of the image to that of perception' (2004: 51).

founding modality of the experience of film; in fact, Steven Connor notes that sound is discussed only twice in the whole of Sobchack's book (2000). For her, the characteristics that make film's body a lived body, have more affinity with vision: it can look directionally, take objects in view without interference, separate figure and ground at will. These are all modes of viewing that depend on vision's qualities of distance, neutrality and simultaneity; the film's body expresses its perception through an act of *showing*. Being and seeing are, for Sobchack, entwined in a way that other modalities are not. To support the assertion that radio drama, too, is perceived through the expression of the radio-body, it must first be asserted that the act of *listening,* too, makes it possible for a being to engage in the world, and to perceive the world *as* a world.

In the next section, I describe how the lived body's encounter with sounds brings about a perception of the world and of itself. Through a phenomenological exploration of auditory experience, I note the similarities and the difference between my encounters with the world of sound, and those of the radio-body, and argue that the radio-body and I share the same *auditory schema*.

2.4. Radio and the auditory schema

In the previous section, I argued that the radio listener can perceive the radio-body's perception of the dramatic world because the two share a body schema. Nonetheless, the idea that the radio-body can share my body schema seems somewhat problematic at first glance, seeing as the radio appears to be materially incapable of encountering the world in the manner that my body allows me. The radio-body cannot see, does not appear to move physically, and does not occupy space in the way my body does – and these are only a few examples of the many capabilities that allow me to be in the world, perceive it as a world, and engage with it. As Cazeaux's arguments about the experience of blindness reveal, however, it is not necessary to share the exact sense modalities in order to have access to the world; a blind person can be in, and make sense of, the world in a similar manner to me, even though the way the world opens itself to her is different to the way it appears to me –because the two of us still exist as bodies in a world, and by virtue of our body schemata, have a perspective upon it. Sensory modalities, after all, are not separate or independent, but act in an interconnected, holistic, synaesthetic manner as 'world-openings' (Cazeaux 2005: 163). Therefore, the radio-body need

not share the exact schema of the listener's body in order to be understood; the listener can make sense of the radio-body's expressed perception despite the differences, so far as the latter's body schema allows it to exist in, and subsequently to have a perspective on, the world.

Here, I posit that the radio-body indeed exists in, and has a perspective on, the dramatic world through its ability to *listen*. When I listen to a radio play, I listen to the radio-body listening to the dramatic world. The radio-body's ability to perceive, navigate and understand its world through sound, its single sensory modality of accessing the world, allows it to exist in that world in the same way that I can exist in mine through my ability to listen. The radio and its listener, therefore, can be said to share an *auditory schema*: the auditory modes of direction available to one's body schema that enable one to have an intentional relationship with the world through the experience of sound. It is this schema that makes it possible for the dramatic world of the radio to be perceived *as a world*. In this section, I describe the listener's auditory schema in detail, and highlight the similarities between this schema and the way in which radio drama is structured. Thus, I argue that it can be said that radio *listens*.

To pursue this argument, let us begin where, according to Merleau-Ponty, the primary structure of perception lies: in the figure/ground structure of the phenomenal field. At first, the concepts of *figure* and *ground* may appear to have distinctly visual connotations, but in the next subsection, I want to argue that my primordial encounter with sound is indeed characterised by such a structure and, by virtue of being open to sounds, it can be shared by the radio.

2.4.1. The sounds of the world

How do I hear the sounds of the world? On reflection, I am aware of the fact that as a body, I am constantly surrounded by sounds; not only am I in the presence of various audible vibrations of the air of my environment, but my own body is audible to me. Composer John Cage narrates how, upon entering an anechoic chamber – a room designed to completely silent, used for scientific purposes – he 'heard two sounds, one high and one low', and when enquiring about them from the engineer, learnt that 'the high one was [his] nervous system in operation, and the low one [his] blood circulation' (Cage 1961: 8). Experiencing silence, it seems, is impossible from a theoretical perspective, as I am always in the presence of

something audible. And yet, what is audible is not necessarily heard as sound. In his exploration of theatre sound, Ross Brown defines all that is audible as *vibration* – 'the wave energy that contains the analogue history of kinetic activity within the radius of an earshot' (2011: 4). He argues that in order for these vibrations to become sounds, they have to be perceived by a listener, as 'any meaning made and exchanged through sounding and hearing is contingent, always, on an aural presence at the eventual end of the signal chain' (2011: 4). Sounds are, therefore, characterised by their *aurality* – each sound is perceived as a sound only because it is *heard,* and made sense of, in a certain manner. Here, it can be asked: how does one make sense of vibration as sound?

At first glance, it may be assumed that the answer to this question is to be found in the discipline of psychoacoustics, the study of auditory perception, which draws from physics, physiology, and psychology in order to develop theories of how particular vibrations are perceived as sounds. Various perceptual models have been proposed for process that results in the perception of certain sounds out of certain vibrations. [16] My question here, however, is phenomenological: I do not ask for an explanation of *why* I perceive sounds in the way that I do – after all, I cannot argue that the radio-body shares my neurology and psyche. Instead, I seek a description of what it is like to experience sound out of all that is audible, as the sound structure of radio can resemble this description. To clarify this point, let us take the example of Albert Bregman, whose model of auditory scene analysis understands listening as a process by which sounds are isolated – or streams of sound 'segregated' (1994:18) – with some frequencies, tones and rhythms then segmented together an perceived as sounds. Bregman argues that this model can explain phenomena such as

> timbre constancy. A friend's voice has the same perceived timbre in a quiet room as at a cocktail party. Yet at the party, the set of frequency components arising from that voice is mixed at the listener's ear with frequency components from other sources […] To recognize the unique timbre of the voice we have to isolate the frequency components that are responsible for it from others that are present at the same time (1994:2).

[16] See, for example, Gulick et al (1989), Yost (2013), Schnupp et al (2011), Fastl and Zwicker (2013), and Howard and Angus (2017).

Here, an investigation into the process of isolating these frequency components may tell me *why* I hear my friend's voice in the same timbre, but only because it begins with the phenomenon itself. In fact, the explanation that the model provides does not add to the experience itself: when I talk to my friend at a party, I am not actively attempting to isolate the frequencies responsible, or to perform an auditory scene analysis, and yet I can still hear her voice without difficulty. To pursue my argument that the radio-body and I share an auditory schema, a description of the encounter with the world of sound in its first-person, primordial experience is required.

Heidegger argues that within all that is audible, my primordial experience of listening is that of distinct sounds that make sense to me within the context of a world.

> What we 'first' hear is never noises or complexes of sounds, but the creaking wagon, the motor-cycle. We hear the column on the march, the north wind, the woodpecker tapping, the fire crackling. It requires a very artificial and complicated frame of mind to 'hear' a 'pure noise'.
>
> (Heidegger 1962: 207)

Heidegger holds this mode of hearing – which he labels *hearkening* – as evidence of our fundamental relationship with the world as beings in it: I do not hear vibration, but sounds that are part of the world in which I am present, and with which I engage; I hear the things in the world because as a being in the world, I understand it as a totality of interconnected elements, each of which make sense to me in relation to each other, and to me. I am aware of these interrelations because I have an aural history in this world: I know what the creaking wagon and the woodpecker are, and how they sound; thus, as Brown would put it I am 'culturally equipped' (2011: 3) to make sense of these individual sounds through hearkening.

In their exploration and classification of the everyday details of the experience of sounds, Agouyard and Torgue provide useful terminology with which to discuss the phenomenon of hearkening: they describe the ability to perceive some sounds out of the myriad of what is audible in terms of the two complementary *sonic effects* of 'asyndeton' and 'synecdoche'; the former is the 'deletion from the perception or memory of one or many sound elements in an audible whole' (2005: 26), while the latter is 'the ability to valorise one specific

element [of the audible] through selection [...] produced by simple acoustic vigilance, by the determination of a predominant functional criterion, or by adhesion to a cultural schema establishing a hierarchy' (2005:123-4). [17]

In Heidegger's example, we can observe asyndeton and synecdoche in action: when I hearken to the tapping of the woodpecker, I am also in the presence of the noises of other animals, the wind howling through the trees, my own heartbeat, and countless other sounds. Yet, through synecdoche, I hear the woodpecker as part of this whole, and through asyndeton, I can separate it from the rest. It should be noted that, I do not begin with the whole of the audible, the noises and complexes of sound, and then *perform* these sonic effects in order to identify the woodpecker – in my fundamental encounter with the auditory world, synecdoche and asyndeton are always present; far from being occasional, deliberative events in the sphere of everyday sonic experience, the two effects are 'at the basis of any interpretation of the sound environment because they make it possible to create a gap between the physical sound of reference and the object of listening' (Agouyard and Torgue 2005: 124). While listening, I am aware that I can shift my attention and perform deliberate acts of hearkening: I can, for example, push the woodpecker out of my field of audition through asyndeton, and instead perform synecdoche in order to hear the wind, albeit with some effort. By doing this, however, I am not initiating the process of the separation of sounds from all that is audible, but merely continuing it by repositioning myself within my auditory world.

Still, the fact that I can hear the bird tapping on the wood, as opposed to a simple rhythm, or a pencil being struck against the desk, only becomes possible *by* the presence of other sounds: the noises of the forest that surround me, while not present in my perception of the bird, are what provide the context in which I can make sense of the sound that I hear. This, in turn, is because I am able to hearken to the sounds of a forest, and to make sense of them in the context of my wider awareness of the world – of what a forest is, and how it fits alongside other elements of the world. When the bird is presented to me through synecdoche, the sounds subject to asyndeton are not *absent*, but in the background, and still providing me

[17] Agouyard and Torgue's concepts are new, and somewhat uncommon, terms with which to describe a phenomenon that has been conceptualised in different ways in debates around sound and auditory perception – most commonly, in terms of the 'cocktail party effect'. I find these terms move useful, however, as they align with the perceptual structures of figure and ground.

with context; after all, without them, the woodpecker would be unidentifiable *as* a woodpecker. Thus, we can describe the object of synecdoche as *figures* and the objects of asyndeton as the *ground* of auditory experience, similar in structure to the wider phenomenal field that contains them.

To put all of this in terms of the ideas drawn from Merleau-Ponty in the previous sections, my experience of sounds is that of things in the world because I perceive the sounds of the world in an intentional structure, through my phenomenal field. This becomes possible for me because I am embodied in the world in a certain way: the possibility of sonic synecdoche and asyndeton are part of the auditory abilities of my body schema, which allows me access to the world in the form of auditory figures against grounds, and thus enables me to perceive the world *as* a world through hearkening – instead of hearing all that is audible, I hear sounds that already have significance for me. Were I the type of being who does not encounter a world as a world, in its *worldhood* – for example, a microphone – then I would not be able to make sense of those sounds as figures of things in the world, such as the woodpecker, and would instead register all that is audible, ubiquitous or otherwise, as noises and complexes of sounds.

Here, we reach the juncture where the technology of radio – an instrument of perception that does not have a world – can lead to the emergence of the worlded radio-body: while the microphone, the recording studio, and the amplifier are themselves unable to separate the elements of the world from physical sound, they provide the possibility, by virtue of having access to the audible, to perform synecdoche and asyndeton – a potential that is realised through the process of radio dramaturgy. To demonstrate, let us return to the scene used throughout the chapter: let us assume that I am there, during that moonlit night, in the lakeside field, listening to man and the woman. There, surrounded by the many sounds of the night, I focus on the conversation through synecdoche. The sounds of the night are present, but do not overtake, the voices of the couple, through asyndeton. Were I there to listen to the crickets, or to my own heartbeat, then the asyndeton would happen to the voices, allowing me to hearken to the insects or my pulse. I am able to do all of these without reflection, in the natural attitude, due to the possibility afforded to me by my body schema. The radio, too, listens to the scene in a similar manner: it hears the crickets and the footsteps, but they remain in the background,

while the couple's lines appear against them, loud enough to be separated from other sounds such as the crickets, wind, or the couple's breathing, as they are subjected to asyndeton – synecdoche is in operation on the voices through the abilities of the radio instruments. In this way, what I hear is the radio performing an effect that I share as part of my auditory schema, allowing it to hearken to the sounds of the world as figures against grounds. But does the mere presence of synecdoche and asyndeton transform the radio device into the radio-body that can be perceived as present in the dramatic world?

An affirmative response to the question above can be problematic: while a sound structure with a figure-ground relationship may resemble the experience of the world as encountered through one's auditory schema, not every figure-ground structure is evidence of a world; my perception of the world, after all, derives from my embodied engagement in my own world, and my tacit bodily awareness within it, and not vice versa: I have a perspective on the world because I am in it. How, one might ask, can I perceive the radio-body expressing an auditory perspective of the dramatic world when it is not positioned bodily in that world?

My response to this is that I myself am aware of the fact of my bodily presence in the world through auditory experience; synecdoche and asyndeton do not just allow me to perceive figures, but to locate myself in the world and to engage with it. This means that when I direct myself toward the sound structure of synecdoche and asyndeton, I do not perceive merely figures, but the embodied encounter with the world upon which they rely. To address this issue, in the next subsection I explore Jean-Luc Nancy's concept of resonance – the bodily quality of the encounter with sound.

2.4.2. The body and resonance

To understand how the auditory schema can locate the body within the world, let us return momentarily to Heidegger's description of the primordial experience of sounds. In response to his characterisation of our encounter with sounds as the hearkening to meaningful figures, as opposed to hearing all that is audible, a detractor may object: surely, I cannot make sense of every sound that I perceive? After all, John Cage may hear the high and low sounds of his own body and not be able to make sense of them *as* the different operations of his body the way I make sense of the sounds of the woodpecker. When I walk in the streets, my

attention is often drawn to particular sounds of which I cannot make sense within the totality of my world, but which I still perceive clearly as individual sounds.

One response here could be that I am still hearkening, in the sense that the sounds that I hear still present themselves are separate from all that is audible: synecdoche is still occurring, even if its objects are heard as an unidentified sounds that may need to be explored and comprehended reflectively to be understood; reflecting upon these figure of sound in order to recognise them as the nervous system and the blood is only made possible because they appear as figures. Still, the fact remains that in the interrelated totality of the world in which John Cage is present and engaged, those two sounds are unrelated to anything of which he may be aware, and yet he perceives them as figures. The possibility of hearkening unknown, unidentifiable sounds that do not present themselves as already meaningful raises a question: what is it that makes it possible for me to perceive particular sounds as figures, if it is not the fact that I am already aware of the sense I can make of them?

Here, Nancy's exploration of listening may provide an answer: the experience of sound is not just something that occurs in the world to a listener already present in it – or in a dramatic world, to a radio-body – but the very thing that places the listener within that world. Nancy distinguishes between two types of listening, characterised in the French language by the two verbs *écouter* and *entendre*; while the latter refers to listening in order to understand – to make sense – the former typifies the openness to sound which is the precondition of any type of understanding: it is the ability to encounter *any sound at all*.[18] For Nancy, listening-*écouter* in this sense is more primordial and more significant than listening-*entendre* due to the fact that it is fundamentally bodily; as he describes, in order for me to hear a particular sound, I first need to be open to it, seeing as my encounter with it is not located at the source, but *in me* – to be heard and hearkened, it is not enough for a sound to be emitted in my presence, but it needs to resonate with me, and I with it.

> All sonorous presence is […] made of a complex of returns […] whose binding is the resonance or "sonance" of sounds, an

[18] To maintain this clarification, I will continue to refer to these as listening-ecouter and listening-entendre, instead of using the translations of the two concepts – *hearing* and *listening* – as these terms are already used by this thesis in different ways.

> expression that one should hear as much from the side of the sound itself, or of its emission, as from the side of its reception or its listening: it is precisely from one to the other that it "sounds" (Nancy 2007: 16).

To put this in simpler terms, the possibility of perceiving sounds in a figure-ground structure only arises because my body is open to being affected, and to resonating, with those sounds: before I hearken to the woodpecker, I have to be the type of being who can resonate *with* the woodpecker, and before I hear my nervous system through the operation of synecdoche, I have to be able to engage bodily with its low hum.

I shall return to Nancy's distinction extensively further on in the thesis. Here, however, I want to note that the possibility of listening-*écouter* is a key aspect of aurality: to understand the vibration of all that is audible as sounds, the listener needs to be affected by, and to resonate bodily with, the vibration of the audible. For Nancy, this bodily resonance precedes the hearkening, or any kind of meaningful perception, of sounds: the sound of the woodpecker appears to me through synecdoche not simply because I know it to be the sound of that particular bird, but because it has the ability to affect my body and resonate with it. If I were hard of hearing, for example, the woodpecker's noise would not affect me. Also, were the bird to make its noise next to the loud commotion of the column on the march, it would not be present in my initial perception, as its resonant effect on my body would be masked by the sound of the soldiers' boots; similarly, John Cage is only able to hear the two different tones in the anechoic chamber and nowhere else, because the hum of his body can only resonate with him in the artificial situation of the absence of everything audible.

The idea of resonance becomes significant in providing a response to the question raised at the end of the last section when we note that for Nancy, listening-*encouter* is not only the precondition to listening-*entendre*, but the fundamental ability that makes it possible for the listener to have a *self* - that is, to be open to the world: 'to listen is to enter the spatiality by which, *at the same time*, I am penetrated, for it opens up in me as well as around me, and from me as well as toward me' (Nancy 2007: 14). In other words, through my ability to encounter sounds through resonance, I am able to both perceive the sound, and myself: hearing any sounds at

all only becomes possible because I listen to myself hearing those sounds and resonating with them.

Let us relate this to the previous discussion: to be able to hearken to sounds, my body first has to have the ability to listen-*écouter*, in the sense used by Nancy: it has to be able to resonate with sounds. Therefore, as I hearken to the sounds of the world, I am also placed within the world in relation to them through their resonance: the auditory schema of my body, which allows me to perceive particular sounds against the background of all that is possibly audible, also positions me within this auditory world: it gives me an awareness of my spatial, temporal, and bodily existence relative to the sounds, and thus gives me a perspective on the auditory world. When hearkening to the woodpecker, not only do I realise that there is a woodpecker near me, but I also simultaneously become aware that I am near a woodpecker, and that each time I hear the bird's intermittent rapping on the tree trunks, it has the ability to affect my body in order to make me resonate with it. Indeed, it is only as a result of me being in the proximity of sounds such as that of the woodpecker that I become aware of my own position. Furthermore, should I walk away, or hold my ears, or turn on my music player to drown out the sounds, my position in relation to the sound of the woodpecker, and its relation to me, changes: listening to the woodpecker gives me a perspective on the world.

Following this, radio too can be said to exist in, and have a perspective on, its world through its ability to resonate, as evident in the fact that sounds appear to it in a figure/ground structure. The sounds of crickets and footsteps in the lakeside scene, after all, can only be hearkened to if there is a listening body with which these sounds can resonate. The fact that crickets are heard on the radio immediately implies that there is a body – the radio-body – there in the proximity of crickets and listening to them. When I listen to the footsteps as they gradually approach and mask the sounds of crickets, the radio-body's perspective is revealed to me as static in relation to the approaching couple, as it resonates more and more as they step closer. Thus, by virtue of listening to and resonating with the dramatic world, the radio-body reveals itself as a being that exists in that world and has an auditory perspective on it, similar to my perspective on my own world. My ability to direct myself toward technologically-crafted sound structures of synecdoche and asyndeton, then, arises from the fact that the structure implies presence in a world.

Thus, the auditory schema allows the radio-body to listen and resonate with its world and thus places it within that world, and makes the sharing of its perception of the world with the listener possible. A detractor may argue that there is still a key difference between the radio-body's relationship with the world and that of the listener: while they are both present in it, it seems that former lacks the latter's active engagement with the world. After all, were I to be present personally at the lakeside scene, I would be there as *me*: a research student who would probably be uninterested in the couple's conversation, or in the moonlit night, and might instead be listening for the sounds of the road beside which I have parked my car, or the voices of my friends whom I have been seeking. The couple themselves would not be listening out for me, or for the crickets, and would be engaged in deep conversation. In each of these cases, the sounds that appear to us through the synecdoche and the asyndeton made possible by our body schemata are directly related to, and make sense only within the context of, our engagement with the world. The radio-body, however, does not appear to have such an engagement, instead receiving the sounds passively and without intent, and plays it back.

In response to this, I want to posit that the radio-body, too, is indeed engaged with the world through its acts of attention; like the couple and I, the radio-body engages with, and perceives, the world with an aim: to listen to it. To argue this, in the next section, I discuss the concept of auditory attention, to demonstrate that the radio-body's listening is not passive transmission, but an act.

2.4.3. Auditory attention

To unpack the idea of auditory attention, let us consider an apparent contradiction within the description of the auditory schema presented in the previous two subsections: in Section 2.4.1, I claimed that the auditory schema allows me to perform deliberate, directed acts of synecdoche and asyndeton, whereas in Section 2.4.2. I posited that these effects are only made possible when sounds are able to affect the body and resonate with it. Yet, in my experience, my auditory auditory schema allows me to listen to, be affected by, and resonate with, a faint sound, while surrounded and affected by the loudest of noises. In his phenomenology of sound, Don Ihde argues that this ability to direct and focus auditory attention is a feature of the experience of listening. He notes: 'I auditorily scan the multiplicity varying my attention in terms of the sounds that catch my

attention or in terms of those I seek out. I may narrow or broaden this attentional aspect of auditory focus at will' (2007: 91). For Ihde, 'the concentration attention-direction of listening is a gesture toward silence' (2007: 22); to focus on one sound, I attempt to silence the rest of all that is audible in my field of audition – or to use the terms discussed previously, the processes of synecdoche and asyndeton. Thus, the auditory schema allows me to move the scope of synecdoche and asyndeton deliberately by focusing on particular sounds; I can overcome my resonance with the loud noises of the environment by gesturing toward silence, ceasing my resonance with them, and directing my attention on one particular sound. And yet, the process of auditory attention is never complete: the sounds subject to asyndeton are not silenced, but merely out of focus – as Ihde himself notes, silence is 'the "absence that is never attained"' (2007: 222-3). Hence, the sounds of the background always have the ability to change and resonate with the listener, and disrupt the process of auditory focus.

Ross Brown calls attention to this possibility of disruption in the context of his exploration of theatre sound, attributing it directly to aurality: because sounds are perceived aurally, the relationship between auditory figures and grounds is characterised by *engagement and distraction*. After all, 'unlike the eye, the ear has no mechanical way of focusing', and thus aural perception relies solely on auditory attention (Brown 2011: 5). The figures focused upon by auditory attention are hence always subject to the interruptions of the ground – 'actively "paid" or "given" attention is continuously tugged and grabbed by events in the heard environment […] Sound must therefore be understood as ontologically distracting' (2011: 6). This tug of war between attention and distraction – between figure and ground – is initiated and maintained by the listener in her engagement with the world. When I sit down to watch a film, my attention is focused on the sound emanating in the space despite the interruptions of the doorbell and the noise of the popcorn in my mouth. When I am in class, I gesture toward my inner monologue and the sound of the woodpecker tapping outside to be silent, and focus my attention on the lecturer. In each case, I engage with the world with specific intentions, and utilise the possibilities of my auditory schema in order to focus my attention despite distractions. My bodily acts of auditory attention, in turn, allow me to continue my engagement with the world.

Let us now return to radio drama. Radio, too, has a hypothetical possibility of oscillating between figure and ground: at every moment, the radio-body could be in the presence of many sounds and vibrations within the dramatic world. Through the process of dramaturgy, however, the radio-body maintains its auditory concentration on the objects of its attention in the face of the possibility of distraction which is a feature of aurality: throughout the scene, the radio-body keeps the key elements of its focus audible through synecdoche and performs asyndeton on all other sounds, maintaining its auditory attention. For example, when the couple chat by the side of the lake, the radio-body is not distracted by the cricket, and they remain in the background. Any other sounds potentially present in the scene – for example, the distant rumble of the motorway, or the footsteps of a wandering research student nearby – goes unheard and thus does not feature in the world of the radio-body. The radio-body thus reveals itself as utilising the possibilities presented by its auditory schema in order to actively engage with the world, much like the listener – but whereas the listener's auditory engagement with the world is part of her wider involvement in and with the world – for example, the sound recordist listens to record, and I listen to the lecture to learn – radio's auditory focus on the world demonstrates that the radio-body engages with the dramatic world with the deliberate, specific purpose of *listening* to it: the sounds, the events, the people, the stories.

The idea that radio listens with intent can also open up a possible discussion on *how* radio listens, and what it listens *for*: after all, if the radio-body purposefully engages with the world to listen, it is no longer simply hearkening to sounds known within the context of the world, but actively seeking out sounds within it. As such, it is possible for these sounds to be perceived not in their primordial givenness in the world, but as objects of attention, affect, reflection, deliberation and interpretation. In the next section, I draw from Chion's idea of *listening modes*, to elaborate on this idea, arguing that in its active listening, the radio-body can assume various approaches toward the sounds of the world.

2.4.4. Modes of listening

In his exploration of cinematic sound in *Audio-Vision*, Michel Chion identifies and describes three different modes of listening: *indexical, semantic* and *reduced* – focusing attention on sounds with the aim of identifying their causal sources,

linguistic and semiotic meaning, and their sonorous qualities, respectively (1994: 25). Following the discussions earlier on in Section 2.4.1. it should be clear that I do not consider these to be the primary modes of encountering sounds in the world: Chion appears to take a theoretical approach, and explain the experience of hearing causes, meanings and tones within the audible through the concept of deliberative listening, neglecting the fact that before one listens to sounds through any of these modes, they already feature as meaningful intentional content in the natural attitude. The possibility of attention present in the auditory schema, however, means that the listener can assume these listening modes as secondary acts of intention and identification. For example, a drumbeat may primarily appear to me simply as the sound of a musical instrument with which I am familiar, but through a secondary act of attentive listening, I can identify it as Morse code and intend toward it as language. Similarly, the tapping of a woodpecker appears to me as the sound of the bird, but I can assume a secondary mode of listening, and identify its rhythm. To go back to Heidegger's conception of hearkening, although it may take 'a very artificial and complicated frame of mind to "hear" a "pure noise"' (Heidegger 1962: 207), the auditory schema is able to assume such a frame of mind, in order to intend toward the elements of the auditory world in ways other than the primary mode of encounter. While I cannot encounter the world *as* a world in this attitude, I can nevertheless direct myself toward particular sounds within the world with the specific aim of perceiving them in ways different than what they normally appear to me.

Chion's assertion that there are only three listening modes can also be questioned; many other listening modes can be, and have been, proposed. Ihde, for example, discussed the *imaginative* mode of listening, where auditory attention is focused on sounds which are not present in physical form, but take the form of inner noise and speech; this kind of listening, although not directed toward vibrations, are nevertheless characterised by their aurality, evidenced by the fact that 'if suddenly the sounds of the environment increase in intensity and volume, particularly if not constant, I begin to find a resistance to the maintenance of "inner" focus to "outer" sound' (2007: 132) – to put it in colloquial terms, I will be unable to "hear myself think". Gaver (1993) differentiates between everyday listening, with its primordial intentionality, and musical listening, a secondary listening mode directed toward the same sounds, but with the aim of identifying patterns, textures and tones. Sterne

(2003) traces the histories of various modes of listening – scientific, musical, educational and so forth. Turi, Mustonen and Pirhonen (2007) expand Chion's model, adding listening modes such as reflexive (initial bodily reaction to vibration), empathetic (listening to identify mood), critical (assessing the cultural context of sounds. Each of Chion's modes can even be divided into subsections – for example, Schlesinger (1994) describes three approaches to semantic listening taken by psychoanalysts: listening to language in the context of therapy, in the assumed role of a stranger, and in pursuit of hidden meaning rather than content. Here, it is not my aim to explore and describe all possible modes of listening – such an endeavour would be impossible, seeing as these modes are not fundamental features of perception, but culturally, historically, physically and technologically contingent; a layman, for example, would not be able to assume a psychoanalyst's modes of listening without training, while someone living in the 17th Century would have found it impossible to listen to Morse code in the mode required. Nonetheless, the short list above demonstrates how the auditory schema allows the listener to assume secondary modes of listening to intend toward sounds in particular ways, directing one's attention deliberately to particular synedchdocal figures against asyndetonic grounds.

The radio-body, which shares the listener's auditory schema, is also able to assume different modes of listening. For example, the radio-body can listen to the world indexically, and focus auditory attention on sounds that have clear causes, or it may disregard those and instead focus on linguistic content and sings, or use a combination of both. The radio-body can focus on identifying and bringing into attention the rhythmic, musical patterns present within the audible. It can, and frequently does, assume an imaginative mode and listen to the inner voices of characters and narrators.

This last point is the most important contribution of this chapter to the arguments of this thesis: following the arguments presented in this chapter, should we agree that radio does indeed listen to the dramatic world, then the process of radio dramaturgy determines the mode in which the radio-body listens to the world. The radio dramaturge chooses whether the radio-body focuses its auditory attention on the primordial experience of the auditory world, individual sounds, inner voices, musical perception, or semiotic content. This understanding is a

crucial methodological tool that I employ in the remainder of this thesis: the next few chapters are devoted to demonstrating how the mode of listening utilised in conventional British radio dramaturgy is mostly semantic, and arguing for a shift in dramaturgical conventions to incorporate other modes of dramaturgical listening.

Before proceeding to such an endeavour, I first need to explore one final aspect of the experience of radio listening in the next section: by describing the experience of listening to radio drama *through* the technological body of the radio-body, I highlight the importance of the aurality of the encounter with the radio-body, and its implications for modes of listening.

2.5. Encountering the radio-body

Let us go back, for one final time, to my description of the lakeside scene. In Section 2.2. I claimed that "I am aware that I am sitting in my room, at my computer, hearing [the couple] through my radio speakers". Throughout my account, I assumed that this process of hearing continues uninterrupted, and that no other sounds are present. Although this may be possible with the aid of the possibility of asyndeton afforded by my auditory schema, nevertheless my encounter with the radio-body is an aural one, as radio technology merely creates vibrations which need to be heard. As highlighted in 3.4.4, it is therefore characterised by the oscillation of engagement and distraction that is a feature of aurality. For example, if I am driving while listening to the scene while the couple are discussing the lake or the house, my attention may be drawn to a car horn, and I may not perceive either. Should there be a fault in the right-hand speaker, I may constantly be aware of a distortion in the sound of the crickets that clearly does not belong in the world of the drama. Perhaps, even in the absence of all external sounds, the low volume of the speaker requires me to focus my auditory attention so intently that I gradually tire and drift away into my own imaginary inner speech, listening asyndetonically to the couple's midnight stroll. Hence, although the radio-body listens intently to the dramatic world and expresses its perception to me, I may not be able to perceive it as a world in the natural attitude, as the oscillation between aural engagement and distraction prevents me from hearing the dramatic world exactly as the radio-body has listened to it.

Indeed, the aurality of my experience of listening to drama through the instrument of radio may require me to assume a certain secondary listening mode.

If I am listening in a very noisy environment that prevents the sound effects from making sense in my perception, I may decide to assume a causal mode of listening, reflecting on my own experience in order to identify the source. Alternatively, I may perform a deliberate asyndeton – a gesture toward silence – on the sound effects and focus purely on the words being uttered, attempting to make sense of the noises through the dialogue. The technological features of the radio-body, too, can affect my experience of listening to it: if I encounter a radio-body that has a similar auditory schema to me, but who expresses what it listens to through the distortion of an FM transmitter or an outdated speaker, I may not be able to make sense of its sounds in the natural attitude as elements of the dramatic world, and encounter them simply as the noise of static, external to the world and distracting my auditory attention from it; in this case, I may assume a reflective, causal listening mode in order to identify the cause of individual sounds. Also, the aurality of the experience of listening to the radio-body allows the sounds it expresses to occupy the background of the listener's auditory experience. I can leave the radio on and allow it to fade into the background while I am talking on the phone or doing the washing-up, and still direct my attention toward it from time to time, treating the radio as a 'secondary medium' – as Crisell calls it (1994: 13).

It would be reasonable to assume that the aurality of the encounter between the listener and the radio-body has certain implications on the listening mode adopted in the process of radio dramaturgy. If a radio-body's expression of certain sounds, backgrounds, rhythms and other auditory features might result in the disruption of the listener's auditory attention, the dramaturge would simply choose to structure the radio-body to assume a listening mode in which such auditory features were not present, to make the dramatic world understandable to the listener. Similarly, the dramaturge could presuppose that the listener's encounter with the radio-body is limited in its possibility of auditory attention – for example, if it is assumed that the radio drama will be encountered while driving, or through an old and noisy amplifier – and that she will therefore automatically assume a secondary mode of listening in order to perceive the dramatic world. In this case, dramaturgical choices regarding what the radio-body listens to could be directed toward providing the listener with the necessary sounds, while avoiding any sounds that could disrupt the listener's auditory attention. The technological – and

therefore, aural – specifications of the listener's encounter with the radio-body, then, have significant bearings on possible modes of dramaturgy.

2.6. Closing remarks

Let us review the progress of this chapter. I began with a phenomenological description of the primary experience of radio drama as the perception of a world that is similar to mine in its worldhood, even though I am not present in it bodily. I drew from Merleau-Ponty's conception of *the flesh* to argue that this dramatic world is the perception of an embodied being similar to me, present in that world and expressing its perception to me through its body; drawing an analogy from Sobchack's phenomenology of film, I labelled this the *radio-body* – consisting of the instruments of radio production and transmission, and the process of dramaturgy, which give it an auditory schema similar to mine, and allows it to listen in a certain mode. Finally, I argued that the mode of listening assumed by both the listener and the radio-body is dependent upon the aural quality of the encounter, which is in turn determined by the cultural and technological trends in listenership.

But what next? The key outcome of the investigations and arguments presented in this chapter lies in the claim that *radio listens*. The dramaturgy of radio, then, can be analysed in terms of the modes of listening assumed by the radio-body. In the next three chapters, I use this idea as an analytical tool to approach, conventional, historical, and contemporary approaches to dramaturgy, by examining how different radio-bodies listen to the dramatic world. Through this, I critique conventional radio-bodies – and therefore, conventions of dramaturgy – and instead propose that new dramaturgical modes of listening lie beyond the boundaries of convention.

CHAPTER 3

HOW DOES RADIO LISTEN? THE SEMANTIC PARADIGM OF BRITISH RADIO DRAMATURGY AND ITS PROBLEMS

3.1. Opening remarks

In the introduction and the first two chapters of this thesis, I concentrated on theoretical approaches to understanding radio drama in generic and abstract terms, in order to critique some prevalent ideas and to propose a phenomenological framework. In this chapter and the two that follow, I apply this framework to historical and contemporary radio dramaturgies in more concrete and specific detail, to critique aspects of practice, and explore possible future developments.

I begin this with the chapter at hand, in which I analyse how conventional British radio drama listens to its world, and argue that what emerges out of conventions of dramaturgy is a radio-body that listens to the dramatic world in what Michel Chion terms the semantic mode. While such a mode may not be problematic from the perspective that understands radio as the *theatre of the mind*, within the phenomenological framework that I developed in the previous chapter, this means that out of all possible modes of listening to the sounds of the dramatic world, the practices of British radio dramaturgy limit themselves to only certain types and arrangements of sound, where acoustic – and bodily – qualities are secondary to referential and signatory qualities. British radio dramaturgy, therefore, follows a *semantic paradigm*. I then critique this paradigm by drawing from Jean-Luc Nancy's ideas on listening in order to question the limits of the semantic paradigm; I argue that semantic listening assumes that the listener is unaffected by her encounter with sound, thereby disregarding the bodily, resonant qualities of sonic experience. The alternative to semantic listening, then, is *resonant* listening – a subject that I explore in upcoming chapters.

3.2. Radio and 'semantic listening'

The 'semantic paradigm of radio drama' – a dramaturgical attitude that, I argue, is dominant in British radio, is the central term of this chapter, and one of the key terms of this thesis. It is therefore of paramount importance that this term

is defined and examined clearly and extensively. To do so, I want to open this chapter by drawing on a concrete example, applying the phenomenological approach developed in the previous chapter to an excerpt from a radio play in order to pinpoint certain features, which I then put in the context of the conventions of radio dramaturgy to define and unpick this paradigm.

The example used here is an excerpt from *doyouwishtocontinue* (Entwisle 2015), a radio play that won the BBC Writer's Prize 2014, and was broadcast in the Afternoon Play timeslot on 8th July 2015. According to the production script, the first scene of the play begins as follows:

	INTERIOR DEBRA'S KITCHEN.
	SFX: RADIO ON:
	MUS 1: 00.00 – 00.12 (00.12)
	CD: Henri Mancini: Legends CD2
	B5: Mr Lucky
	Label: SME
	Opening Anno.
1. JANE GARVEY:	... Lizzy Yarnold winning Gold in the Winter Olympics in the Skeleton event ... (*Archive from 'Woman's Hour' tx Radio 4 Wednesday 31st December, 2014*)
	OVER JANE, DEBRA'S MOBILE RINGS:
	MUS 2: "BY THE SEASIDE" JOLLY RING TONE (00.10 – 0.13). SHE ANSWERS. 'WOMAN'S HOUR' CONTINUES UNDER.
2. DEBRA:	Hello?
3. ASSESSOR:	(*beat*) Miss Fell?
4. DEBRA:	(*beat*) Who's calling please?
5. ASSESSOR:	My name's Carol.
6. DEBRA:	I don't know any Carols.

(Entwisle 2015: 3)

In addition to the words above, the process of dramaturgy adds a number of sounds and effects to the production that are not present in the script: before line 2, Debra sighs and tuts, and the assessor's lines are filtered so that her voice appears

to be heard through the telephone. The background of the kitchen interior sound also contains a group of birds chirping. Further on in the scene, the assessor asks Debra to turn the radio down:

2. DEBRA: I'll just... I'll turn it down a bit.

SHE DOES. IT BECOMES A MURMER OF COMPANIONABLE WOMEN'S VOICES OCCASIONALLY FILLED WITH DELIGHT BUT LARGELY UNDECIPHERABLE.

3. There.

(Entwistle 2015: 5)[19]

In the production, as Debra speaks the second line, her voice gradually fades in volume and gains some reverberation as the sound of footsteps on the floor can be heard faintly; this chain of sounds is then followed by an abrupt change in the volume of the radio sound effect. By line 3, Debra's voice returns to normal.

Should one approach this scene from the perspective of the *theatre of the mind*, the sound codes, or image triggers, are placed and structured in order to allow the listener to understand, or visualise, the scene: the sound of the radio and the background sounds are transcodified signs standing in for the setting; the ringtone indicates a phone – reinforced by the verbal code "Who's calling please?" to separate it from the sound of the radio; the occurrence of the phone call is interpreted through the ringtone, the verbal codes, and the effects on the assessor's voice. Debra's act of turning down the radio is signified by the fading voice of the broadcaster, the increasing reverb, the footsteps, the abrupt change in the radio sounds, and the verbal code "I'll turn it down a bit"; Debra's annoyance is evident in two non-verbal vocal signs – the sigh and the tut. The rest of the meaning of the scene is received through the verbal code of the dialogue. The process of dramaturgy, then, has been successful in creating a sound structure which could be interpreted by the listener as the dramatic world in which Debra answers the phone and talks to the assessor; the script provides a number of signs, which are then performed by the actor – who adds a few signs of her own, perhaps with notes from the director – and realised into structured sounds by the producer, who has been

[19] Appendix A: 1.

careful to make the codes as clear and understandable as possible. In other words, from a semiotic perspective, the scene is using a dramaturgical inventory consisting of distinct signs which *stand for* the elements of the scene. As such, the process of dramaturgy is aimed toward employing the right signs – that is, those codes which the listener would easily interpret as standing for the elements of the dramatic world, allowing her to imagine the dramatic world of the play with clarity.

It is not my intention to repeat my critique of the *theatre of the mind* here. My aim, instead, is to demonstrate that the dramaturgical attitude described above, where the emphasis is on structuring and presenting sounds according to what they stand for, leads to the creation of a radio-body with a specific mode of listening. Where a representational perspective of radio drama understands the dramaturgical choices detailed above as *the* way in which the sounds need to be structured, from a phenomenological perspective, they simply construct a radio-body that assumes a particular mode of deliberate listening. To expand upon this, let us apply the phenomenological lens developed in the Chapter 2: instead of analysing the sounds by dividing them into semiotic or 'visual' codes, let us pay attention to how the radio-body encounters and expresses the dramatic world to which listens.

As the scene opens, the radio-body listens to the ambience of the room, where there is a radio located at some distance, and some birds chirping even further away. The phone rings, very close to the radio-body. Debra – who also appears quite close, positioned next to the phone – sighs and tuts as she picks it. Through a process of synecdoche, the radio in the background fades in asyndeton, and Debra's voice appears in synecdoche. As the conversation takes place, the radio also listens to the voice on the other end of the telephone line; it does not, however, listen for the assessor's voice itself – which would be clear and unfiltered – or for the assessor's voice as it would appear from its initial perspective next to Debra and the phone, in which case, it would simply comprise a faint noise. Instead, it listens to the voice as it would appear to Debra. When Debra moves toward the radio playing in the room, it stays with the phone. By the time she returns, it has resumed its position, and continues to listen to the conversation. The radio-body, then, is not simply a passive listener, but constantly listening *for* particular sounds by shifting its perspective. Here, the dramaturgical process is aimed toward controlling,

manipulating and structuring the radio-body's directed listening. The writer, the performers, and the producer, all influence the structure of listening to varying degrees. The dialogue, for example, indicates that the radio-body should listen to the words of the characters against the background of the radio and not vice versa; the performer walks away from the microphone in the studio, so that she appears to walk away from the radio-body as she goes to turn her device down; the producer passes the assessor's voice through a filter so that the radio-body listens to her through the phone on Debra's ear. Each of these decisions changes the radio-body's relationship with the elements of the dramatic world to express different perceptions and perspectives, even though it does not alter what they signify.

Some of these decisions, although not significant from a semiotic perspective, uncover a certain attitude in dramaturgy when analysed from a phenomenological stance. For example, let us consider the position from which the radio-body listens. As the scene begins, the radio-body is situated close to the phone, and to Debra. The position from which it listens to the assessor's voice, however, is not its initial perspective, but from inside the telephone speaker. Why, one can ask, does the radio-body choose this particular position? If the aim of the sound structure is to maintain a 'visual image' of Debra speaking on the phone, then in order to maintain a consistent visual perspective, the assessor's lines would have appeared as faint noise; the perspective from which Debra and the phone are visible is, after all, one from which the assessor cannot be heard. Similarly, if the goal were to present the listener with the conversation, then why not reduce the filtering and present it with a lower volume, to allow the listener to hear it in a manner similar to Debra? Regardless of the fact that modern telephones allow the voice to be heard in higher quality than the filter through which the voice of the assessor is presented in the production above, when I speak to someone on the phone, phenomenologically, my perception of the conversation is not of *how* it is mediated, but rather the *content* of the mediated conversation as I engage in it. Debra, in other words, would not hear the conversation in the way that we do. Instead of these solutions, the radio-body listens to the dialogue specifically to hear it in a manner that clearly expresses itself as a *phone* conversation. In other words, it listens *for* the assessor's words *as* the other half of the phone conversation.

A similar attitude is manifested when Debra goes to turn the radio down. The radio-body remains in its place, and listens to Debra's footsteps as they move away from it, and afterwards, as they return. Interestingly, very few of Debra's other movements can be heard. For example, the sound of her hand putting the phone down or picking it up during this action is not heard, unlike the first time she picks up the phone. This particular action of Debra's body, however, is one to which the radio-body listens; like any background sound, which does not appear unless listened to through a process of synecdoche and asyndeton, the radio listens to and *for* it. After all, as the script implies, this is the sound of Debra walking toward the radio to turn it off – unlike her handling of the phone, or her breathing, or any movement that is not part of the sequence of Debra's process of walking to turn of the radio, it has dramaturgical importance, and therefore the process of dramaturgy has created a radio-body that listens to it. In other words, the radio-body listens *for* Debra's footsteps not because they occur in the dramatic world, or because the sound has particular qualities, but because it *stands for* Debra walking toward the radio to turn it off.

Here, we see the emergence of a certain attitude in listening – a certain *mode* which the radio-body adopts toward the dramatic world, where it listens *for* sounds *as* events and things in the world. The sound of the assessor's voice, for example, is encountered as filtered because it is listened to not simply as it would sound to someone listening in on the scene, but *as* a phone conversation, requiring the assumption of a specific auditory perspective. The radio-body, in other words, adjusts its position toward the sound in order to listen to it as a sound that *stands for* things, rather than simply the sounds of things as they are encountered in the dramatic world, in the natural attitude. This attitude is what I term 'the semantic mode of radio dramaturgy' – where the dramaturgical choices are made with the aim of creating a radio-body that listens *for* sounds which stand in *as* elements of the dramatic world.

I draw the term 'semantic mode' from Michel Chion's work on film sound – albeit with slight differences which will be explored further on. As mentioned previously, Chion claims that 'there are at least three modes of listening' – the other two, in addition to the semantic mode, are the *causal* and the *reduced* (1994: 25). Causal listening aims to identify the qualities of the sources of a sound; for example,

listening to the sound of a ringtone allows me to identify a phone as its source. Reduced listening is directed toward the acoustic and sonic qualities of a sound: by adjusting my mode of listening, I can perceive the tone, rhythm, texture and volume of the ringtone. The semantic mode, in Chion's words, 'refers to a code or a language to interpret a message' (1994:28), where the sounds themselves simply stand in for messages. A phoneme, for example, 'is listened to not strictly for its acoustical properties but as part of an entire system of oppositions and differences' which determine its meaning for the listener (1994:28).

As explained in Chapter 1, within a phenomenological framework, what Chion labels 'listening', as the body's ability to take a certain stance toward the sounds in the world, is always preceded by an engaged aural perspective of the world, and therefore, all sounds appear in the phenomenal field as things in the world before one can take a stance of 'listening' to them in a specific mode. [20] Nevertheless, Chion's taxonomy, although rather general, is helpful here in describing the mode of radio listening which I explored above, as it could be argued that the dramaturgical choices above direct the radio-body in the scene to listen to sounds for their 'messages' as Chion puts it. For example, the stance that it assumes toward the assessor's voice aims to listen to is as a sign which *means* that the voice is emerging from the telephone, while its focus on the footsteps walking toward the radio is due to the fact that it listens for the sound which *means* that Debra is walking off and coming back. Anything in the scene which is audible but does not *mean* anything – in that it does not stand *for* a specific 'message' or element in the dramatic world – is not 'listened to', either through synecdoche or total elimination, and does not appear to the radio-body, and therefore to the listener. The radio-body listens to the scene in the 'semantic mode'.

A detractor may question the validity of such a characterisation: after all, sounds such as footsteps and telephone effects are not necessarily understood within a linguistic system, and so would be listened to in what Chion describes as the causal mode, directed toward the origins of sound; listening to the assessor's voice reveals its source to be someone behind the telephone line, while the footsteps

[20] It could even be argued that a better term for Chion's 'listening modes' would be 'listening techniques', or even 'listening schemata', as they could be better described as specific bodily acts of intentional perception rather than entire 'modes' of being. To avoid confusion, I have maintained Chion's term.

reveal the act of walking as their cause. Such a critique would neglect two factors. [21] Firstly, the two modes are not mutually exclusive; as Chion mentions, '[o]bviously one can listen to a single sound sequence employing both the causal and semantic modes at once' (1994: 28); indeed, listening to the sound of footsteps can indicate both the person walking, and stand for Debra going toward the radio set. Secondly, in this case, the manner in which the radio-body express what it listens to – and therefore its act of listening as such – is focused on the particular acoustic qualities that emphasise and highlight what the sounds stand for semantically, rather than what causes them: when the radio-body listens in the semantic mode, the sound of the voice heard through the phone line is filtered in a clearly conspicuous way, distorting the speech much more than a conventional phone would; for example, it is not listened to in order to realise the specific type of phone, or the position of the receiver in relation to the point of listening – but *as a sign* that the voice is heard through a phone. Like Chion's description of a phoneme, the acoustic qualities of the sounds for to which the radio-body listens are not relevant as long as the 'message' – in this case, its telephonic origins – are signified with clarity. Here lies my slight divergence from Chion's term: although sounds such as footsteps and distorted voices are not purely linguistic signs, they are nevertheless treated by the radio-body as standing for a certain semantic reference, and can therefore be considered as taking place within the semantic mode.

It should be emphasised here that the radio-body's mode of listening does not necessitate that the listener change her listening mode as well. As I have argued in both Chapter 1 Chapter 2, the listener's mode of listening to the radio-body is not one of deliberate interpretation but of experiencing the expressed perception of an other; after all, it would be impossible to recreate a world through separate elements or codes, without perceiving them through the body, having a perspective, and gaining a 'grip' which arranges those elements into a world. While the radio focuses on the footsteps *as* Debra's movement toward the radio, I do not interpret the footsteps, but merely listen as Debra moves in the kitchen. The radio-body's adoption of a semantic mode of listening, then, does not affect my ability to direct myself toward its expression of a perceptual perspective unto the dramatic world,

[21] Within the broader context of the thesis, this critique can also be addressed from the perspective of semiotics, by questioning whether any kind of causal relation can be understood outside a sign system; however, issues with semiotics have been discussed previously in Chapter 1.

but simply affects the acoustic qualities of this expression, and thus the bodily qualities of my experience of the dramatic world. [22]

Crucially, however, although the radio-body's mode of listening does not change *how* the listener encounters the dramatic world, it does affect *what* she encounters. The quantity, quality, type, location, and significance of the sounds which occur in the structure of the radio drama are dependent on the mode of listening assigned to the radio-body through the process of dramaturgy. Adopting a semantic mode of listening to the dramatic world, the radio-body limits itself to specific types of sound: those able to *mean*, or stand *as*, something. Such a limit would only be apparent from a phenomenological perspective, and in fact, as the beginning of this section aimed to demonstrate, would not be observed using the critical lens of semiotics or visual imagination– which, after all, would analyse and assess radio drama on its success in using the right codes, or to put it in the terms discussed, by employing semantic listening.

This exploration of the semantic mode of radio drama, of course, is not simply aimed at analysing the brief excerpt described above. In fact, I want to argue that this semantic mode, as detailed in this section, is the predominant mode of listening assumed by radio-bodies that are constructed through conventional British radio dramaturgy, to the extent that it can be labelled a paradigm. Initially, this claim may appear rather broad and unprovable; presenting similar analyses of a broad enough cross section of British radio plays to argue this quantitatively would be beyond the scope of this thesis – and many more. I do not aim, however, to argue that all British radio-bodies listen semantically, but posit that the conventions of radio dramaturgy are oriented toward constructing a radio-body that predominantly listens to the world in a semantic mode. As these conventions are practiced today, and have been developed through the history of radio drama in the U.K, it can be argued that a paradigm exists and is observed by practitioners, resulting in the prevalence of the semantic mode in radio dramaturgy. To make this argument, in the next section, I explore a range of radio practices and demonstrate how they are oriented toward enabling semantic listening in the radio-body.

3.3. British radio practice as a paradigm

[22] I shall return to this point in Chapter 5, positing that what the semantic mode filters out of the radio-body's experience of the world is its own resonance with the dramatic world.

Where does one locate a paradigm of practice? British radio drama has had a long and varied history, fitting within its scope all manners and styles of programmes, uses of technology, approaches toward dramatic texts, and cultural and historical contexts; even the widest of quantitative surveys would have difficulty in establishing an overarching similarity among these. I acknowledge this diversity fully; it is exactly for this reason that I have chosen the term 'paradigm' – rather than discussing the 'British style', or simply calling the attitude 'British radio dramaturgy' – to describe the dramaturgical approach. Drawing from Thomas Kuhn's conception of scientific paradigms, a paradigm of dramaturgy can be defined as 'some accepted examples of actual […] practice – examples which include law, theory, application, and instrumentation together – [which] provide models from which spring particular coherent traditions' (Kuhn 1996: 10). In other words, the term paradigm denotes a broad consensus on dramaturgical problems, solutions, techniques and instruments, rather than uniformity in aesthetics and structure – as Kuhn points out, 'men did not all paint alike in the period when representation was the norm' (1996: 186).

I have already examined and critiqued the theoretical assumptions of the semantic paradigm – the idea of *the theatre of the* mind – in Chapter 1. The aim of this section, instead, is to focus on the practices that form the paradigm. Its method for doing so is to examine what Kuhn terms 'exemplars': 'the concrete problem-solutions that students encounter from the start of their […] education […] [and] technical problem-solutions found in the periodical literature […] that show them by example how their job is to be done' (1996:187): in other words, existing exemplary samples of work, practices, ideas, instruments, and dramaturgical techniques, knowledge of which is considered a required skillset for a practitioner of radio. Such exemplars, available in the form of handbooks, guides, practice guidelines, and practitioner accounts, can shed light on the practical conventions of radio dramaturgy.

In the case of British radio, locating the paradigmatic exemplars is relatively simple, as almost all major strands of practice have traditionally taken place within one institution – namely, the BBC - and most practitioner guidelines are therefore

geared toward meeting the same standards and goals. [23] In the next three segments, I study these exemplar practices by analysing a number of these practitioner guidelines in manuals, handbooks, and other forms of practitioner advice. By analysing these, I aim to demonstrate that they are geared toward constituting a radio-body that listens to the dramatic world in the semantic mode.

3.3.1. Writing the radio play

Let us begin our examination of radio conventions by exploring how the dramatic world is first conceived by the writer. The writer occupies a key position within the process of radio dramaturgy; indeed, radio has frequently been labelled a 'writer's medium' (Smethurst 2016: 80, Hill 2015: 44, Willett 2013: 200, Ash 1985: 69, Lewis 1981: 6, Holme 1981: 58); after all, as Grove and Wyatt put it, 'there are no visuals to draw the listener away from the words and sounds which the writer has imagined' (2013: 28). William Ash expands on this:

> There is not the opportunity in radio drama production that there is in visual dramatic production for the intervention of stage business or mimed sequences or vivid expression and gesture to help the author get the dramatic message across; but then neither is there the same possibility of 'guying' or 'sending up' the play or reinterpreting it by the way it is staged. The producer has to be satisfied that the play as scripted by the writer, with whatever amendments and alterations they have agreed, is the working plan for what actors, helped by studio assistants, are going to do in the studio (Ash 1985: 64).

In other words, in the absence of visuals, it is the writer who presents the key dramaturgical elements of the radio play, and creates the blueprint through which the performer and the producer guide their practices. Unlike films or theatre, where the material conditions of the realisation of the writer's blueprint of written words add elements to the drama that were absent in the script, the so-called immateriality of the medium is assumed to allow those words to feature independently and with

[23] This may appear somewhat generalised. It should be acknowledged that there exist many independent radio production companies and practitioners – a number of whom will be subject of case studies in Chapter 5 – and that digital methods of distribution have disrupted the BBC's monopoly on radio broadcast. These, however, could still be said to follow the same paradigm. Indeed, many of these independent practitioners have emerged from the BBC system – for example, Dirk Maggs and Simon Barnard, respectively of Perfectly Normal Productions and Bafflegab, both worked as BBC radio producers. Furthermore, even if we were to disregard these links, most guiding sources available to potential practitioners – such as those explored in Section 3.3. – are composed according to the requirements of the BBC.

minimal interference. I have discussed the representational assumptions of such an idea in Chapter 1. Here, I want to discuss how such an attitude affects the radio-body's mode of listening, to argue that delegating key dramaturgical decisions to the writer leads to a semantic mode of radio listening.

To present her creative blueprint for the production, the writer has to present this in the form of a script. Advice on how the script should be written for the specific medium of radio is widely available in manuals and handbooks (Ash 1985, Grove and Wyatt 2013, Hill 2015, McInerney 2001, among others), although most of this advice is articulated along the same lines. Before we explore the implications of the advice to writers, however, let us examine the medium of the script itself: the written word. A script dictates what the producer and performer do and the choices they make, and therefore, what the radio listens to, and for, through the medium of language. Even disregarding any further restrictions on what the writer can or cannot write, this fact in itself opens the way for semantic listening. Here, I am not referring simply to the fact that radio plays contain language; I want to argue that basing the production on a blueprint of written words creates a potential for the semantic attitude.

As Chion claimed, in the semantic mode, one listens beyond variations in the acoustic properties of the sound in order to locate the meaning behind it. For example, not all waves in the ocean sound the same, but one can listen to the sounds of different waves, listen beyond the specific wave which has caused it and its properties, and listen to identify the sea as an object. [24] In the latter case, the acoustic properties of the waves serve only to be recognisable enough to be identified as referring to 'the sea' – a semantic concept, here presented through a written sign, which is understood within a complex sign system; acoustic properties that are not necessary for this do not become figures in the auditory field, and thus forms part of the auditory ground through the processes of asyndeton and synecdoche. Here lies the written word's potential for creating a semantic mode of radio: when serving as a blueprint for the production, it informs producers and performers through semantic concepts: a writer advising the producer to play 'the sound of the sea' implies that the radio-body should listen to that sound because of its reference to 'the sea', not specifying anything about its sonic and acoustic qualities.

[24] 'Listening' here is used in the sense of direct, second-order bodily attitude, rather than 'hearkening'.

It may be argued that there is nothing to stop the writer from using language to describe sounds more sonically and acoustically. Here is where conventions of writing add further limitations: writers are advised, through exemplars, that such an approach is not useful. Grove and Wyatt advise against lengthy descriptions of sounds: 'if, for example, you have a scene set in a busy supermarket and the characters are by the tills, then say so. You don't need to add that there is the chatter of shoppers, crying babies, food being packed in plastic bags, etc' (2013: 183). Similarly, the BBC's own house scripting guidelines state that 'technical directions should be used sparingly and work with the dialogue. Only describe the immediate sound pattern and never use superfluous novelistic text' (Carless 2004: 2). These scripting conventions limit the writer's ability to detail the acoustic, sonic, and bodily properties of sounds beyond their semantic reference, and thus facilitate the possibility of semantic listening in the radio-body.

The written word also creates a barrier against sounds that have dramatic significance but do not necessarily fit within a semantic structure. For example, a 'sad' piece of music, or a 'frightening' sound, relying as they do on expressive qualities, could not themselves be expressed in a written script beyond describing them within existent semantic concepts of 'sad' and 'frightening'. The producer, therefore, has a limited scope of what sounds may express such qualities. Perhaps this is why the script guidelines state that music – which has the possibility of being listened to non-semantically – 'is generally only indicated when it is a source cue or performs a function such as a transitional device between scenes' (Carless 2004: 2). Therefore, the sounds to which the radio-body listens are likely to be chosen mainly according to their pervasive cultural association rather than expressiveness in the given context: a 'sad' piece of music would be chosen based on the conventional agreement about what constitutes 'sad' music, rather than the appropriate music for the specific dramatic moment.

In addition to the inherent problems of using the writer's script as the production blueprint, the guidelines for radio writing advise certain limitations that also open the way for semantic listening – the most significant of these being the reliance on dialogue, which, as Ash puts it, is 'the *sine qua non* of a radio play. The radio play makes use of sound effects and music but only as adjunct to dialogue' (1985: 34), as it has a narrative function as well as a dramatic one, being the primary

site of the listener's encounter with the dramatic world. McLeish goes even further, claiming that when faced with a detailed description of a scene, '"picture setting" designed for the reader rather than the listener should be crossed out and the dialogue considered in isolation (1994: 226). [25] If the words themselves create the same scene, the directions are superfluous; if not, the dialogue is faulty'. Such descriptions, however, can be presented freely to the listener in the form of narration; Grove and Wyatt explain that unlike visual media, 'radio […] thrives on narrators […] it's part of the intimacy of radio that we warm to somebody who has a good story to tell and we are drawn into the interior world of a character' (2013: 45), and Harris acknowledges that 'most modern radio dramas inter-cut between direct access and dialogue' (2007: 275). It should be clear that the reliance on dialogue leads to a radio-body that listens to the words, and for descriptions of the world in them, in the semantic mode. Indeed, even when sounds other than words occur, writers are advised to signpost them – and hence, highlighting their referential purpose and reiterate their meaning – through 'designative dialogue', as sounds 'are often inadequate in themselves to place the listener unmistakably in the right scene' (Ash 1985: 47). It is assumed that the process of listening for the meaning of the sound – semantic listening – cannot be sustained unless the writer provides the radio-body with further semantic background in the form of verbal context.

It should be noted that this perceived inadequacy is only valid only if the assumed purpose of the sound effect is to be listened to as a reference for meaning – an attitude towards sounds that persists in practice guidelines, as is evident from this statement by writer Mike Harris:

> Some music and sound effects can be instantly evocative but most aren't. For example, cicadas always mean 'hot and abroad' but rain on radio is just as likely to sound like someone rustling through long grass. Does a burst of Tchaikovsky mean we're in Russia, or just in a bit of an emotional state? And no combination of music and sound

[25] In the body of this chapter, I refer to the third edition of *Radio Production*, which may appear rather out of date. After all, being a major exemplar and educational textbook, McLeish's book is frequently updated to keep up with the changing landscape of practice. In response, I should note that McLeish's dramaturgical advice remains constant in all editions: the advice on 'picture setting' dialogue, for example, is repeated without change in the first, fourth, fifth, and sixth editions (1978: 240, 1999: 204, 2005:248, 2016:300) – a fact that signifies the paradigmatic status of such practices. To ease the flow of the text, I have only referred to one edition, having ensured that the quoted sections appear in every edition cited above.

> effects is going to tell you, 'Ibiza, Sunday Afternoon, 2005, Chantelle Smith applying sun-block to burnt skin' (Harris 2007: 278).

Here, we see how it is assumed that in order for the radio-body to perceive the Sunday afternoon in Ibiza, it needs to listen to a semantic expression of the situation through language – an expression that the writer provides through dialogue. Even when these sounds are clear and signposted, their purpose is to be linked back to the words; for example, Grove and Wyatt describe how the meaning of a simple dialogue can change according to ambient sound, advising writers that 'part of thinking in sound is always to be aware of how you can economically establish a scene' through sound in order to suggest the context for the dialogue (2013: 110-111).

Following these points, it should be easy to see how aspects of the conventions of writing for radio open it up to creating a semantic mode of listening. In the next section I explore how this potential manifests itself in the studio.

3.3.2. Performing the radio play

In the process of radio dramaturgy, the script produced by the writer is rehearsed and performed in the studio under the supervision of a producer or director, [26] and here, too, practices can be observed that are conductive to a radio-body with a semantic mode of listening. The most important of these, the relative adherence to the script, I discussed in the previous section. There are, however, certain practices and limitations that result in semantic listening.

The first limitation exists in the choice of performers: the voice of the performers need to be clearly distinguishable from each other; McLeish points out that at times, 'two excellent players [may be] available, but their voices [may be] too similar to be used in the same piece' (1994: 231). [27] This may appear to be a simple matter, and even common sense, but it indicates that when the radio-body listens to the voices of these actors, it listens for clearly-distinguishable constants – sounds that refer to the characters through established difference – in order to recognise

[26] The studio production is no longer ubiquitous – both McLeish (1994: 237) and Grove and Wyatt (2013: 162) discuss the possibility of recording on location; however, McLeish acknowledges that this is not conventional.

[27]

characters rather than encountering them in more ambiguous tones which would require causal listening.

During the recording, too, similar semantically-oriented practices can be observed. The focus of the recording is on the performers and the dialogue; for example, as Alan Beck's handbook for radio actors informs them, 'you rarely get to hear your *atmos* [;] if you ask the [stage manager], he will play a sample back to you' (1997: 33). The importance of this observation lies in the fact that the performer is essentially asked to perform against a sound whose acoustic and sonic qualities are not important – as long as she is aware, through playback or the script, of its significance. Her vocal manipulations, then, are assumed to be generally irrelevant to the background sound, except in how their semantic contents affect each other; the radio-body, then, presumably listens only for these meanings in both strands of sound. Furthermore, at times a Foley artist, or 'spot' (Beck 1997: 19), performs the sound effects to make sure that the actors focus on their task of engaging with words; for Beck, unlike most modern dramatic arts where acting occurs mainly on 'the margins of words', 'radio offers [the performer] clearer ground on which to work, as [her] main task is to get to grips with the words' (1997: 84).

The use of the 'spot', whether in the form of a dedicated member of the production team, or as part of a stage manager's duties, has similar implications. Delegating the occurrence – and hence the audibility – of the sounds of the dramatic world to a specific body in the studio is in itself an act of selection, as it means that these sounds must be chosen and performed. The criteria for this selection, McLeish asserts, is 'not what is real but what is understandable'; for example, he mentions that the spot need not perform the characters' footsteps in all situations, as 'these are only used to underline a specific dramatic point' (1994: 234). The spot, in other words, works to create sounds that have specific referents. In addition to this, the spot's skills follow certain conventions. Practical sound effects – known in film terminology as Foley sounds – such as the hitting together of coconut shells to replicate the sound of a horse, the use of a box of gravel to emulate a marching army, or any other of the conventional methods mentioned by McLeish (1994: 235) are created in the same manner regardless of the context of the play and their position in the dramatic world; this, too, could be regarded as indicating that the radio-body does not listen for the acoustic, sonic, and bodily qualities of these sounds, as long

as they are understood to refer to horses and armies. The spot equipment described by Beck – 'the famous radio drama door and the sash window [and] cups and saucers on a low table' (1997: 28) – also remain constant in the studio to be employed when needed, regardless of dramatic context.

The process of recording in the studio, then, also appears open to creating a semantic attitude in the radio-body. In the next section, I discuss the methods of post-production and mixing which, I argue, continue this trend.

3.3.3. Producing the radio play

Once the performance has been recorded, the producer or director has the task of structuring the recordings further through specific dramaturgical practices in order to create the final product: 'the sound engineer roughly assembles the play from the script marked up by the production coordinator. They then work with the producer substituting takes, adding music and sound effects, and generally polishing the production' (Grove and Wyatt 2013: 195). Again, this task mostly follows the writer's script. The practical conventions of this stage, however, also open the radio-body to the possibility of semantic listening.

Let us begin with the sound effects, which are added at this stage. McLeish divides sound effects into 'backdrop' – the background sound, which is usually pre-recorded – and the 'incidental furniture and props', which are produced by the performers during the previous stage (1994: 234). In the last two sections, I have demonstrated how these can contribute to the radio-body's semantic mode of listening through their scripting, selection, and realisation. Here, however, I want to explore how the separation between the recording of the backdrop, the incidental/prop sounds, and dialogue can lead to the semantic mode.

Firstly, there is the fact that behind treating the elements of the production separately in practice lies the assumption that they function independently; that is, the 'incidental' is there not as a constituent part of the auditory whole, but as a specific reference – otherwise, the interdependence of the elements could hinder the separation. Therefore, the producer's choice of sounds is, McLeish puts it, a 'search for clear associations between situation and sound' (1994: 234). As such, what this means in practice is that even before specific sounds are selected and realised from what occurs in the dramatic world, they are already chosen from a lexicon of conventional associations that radio practitioners 'over the years have

developed [...] with generally understood meanings' (McLeish 1994: 234). For example, even disregarding the previous sections' critique of the assumption that there are specifically-produced sounds which refer to objects, for radio producers there exist specific combinations of sounds that refer to specific situations – seagulls and waves, for instance, refer to 'the sea'. This means that the radio-body listens to the sounds for their conventional association to situations, rather than for their other acoustic, sonic, and bodily qualities.

Secondly, the division between different sounds means that as sounds are recorded from a variety of points of listening – relative to different recording instruments – and then combined, the producer determines how these points of listening converge, and therefore, how the radio-body is positioned bodily in the dramatic world. [28] As sounds are recorded and mixed separately, the proximity of sources of sounds is not necessarily determined by their position relative to other sounds. This gives the producer the option of positioning the sound in a manner that is more conducive to clarifying its reference rather than its spatial existence in the dramatic world. Hence, the radio-body's spatial perspective on the dramatic world becomes reliant on semantic listening, in that it expands its field of listening to have a similar perspective on every significant sound selected in the previous stages, rather than maintaining a unified perspective on the world, in which each sound appears relative to its position; this can be observed in the positioning of the assessor's voice in the example explored in the previous section: it is positioned where can be heard as a telephone call, rather than where the phone call would occur from a physical perspective.

Thirdly, separate recording and mixing of sounds also limits the ability of spatial movement, both in the point of listening and in individual sounds; after all, as sounds in foreground and background are recorded separately and combined, the co-ordination of the movements of their different listening points around one particular axis becomes more difficult in practice. Movements in sound, therefore, also becomes open to a semantic approach: as the movement of one sound does not necessarily affect other sounds, it may be perceived not as a movement within the

[28] Again, here it should be acknowledged that not all radio productions are created in this manner; locations shoots, and those with binaural recording technology, are clear examples of how one focal point of listening sustains the whole production. As with highlighted before, however, such practices are not a matter of convention.

world to which the radio-body listens – that is, a coherent transformation of foreground and background – but as the radio-body listening for that movement *as* a movement. To revisit the previous section's example, the radio-body stays still and listens to Debra walking away from the point of listening, because maintaining its position by Debra's ear does not allow it to listen for her movement *as* a sound that refers directly to her movement.

Music, too, is added at this stage, and the conventions around it are also geared toward sematic listening. As Grove and Wyatt mention, 'original music is considered a luxury in radio drama' (2013: 163) – although McLeish does recommend that producers 'should sometimes consider the use of specially written material […] this need not be unduly ambitious or costly – a simple recurring folk song, or theme played on a guitar or harmonica can be highly effective' (1994: 236). As such, the producer's options for music are mainly limited to already-existent specimens, with particular associations. This in itself is not problematic: an archival piece of music can appear against other sounds in a manner that changes its conventional associations completely. Nonetheless, the limitation of choice opens the way for a semantic mode when we consider how music is conventionally used. McLeish cites three purposes for music: as a leitmotif between scenes, as an indication of the passage of time, and as a mood generator (1994: 236). The first and the second of these purposes clearly demonstrate a semantic approach; the radio-body listens to the leitmotif at the end of one scene and the beginning of another, while the music which denotes time passing – what Crook calls a 'time transitional lintel' (1999: 165) is listened to for its significance rather than its sonic properties. The third of these, mood music, is also open to semantic listening due to the limits in choice: although McLeish advises producers to choose music 'that is not so familiar that it arouses in the listener his own preconceived ideas and associations' , his examples of the atmospheres which can be established by music – 'haunted house' and 'a day at the races' – demonstrate how 'mood music' relies on a particular association between the pieces chosen and specific situations (1994:236); the radio listens to music not as a sound in or of the dramatic world or its perception, but as points of reference that establishes – rather than expresses – the mood of the scene.

The practices of the production and post-production stage, too, therefore similarly lead to the creation of a radio-body that listens semantically. Indeed, the

three stages are fundamentally linked: the semantic attitude in post-production is only possible if the writer is limited to brief descriptions and sound effects and dialogue are recorded separately, while following the script as a blueprint would be impossible had the process of performing and recording it required the addition of more than simple indicative sounds effects to the writer's work. Overall, then, the conventions described above function together to create a radio-body that listens in the semantic mode. They, then, constitute what I term the semantic paradigm of radio drama.

My definition of the semantic paradigm of radio drama is open to two critiques: that what I have described is too open to be labelled a paradigm, and conversely, that it demonstrates not just one paradigm of radio drama, but the only possible one. In the next section, I address these two points.

3.4. Paradigm or principles?

In my analysis of radio drama conventions in the previous few sections, I reiterated several times that the conventional practices I explore "open the way" or "create the potential for" a semantic mode of radio listening. This may lead a critic to argue that the conventions of practice do not necessarily form a semantic paradigm, but are simply principles that can be disregarded or subverted; after all, practitioners may simply practice within the same guidelines but in a manner that does not lead to the realisation of that potential: practitioners may practice along the same lines but achieve a final product in which the radio-body does not listen semantically – which in turn means that my analyses of the practice conventions do not constitute good evidence for the claim that there exists a semantic paradigm in British radio drama. This counter-argument could be strengthened by highlighting the historical trajectory of British radio dramaturgy: labelling these principles a paradigm assumes that these practices – and therefore the radio's mode of listening – have remained constant, which would mean that pieces of radio drama from different eras would not differ in how they sound. In response to this, three points should be highlighted.

Firstly, although each of the practices described could, with some slight variation, result in the radio-body assuming a non-semantic stance toward a number of sounds, to achieve a significant change in listening mode, many of the practices would require such alterations – however small – and due to the

interconnected nature of the process, this would ultimately mean that a noticeable change in listening mode ultimately requires the practitioner to go beyond the boundaries of convention; indeed, this interconnectedness and interdependence of production practices is one of the reasons behind the label 'paradigm'. Therefore, although the practices are open to development and evolution, the radio-body created through them would only be radically different in listening mode if radical changes were made to the practices.

Secondly, the paradigm is sustained not just through the propagation of the practices described, but also by the assumptions behind them. Here, I should emphasise the point, also explored in detail in Chapter 1, that assumptions about the listener's experience of the dramatic world – through 'visual imagination' or signs and codes – are related to, and form the theoretical basis of, how the sounds of the radio drama are structured. It is important to note that these assumptions exist in, and are used as justification for, the practical conventions of the semantic paradigm. The producer creates the play based on the 'visual images in his mind' (McLeish 1994: 238), the actor is advised to treat dialects as 'the 'clothing' the voice wears, [and] how [the] character appears to the listener' (Beck 1997: 106), and the writer is reminded of the cliché that listeners 'like radio for the pictures' (Grove and Wyatt 2013: 29), and that 'radio drama has the additional job of prompting listeners to supply imaginatively all the visual aspects of the play' (Ash 1985: 42). As such, the dramaturgical constraints of the semantic paradigm may not be directly apparent to practitioners, or there may not be a need to explore beyond them at all.

The third point relates to history: it should be highlighted that the conventions described above are all rooted in the historical development of radio drama: Grove and Wyatt cite, and agree with, Gordon Lea's 1926 exploration of the possibilities and the limits of radio drama for writers (2013: 7), while Harris' advice to writers about sound effects is drawn from Val Gielgud's ideas of the medium in the 1950s (2007: 278). Conventional Foley sounds date back to the techniques of theatrical sound generation – for example, McLeish's spot effect for marching troops (1994: 235) can be found in Napier's manual, *Noises Off* (1936: 87). These historical precedent mean that although radio dramaturgy has indeed seen some changes, general attitudes have remained somewhat consistent. Overall, then, the guidelines

and exemplars explored here can be understood as a paradigm, rather than individual practices.

3.5. A resonant alternative to semantic listening

Until now, the focus of this chapter has been on demonstrating the existence of a paradigm of practice that creates a radio-body that listens semantically. The broader aim of this thesis is to critique this paradigm, by positing that the semantic mode is not the only mode of listening that the radio-body can assume, but is simply one of many modes that it can assume. Positing this critique, however, can be problematic: from the perspective of the *theatre of the mind*, for example, the practices explored in this chapter are not merely one particular mode of dramaturgy, but *the* method of creating drama through sound alone. A detractor can argue that if a radio-body assumes a mode of listening other than the semantic, then perceiving it *as* a radio-body will no longer be possible; in other words, it could be argued that in order for me to be able to direct myself toward sounds as an expression of a perception, those sounds must be structured semantically.

Let illustrate the problem with an example, from Mike Walker's *Dickens Confidential* (2008: 35:28-35:58)[29]. The following excerpts depicts a fight between two women on a hot air balloon, and is taken from the climactic scene of the play, just after Agnes has realised Olga's plan to bomb the opening of Parliament.

ATMOS:	HOT AIR BALLOON: FIRE BURNING, THE SQUEAKING OF ROPES
AGNES:	(*incensed)* Madam! I am English, and I will never betray my country!
F/X	A PUNCH; THE BASKET RUSTLES.
AGNES:	*(breathy)* You hit me!
OLGA:	*(Russian accent)* I punch you girl - now I punch again!
F/X	ANOTHER PUNCH, ANOTHER RUSTLE.
AGNES:	*(grunting)* I don't think so!
F/X	A BLOW FROM AGNES, A GRUNT FROM OLGA, FOLLOWED BY HER PUNCH
OLGA:	This puts Cossack to sleep!

[29] The timecodes given throughout the thesis relate to the original source and not the excerpts in Appendix A.

F/X ANOTHER BLOW, ANOTHER RUSTLE. AGNES MOANS IN PAIN AND FALLS SILENT.

OLGA: Broom most handy.[30]

As argued previously, in this scene the radio-body is listening to the dramatic world semantically: it expresses its direction of auditory perception toward the meaningful elements there before it in the form of the sounds that I hear out of its body. The meaningful elements here are easily observable: the radio-body listens for the background sound of the balloon – having also introduced it through listening to the dialogue prior the excerpts – to express the setting of 'the balloon'; as the sound is simply being listened to as 'balloon', most of its auditory features remain constant throughout the scene. The radio-body also listens to the blows being dealt between the women in order to listen for 'punches' and 'the fight' – supplementing the possible ambiguity by listening to the characters describing their actions and emotions. Again, the auditory quality of the punches do not vary significantly regardless of the puncher, save for their position within the stereophonic field: Agnes receives Olga's punches positioned to the left of the radio-body – and therefore the listener – and Olga is situated on the right. The radio-body also listens for 'pain' by listening to the character's grunts. Finally, as Agnes falls silent, despite the fact that the action is finished, the radio-body continues listening until the means of Olga's victory – the broom – are heard in her line of dialogue. Other sounds are removed from the expression of the radio-body's perception by asyndeton, and the radio is thus able to express its perception of the key semantic elements that it identifies in the dramatic world. Now, to ask the key question of this section: how else could the radio-body listen to this scene? If the processes of synecdoche and asyndeton structure sounds according to their signification, what would be the alternative structure? Would these sounds still be perceivable by the listener as the expressions of a radio-body present in the dramatic world?

Chion's taxonomy taxonomy can give us a broad understanding of a spectrum of types of deliberative listening with which the I, and the radio-body, can engage: our bodily capability to intend toward sounds can tend toward abstraction, in the case of *reduced* listening, or identification, in the *causal* mode. Following my

[30] Appendix A: 2.

exploration of listening in Chapter 2, any deliberative listening mode is only possible because of the possibility of perceiving sounds as part of a world through one's body (here, auditory) schema; in this context, the reduced mode would be the furthest away from the worldly perception of sounds – depending, as it does, on total decontextualisation of the sound – and the causal mode, with its focus on the worldly causes of sounds, the closest. Should radio dramaturgy tend toward the abstract end of this spectrum, then a listener may not be able to perceive the resulting sound structure product *as* a radio-body, as the sounds to which it listens will be decontextualized and de-worlded. Conversely, a purely causal dramaturgy may be similarly unsuccessful in expressing a perception of a dramatic world: if the radio-body directs itself toward sounds not to listen for what they stand for, but for how they *sound* – that is, how their sonic properties are caused by their sources – then the radio-body would listen for all that is audible in the dramatic world – that is, an exact recreation of the sounds as they may appear, for example, to a microphone – with minimal recourse to asyndeton. This means that the radio-body no longer *listens* to the dramatic world, but merely records it.

If, however, the sound structures formed around modes of listening at the ends of the deliberative spectrum do not lead to the constitution of a radio-body, then it could be argued that a bodily perception of the dramatic world can best be expressed through the semantic mode, which lies between abstraction and perception, relying as it does on interpretation within the referential context of recognisable auditory signs. In simpler terms, it appears that in order for a sound structure to become dramatic, it needs to steer away from both abstraction and precise reproduction, and instead assume a more-or-less semantic mode of listening. Does this, then, mean that the semantic mode is more in tune with the capabilities of the medium in presenting a dramatic world?

Here, I want to present a solution this question by critiquing the idea of deliberative modes of listening described by Chion. To do so, let us return to Nancy's ideas, previously mentioned in 2.4.2, as Nancy's two types of listening – the listening-to-understand, *entendre*, and the openness-to-listening, *écouter* – could help us find a new perspective toward resolving the problem. According to Nancy, when I listen-*entendre*, I encounter sounds as already constituted: I listen to the waterfall, or a speech, or a punch, and I perceive or understand each as such. I

am also able to take a deliberative stance toward it, to recognise the waterfall as the Niagara Falls, or recognise an idea in the speech, or discern the texture of the sound of the punch. The interesting factor in this type of encounter is that for it to be possible, *I* would need to be there; after all, being able to listen-*entendre* to the Niagara Falls would assume several facts: that I have a perspective on the sound – that is, that I am separate from it – and that I have a prior history through which I can recognise it. The same would apply to understanding a speech, or identifying tonal qualities in the sound of a punch: I would need to be able to separate myself from each in order to listen to them. In Nancy's words, listening-*entendre* 'converts [sound] ahead of time into the object of an intention that constitutes it' (2007:20) – hence, the intention, and the subject intending it, is independent of the sound. Indeed, it could be said that deliberative modes of listening, such as those described by Chion, operate at the level of listening-*entendre*; the possibility of approaching a specific sound to abstract its sonic features, or its references, or its sources, again assumes that I am separate from the sound and that both I and the sound are already constituted.

For example, in the scene set on the balloon, where the radio-body is listening semantically, two assumptions have to be made before it adopts its mode of listening: firstly, the radio-body has to precede, and have a pre-existing knowledge of, the element for which it listens within the referential context of the scene; in simpler terms, it would have to already know what they are. If the radio-body were to listen to and discover the significance of each sound individually as the scene progresses, then it could not listen for and express those elements recognisably and consistently – a punch, for example, would not be expressed consistently as the repetitive, voluminous, recognisable "thud/rustle" effect and the supplementary lines; instead, it might evolve over time throughout the scene, or change suddenly, in which case, it would no longer stand *for* the punch. Secondly, for the radio-body to maintain a consistent perspective on the elements of the dramatic world, it would have to remain significantly unaffected by these elements. After all, a radio-body that identifies and listens to specific elements consistently would have to have a perspective on these elements – in which case, it would have to have a degree of separation from them. For example, listening for each punch *as* a punch consistently would assume that the relationship between the radio-body that listens and the punch that is listened for has not been altered; otherwise, the

sonic qualities for which the radio-body listens would be altered with each punch. This pre-existence and separation are hallmarks of listening-*entendre*.

Nancy critiques the reduction of listening to *entenre*, and argues that the other mode, listening-*écouter*, precedes it. The already-constituted, intending subject of the former is, for Nancy, an assumption that does not hold, as it presupposes a subject that is transcendental – that is, itself not constituted in reaction and in relation to its object. For Nancy, the sound, as encountered through listening-*écouter*, is the factor which allows the subject who listens-*entendre* to be constituted; as he writers, 'sound is what places its subject, which has not preceded it with an intention, in tension, or under tension' (2007: 20). In other words, the ability to listen-*écouter* opens one up to the possibility of encountering sound, and to being constituted by it, before one can even listen-*entendre* to what the sound itself is within the world. At this level, Nancy argues, there is no separation between the listener and the sound: whereas in order to listen-*entendre*, I would have to have the sound as the object of my perception, listening-*ecounter* occurs at the moment that through my encounter with sound, the sound and I *resonate* together, to use Nancy's term; [31] therefore, before the sound is understood by an already-constituted me, it is encountered 'as much from the side of the sound itself, or of its emission, as from the side of its reception or its listening' (Nancy 2007:16) – it forms me, remains in me, and defines my relationship with the world – including the sound itself, as encountered through listening-*entendre*. As such, what 'listening (*écouter*)' reveals about a self is that it is a transient, constantly-changing, reactive resonance, formed and determined in tandem with what surrounds it, and 'nothing available (substantial or subsistent) to which one can be "present"' (Nancy 2007: 12).

For example, let us assume that I am sitting on a park bench on a quiet summer's day reading the book, when I suddenly hear an explosion. When describing this event, I could claim that *I* listen-*entendre* to the explosion; after all, I

[31] Here the term resonance, it should be noted, is drawn from the world of physics – in particular, acoustics – where it implies 'the tendency of a mechanical or electrical system to vibrate at a certain [frequency] when excited by an external force, and to keep vibrating after the excitation is removed' (Louie and White 2005: 329). Nancy's use of the term, however, does not refer simply to the physical phenomenon, although the physicality of the bodily encounter with sound is indeed one of the tenets of his argument. Instead, the 'resonance' here is metaphorical, and relates to the Latin root – to 're-sound' – and refers to the self's constitution in sound: as my primordial encounter with the sound forms *me* through listening-*ecouter*, any further interactions between the sound and I through listening-*entendre* emerges from a *me* that is still existing the repetition of that sound within my subject.

will perceive and immediately recognise and react to it. Still, even before this occurs, at the moment when I hear the explosion – or in Nancy's terminology, listen-*écouter* to it – the *I* that encounters the sound is different from the me sitting on the park bench, in that its world is no longer the quiet day of the park bench: whereas everything around me – the grass, the book I may have been reading, my internal monologue about it – appeared in my perceptual field as an interconnected whole of peace, suddenly, the same elements and backgrounds, although unchanged, may appear threatening and terrifying. The same even applies to the sound of the explosion itself: when it appears to me – that is, when I intend toward it and listen-*entendre* it as an explosion – it is appearing to a *me* whose relationship with the world has already altered from peace to terror through the encounter with the very same sound. The same applies should I attempt to examine the sound through deliberative listening: should I attempt to determine the cause of the explosion, or listen for the codes hidden in it – for example, attempting to understand whether this means the end of the world, or attempting to determine the rhythm of its bass tones, I will only be doing this as a *me* whose relationship with the world is already changed to that of terror, and thus, anything I listen for in the sound will have already been influenced by the very sound itself. Even after the sound ends, and the park falls silent again, my relationship with the world does not return to where it was before I encountered the sound: its effects, even before being known and recognised by me, are in me: the sound, although physically gone, is *re-sounding* in me, influencing my world. It could even be said that this *me* is constantly constituted and re-constituted by such encounters: who is to say, for example, that the peace that characterised my world before the explosion did not have a root in the soft breeze and the birdsong that preceded it briefly before the asyndeton silenced them in my perception and allowed me to attend to my book? In that situation, even the mere act of looking up from my book and recognising the peace would be preceded by the peace itself, which in turn is constituted by the sonorous encounter of listening-*écouter.*

Returning to the example of the radio play above, however, we can observe that as the radio-body listens for the sounds of the dramatic world, it appears to remain unchanged itself: punch after punch lands, but the radio-body listens for them in the same manner, even though each punch changes the power balance in the scene. The relationship between characters, cordial until just before the excerpt

begins, has taken a sudden violent turn, but any effect that this change could have had on the radio-body's relationship with the dramatic world remains inaudible. The background sound of the fire burning and the balloon creaking remains constant, as does the radio-body's perspective on the events. Overall, the radio-body seems to express that to which it listens-*entendre*, rather than its listening-*écouter*; as discussed previously, semantic listening – as with other deliberative listening modes – only exists at the level of the former, and is preceded and formed by the latter. As such, the semantic radio-body remains separate from and unaffected by the dramatic world, assuming a position that presupposes transcendence.

Here, I posit that it is at the site of resonant, ante-predicative listening-*écouter*, that the alternatives to semantic modes of listening, and thus, new forms of radio dramaturgy, can be found: the radio-body could, in addition to listening-*entendre* to the dramatic world by listening for specific, already constituted sounds, also listen-*écouter* to its own dynamic relationship with those sounds and with that world. After all, whereas assuming different deliberative modes of listening may lead to sound structures that, as discussed in the previous section, may not express the world through an auditory schema, listening-*écouter* is, by virtue of preceding any kind of sonic experience, already part of the listener's auditory schema and would thus not hinder the constitution of the radio-body in the way that, for example, reduced or causal listening would. The radio-body, in other words, could access an alternative listening mode by foregoing the transcendental presupposition existent within deliberative modes.

A clear question then beckons: how can a radio-body possibly achieve this? Let us consider this question from a philosophical perspective. The radio-body can listen for the sounds of the world because they appear in its perceptual field in a pre-reflective gestalt, allowing for synecdoche and asyndeton. Nancy's idea of resonance, however, seems to be the precondition for this appearance, and for the existence of the perceptual field – and thus, itself absent from it: it is inaccessible phenomenologically. Nancy himself, too, mentions that 'the subject of the listening or the subject who is listening (but also the one who is "subject to listening" in the sense that one can be "subject to" unease, an ailment, or a crisis) is not a phenomenological subject' (2007: 22). After all, back in the park, no matter how certain and clear I will be, in reflection, that it was the explosion that changed my

world from peaceful to terrifying, *I* did not, and could not, experience the moment in which the sound instigated this change, simply because doing so would assume that this *I* existed in some continuous form outside the two states for peace and terror, and outside of the sound. [32] If I cannot listen *for* the experience of listening-*écouter*, then how can the radio-body do the same, and then express it to me?

Here, however, Merleau-Ponty's idea of *flesh,* already discussed in Chapter 2, can provide a response in two ways. Firstly, Merleau-Ponty's conceptualisation of perception in his later book, *The Visible and the Invisible*, is not the fundamentally-directed condition of one's experience described in his earlier *Phenomenology*, but a state of being in the world which also experiences one as one is experiencing – one far more compatible with Nancy's resonant self. He writes:

> since perhaps the self and the non-self are like the obverse and the reverse and since perhaps our own experience is this turning round that installs us far indeed from "ourselves," in the other, in the things. Like the natural man, we situate ourselves in ourselves and in the things, in ourselves and in the other, at the point where, by a sort of chiasm, we become the others and we become world (Merleau-Ponty 1968: 160).

As discussed in Section 2.3, Merleau-Ponty locates the self not on one side of the encounter with the world that shapes and influences one's experience as it is

[32] Indeed, this problem is the basis on which post-structuralist Gilles Deleuze presented his critique of phenomenology: that what determines, forms and affects the subject whose experience is the subject of phenomenological reduction, itself cannot be present to this subject unless we assume that the subject transcends the experience. Deleuze and Guattari instead propose to understand experience through the prism of, among other concepts, *affect*: a 'modification of experiences as independent things of existence' (Parr 2010: 12). Affect – both a verb and a noun – is understood by Deleuze in the same way that resonance is conceived by Nancy: the change from one experiential state from another, itself not part of experience, but what enables experience in a constant process of *becoming*. Following Deleuze's concept, there has been a recent *affective turn* in the humanities and the critical study of the arts in recent years, wherein social, political, cultural and artistic phenomena have been scrutinised and conceptualised through the lens of affect; overviews of this turn can be found in Clough and Haley (2007), and Gregg and Seigworth (2010). Although there are close parallels between the argument of this thesis and the concept of affect – especially when concerning sound – the fundamental position of this thesis in phenomenology means that the lens of affect is not suitable methodologically. This, I would argue, is not problematic – especially as any critique of this thesis from the perspective of affect would be directed more toward the aspects drawn from Merleau-Ponty's earlier *Phenomenology of Perception*; the later *Visible and the Invisible*, which forms a much more important part of my arguments here, has a more ambiguous relationship with the idea of affect – indeed, Reynolds and Roffe argue that 'both Deleuze's basic criticisms of phenomenology, as well as he and Guattari's problems with the concept of the flesh, do not adequately come to grips with Merleau-Ponty's later philosophy' (2006: 228) – upon which the key arguments of this thesis rest. Further exploration of the connections between Merleau-Ponty's idea of *flesh* and Deleuze's *affects* can be found in Lawlor (1998), Reynolds and Roffe (2006), and Somers-Hall (2006). Broader discussion of post-structuralist critiques of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology can be found in Evans and Lawlor (2000).

being experienced, but in the *chiasm* in which the encounter occurs. The perceiver that is formed from *flesh*, therefore, is not the phenomenological subject whom Nancy precedes with the resonant self.

Secondly, the reversibility of perception and expression that is made possible by, and is a fundamental part of, the condition of being *flesh*, and which, as Chapter 2 argued, allows me to direct myself toward the expression of the radio-body and perceive its world *as* a world, would also provide me with the possibility of experiencing its listening-*écouter* and resonance, even if the resonance itself does not feature in the radio-body's own experience. After all, due to the radio-body and the listener being of the same *flesh*, I experience the changes in the radio-body's relationship to the world as it does: while the resonance itself does not appear to my experience, I experience the same changes in the world that the radio-body does as a result of resonating with it.

In order for the radio-body to be able to listen-*écouter*, then, it suffices that it expresses not the resonance of listening-*écouter* itself – which, is not present or audible in the experience – but changes in the world, including its own position in and relationship with it; once these are made audible, the listener will be able to not just listen-*entendre* to the fact that this relationship has changed, but listen-*écouter* with it, going through and resonating with the change. I deliberately use the term 'make audible', because unlike elements of experience, these changes may not be audible in the dramatic world itself. To express the results of resonance, the radio-body would need to express sounds that demonstrate its dynamic engagement and listening-*écouter* in the dramatic world, rather than remaining static and listening semantically, that is, only for things for which it can listen-*entendre*. In simpler terms, to find an alternative to semantic listening, the radio-body needs to listen to itself.

Here, I should make a terminological clarification. It may be assumed that my use of the word *itself* implies that the radio-body has a constituted self, whereas the key point revealed by Nancy's conceptualisation of listening-*écouter* is that there is no such thing as the *self* outside of resonance. My use of the term, however, follows Nancy, who writes in describing listening to music:

> It is not a hearer […] who listens [.] Listening is musical when it is music that listens to itself. It returns to itself, it reminds itself of itself, and it feels itself as resonance itself: a

> relationship to self deprived, stripped of all egoism and all ipseity. Not "itself" or the other, or identity, or difference, but alteration and variation, the modulation of the present that changes it in expectation of its own eternity (Nancy 2007: 67).

By using the term *listening to itself*, Nancy collapses the distinction between music and its listener: the relationship between the two, he argues, is not unidirectional, but resonant. In resonating with the music, the listener's self is revealed as nothing but alteration and variation in encounter with the world. By applying the term *listening to itself* to the radio-body, then, I am referring to the possibility that it can listen for sounds that reveal the radio-body to be transient, only constituted as a result of its encounter with the dramatic world, and continuously subject to alternation and variation. After all, one factor is self-evident: radio cannot listen to itself in the semantic mode; doing so would, again, presuppose a transcendent listener. Necessarily, then, a radio-body that expresses listening to itself as it listens to the dramatic world constitutes a break with the semantic mode of listening. This form of radio-listening-to-itself I label *resonant* listening. Resonant listening cannot be understood as a *mode* of listening per se in that the radio-body is not directing itself toward particular acoustic and sonic qualities already audible in the world; instead, it is the openness to dynamism, multiplicity, and transience in modes of directedness toward sound that define resonant listening. Resonant listening, in simpler terms, can consist of a variety of modes of listening that allow the radio-body to listen to itself. The alternative to the semantic mode of dramaturgy, then, is not the construction of the radio-body according to another mode of listening, but overstepping the transcendental limits of the semantic mode, and utilising a variety of modes in order to create a radio-body that listens to itself.

It is crucial for the arguments of this entire thesis to note that by listening to itself, the resonant radio-body also engages with the listener's body to a much larger extent than the radio-body that results from a semantic approach to dramaturgy. The listener's encounter with the radio-body is also through the resonant, ante-predicative attitude of listening-*écouter* – in other words, the radio listener does not merely listen to the radio-body, but *resonates* with it, and experiences the dramatic world accordingly. The fact that the radio-body listens to its own resonance with the dramatic world does not result merely in the listener becoming conscious of the resonance – she, being of the same *flesh*, also resonates

with the radio-body, and thus its shifting bodily relationship with the dramatic world. In the radio-body of the semantic paradigm, however, the bodily resonance with the world falls silent, meaning that the perspective of the listener unto the dramatic world remains that of the idealised semantic listener: unaffected and separated from the world. This, in fact, is the source of the title of this thesis: whereas a semantic radio-body listens to *tell* – that is, to listen for discernible sounds standing for distinct, already-constituted elements – the resonant radio-body resonates with the listener's body in a manner resembling Nancy's description of music: it *plays* the dramatic world. Thus, a resonant radio-body can be an alternative to a semantic radio-body – an idea that I pursue in the next two chapters.

3.6. Closing remarks

In this chapter, I argued that the British conventions of radio practice constitute a semantic paradigm - that is, a mode of dramaturgy that creates a radio-body that directs itself toward sounds in order to identify what they stand for, rather than attending to their acoustic, sonic, and bodily qualities. I located this dramaturgy within conventional practices and exemplars in writing, performance, and production. I then presented a critique of this approach to dramaturgy by questioning the philosophical assumptions of the semantic mode of listening, arguing that a *resonant* approach to the construction of the radio-body can be an alternative to the semantic paradigm. While I have hypothesised such an approach, the question remains as to if and how a resonant dramaturgy may be possible in practice. How does a resonant radio-body listen, and what does it sound like to a listener? And more importantly, if such a mode is possible, and offers a larger dramaturgical toolkit because of the manner in which it engages the listener's body, then why is it not the dominant paradigm of radio dramaturgy?

This last point is a major critique of the argument for a resonant dramaturgy. After all, the semantic paradigm of dramaturgy has entered the conventions of radio through a long historical process of development. As such, it could be argued its mere existence shows that it is the necessary and ultimate shape that any attempt to present a dramatic world through radio would take. This is an attitude that Ash, for example, takes when he claims that writers attempted to saturate their work in the early years of radio, 'when radio drama was still not too sure of itself' (1985: 50), whereas, as dramaturgy has evolved, 'producers and technicians have half a

century of experience behind them' (1985: 50), and as such are able to use the medium to the best of its abilities, by allowing it to listen semantically. If resonant dramaturgy is practically possible and not just a theoretical concept, and if it more engaging for the listener, then why this historical process not lead to the dominance of this hypothetical resonant dramaturgy, and instead ended in the conventionalisation of the semantic mode?

This is the question that I pursue in the next chapter. By examining the genealogical history of the development of the semantic paradigm, I want to posit that in fact, the adoption and domination of the semantic mode of dramaturgy is a consequence not of some inherent quality of the medium of radio, but of contingent historical and contextual factors. As these change, I argue, the paradigm is also beginning to shift.

CHAPTER 4:

RADIO LEARNS TO LISTEN: A GENEALOGY OF THE SEMANTIC PARADIGM

4.1. Opening remarks

In the previous chapter, I posited that British radio dramaturgy follows a semantic paradigm. I then argued that this paradigm could be critiqued for its disregard for resonance, and instead envisaged a hypothetical resonant mode of dramaturgy, through which the radio-body listens to itself. I then highlighted a significant critique of this hypothesis: the historical dominance of the semantic paradigm can imply that it is the 'final' form of radio drama.

Andrew Crisell follows such an argument in *Better than Magritte* – an article which, interestingly for the theme of this chapter, is subtitled *how drama on the radio became radio drama*. Crisell argues that British radio dramaturgy, which began life as simply the radiophonic broadcasting of the sounds of live theatre, gradually found its own original 'radiogenic' (2000: 470) form and content which was derived from 'the evocativeness of a sound-only medium [as well as] its evident limitations' (2000:471). Crisell claims that after a period of experimentation in the 1920s and 30s, radio practitioners progressively became aware of what the possibilities and the limitations of the medium were, and adjusted their process of dramaturgy accordingly: they 'rediscover[ed] the verbal nature of drama' (2000: 469), and realised that 'mostly and primarily through speech, sound on the radio will tell us all the things we need to know' (2000:467) – attitudes characteristic of the semantic paradigm. In other words, according to Crisell, the limitations and capabilities of the unisensory medium of radio necessitate a certain dramaturgical approach, which has been discovered and completed gradually through its history. Were a resonant dramaturgy possible, beneficial, and *radiogenic*, it would have found a way into the paradigmatic conventions of radio; the absence of resonant listening in semantic dramaturgy, therefore, implies that it is not.

Such historically-deterministic positions, however, are open to serious objections. A number of influential works by philosopher Michel Foucault, for example, are devoted to tracing histories of phenomena commonly assumed to be normal, universal of inevitable, and exploring the contingent factors that have made them possible. In *Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,* Foucault critiques the historicist approach on the grounds that it assumes the 'existence of immobile forms that precede the external world of accident and succession' (1971: 78), thereby projecting a teleological narrative of purpose on what, ultimately, is always historically contingent. For example, behind the idea that there is a normal and inevitable path through which radio dramaturgy developed, adapted to its medium, and grew to become what it is today, exists the assumption that there is a final, ideal form of radio dramaturgy that is itself not contingent to, for example, the types of experimentation, the personalities of the practitioners, the instruments, the cultural contexts, or countless other factors ultimately unrelated to the art form itself. Such an assumption makes it impossible to imagine an alternative, as any form of dramaturgy other than this radiogenic version would ultimately either fail or adopt the rules, techniques, and assumptions of this ideal mode. In reaction to this 'history', Foucault proposes instead to undertake a 'genealogy' – a methodical approach that aims, conversely, to show how the historical is not really inevitable, by focusing on 'the accidents, the minute deviations – or conversely, the complete reversals – the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to have value for us' (Foucault 1971: 82). Contrary to a historicist approach, a genealogical view of history allows for the possibility of transformation by pointing out the contingency of practices and structures.

In this chapter, I approach the history of British radio dramaturgy with this genealogical approach. I begin with the period of experimentation following the founding of the BBC, and show how two visions for radio drama clashed during its early years: one that constructed a semantically-listening radio-body, and one that could be interpreted as valuing resonance. I then examine a number of factors which led to the dominance of one over the other in the determination of radio drama practice conventions. I move to the post-war 'second golden age' (Rodger 1982: 5), and then to the relatively contemporary Radio 4 era, arguing that the semantic paradigm prevails during this period despite the proposal of resonant alternatives. Finally, I present an appraisal of the current state of radio drama, focusing on its

rapid changes in the digital age, and highlight the possibilities that these changes bring. [33]

4.2. The early years: drama on the radio and radio drama

In 1946, Val Gielgud, the BBC official responsible for drama between 1929 and 1963 – of whom I shall speak more in the upcoming sections – writes that:

> The main period of technical experimentation [...] lasted – in this country – roughly from 1928 to 1932. During those years the machinery was tested; its components were largely fixed; and interest, both professional and listening, was almost entirely coined to the means, with deplorably little regard for the end (1946: vii).

Gielgud follows this by arguing that – 'largely as an unconsidered result of the Second German War' (Gielgud 1946: viii) – this era ended, allowing radio practitioners to stop the perceived obsession with the technological possibilities of the medium, and instead pursue the aesthetically-appropriate objective of radio drama which, he argues, is 'the telling of a story in [...] radio-dramatic terms; the telling of a story qualified by proper and practical consideration of both the advantages and limitations conferred upon the author [...]' (Gielgud 1946: ix).

Gielgud's timeline could, of course, be contested: Beck argues that by 1928, 'key aesthetic and technical achievements' (2001: 1.1.) were in place, while Crook (1999: 22-9) begins the history of audio drama with oral culture, continuing through the invention of mechanical sound reproduction and early experiments with recording theatre – placing the period cited by Gielgud in the 'fourth age'

[33] Here, it should be stressed that I do not intend to present a methodical history of British radio drama; such an endeavour would not fit within either the aims, the scope, or the methodological approach of this thesis, nor would it add any original facts to what is already available in the literature. Histories of the development of British radio drama have been documented by Rodger (1982), Crook (1999) and Hand and Traynor (2011), and can also be found in sources on the broader context of the history of British broadcasting, such as those by Briggs (1961, 1965, 1970, 1979, 1995), Crisell (2005), and Street (2002). Cardiff and Scannell (1991), Gielgud (1956), Beck (2005), Pepler (1988), Wood (2008), and Hendy (2007, 2012, 2013, 2014) all cover partial periods of this development. Although each of these have individual angles, overall, there exists a degree of consensus on broad timelines and important developments in British radio drama, summarised briefly by Crisell's aforementioned article: that radio drama appeared in the early 1920s, found its shape through a variety of styles and experiments under the monopoly of the BBC during the next decade, reached new accolades of artistic and creative acclaim in the post-war era, faced competition with television but survived due to the public service nature of the BBC, and is currently going through a transformation as a result of digital methods of broadcast and distribution. I do not contest this timeline, but instead follows it with a critical eye and by drawing from the phenomenological framework of the previous chapter, to point to the emergence of the semantic mode of listening in the conventional British radio-body, and the historical contexts through which these conventions achieved paradigmatic status.

(1999: 25) of radio drama. It cannot be denied, however, that the arrival of radio broadcasting, and its quick monopolisation in 1922 by the BBC, opened up the many possibilities of the medium: following its General Manager John (later Lord) Reith's mission statement to inform, educate and entertain, 'the BBC created a benign climate to encourage writers of very various talents' (Rodger 1982: 4) who began attempts and experiments to adapt the old methods of dramaturgy to the demands of the new technology and its cultural and social reach. What they encountered was the problem of radio drama: how can a world be presented to the listener without the aid of sight? The response to this problem, as we have seen before, lies within the process of dramaturgy: constructing a radio-body that listens to a dramatic world creates the possibility of encountering a dramatic world through the radio apparatus. Therefore, what Gielgud labels technical experimentation could be interpreted as testing and exploring different methods of dramatisation and dramaturgy, and thus different modes of listening for the radio-body.

Similarly, it can be questioned whether the conventions of radio dramaturgy was, as Gielgud mentions, in place by 1932: experiments with the radio form certainly continued in Britain, and in the BBC itself, through the next decades, some of which will be the focus of upcoming sections. The practice conventions also changed, as did the technical aspects of radio dramaturgy; indeed, Gielgud himself follows the claim about 1932 by citing post-war changes to the practice of radio. Nevertheless, by the end of the 1930s, a number of key practices were in place; a number of books and articles on how to write and produce for radio drama had been published by Gordon Lea (1926), Val Gielgud himself (1931) – who also published them in six parts in the Radio Times during 1929 (Crook 1999a) – and Lance Sieveking (1934), another pioneer of radio production. These show a number of processes already in place: Lea discusses the medium's openness to a narrator, Gielgud prescribes the appropriate themes, lengths, and methods of using sounds, and Sieveking presents clear descriptions of the methods and processes of multi-studio broadcasting. The BBC's annual public bulletin – known as the Handbook, the Yearbook, or the Annual in different years – demonstrates this settling of practices: in 1928, it states that although 'there has been extraordinary progress' in the production and reception of radio drama, which was initially 'an experimental feature, of short duration and irregular appearance – sponsored, be it said, with some trepidation', there still exist 'the question of adapting and presenting

[dramatic] material in that form which renders it capable of reception and appreciation by the listener' (Handbook 1928: 115) and that 'the ends and forms of the new art of Radio Drama are hardly yet in sight' (Handbook 1928: 116); [34] by 1934, it announces that 'the first phase of development of radio drama has come to an end. The over-emphasised, over-publicised special technique of presenting drama through the medium of the microphone has now crystallised as far […] as its fundamentals are concerned' (Yearbook 1934: 57). These fundamentals, I argue n this chapter, are the conventions of dramaturgy, and the semantic mode of listening assumed by the resulting radio-body.

From a genealogical stance, however, it can be observed that this crystallisation was not the inevitable result of paradigmatic necessity; the fact that these particular fundamentals became the norm related to factors which, to varying degrees, had little to do with 'the medium of the microphone' (Gielgud 1946: vii) itself. In fact, as I discuss in the next section, the emergence of radio drama as an independent art form was influenced not just by the auditory nature of the medium, but the practicalities of producing drama for it.

4.2.1. Settling into the new body

In the initial experiments with drama on the radio, the main attempts were focused simply on adapting drama – meaning theatrical drama, since the other major form of dramatic art, film, did not yet include sound – to the specifications of the medium: its sightlessness, liveness, and stationary technology.

The strategies to overcome the 'blindness' of the medium can be seen from the very beginning, in what both Crook (1999: 4) and Beck (2001: 2.2.1) acknowledge to be the first experiment in broadcasting a piece of drama – a performance of excerpts from Edmond Rostand's 1989 play *Cyrano de Bergerac* in October 1922, organised by Peter Eckersley, the BBC's fist chief engineer. [35] In choosing the excerpts, Eckersley writes (in Crook 1999:4): 'we chose the balcony scene […] it is played, on stage, in semi-darkness with virtually stationary players and so it seemed very suitable for broadcasting' – resolving the problem of radio

[34] The authors of these annuals are often anonymous. Considering that the books were the official position of the BBC, I have cited the corporation itself as the author is the bibliography. In the body of the thesis, however, I use the shorthand 'handbook', 'yearbook' or 'annual', where appropriate, for clarity and ease of flow.

[35] Briggs (1951: 280) instead identifies scenes from *Julius Caesar* as the first broadcast of drama.

drama by essentially removing the factor of vision from the dramatic world itself. The same trope was used by Richard Hughes in *A Comedy of Danger* (1924), the first play specifically commissioned for radio which, as previously mentioned, was set in the darkness of a mine. Plays broadcast on the radio in the early years would be accompanied a narrator; 'an announcer [who] would not only read the opening scene settings, but also some directions as the dialogue proceeded and explaining the action' (Beck 2001: 3.1.14) – another dramaturgical method of compensating for the absence of visuals.

Practical and technological issues also required adaptation: the immobility of broadcast equipment and microphones made it impossible to perform a play in the 'normal' manner in a space. The 1929 Handbook, for example, deems theatrical settings to be unsuitable as sources of broadcast, because:

> [I]t is impossible to place microphones sufficiently near the performers to avoid a pronounced echo effect, particularly when there is much movement on the stage. The result of this echo is frequently that the tone quality and expression of the speaker become distorted to listeners by wireless. […] Another difficultly is to obtain a proper vocal balance between individual performers; […] to give listeners an impression equivalent to that received by the theatre audience (Handbook 1929: 195).

Let us understand this in terms of the radio-body's mode of listening: the attempt to present the dramatic world of the stage through the microphone, and to the listener at the end of the receiver, we can understand as the attempt to express the dramatic world through a radio-body which, as the anonymous writer in the Handbook shows, does not materialise, because the microphone's ability to pick up the sound of the theatre stage differs completely from the spectator's ability to listen to it as a world: spatial relationships are disrupted, sounds lose their place in the perceptual field, and do not follow the listener's auditory schema. Subsequently, to make the dramatic world perceptible, the adoption of new methods of structuring sounds is required.

Such methods did gradually appear: initially, they began with actors performing to the microphone instead of to an audience, requiring a readjustment of their relationship with the space of performance, and subsequently with the radio-body. This required changes in styles of action: the anonymous producer describing a radio drama production in 1929 writes that '[t]he actor of ability enters

a broadcasting studio with the confidence of long acting experience, often to find that the microphone demands that he start learning all over again' (Handbook 1929, 179-80). Furthermore, the use of studio space had to be adjusted, as it became apparent that sound effects 'require light sounds near the micro- phone, rather than the heavy and relatively distant noises necessary in a theatre, which come out blurred and often unidentifiable on a receiving set' (Handbook 1929: 185). In the description of a Daily Mail reporter present for the first broadcast of *A Comedy of Danger*, quoted by Beck, one can see the beginnings of such an adaptation to space, where there is an orchestration of different sounds around the microphone, with various distances and volumes, in order to create a radio-body that listens to the scene in the mine.

> In a brightly lit room a young woman in evening dress and two men holding sheets of paper in their hands declaimed to a microphone their horror at being imprisoned in the mine. Outside the room, a young man sat cross-legged on the floor, with telephone receivers on his ears and as he heard through the receivers the progress of the piece he signalled to two assistants on a lower landing to make noises to represent the action of the play. In a passage there stood five men singing through a partly-opened door leading to the broadcasting room. They were a group of "miners" singing in another passage in the mine (Beck 2001: 4.2.11).

The awkwardness and difficulty of this spatial arrangement shows why measures were taken to resolve it by 1928, when the Handbook states:

> The use of several studios simultaneously has been a feature of some of the dramatic productions during the last year or so. […] [T]he producer […] can use a new control board which comprises any desired number of studios. He can listen during rehearsal to a loudspeaker reproducing the combined results, and correct faults (Handbook 1928: 210).

With this device – known as the Dramatic Control Panel – the producer is able to listen to the loudspeaker, which more or less represents a radio receiver, and assess whether a radio-body with an auditory schema has been formed; the listener's encounter with the dramatic world now depends not just on what the actors and artists do, but how the producer in charge of the Control Panel listens to them. Crucially, this development allows not only for the replication of the auditory schema of a theatrical spectator, but that of any listener: the set-up here allows for drama that does not need, necessarily, to be even possible on stage, as long as it can be listened to by the radio-body.

Such observations are made by 1926: whereas just a year before, the then-head of drama, R.E. Jeffreys, had hoped that '[i]n the future […] there may be an actual stage and the players may dress their part – all with the idea of getting the right "atmosphere"' (in Beck 2001: 6.4.5). Gordon Lea's manual on writing for radio drama, the first two chapters of which is actually devoted to a study of stage drama, hopes that 'radio drama in its real form – not a bastard cultivation from the stage – will become a source of inspiration' (1926:12); a hope supported by Director General Lord Reith who, in a memo to all heads of stations, commends Lea and writes:

> [I]n many of our productions there is too much striving for theatre effect and too little attempt at discovering the actual radio effect when the play is received in distant homes. […]The quickest way to alienate sympathy for and interest in radio plays is for any 'staginess' to be suggested, either in characters or method of treatment (in Beck 2001: 6.4.4).

The radio-body, in other words, no longer needs to develop tactics to listen for the *stage* play, but to dramatic worlds of its own. Lea's manual argues that radio 'releases for drama from all the things which are difficult, if not impossible, on stage' (1926: 41) and critiques the tropes of production that were enacted to enable the radio-body to replicate the listener of a stage play, such as the static nature of scenes (1926: 42), and the use of the narrator (1926: 46), which he explores in detail. Lea compares two different approaches to radio dramaturgy: the 'Narrator Method' (1926: 46), where the drama is supplemented by literary descriptions of the scene and actions, and the 'Self-Contained Method' (1926: 53), where the listener encounters the dramatic world without narratorial mediation. Lea argues that the former is unnecessary, and even undesirable, as '[t]o offer a mind-picture is to prejudice the imagination of the listener, besides being outside the unity of the radio-form' (1926: 70). Instead, he proposes that radio drama should utilise the Self-Contained Method, and sound as if it is '"overheard". It can be made as startling and realistic as if the listener were overhearing something in the next room through a half-open door' (1926: 57). In essence, Lea's proposal is for a new mode of listening for the radio-body.

What, then, should this new mode of listening be? In the next section, I outline the responses that pioneers of British radio drama provided to this question,

arguing that both semantic and resonant modes were proposed during radio's early years.

4.2.2. Two visions of radio

In 1931, Val Gielgud, by then two years into his spell in charge of the BBC's drama productions, published a booklet entitled *How to Write Broadcast Plays*. It contained three production scripts from his recent radio plays, preceded by a summary of what characteristics, in his opinion, a suitable play for broadcast should have. The vision he puts forward for the radio demonstrates similar features to the practical and aesthetic properties of what was described in the previous section as the 'semantic' mode. He argues that 'in writing a radio play […] it is advisable to conceive of it in terms of separate ingredients of music, sound effects, narrator, cast, and so forth' (1931: 25), and calls for plays to have 'simple plot, involving few characters […] of a type to be simply and immediately distinguished' (1931: 19). He also critiques one of his own scripts, *Exiles,* by pointing out that 'in the stage directions there are far too many indications of purely realist effects which it would be much better to omit altogether' (1931: 98) and is happier with another project, Red Tab – which he himself produced – where 'the use of effects is more discreet' (1931: 148), indicating his preference for the 'symbolic' effect; indeed, he speaks with some derision of plays which use 'every type of mechanical sound device to give variety and diversion' (1931: 28). Although he emphasises the importance of music to the radio play, his taxonomy of the uses of music is strikingly similar to what McLeish (1994: 236) also cites more than sixty years later, as mentioned in Chapter 3: music 'may be employed merely for emotional purposes', or 'to indicate changes of scene, and to stamp clearly the entrances of different characters by providing them with musical themes' (1931: 29) – in other words, as stand-ins for characters. He also emphasises the verbal nature of radio drama, and advises the writer that he (sic) has 'nothing but dialogue in which he must not only tell his story clearly and unmistakeably, but also indicate changes to the scene, physical traits of his characters, and the essential details of their background' (1931: 18). Apart from the section on music, and one on mixing voices (1931: 33) he says very little about how a radio drama should sound, focusing instead on the themes and the literary content. The book's main concern regarding production is to advise writers to ensure that they do not create pieces without due care for the procedures and instruments of production.

As I have posited in Chapter 3, these dramaturgical features can all lead to the creation of a radio-body that listens semantically. The proposal for such features, however, is not arbitrary. Gielgud argues that it is through these principles and practices that radio drama finds its true form; his proposals, he claims, are based on his practical experience as a producer and writer, and the conclusion of a process of trial and error. The separation of elements he bases on the separation of the studios in the multi-studio system: each 'kind' of sound needs its own studio, so it would be beneficial for them to be separate at the start. His attitude toward sound effects he derives from the fact that to the listener's ears, they are 'diversions', whereas he requires the audience's full attention. He emphasises words as they are more intelligible than other sounds, and thus allow for more clarity. Nevertheless, one can also spot continuities between the stage-centred modes of listening and Gielgud's proposals. For example, while he concedes that 'perhaps there is room' (1931: 28) for plays with rapid scene changes and sound effects, a 'discussion play' (1931:31) – with static, continuous scenes and little extraneous sound, like Eckersley's *Cyrano* – would be a 'purer' source for radio plays; a link, also, to the theatrical forms of the day, which will be discussed at length further on, in Section 4.2.3.1. His advocacy of the symbolic use of sound effects, and for the idea of overall clarity, can be said to resemble the attempts to present the clear 'mental picture' of the stage play in earlier years.

As we have seen, this type of dramaturgy has survived and become a paradigm of British radio production. The dramaturgy and mode of listening of its resultant radio-body, exemplified here by Gielgud's ideas, however, were certainly not the sole proposals for the new medium. During what he labelled the 'experimental phase', a number of alternative ways of writing and producing radio were tried out, which dealt with the medium first and foremost in terms of sound. Such attitudes, that were part of the early experiments dismissed by Gielgud, do not fit within the dramaturgy that would later become the semantic paradigm, but can be considered part of what Hall labels '[t]he history of radio art and experimental radio [that] can be read as a "counter-history" of radio, one which works both in parallel with as well as against the grain of a canonical broadcasting history' (2015:25). This mode of dramaturgy, I posit, manifests resonant tendencies.

The alternative approach – which encompassed experiments by Guthrie, who wrote the 'microphone play' *The Squirrel's Cage* (1931), and Archie Harding, who worked on Operas for the radio with Ezra Pound (Fischer 2002: 77) – was most prominently advocated, and is perhaps best exemplified, by Lance Sieveking, a staff producer at the BBC, who published *The Stuff of Radio* (1934). [36] In this treatise on the medium, which also contains the production script of eight radio plays, he presents a picture of radio starkly different to Gielgud's; indeed, he proclaims that he 'disagree[s] violently' (1934: 56) with Gielgud on everything. The difference between the two arises from the fact that in contrast to Gielgud's approach, Sieveking champions sound:

> [There is] [o]ne kind of thing, one genre of arranged sounds, that is peculiarly, particularly, and integrally *the* stuff of radio. The radio play, and the "feature-programme", are of this genre. And in both of these […] the sound effect is made use of. And that […] is *the* radio of radio (1934: 25-6).

Unlike Gielgud, whose focus is mainly on radio drama as a written and then performed form, Sieveking understands radio as a predominantly aural – and musical – medium. He proudly declares that his 1927 play *Kaleidoscope* is 'the epitome of the radio play: there is nothing to print!' (1934: 29) and is doubtful about publishing his scripts at all: 'a radio play being prepared for reading demands […] that all the sound sequences shall be so described that nothing essential shall be lost. To do this completely is, I believe, an impossibility' (1934: 27). When discussing sound effects, he describes how the mixing of a variety of sound effects through the Dramatic Control Panel can create a whole scene, and describes the mix not in terms of symbols, but in terms of music: 'the exact *rightness* of its timing is everything […] and this is not achieved with clocks, but with an instinct similar to a musician's' (1934: 39). He expresses his particular attitude to the new medium clearly when critiquing Gielgud's understanding of the workings of Dramatic Control Panel:

> He says: "… *This panel is simply the centralising and mixing unit, by means of which the output of several studios can*

[36] Throughout this section, I use Gielgud and Sieveking's texts as shorthands for the two contrasting forms of dramaturgical proposals put forward by them; it should, however, be noted that the differences between the works and practices of the two, particularly in later years, was not as pronounced as their respective writing suggests. Sieveking and Gielgud did collaborate – Sieveking, for example, produced Gielgud's *Friday Morning* (1934), while Gielgud produced a number of Sieveking's adaptations – for instance, of *Ghosts* (1944), Hedda Gabbler (1952), and *A Midsummer Night's Dream* (1953). What is under discussion here is not two personal styles, but two competing approaches to dramaturgy.

> *simultaneously be used, and welded together into a single whole at a central point under the control of the producer*". Please compare that with this: "… *this* organ *is simply the centralising and mixing unit, by means of which the output of several* pipes *can simultaneously be used, and welded together into a single whole* (chord, or succession of chords) *at a central point under the control of the* organist. " This is one of *the* essential differences between us. He thinks the instruments should be "operated", I that it should be "played" (Sieveking 1934: 58).

The dramaturgy proposed by Sieveking, then, is radically different to the approach that characterises Gielgud's methods. Whereas the latter advocated for separate elements, clarity, and meaning, the former emphasises the sonic quality and the experience of encountering the sound. For example, whereas Gielgud's descriptions of sound and music in the script for *Exiles* is simple, concise, and brief – '*Fade into a piano playing a Nocturne of Chopin. This continues for about one minute. Then there is the sound of a door opening quietly*' (Gielgud 1931: 69), Sieveking, in writing *Arrest in Africa*, is much more expressive and evocative '*Like a great wave gathering itself to its greatest height before it topples over and crashes on the beach, the howling, hooting, screaming, roaring jungle hovers, spreads, swoops, and in one final, deafening shudder, overwhelms the young men, and they are swallowed up* (Sieveking 1934: 185). Rather than stick to script, Sieveking argues that there should be a system of notation for the Dramatic Control Panel and calls it '"scoring" for the D.C. Panel […] [which] would be done in very much the same manner as musical orchestral scoring is done' (1934: 404); instead of using scripts, he drew diagrams of his productions (1934: 104-5, 408). He even experiments with new types of sound; attempting to create something akin to a close-up on the radio, a 'time-sound close-up', he describes how a speech from his *Intimate Snapshot* gradually slows down: '[B]y the end of the speech she has approached her lips close to the microphone and is speaking at the exact slow *tempo* of the music, which now fades up, slowly thudding with its percussive insistence' (1934: 39). Of course, just as Gielgud's proposals were derived from earlier models of the radio and the stage, Sieveking's ideas share a heritage with film. Sieveking devotes a whole chapter to discussing Soviet filmmaker Podovkin's experiments with montage, and presents his own work as a radiophonic version of these (1934: 32-43). [37]

[37] Hendy (2012) also posits that Sieveking's attitude may have arisen from his experiences, of both sounds and technology, while engaged as a fighter pilot during the First World War.

The mode of listening of the radio-body created by such dramaturgical practices is also radically different from the semantic paradigm. The radio-body does not listen to individual sounds simply *as* things, but rather resonates with their tempo, rhythm, and bodily quality. The sounds of the jungle in *Arrest for Africa*, for example, are not simply stand-ins for 'jungle', but orchestrated and directed toward creating an aural and bodily effect, as the radio-body listens to its own resonance with the foreboding threat of the jungle. Similarly, the rhythmic slowing down of the speech in *Intimate Snapshots* is not encountered by the radio-body *as* a speech – indeed, the effect disrupts its semantic function – or *as* a trope standing for something else; it simply resonates with the sound's shifting rhythm, and its synchronicity with the music, changing its bodily stance toward the world. What Sieveking proposes for the new medium's body, then, is a form of resonant, rather than semantic, listening.

Why then, one might ask, was it the semantic mode that became dominant over its resonant counterpart? In the next section, I explore this question in detail.

4.2.3. A paradigm emerges.

When writing the treatises analysed above, neither writer imagined a bright future for the medium: Gielgud predicts that with the advent of television, 'the Broadcast Play dependent solely upon sound will become as inadequate and out of date as the [silent] film' (1931: 187), while Sieveking writes that 'Perhaps, and it is more than likely, this decade will be the only decade in the history of the human race which will know the radio play' (1934:28). Contrary to these predictions, however, the productions of radio drama continued; 'on the 1st October 1936, the Corporation started a new enterprise in the shape of a Staff Training School', in which the techniques of radio drama production, now having 'crystallised' according to Gielgud, were taught (Annual 1937: 18): there now existed enough exemplars to sustain a paradigm. Of course, moments of resonant dramaturgy could be found within radio programmes – especially those produced by the Features Unit, which is discussed in Section 4.3.; for example, Cecil McGivern's *Junction X* describes the programme's use of music thus '*The music changes, ascending, as if lifting part of the darkness. There is a hint of a recurring rhythm in it. Night is giving place to dawn*' (1940:12). Still, in Gielgud's next piece of advice to radio writers, *The Right Way of Radio Playwriting*, he continues to advise writers to 'leave the music to the producer', because 'many listeners rage so consistently against the general use

of music in plays' (1948: 27), that when using '[s]ound effects, the dialogue must point forward or refer back to it' and that 'one sound effect is ten times as dramatically significant as ten' (1948: 52). In this book, Gielgud no longer speaks of new modes of medium-specific dramaturgy, and instead states that '[t]he broadcast play has ceased to be a producer's toy, or an experimentalist's dream, or one particular type of highbrow's pride and joy. [It is now] a majority listening item' (1948: 46). British radio dramaturgy was no longer a series of experiments, but a set of conventions set by experienced producers and dramatists; conventions that followed the semantic paradigm.

How was it, then, that the semantic mode of dramaturgy became 'majority listening', while the kind of dramaturgy advocated by Sieveking remained out of the mainstream? Gielgud argues that this was a result of producers shifting attention from 'what the [medium] *could* do, to *what* it could do' (1946: viii). For him, Sieveking's proposals exemplified an dramaturgical approach with an over-emphasis on – perhaps even over-excitement for - the technical capabilities of the medium, which disregarded its essential need for simplicity; as he would put it '[t]he somewhat elaborate machinery […] at the disposal of the producer must be the servant of the play, and not its master. […] [T]he golden rule is that a complicated method should never be employed where a simple one can achieve the desired result' (Gielgud 1931: 19). Sieveking's resonant approach, with its reliance on elaborately-structured sounds, was guilty of breaking this rule.

I posit that the dominance of the semantic paradigm and the marginalisation of alternative modes of dramaturgy did not occur simply because the former was more suitable for auditory dramatisation, or that the arguments in favour of it were stronger. Instead, I argue that the semantic paradigm emerged in concurrence with a number of contingent historical factors, such as the dramatic and auditory culture of the era, the technologies employed, the listenership, the bureaucratic and organisational structure of the BBC, and the changes brought on by the Second World War. In the next few sections, I examine these topics in more detail.

4.2.3.1. A theatrical heritage

In Section 4.2.2. I briefly cited the different backgrounds from which the two dramaturgies under discussion derive their aesthetic sensibilities and dramaturgical attitudes, and noted that the semantic mode was closer to theatrical

drama. It is important, however, to point out that it links not to stage theatre in general, but to a specific kind of theatre, with its own sonic sensibilities: the *play of discussion* or *ideas*. Gielgud calls '[t]he play of discussion […] probably far nearer to what may be called, for lack of a better expression, "pure Radio," than any play of action can be. It is easier for the listener to follow, and even easier for the dramatist to write' (1931: 31). The same can be found in *"Some Notes on Radio Drama, as issued by the BBC to authors seeking guidance"* (Gielgud 1948: 125-30): 'there is one dramatic field which can be most profitably exploited by the radio dramatist: the play of ideas. […] [t]he microphone offers an extraordinarily sympathetic means of expression to the dramatist who has something to say or discuss […]' (Gielgud 1984: 128).

What Gielgud refers to here is a specific type of play, emerging out of the modern realism of Ibsen, and advocated in Britain, among others, by George Bernard Shaw, whose *St Joan*, incidentally, Gielgud cites as a play suitable for radio (1931: 29). The play of ideas, Shaw argues in *The Technical Novelty of Ibsen's Plays*, works against the prevalent styles of the 'well-made play' and melodrama, as it relies on dramatic interest that 'arises through a conflict of unsettled ideas rather than through vulgar attachments, rapacities, generosities, resentments, ambitions, misunderstandings, oddities and so forth as to which no moral question is raised' (1948: 165). To make this possible, Shaw posits, theatrical artifice should give way to realism, and spectacle to discussion: 'Crimes, fights, big legacies, fires, shipwrecks, battles, and thunderbolts are mistakes in a play, even when they can be effectively simulated' (1948: 165); these can instead be replaced by dramatic discussions, which are developed 'until it so overspreads and interpenetrates the action that it finally assimilates it, making play and discussion practically identical' (1948: 172). The auditory aspects of such a play, of course, would be more conducive to the semantic mode, as the primary function of the sounds of the play is to convey the intellectual arguments of the drama, rather than to musicalize or support the spectacle of the piece. This tendency toward silence characterises the theatrical sounds of early to mid-20th century. As Ross Brown remarks about the state of theatre sound in the 1930s, 'the music of melodrama […] ha[d] by now fallen silent, and the 'new dramatists' [were] scripting sounds which [stood] out against a backdrop of brooding silence' (2010:24). He notes further that 'whereas in the mid nineteenth-century, every theatrical moment had been filled with noise, sound and

music, with scarcely a panting beat between verbal salvo or musical set-piece, the dawn of the twentieth-century saw dramatists actively seeking settings for their dramas where silence *was*' (2010: 77). Elsewhere, Brown ascribes the silencing of the stage to the assumption that 'any extraneousness […] might distract the audience from purer, abstract, intellectual edification' (2011: 10). [38]

Gielgud's dramaturgy closely resembles the auditory qualities demonstrated by some of the theatre of the day, in the heavy reliance on dialogue, the silence of its setting– a silence that existed, similarly, on the stage and the radio studio – and the use of individual, stand-out sound effects. Thus, the semantic mode sat in relation to an already established tradition of theatre, and of listening, which was already popular and accepted; Gielgud reminisces about how audiences being queried about radio plays 'made it abundantly clear that as far as their taste in drama was concerned they were, by a large majority, dyed-in-the-wool conservatives. It was the […] adaptation of a good old stage favourite that was popular' (1957: 68): the type of play that listened in a manner closer to the semantic. Sieveking's experiments, however, were not welcomed as such; a Sunday Express review says of the experiments: 'Most people hate them. They are too bothersome for the ordinary listener, too childish for the intellectual' (in Sieveking 1934: 404). The reliance of the semantic mode of radio dramaturgy on the specific theatrical heritage of early 20th-century British middle-class drama, then, influenced its adoption.

4.2.3.2. Bureaucracy and personality

[38] For Brown, this historical development presented the theatre audience with a new auditory experience, as it allowed them to engage with *theatre noise*: without the focusing function of the sounds of the stage, the audience's attention can instead be directed at the auditory qualities of the theatre space. As he notes: '[s]tillness is revealed not to be still at all, but crawling with small ticks and hums. Even in the quietest theatres, silence has a sound perhaps best described as something between tinnitus and the imagination' (2010: 78). Such a mode of dramaturgical auditory experience is generally inaccessible to the radio listener, because the space in which the listener encounters the radio drama is the everyday space of her own world. The theatregoer's experience is, after all, framed by the theatre space: her ability to attend to the *noise* of the silent theatre arises from the fact that she is there in the auditorium, as an audience member, following certain rules and assuming the specific culturally-acquired bodily stances required of her. The listener to radio drama, in contrast, is only a radio listener insofar as she directs herself toward the sounds of the radio-body and away from the noise of her everyday space; when radio falls silent, the noise of the audible is not *theatre noise*, but simply the noises of everyday life, which are normally under asyndeton. There are, of course, rare instances of radio programmes directing the listener's attention toward such noises; Brown (2016) examines how Norman Corwin's *Notes on a Triumph* achieves this. This, however, requires a dramaturgical approach quite different from the one delineated above.

The BBC's role in the emergence of the semantic paradigm was, of course, not limited to the influence of its staff's theatrical backgrounds. The centralised nature of the organisation of radio drama practice was crucial in the emergence of a paradigm. While Sieveking may have indicated playfully that readers can replicate his plays at home using gramophone records (1934: 30), the experiments and developments regarding radio dramaturgy happened entirely within the bureaucratic, technological, and political structure of the BBC. Producers were employed by the state and structured hierarchically; employees like Guthrie and Sieveking, for example, were managed by, and answerable to, Gielgud, who maintained his overarching authority on drama productions into the 1960s. Any aesthetic model, therefore, required a degree of bureaucratic – or even personal – authority in order to establish itself as a paradigm.

As the only option available to the listening public, the BBC also had to adapt to the demands of its listenership. In fact, as Gielgud the dramaturge was advocating a semantic mode in theory and practice, Gielgud the manager was undertaking listener research: in 1937,

> Four months' study of public taste in radio drama was undertaken. Four hundred listeners answered questionnaires about the merits of forty -seven separate productions as well as about such matters as the best length for radio plays and the times at which they should be broadcast (Handbook 1938: 25).

Perhaps it is as a result of such research that works of experimental drama became less frequent; for example, Rodger mentions that in 1939, Gielgud vetoed the production of Guthrie's *Traveller's Joy*, arguing that he had the right to veto 'when a submitted work by however distinguished an author is unlikely to meet the bill as far as popularity is concerned' (Rodger 1982: 52-3). Perhaps it is in reference to this that years later, Guthrie deems the BBC's 'monopolistic position […] the bane of the B.B.C. It has rendered the officials at once complacent […] and timid […]' (1961:50); he goes on to say that '[t]he conditions attract the prudent, rather than daring, men and women' (Guthrie 1961: 52). The environment at the Drama department certainly seems to have been tense enough to create animosities between experimentalists and the hierarchy; Sieveking himself certainly feels so: he writes of Gielgud: 'I disagree with him on almost any subject, even about the desirability of being alive at all' (1934: 56).

What Guthrie describes as prudence, Gielgud may have understood as concern for the listener – also a key concern in his dramaturgical writing. In 1956, he reminisces:

> It was the worst of luck for Sieveking that there was never an experimental laboratory available for British Broadcasting. […] Experimental programmes had to be found a place in normal programme hours, and 'tried out' upon a patient, but necessarily largely uncomprehending public. And there was not infrequent expression of resentment that producers should apparently be learning their business at listeners' expense (1957: 26).

Even when an 'Experimental Hour' (Gielgud 1957: 69) was established, the mode of listening that its radio-bodies assume seems to be far from Sieveking's resonant vision: the first programme to be broadcast in the slot was an epic verse, and the second, a performance of Shakespeare with speculative 'original' Elizabethan accents. The programme was axed due to 'lack of suitable material' (Gielgud 1957: 70). Gielgud's attitude here represents a different understanding of the function of radio drama than to that held by those, such as Sieveking, who were keen to experiment: whereas the latter sees the medium as a form of artistic expression, the former attitude understands it as a product, in a transaction with the listener, occurring within the wider framework of a mass medium.

Another important development in the bureaucratic structure occurred in 1936 with the separation of the Drama and Features units. The latter, Gielgud explains, 'may be described as any programme-item, not basically in dramatic form, designed to make use of radio-dramatic technique in its presentation to the listener. […] Features deal with fact, Drama with fiction' (1957: 48). He follows by expanding on the merits of the separation: 'the original radio play had to compete with the innate conservatism of the listening audience, which thought of a play as something essentially written for the theatre' whereas the feature is better-placed to explore the possibilities of the new medium (Gielgud 1957: 49). It might, of course, be argued that this division allowed a space for alternative modes of dramaturgy; however, while the separation between Drama and Feature may have preserved some of the dramaturgical techniques that would lead to a resonant mode of listening, it seems to have had the effect of institutionalising the distinction between the two, with features becoming less dramatic and moving toward abstract sonic forms that do not constitute a radio-body, and drama becoming less experimental

in sound and more conventional in production. Even at the time of the division, the Handbook's description belies a clear separation of heritages and functions:

> [T]he `Feature Programme', which has no link with any other type of art or entertainment, is bound to have an ever-increasing significance from the point of view of broadcasting by sound alone. It has to be admitted that the broadcasting of plays without vision is a handicap: it is very questionable whether the same thing is true of `Feature Programmes' (Annual 1937: 29).

Cecil McGovern's 1940 feature, *Junction X,* is an interesting example of how this division begins to occur: the programme presents both 'dramatic' moments where a radio-body listens semantically, and 'sonic' moments of musical resonance, but these do not occur simultaneously. A fast-paced montage of dialogues is accompanied by '*[t]he brass of the orchestra blar[ing] like a hundred barrow horns and the voices of the women porters [...] a strident ruffling of morning nerves*' (McGovern 1940:15) but this is immediately followed by two pages of conventional 'discussion play' dialogue. In other words, dramaturgy in the sense of creating a sonic dramatic world was separated from sonic experimentation through institutional organisation. As we shall see in Section 4.4, the ultimate fate of the Features unit – later a department of its own – was also determined by the bureaucratic structure.

Radio technology and budget, too, was in the monopoly of the BBC, and models, costs, and uses were limited by bureaucratic control; in 1934, for example, Sieveking wishes for a cut-off key added to the volume dials for the Dramatic Control Panel so that a 'cut' effect similar to that of film can be achieved (1934: 99), but such a key is never installed: the last model of the Panel, installed in 1936, is still operated with dials (Beckwith 2013). The limited resources and budgetary concerns around the DCP may also have influenced the choice of dramaturgical practices; increasing the number of studios used by the production meant the occupation of resources such a rehearsal space, studio managers, and actors. Sieveking himself remarks that the ideal length of preparatory time for him is 'at least double the normal amount' (1934: 23).

The fate of the Dramatic Control Panel is, in fact, a clear example of how the centralised bureaucracy of the BBC affected the competing modes of dramaturgy. The device and the multi-studio mode of production which it facilitated were, after

all, key to the medium's ability to listen for sounds beyond semantic reference. As Sieveking's previously-cited remarks show, the set-up offered the producer a high degree of control over how the final product sounded; unlike the single-studio model, where diversity in sonic elements would be difficult to control, it allowed for the employment of highly diverse sounds: an orchestra, a group of actors – each in a different acoustic environment – and a variety of recorded or live effects could be mixed and broadcast with little effort, and with precision, a resonant radio-body. This, perhaps, is why the Control Panel features in almost all of the key experiments in the development of modes of radio listening during the early years: *Exiles, Kaleidoscope, Squirrel's Cage,* and *The Flowers Are Not for You to Pick* – all constructing resonant radio-bodies to various degrees – featured the device. Even the operation of the device was contentious: as some engineers regarded the device as a simple mixing deck, Sieveking's continuous requests to control – 'play' – the Dramatic Control Panel, Gielgud recalls, created complications 'because [his] case could not easily be pressed without its sounding highfalutin – and in consequence suspect – and apparently reflecting upon colleagues of the Engineering Division, which was neither intended nor desirable' (1957: 58); as we have seen, for Sieveking, the ability to use the dramatic control panel with musical sensibility was a key aspect of his dramaturgy, which may have been lost if delegated to an operator, whose conventionalised mode of operation may have remained constant from production to production.

With the advent of the Second World War, however, the technological possibility of alternative modes of listening was greatly diminished when '[t]he Drama Department was evacuated to the Provinces. The Drama suite was destroyed. In consequence the multiple-studio technique had to be abandoned.' (Gielgud 1957: 58). After the war, the multi-studio system was not restored, and plays were instead broadcast from one studio, with dividers between sound sources; this may not have allowed for elaborate control of the sound, but 'the producer now retain[ed] visual and personal contact with his players' (Gielgud 1957: 60) – a more important factor for the dramaturgy of the semantic mode, with its focus on dialogue and discussion. This, importantly, is the moment where 'handling of any studio Mixing-and-control Unit [becomes] the business of the Programme Engineers' (Gielgud 1957: 60) and directing the artists emerges as the producer's main duty; in Gielgud's words, 'it [was] most unlikely that the old

controversy will ever be revived' (1957: 59). The centralisation and institutionalisation of dramaturgical means, then, also influenced the emergence of the paradigm in a variety of manners.

4.2.3.3. The listener at home

Let us now consider how these different modes of dramaturgy would be encountered by the listeners. As argued in Chapter 2, the encounter with the dramatic world is essentially a bodily encounter, between the radio-body and the listener. How, then, did the listener encounter the body of early radio drama?

Interestingly, it seems that the listener's ability to encounter the dramatic world through radio developed in concurrence with the efforts, described above, to find methods of radio-specific dramaturgy during the early years of radio drama. Particular emphasis can also be observed on the search for the right way of listening to it, both in technology and in the bodily and perceptual stance of the listener.

As early as 1924, producer Victor Smythe writes: 'how many listeners have considered the great advancement which has been made in the power of "seeing through the sense of hearing" since broadcasting began' (in Beck 2001: 4.3.4)? Four years later, The BBC Handbook points out that although the art form of radio is still young, '[t]he listener has during these three years developed his "listening sense" to a far greater extent than formerly' (1928: 116). The key to this "listening sense", it proposes, is concentration: the listener '*must* give his undivided attention to the Broadcast play' (Handbook 1928: 116). A year later, writer Filson Young advocates the 'cultivation' of this sense of listening, and complains that 'one of the reasons why broadcasting is not universally cultivated by people who are most able to avail themselves of its services is that we do not sufficiently use discrimination in our listening' (in Handbook 1929: 253). After all, it must not be forgotten that, in the soundscape of everyday life, the radio is still a new-fangled sound: the auditory ability to listen to radio drama has not yet 'sedimented' – to use Merleau-Ponty's term – in the listener's body schema. This, perhaps, may explain why listeners encountered more clarity when listening to 'stagey' plays; these were more familiar and accessible modes of performance for the listener, the encounter with the sounds of stage drama having sedimented.

Simultaneously, efforts were made to improve the sound quality of receivers, and to determine the correct level, direction, and properties of its sound – in other

words, this part of the radio's body was also in development. Particular emphasis is put on fidelity – the degree to which the radio can reproduce the original signal, or in the case of the listener, the degree to which 'the listener has the same aural sensations that he would if present among the audience in the studio or concert hall' (Langford-Smith 1953: 603). This, however, raises the question: how much of what is audible can be considered 'aural sensations'? For example, does the sound need to be all-encompassing, as it would be if the listener were present in the studio, or simply replicate the perceptible sounds present in there? In the early years of BBC engineering experiments, loudspeaker engineer and inventor P. G. A. H. Voigt developed the idea that the correct level of fidelity was that of '"hole in the wall" listening' (Brown 2016: 184), which radio engineer and journalist Fritz Langford-Smith describes thus:

> [T]he listener, surrounded by his listening room, is imagined as being in a concert hall and able to hear directly, through his open window, the sound coming from the stage, together with the echoes. Echoes from his own room will come from all directions, but echoes from the concert hall only come through the open window (Langford-Smith 1953: 603).

Many reasons can be cited for such an approach; Langford-Smith himself points to 'the greatest deficiencies': the 'single-point sound reproducer (the loudspeaker) and the volume level', and the fact that 'stereophonic reproduction […] is impracticable with the existing radio and recording techniques' (1953: 603-4), while many engineers, as Brown states, were 'worried about the disorienting effect […] of changes in the scale of reverberation between different microphone placements' (2016: 185).

Let us consider how such listening conditions can affect the encounter with the radio-body. As discussed in 2.3.4. listening to the radio-body, like any other act of listening, is always an oscillation between attention and distraction. The radio-body is, after all, one sound among all that is audible within the auditory field, and can move to the background in interaction and competition with other sounds. If this attention is maintained, and other sounds move to the background through asyndeton, the radio-body's expression is perceived as a perspective on the world. In the unidirectional 'hole in the wall' model, the sounds of the radio play occupy a specific space in my auditory field, surrounded by all else that is audible. In order for my encounter with the dramatic world to be maintained, then, a focused process

of asyndeton, and a specific bodily orientation, are required. It may be for this reason that Sieveking advises the listener on a ritual of listening, akin to that of theatre-going:

> [Do not listen to radio drama] [u]nless you can come into the auditorium properly. Lots of people do. The Method is simple. (1) Have a moderately good loud speaker, a really good one if you can afford it. (2) Read the programme of the play in the *Radio Times*. (3) Shut out extraneous noises. (4) Turn down the lights a little. (5) Get into a comfortable chair. And (6) Don't try to do anything else except listen to the play (1934: 97).

These rituals aim to clear the phenomenal field, as much as possible, of what is audible, or distracting, bringing the faint radio sound to prominence, and permitting for the encounter of the radio-body. Gielgud, on the other hand, imagines his audience 'by the fireside' (1957: 61), with additional sounds competing with the radio drama.

Issues arise, however, when we consider that the sound quality presented by early devices was less than perfect. To understand this, the concepts of 'phonographic' and 'telephonic' models of sound reproduction, discussed by James Lastra, may be useful. He writes:

> Two general models of sound recording that dominated […] technicians' ideas about sound representation could be called the "phonographic" (or "perceptual fidelity") model and the "telephonic" (or "intelligibility") models. […] [t]he former sets as its goal the perfectly faithful reproduction of a spatiotemporally specific musical performance (as if heard from the best seat in the house); the latter, like writing, intelligibility or legibility at the expense of material specificity, if necessary (Lastra 2012: 248).

In other words, the former model aims to replicate the signal, while the second attempts to make the signal understandable, perceptible, or even interpretable.

The quality of reception and loudspeakers during the early years of radio appears to have been questionable; the BBC Handbook states that '[i]t is generally admitted that the loud speaker is at the present moment the least perfect part of the whole broadcasting system' (1929: 334). Indeed, the Handbook states that to have perfect quality in a speaker:

> [Y]ou must have the horn at least fifteen feet long and an electrical movement which is fairly free from resonance in the audible range of frequencies. Recently this type of loud speaker has been developed for special purposes. As a "home" product, it is apt to be clumsy, and the twisting of the horn for compactness may introduce other troubles (1929: 334).

Charts comparing the frequency responses of most common telephone earpieces and various types of loudspeaker show little difference (Handbook 1929: 338-340). It could, in fact, be contended that the sound reproduction quality of 'home' radio devices of the day approached the 'telephonic' more than the 'phonographic'. Here, then, Gielgud's semantic model shows its benefit: after all, its key focus is on being 'intelligible'. Sieveking's resonant model, emphasising as it does the sonic qualities, rather than the intelligibility of the sounds within its structure, is at a disadvantage in conveying its structure fully through the 'hole in the wall' of the telephonic device; the radio-body created in the studio by the producer with the aid of the Dramatic Control Panel is likely not to be the radio-body encountered by the listener at home. It is interesting to note that, because performances were live and not recorded, Sieveking himself was never able to hear any of his experiments through a 'home' radio device, instead encountering it through the professional loudspeakers attached to the Control Panel.

Of course, device sound quality improved rapidly, as did technologies of broadcast; the BBC Handbook/Yearbook, which had devoted at least a third of the first five editions to sound quality and methods of choosing devices and avoiding interference, reduced this to a mere seven pages by 1941, and abandoned the engineering section altogether afterwards. By then, however, the other developments mentioned above had taken place: the Dramatic Control Panels were decommissioned, Drama and Features remained separated, and Sieveking himself had moved to the role of Programme Director in the West Region. With the advent of the war there was little space for new experiments.

4.2.3.4. Dramaturgy and the War

Writing just after the end of the war, Val Gielgud writes that '[b]etween 1939 and 1946 two most important things happened in the world of dramatic broadcasting' (1946: xiii). The first was that as a result of the war, the dramaturgical techniques had to adapt to the new practical and economic conditions – for example,

as mentioned above, the Dramatic Control Panels became unaffordable, while rehearsal time was cut by 75 percent, despite the doubling of the number of productions (Handbook 1942: 42). 'The producers had to adapt themselves at the shortest notice to the American single-studio system. It was, for most of them, a case of having to go to school again […]' (Yearbook 1945: 54). For Gielgud, this is a positive development, as 'the precision and elaboration of the dramatic-control-panel – with all the opportunities for misuse afforded by that fascinating invention – were replaced by non-compensating mixing unit' (Gielgud 1946: viii) which allowed dramaturges to focus on what mattered: the drama, rather than the sound – or in other words, the semantic, rather than the resonant.

While the technological shifts certainly influenced dramaturgical practices and attitudes, the development of conventions of dramaturgy at the time should also be understood in relation to the second important change brought on by the war: the fact that the social and cultural function of radio drama underwent a transformation.

> Black-out combined with *blitz* to keep people at home. Difficulties of transport and closing of theatres robbed people of their usual theatrical entertainment. And literally thousands of listeners who had never bothered to give serious attention to that type of radio programme, which must demand from the audience both attention and imagination, found themselves making these necessary contributions to make their own enjoyment simply because they had little or no alternative (Gielgud 1946: viii).

Because of this development, Gielgud posits, '[b]oth producers and audiences have recovered a proper perspective, and a reasonable sense of relative values' (Gielgud 1946: viii). These values, as it should be apparent from previous discussions, were rather conservative in aesthetic taste, and not open to resonant experiments – especially considering that the BBC, as a governmental institution, also carried the burden of preserving national morale, providing familiar entertainment to the public. [39] A survey of drama audiences in 1941, for example, found that 'the majority wished to have the minds taken off the war when listening to a play on the wireless' (Handbook 1941: 21). The policy of the drama department was reflective of this conservatism and the national mood, aiming to

[39] For an extensive exploration of the BBC's cultivation and preservation of national identity, see Hajkowski (2010).

> maintain interest in classic plays, British and foreign, and especially those of Shakespeare; to provide what may be termed recognizably theatrical entertainment for lovers of drama cut off by circumstances from the theatre itself; and finally – perhaps the most important of all – to encourage the writing of new plays specifically designed for the medium of broadcasting (Handbook 1942: 41).

Such new plays, of course, would be produced with the methods of dramaturgy outlined above, limiting their experimental scope.

Experiments with resonant forms did continue, but in the Features unit, which 'grew up with a bang as the result of the emergency of 1939' (Gielgud in Handbook 1940: 59), serving to inform the public of wartime developments. Documentaries and poetic features, whose key function was not just to entertain and distract, but also to 'find effective methods of reflecting the great themes of the war' (Handbook 1942: 38), could utilise different methods of practice. As the Handbook expands, 'the feature was proved again to be the "striking force" of radio, a method of wide application and flexible technique peculiar to broadcasting, equipped to concentrate interest and attention, to evoke emotion, and to provide satisfactory entertainment' (Handbook 1942: 38). As I posited in previous sections, the separation between the two departments, and their respective functions, meant that the experiments and resonant practices of features remained rather separate from dramaturgy in the sense of creating a radio-body that listens to a dramatic world.

The condition of the war intensified the factors that made semantic dramaturgy the preferable mode with which the institutions of British radio could approach the medium. It placed limits on experiments and techniques, and also increased demands for familiar forms of drama and sound, requiring the conventionalisation of production in order to meet demands; for example, the BBC's repertory company formed in 1940, providing actors who would 'often play in six or seven different productions a week' (Yearbook 1944: 47) – on one hand, speeding up production, while on the other, limiting creative input and establishing routine working conditions for performers. The semantic paradigm, it could be said, was solidified during the war.

4.2.3.5. A paradigm in place: the case of *The Man Born to be King*

Let us end the exploration of the conditions within which early radio dramaturgy developed by examining a prominent example where the outcome is manifest: Dorothy L. Sayers' *The Man Born to Be King*, a collection of twelve radio plays narrating the life of Jesus, that were produced by Gielgud and broadcast between December 1941 and October 1942; the semantic paradigm can be observed in both the way that the play cycle's radio-body is constituted, and the effects of the conditions within which it is produced.

Dramaturgically, the focus of both Sayers and Gielgud appears to be on the narrative and semantic aspects of the play, rather than its sound. In her introduction to the play, for example, Sayers explores her use of the source material and her decisions in plotting and characterisation in detail (1943: 27-36), whereas her remarks on sounds are limited to choices made in order to make the story intelligible on the radio – for example, the decision to write that in a particular scene, oxen are being driven by whips, rather than the more historically-accurate ox-goad, which she justifies by arguing that 'the lash of a whip can be heard on the air, whereas it is useless to ask the studio-effects-man to stand by making a noise like an ox-goad' (1943: 26). She argues at length that her aim is to '*tell that story*' (1943: 20), and that aesthetic and thematic concerns are subordinate to the drama, remarking, as an example, that '[t]he music of [the] English [language] can be abundantly illustrated from English poetry, but only from those poems which are created *by that means* and not *to that end*' (1943: 20), echoing Gielgud's remarks about the importance of '*what* [the medium] could do', rather than 'what it *could* do' (1946: viii).

Sayers' scripts describe sounds in brief indexical terms; '*the rattle of dice and the sound of a lute*' (1943: 48,), '[*n*]*oise of fighting*' (1943: 62), and so on. Sounds are also often accompanied by verbal descriptions: '[d]o me the favour to strike upon that gong. *(Gong struck*)' (1943:55). The music is simply described as '*Music. It fades and swells again*' (1943: 60). Sayers' remarks in notes to the producer also manifest this tendency; her concerns with particular sounds are directly related to what the sounds stand for, rather than how they are experienced. Regarding a scene in the fifth play, for example, she writes:

> *Warning to the Record Library!* The "sea" of Galilee is an inland fresh-water lake, and the boat was a rowing-boat. Do not vex the Producer (who has troubles enough already) with

> the offer of "Schooner in a Storm – Sail-Flap and Shroud-Whistling Effects", or "Atlantic Rollers Breaking on the Cornish Coast", or even that sweetly-pretty thing with the Seagulls, which we know so intimately. "Squall on Lake Windermere" is nearer the mark; but you men have plenty of wind and waves, because it says so (Sayers 1943: 136).

The plays were also produced in wartime conditions, in a single-studio setting. In his production notes, Gielgud remarks: '[b]efore the war I would not have dreamed of undertaking plays of their calibre with less than a week's rehearsal, with all the advantages of a dramatic control panel and a suite of studios' (in Sayers 1943: 47); for him, the benefit of the pre-war setting would have been that 'such *disturbing* elements as crowds and effects could have been isolated from and very simply balanced against the main scenes and characters' (in Sayers 1943: 47, italics mine). Gielgud's brief notes are also focused on the difficulty of production and the complexity of the scripts.

As a result of these dramaturgical approaches, the radio-body of *The Man Born to Be King* listens in a semantic mode, which was by then prevalent. The radio-body listens to composed dramatic dialogue against the backdrop of silence, or low-volume crowd-effects –Sayers even suggests lines of dialogue for the crowd (1943: 46), meaning that the radio-body would listen to the crowd, too, to glean what they contribute to the debates and discussions. When the radio-body listens for music, it is usually because it is audible in the dramatic world – such as the hymn arising from the Great Hall in the Ninth Play, or the music in the tent of the Three Kings in the First Play. *The Man Born to Be King* is thus demonstrative of how the radio-body that emerges from the early developments of radio drama has adopted a semantic mode of listening.

The fact that this mode became the paradigmatic mode of the British radio-body, of course, does not mean that it was ubiquitous – simply that it retained its dominance, and was the generally-accepted solution to dramaturgical problems; its practices were now the convention, rather than one competing alternative, and its prominent manifestations – such as the case discussed in this section – became exemplars of radio dramaturgy. Indeed, as I argue in the next two sections, experiments with alternative dramaturgies were set against, but also ultimately derived from and indebted to, the presuppositions and conventions of the semantic paradigm that emerged out of the early years.

4.3. The semantic and the resonant in the post-war years

The end of the war led to a restructuring of British radio, which in turn opened a space for dramaturgical experimentation. In 1947, BBC Director-General Sir William Haley presents an overview of these changes in broadcasting:

> The Home Service had been reorganised. Regional broadcasting had been restarted. A new Light Programme had been introduced. A Third Programme had, despite great obstacles, been launched […] All this was matched by a sudden spurt in the number of listeners. That the passing of the war had not made broadcasting less of a social necessity was shown by the fact that in those same eighteen months the number of licence holders had risen by nearly a million to the record figure of 10,740,350 (in Yearbook 1947: 7).

For the next two decades, British radio dramaturgy existed and developed within these institutional structures, with both Drama and Features units, now separated into distinct departments (Laws 2017: 116), producing radio programmes for the middlebrow Home Service, and for the more highbrow Third Programme – networks that were later reorganised as Radio 4 and Radio 3 respectively. The latter, in particular, opened the way for dramaturgical experiments, as it was intended, according to its head, G. R. Barnes, 'for the alert and receptive listener, the listener who is willing to make an effort to select his programme in advance and then meet the performer half-way by giving it his whole attention' (1946: i); also important was its aim to cater not to the general listening public, but to an audience who, as an internal memo describes, were 'already aware of artistic experience […] and will include persons of taste and intelligence, and of education; it is […] selective not causal […] The programme need not cultivate any other audience' (Anon in Collini 2006: 438). This new space, coupled with increasing competition and collaboration between the Drama and Features department, led to fruitful period: many of the most prominent and prestigious pieces of British radio drama – Dylan Thomas' *Under Milk Wood* (1954), Samuel Beckett's *All That Fall* (1957) and *Embers* (1959), and Harold Pinter's *A Night Out* (1960), for example – first found their place in the Third Programme, and producers such as Douglas Cleverdon and Donald McWhinnie adopted the unconventional practices of feature production to drama. In April 1958, the BBC even established a Radiophonic Workshop whose function was to produce sound effects for radio and

television programmes, creating a new space for sonic experimentation (Niebur 2010: 51).

These developments may appear to imply a shift in the dramaturgical paradigm of the day paradigm; in the next few subsections, I examine the alternative modes of radio dramaturgy in the post-war years, aiming to make two related points to the contrary. My first point is that the new dramaturgical approaches did not break completely with the assumptions and practices of the paradigm that had developed in the pre-war years and conventionalised during the war, and still produced radio-bodies that often engaged in semantic listening, even in the most sonically-experimental productions. Of course, this is not say that they stayed entirely faithful to paradigmatic dramaturgy; focusing on McWhinnie's ideas, I discuss how some resonant dramaturgical approaches went against semantic norms. The second point that I posit is that institutional, technological, and conventional limitations hindered the transformative potential of the techniques developed during these years, and the new practices were not able to challenge the dominance of the semantic paradigm, which remained extant.

4.3.1. "Sound Radio?": *Art of Radio* and the case of *All That Fall*

Producer Donald McWhinnie's treatise on radio dramaturgy, *The Art of Radio* (1959) is the first significant guideline on radio practice published since Gielgud's *Radio Theatre* (1946), which was discussed in the previous section. Whereas the latter's advice to practitioners was typical of the semantic paradigm that he had helped establish, however, the former – who was appointed Gielgud's deputy in 1953 (Street 2002: 88) – complains about the conservative attitudes toward radio drama, and its 'reputation of thorough-going respectability and dullness, in spite of the fact that the practitioners who have cared most about it, contributed most to it, and regarded it most seriously, have been men of lively, unconventional and highly original talent' (McWhinnie 1959: 28). Aiming to address the creative and artistic potential of 'Sound Radio' (1959:15) – as distinguished from the emerging medium of television – and 'to reinvestigate the principles and practice of an art-form which has been often, and unjustly, been regarded as too ephemeral to merit serious consideration' (1959: 16), McWhinnie approaches radio dramaturgy from a more sonically-minded perspective. Although for him, like Gielgud, '[a]t the heart of the radio experience is the spoken word' (McWhinnie 1959: 44), McWhinnie

acknowledges that the function of speech is not limited to the linguistic meaning, and instead draws attention to the evocative and musical capabilities of radio sound in addition to its referential qualities, arguing that 'the sound complex of radio works on the emotions in the same way as music; aside from its total *meaning* it, too, exists in time, not space, it has its own rhythmic and melodic patterns, its musical shape' (1959: 39) – in other words, qualities of resonance. Whereas Gielgud's semantic dramaturgy was conventional in practices, McWhinnie posits that 'there are no immutable rules governing' the process of integrating individual words, sounds, and music into the integrated structure of the radio play (1959: 93). Where semantic dramaturgy associated radio with the play of ideas, McWhinnie cites melodrama, with its noisy, musical sounds, as the framework through which radio practice can be understood (1959: 64). In creating sound effects, he draws not from theatrical traditions and conventionalised radio practices, but from the avant-garde *musique concrete* of Pierre Schaeffer (McWhinnie 1959: 86), which he had encountered in Paris (Niebur 2010: 21), arguing that through technological alterations, entirely new radiophonic sounds can be created. [40] Overall, McWhinnie's exploration of his art of radio reveals an attitude distinct from the semantic mode of dramaturgy prevalent at the time, and closer to the resonant model advocated by Sieveking – whose production of *Brideshead Revisited* McWhinnie discusses at length as an example of his type of dramaturgy (1959: 74).

While McWhinnie's dramaturgy is unconventional, however, it is important to note that its challenge to the semantic paradigm remains somewhat limited; many of the ideas and underpin semantic dramaturgy appear in his writing in conjuncture with more resonant ideas. He nevertheless insists, for example, that 'words are invariably the most important single element in a radio composition' (1959: 64) and other sounds and music function as 'reinforcement' (1959: 64). Despite putting emphasis on musicality and sonic qualities, he still posits that '[t]he writer is the key figure' (1959: 102) in a radio production; an attitude characteristic of the semantic paradigm. Regarding sound effects, he balances his advocacy of experimentation with the cautious advice that radio drama should 'only […] use

[40] *Musique concrete*, which will be discussed at length in Chapter 5, is both a theoretical approach to music and a method of music practice, first formulated by Pierre Schaeffer (2013), who argues that with the advent of recording technology, the concrete sounds of recordings, altered and arranged by the musician according to their musical, rather than referential, qualities, can replace the abstract sound of traditional musical instruments.

effects if they are dramatically to the point' (1959: 127), as 'lacking vision, we cannot afford chaos or lack of intelligibility in the sound sequence' (1959: 78); indeed, he prefaces his examination of his use of sound with this disclaimer: 'the last thing I should wish to do […] is to overemphasise the importance of the sound-elements at the expense of a close realisation of word-meaning and speech rhythm' (1959: 131-2). Furthermore, he puts strong emphasis on sonic simplicity, positing that 'whatever the combinations of speech, sound, and silence, the most powerful imaginative effect is always created by a single note, singing alone and purely; the *melange* has its part to play, but in the end the purest sound is also the most persuasive (1959: 91). His praise of incidental music – despite the fact that for him, 'its abuses have tended to overshadow his field (1959: 65) – does not extend to music in the background, as 'either the words are interesting, in which case we do not hear the music; or they are not, when it becomes irritating; or we long for the action to stop so that we may listen to the music in comfort' (1959: 67). Despite his focus on practical experiments in creating individual sound effects, the recording set-up that he describes in the book is generally that of a conventional single-studio BBC production (1959: 127-8). McWhinnie's conception of the medium, then, manifests the influence of the semantic paradigm in concurrence with a resonant approach. The radio-body created in his practice, too, often demonstrates a semantic attitude in its mode of listening.

To demonstrate this point, let us examine McWhinnie's most prominent production, Samuel Beckett's *All That Fall* (1957). The play tells the story of Mrs Rooney's journey to and from the train station where she is meeting her husband; on the way, in between her encounters with a variety of people, she reflects on various subjects in a stream of consciousness. The programme was well received, and '[r]eviews were almost unanimously positive for this first production' (Niebur 2010: 24). The BBC Handbook hailed it as a powerful demonstration of 'the artistic and emotional potentialities of sound radio as a medium of expression'. The practical experiments that created its distinct sound effects led 'directly to the founding of the BBC's innovative and hugely influential Radiophonic workshop' (Laws 2017: 109), which I shall discuss in the next section. Its dramaturgical importance can also be demonstrated by the fact that McWhinnie himself uses his production as the example of his understanding of the art of radio, reflecting on his practices at length (1959: 132-42); the radio-body of *All That Fall,* then, could be

considered an exemplar of McWhinnie's proposed mode of dramaturgy. This radio-body, I posit, demonstrates an ear for musical and bodily sounds, but one that is based on a semantic attitude.

At first glance, the radio-body of *All That Fall* manifests modes of listening that are not limited to the semantic, and can be labelled resonant. As the play begins[41], the radio-body listens for a group of farm animals. It does not, however, listen for them *as* farm animals; indeed, the sounds are replicated vocally by actors, and organised not in a realistic manner recognisable as what Beckett's script describes as '*rural sounds[-] [s]heep, bird, cow, cock, severally, then together*' (in Niebur 2010: 21), but in a musical structure: first a cow followed by a duck, then a two lambs in different registers, then a dog followed by a chicken, and then, after a momentary silence (00:16), the repeated rhythmic noises of a dog, a cat, a cockerel, a cow, and a lamb – a pattern that continues for ten seconds before slowing down and coming to a halt (00:35). The radio-body, in other words, is not listening semantically, but is resonating with the rhythm of a rural day. This is followed another rhythmic sequence where the radio-body listens to Mrs Rooney's mechanical-sounding footsteps (00:36) and whimpers (00:41), in addition to a piece of selected music (00:53), not simply to listen for her walk, but to resonate with the slow pace of her stroll it in a musical manner; the same attitude is assumed by the radio-body when encountering the walking movements of Mrs Rooney (8:50) [42] and Mr Rooney's walk (42:04).[43] The radio-body's encounter with individual sounds, too, is rather ambiguous, rather than the recognisable stand-in sound mandated by the semantic mode. For example, when Mr Tyler's bicycle approaches (7:36), [44] the radio-body does not listen for the instantly-recognisable sound of a ringing bell, but instead listens to an echoey, ringing vibration; the reverberations of the sound gradually decrease until it becomes perceivable as a bell; the same effect applies, for example, to the distorted mix of wind and kettle whistles (1:01:56) [45] and the approaching truck (14:42) [46] – the radio-body does not listen to the sound

[41] Appendix A-3.
[42] Appendix A-4.
[43] Appendix A-5.
[44] Appendix A-6.
[45] Appendix A-7.
[46] Appendix A-8.

as the wind and the truck, but instead resonates with Mrs Rooney's encounter with the world.

While such moments, when examined in isolation, are evidence of a resonant approach to the radio-body, they are relatively rare within the scope of the play. For the majority of duration of the radio-body's encounter with the dramatic world – approximately 54 out of its 69 minutes – its listening mode is entirely semantic, directed solely toward the characters' voices against a backdrop of silence. Furthermore, while some sounds, such as those mentioned above, are stylised and modified, the radio-body listens to some others, such as the sound of the truck avoiding a hen (19:08) [47] and the truck speeding away (22:09), [48] in a rather clear and recognisable fashion. The moments in which the radio-body does listen for the sonic qualities of the dramatic world, including all of the examples above, are preceded and followed by silence, as the radio-body switches its stance. Indeed, with the exception of a few sounds such as the bicycle bell and the truck, the radio-body even appears to listen for these sonic moments not when it encounters them in the dramatic world, but when it deliberately directs itself toward them when the listener needs to be informed of the elements that they represent – in other words, still listening for them as stand-ins for elements occurring in the dramatic world. The rhythmic, stylised sounds of walking, for example, are encountered not when Mrs or Mr Rooney walk, but only at a few specific points. The radio-body's spatial relationship to the sound of the walking also remains static, despite the apparent movement in Mrs and Mr Rooney. The radio-body listens for the sound symbolically, *as* walking. In short, while the composition of these unconventional musicalised sound is not semantic when encountered for the first time, the radio-body's encounters with its world within the context of the play are still in the semantic mode. These features of the mode of listening, of course, is by design: for McWhinnie, the sound effects must work as 'a form of shorthand' (1959: 131). In fact, he understands the sounds of the play as symbolic, stylised conventions, even labelling the musical opening described above as 'a stylised form of scene-setting, containing within itself a pointer to the convention of the play' (1959: 133). Put in

[47] Appendix A-9.
[48] Appendix A-10.

the terms of this thesis, the radio-body listens for sounds as standing in for elements, rather than encountering them within the fabric of the dramatic world.

Here, it may be argued that the dramaturgy outlined here is specific to *All That Fall* or McWhinnie. The same attitude, however, can be found in other productions of the period: the radio-body of McWhinnie's production of Giles Cooper's *The Disagreeable Oyster* (1957) listens briefly for sounds such as the cartoonish crowd (08:04, 18:54) [49]simply to indicate their presence; they then fade away, leaving the radio-body to listen to the spoken word, again, against a backdrop of studio silence. The radio-body of Douglas Cleverdon's production of *Under Milk Wood* (1954) – listens for voices against a backdrop of silence for almost its entire duration, interrupted only by the characters' singing, and a number of isolated sound effects such as bells and distant music. McWhinnie's next collaboration with Beckett, *Embers* (1959), juxtaposes monologues and musical sounds, in the style of poetic features, with moments of dialogue set against the backdrop of silence. The mode of dramaturgy outlined in this section, characterised by a juxtaposition of the resonant and a semantic, is therefore not limited to one example, but present in key productions of the era.

Following this chapter's intended aim of examining the historical contexts through which the semantic paradigm emerged and consolidated its advantage, here one can ask how these resonant attitudes toward dramaturgy emerged, and how they ultimately remained bound by semantic conventions. In the next two sections, I respond to such questions by examining some of the conditions within which post-war radio dramaturgies were embedded.

4.3.2. Institutional practices

Although McWhinnie's writing continuously champions the writer as the key creator of radio drama – to the extent that he argues that '[t]he basic principles of radio production are an extension of those which concern the writer' (1959: 126) – it is important to note that initially, the post-war experiments in radio drama began with a blurring of the lines between producer and writer. This occurred due to the increased interest in producing drama by the Features department. Crucially, '[t]he major difference between the roles of producer in Drama and producer in Features

[49] Appendix A-11 and 12.

was that the latter was usually employed as a writer as well' (Whitehead 1989: 34), meaning that the creative process of the producer did not necessarily begin with an authorial text that needed to be interpreted and realised, but could instead start with sounds, ideas, or experiments. Even when outside writers were employed, 'Features Department relied much more on producer-writer contact than Drama' (Whitehead 1989: 41), allowing for more extensive collaboration and co-operation – to the extent that producer Rayner Heppenstall could label certain writers *his* (Whitehead 1989: 35), denoting a close creative relationship. While during the war, the key function of the Features department was the production of documentaries and propaganda, the post-war years brought a 'feeling of freedom and opportunity' (Whitehead 1989: 114) and a space in which wartime experiments and modes of practice could be utilised in dramaturgy.

After the restructuring of services, the Drama department did not provide the new Third Programme with the new experimental dramaturgies that it demanded; as Roger remarks, the Programme 'did not become the arena for avant-garde experiment in its early years. There was a tendency on the part of the Drama department to concentrate on the production of more plays from the classical repertoire' (Roger 1984: 74). Indeed, during the first year of the Programme, the key drama productions consisted of 'five Shavian [plays] broadcast in the Shaw festival […] [,] three by Harley Granville-Barker […] [, and] performances of Shakespeare's sequence of historical plays from "Richard II" to "Richard III"' (Yearbook 1948: 71). Experimental plays instead emerged from Features:

> in 1948 a BBC list of "Plays Performed During the First Two Years of the Third Programme" contained only items attributed to the Drama Department, [whereas] a 1956 list of plays for the network's first ten years had roughly as many items from Features as Drama, divided into three categories "Original Pieces for Radio", "Adaptations" and "Stage Plays", with Features providing most of the former (Whitehead in Laws 2017: 117).

The fact that the Drama department caught up with the experimental output of Features after the arrival of McWhinnie in 1953 was, according to Laws, because '[w]ith [his] success in enticing more young writers, and his interest in new sound techniques for radio, there was less of a distinction between Drama and Features' (2017: 118). As noted above, Feature conventions and techniques such as increased collaboration between writer and producer, the use of magnetic tape (Whitehead

1989: 115), a poetic – rather than conventionally dramatic – approach to writing (Cleverdon 1969: 7), and an emphasis on making 'the listener feel as well as think' (Gilliam in Laws 2017: 117), all found their way into drama production.

These institutional changes, however, appear to have ultimately led to a reinforcement of the writer-centric attitudes of the Drama department on Features. After 'frequent complaints that Features Department was too reliant on staff products' (Whitehead 1989: 81), attempts were made to involve outside writers with the department – rather than, say, outside producers, who would need more extensive training. Proposals were made, for example, to hire writers on medium-length contracts – as opposed to the commission-based freelancers or salaried staff producers – in order to allow them to cultivate their styles of radio writing (Whitehead 1989: 81-2). The training conference for features producers – the Feature Conference – opened to outside writers for the first time in 1956; the proceedings of the conference echoes the writer-centric ideas of the semantic paradigm: '[o]f all the possible contributors to the future of sound broadcasting … the writer is the most important' (Whitehead 1989: 88). As Laws remarks: '[b]y 1959 the number of Features Department staff had been significantly reduced, leading to the gradual demise of the department […], with many Features producers then starting to work more consistently within Drama' (2017: 118); thus functionally redundant, the department was finally closed down in 1964 (Hendy 2007: 40). As a result of institutional shifts, then, the integrative working practices of the Features department, which had preceded the post-war experiments in dramaturgy, gave way to writer-centric conventions that facilitated a semantic approach.

A similar shift in the institutional organisation of practice can be observed in the founding of the BBC Radiophonic Workshop. The Workshop provided a technologically-equipped space for sonic experimentation, and was staffed by dedicated technicians who could concentrate on finding new ways of creating sound. In effect, however, this separated the process of sonic experimentation from that of writing and production, and created a hierarchy of practice; producers instead commissioned the Workshop for individual productions (Niebur 2010: 64), later in the creative process. Furthermore, the Workshop was open to commission by television as well as radio, meaning that its function was not to create

experimental *radio* sounds, but sonic effects and compositions in general; the institutional specialisation of sonic experimentation, in other words, moved it away from the realm of radio; despite its roots in radio production, by the mid-1960s 'the highbrow dramatic radio commissions responsible in large parts for the workshop's creation had started to dry up' (Niebur 2010: 102), and the workshop's key output was directed toward television – for example, providing music and effects for *Doctor Who* (Niebur 2010: 96) – and stand-alone experimental music. The institutional hierarchies of the BBC, then, influenced modes of dramaturgy and were influential in the centrality of the writer, and the maintaining of the semantic paradigm.

4.3.3. Technologies, techniques, listeners

Finally, let us consider the influence of technologies and the modes of practice facilitated by them. New production methods facilitated McWhinnie's approach to dramaturgy. In particular, the use of magnetic tape allowed for the creation of entirely new sounds influenced by *musique concrete*:

> Record [a sound] at different speeds, play it backwards, add it to itself over and over again, subject it to the influence of frequency filters, acoustic variations, combine one segment of magnetic tape with another, unrelated, segment; by these means, among others, we can create sounds which have never been heard before […] (1959: 86).

Constraints in practice, however, meant that such time-consuming sonic techniques had to be balanced against the limitations of the production. Productions still took place mainly in a single studio, and access to tape effects was not always available; in fact, even in the case of *All That Fall*, 'many of the sounds were, in fact, made in the studio with the actors, and it was virtually a one-take session' (Briscoe in Niebur 2010: 22). New technologies, in other words, did not change the semantic modes of practice, but were instead incorporated in old practices; the dramaturgical possibilities of new technology, then, was limited by the heritage of the semantic paradigm.

Technologies of broadcast and reception, too, were both important in enabling new modes of dramaturgy, and limiting factors. McWhinnie notes the importance of technological developments for his practice:

> We have come a long way in forty years, from the phonograph and the 'cat's-whisker' to the perfection of magnetic tape and

> V.H.F. transmission; [50] stereophony is on the horizon; there is probably more enthusiasm and creative interest among radio practitioners than at any time since the early days (1959: 16).

Clarity of sound, as discussed in Section 4.2.3.3, would allow for a more 'phonographic', rather than 'telephonic' (Lastra 2012: 248), sound for radio drama, and therefore a move away from semantic listening for the radio-body. Yet, McWhinnie still finds the equipment lacking, remarking that '[t]he *fortissimo* attainable on a radio receiver is restricted, and a single human voice in close focus can appear to be as loud as a full symphony orchestra' (1959: 65), and that 'adventurous radio producers have attempted [to create complex sound structures] but it has always resulted in confusion' (1959: 78) – a fact that leads him to suggest that producers should approach sound effects semantically and telephonically, as short-hands for elements of the dramatic world.

Radio receiver technology was rapidly improving with the development of the transistor radio, which was affordable, portable, and permitted phonographic reception and amplification. As Street remarks, the 1960s were 'the "Transistor Age" […] By 1963, 36% of all radios sold in Britain were imported from Japan [which specialised in pocket transistor radios]' (Street 2006: 273). By this time, however, patterns of radio consumption were changing as a result of competition from television. The 1969 BBC plan for network radio, *Broadcasting in the Seventies*, acknowledges that there has been

> [a] fundamental change in the nature of the radio audience. The millions who once listened of an evening to 'In Town Tonight' and 'Itma' now watch television. Radio's peak hours have moved to breakfast time and lunch time […] [F]or most people radio is now mainly for the day time. They see it less as a medium for family entertainment, more as a continuous supplier of music and information (BBC 1969).[51]

The dedicated listener of the Third Programme – which by now had changed its name to Radio 3 – then, had given way to a listener who encountered radio as a sound in the background of daily life, rather than as a focused, engaged experience. The programme was therefore reorganised; as *Broadcasting in the Seventies* details,

[50] Cat's-whiskers 'was the popular term for a piece of early, rather crude radio technology that consisted of a length—usually of about two inches—of thin wire positioned on a piece of suitable material' used to pick up radio signals (Street 2006: 66).

[51] For legibility, I have used the abbreviation when referring to the document; the bibliography entry is ascribed to The British Broadcasting Corporation instead.

> On Radio Three the separate labels of Music Programme and Third Programme will disappear and the entire output of the network put under the single heading of Radio Three, which will concentrate wholly on music and the arts. The day time stream of music will be maintained and it will now be extended more into the evening (BBC 1969).

The primary role of the Third Programme was thus altered to accompany new listening habits and modes; while 'Radio Three [continued] to carry, in the evening, some of the more specialised drama, poetry, and other cultural programmes which [had] been a feature of the Third' (BBC 1969), the space for experimentation was limited, and the practical constraints remained in place.

Overall, the experimental dramaturgies of the post-war Third Programme were limited by semantic assumptions, institutional, technical, and technological limitations. Despite key innovations in dramaturgical practice, the dominance of the semantic paradigm remained unchallenged. In the next section, examining another period of broadcast experimentation two decades later, I posit that this dominance continued.

4.4. High Fidelity: the contemporary era

As Hendy notes in his history of Radio 4, the late 1970s saw significant changes in the institutions and technologies of radio drama. New broadcast technologies were being adopted; stereo, which had first been used in the 1960s, was by now the norm (Hendy 2007: 197), and 'regular experimental quadraphonic broadcasts were made' (Handbook 1979: 63). Binaural recording was also employed, and first used in *The Oil Rig*, a feature programme (Handbook 1978: 20); '[T]wo microphones placed about the same distance apart as a person's ears and separated by a baffle, or alternatively mounted on a dummy's head' (Handbook 1978: 85) replicated an approximation of how the listener's ears would encounter the world, and she in turn would use headphones in order to listen to the programme. Such technological changes led to a shift in listening modes. Hendy draws attention to *Hi-Fi as a Pastime* – a book that

> claimed the technology broke through "the former limitation of a performance that had to be heard as though squeezed through an 8 to 15 inch hole in the wall" and gave instead the "effect of the wall between yourself and the concert platform being taken completely away" (Hendy 2007: 198).

Concurrently, institutional changes in the BBC created a space for new experiments in drama. Martin Esslin, whose ideas on radio I discussed in Chapter 1, and who was 'interested in the theatre of ideas, though somewhat less interested in the mechanics of directing actors' (Hendy 2007: 184) was replaced as Head of Drama by Ronald Mason, 'a solid and less, innovative figure, but a pragmatic man' (Hendy 2007: 184). Additionally, 'inspiration of making radio drama less literary and more cinematic arrived from a number of sources' (Hendy 2007: 196): European radio, television production, and the heritage of post-war experimental radio. A new programme of plays, *Hi-Fi Theatre*, began in 1978 (Wade 1981: 221), aiming to utilise new technological advances in dramaturgy. *The Hitch-hiker's Guide to the Galaxy* (1978) employed the output of the Radiophonic Workshop and stereophonic sound to create a futuristic sound style. Utilising binaural recording, a short experimental play *The Revenge* (1978), which I discuss in the next section, even attempted to dispose of words and create an entirely sound-based piece of radio drama.

Jonathan Raban's (1981) critique of these new dramaturgical experiments is evidence both of their move away from the semantic paradigm, and of the general reaction that they encountered – reactions that echo Gielgud's critique of experimental dramaturgy as motivated by technology, rather than drama. Raban argues that moving toward the reproduction of actual spaces and focusing on the non-symbolic aspects of sounds is an attempt toward what he terms a 'pure radio' (1981: 79); the attempt, Raban posits, arises not from the aesthetic need felt by the dramatist, but due to the enthusiasm of practitioners who deal with sounds as auditory phenomena and not meaningful symbols – in particular, he points the finger toward 'the radio producer and the studio manager,' (1981: 83) whose eagerness to use their craft to create a unique sound diminishes the true achievement of the medium, the reliance on the symbolic, and tends to create 'wordless sequence[s] of noises' (1981: 80). Instead, Raban defends the use of stylised codes and sounds that are characteristic of the semantic paradigm. Describing the production of the long-running rural soap *The Archers*, he writes:

> [T]he producers and writers of *The Archers* are masters of an extremely effective, if mundane, form of radio drama. Everything is vested in cues, signals and symbols. No attempt is made to create a realistic aural surface; such imitations of reality as are absolutely necessary are given in economic

> semaphore, then dropped as soon as the listener has been equipped with whatever basic clue he needs (Raban 1981: 86).

Despite such protestation, is important to note that the experiments with stereo, too, manifest a tendency toward the semantic paradigm. The first play broadcast under the banner of *Hi-Fi Theatre,* for example, was a production of *Under Milk Wood* which, save for stereophonic spatialisation and alternating the role of the narrator between a male and a female voice, showed little dramaturgical change. The semantic approach to dramaturgy is even evident in the wordless *The Revenge*; as I argue in the next section, the radio-body of the play listens to the dramatic world in the semantic mode, despite the absence of recognisable linguistic codes.

4.4.1. Semantic listening without words: the case of *The Revenge*

The Revenge, written by Andrew Sachs and produced by Glyn Dearman, was broadcast in 1978 on Radio 3, preceded by a discussion between the announcer, Sachs, and head of Drama Ronald Mason. The listener is advised to devote her attention completely to the play by listening through headphones or balanced speakers, and darkening and silencing the room. The play narrates the story of a man who, after running away from prison and evading chasing police officers, hides in a house to ambush and suffocate another; the theme of the play is highlighted by Mason: "what is absolutely important when you are listening to this play is to remember that implicit in the title is the theme".

Even without the semantic signpost of the title, the radio-body's mode of listening remains focused on the clear and distinguishable presentation of distinct elements of the dramatic world, rather than on resonating with it. This can be observed, for example, in the opening of the play: [52] after the announcement (4:50), the radio-body listens to the dawn chorus in an open space for roughly 18 seconds. Then, a distant siren begins, almost immediately followed by the heavy breathing of a man in very close proximity to the radio-body's position in the dramatic world (5:08). In this sequence, the radio-body appears to listen to the sounds not as it encounters them within the dramatic world, but in a step-by-step unfolding of its clear and separate elements: first, the open space, and then the siren and the man; the man only appears to the radio-body after the space for which the sounds of the

[52] Appendix A-13.

dawn chorus stand has been established. The radio-body, in other words, adjusts its auditory stance toward the dramatic world in order to listen to sounds individually.

Another example in which such a change of stance can be observed clearly occurs later in the play when the main character ambushes a biker (9:05). [53] The radio-body has, up to this point, listened to the world from a position close to the main character, as evidenced by the fact that it constantly listens for his breathing and the rustle of his movements. As the motorbike approaches, however, such sounds disappear entirely, allowing the radio to listen instead for this new element of the dramatic world. The moment of the attack itself (9:48), in fact, set against silence, relatively further away from the radio-body, with almost all background sound in asyndeton; the radio-body, in other words, adjusts its stance toward the dramatic world to listen with clarity for the sound that stands for the attack. After the struggle (9:53), its close proximity to the main character is resumed.

The radio-body of *The Revenge* even uses its newfound ability to listen for direction in the same indicative manner; while listening to the approach of the motorcycle (9:10) [54] and a departing truck (16:48), [55] for example, the radio-body continues to listen for their sounds until they are heard entirely on one side of the stereophonic spectrum – in other words, it listens deliberately for the truck and the bike *as* denotative of the direction of their travel, demonstrating this clearly by directing its body toward them from one direction. Such examples are demonstrative of a mode of listening that echoes semantic attitudes; despite the absence of words, the radio-body of *The Revenge* still treats the sounds of the dramatic world as auditory codes.

In the discussion preceding *The Revenge*, when asked whether this was the beginning of a series of worldless plays, Mason replied: "certainly not! Radio is a medium where the word is all important; the word has so much power". As Hendy notes, such attitudes to radio drama did indeed prevail: '[a]ll evidence suggested the bulk of Radio Four's audience wanted good plain storytelling, uncluttered by sound effects […] These predilections could not be ignored' (2007: 199). Furthermore, the conditions of listening required by such programmes stood in contrast to the

[53] Appendix A-14.
[54] Appendix A-15.
[55] Appendix A-16.

requirements of the daytime listeners who, as *Broadcasting in the Seventies* posited, encountered radio 'more as a continuous supplier of music and information' (BBC 1969); the Handbook advises listeners that '[t]he stereo programmes broadcast by the BBC are intended for reproduction in the home through two loudspeakers placed a few feet apart' (Handbook 1978: 85). In reaction to this reception, therefore, resources were directed instead toward 'the middle ground' (2007: 200), defined by semantically-minded, writer-centric practices, and the experiments with sound remained 'a small avant-garde of work in the margins' (2007: 205); the semantic paradigm, thus, remained dominant.

4.5. A digital age: the current conditions

The semantic conventions of dramaturgy, as I have argued, have persisted throughout the history of British radio due to a number of contingent cultural, institutional, and technological factors. During the last two decades, however, these factors have undergone rapid and radical change with the prevalence of digital media, and the convergence of radio and new media; indeed, for Crook, this development is significant enough to merit the label of a new age – the 'sixth age' (Crook 1999: 26) – of audio drama, when the Internet's ability to act as a sonic medium has opened entirely new avenues of making, distributing and listening to solely-auditory drama. In this final section, I examine some of the conditions of the contexts within which radio drama is situated in this age, drawing parallels between them and some of the historical factors examined previously in the chapter, and suggest that the digital age results in a *crisis* in the semantic paradigm of radio dramaturgy.

What do I mean by crisis? In his conception of paradigms, Kuhn posits that when paradigms are faced with increasing anomalies that cannot be resolved with commonly-accepted frameworks, 'technical breakdown' (1996: 69) – that is, the insufficiency of conventional solutions to problems – leads to a state where fundamental assumptions are reassessed, alternative paradigms are proposed, and obsolete solutions are revived and retried; this crisis state is the precondition to the emergence of new paradigms. In the case of radio drama, I posit that this technical breakdown arises from changes in the way radio drama is made and distributed and new modes of audience attention, which open the paradigm to a shift.

4.5.1. Conditions of distribution and production

In 1999, at the dawn of the convergence of radio and new media, Tim Crook writes:

> The internet has rendered obsolete state regulation and the top-down systems of control and access for radio drama writing and production. It has taken the message of audio drama art into a medium which is being accelerated by the younger generation in terms of consumption [...] The new medium has therefore created a new message in audio drama and a new relationship between sound play and listener (1999: 48).

At the time, such claims may have appeared rather ambitious, as Internet radio was limited in scope, and lacking success – for example, IRDP, the online radio production and distribution that Crook uses as a case study, ceased functioning in 2003 (IRDP 2003). Crook's predictions, however, have proved accurate. Podcasting, a system of distributing audio files to large numbers of listeners, has created the possibility of direct broadcasting without the need for institutionalisation. Demand for podcasts is high. In the UK, the number of podcast listeners increased by over 44% between 2016 and 2017, from 3.8 million (RAJAR 2016) to 5.5 million (RAJAR 2017), while the percentage of Americans who listen to podcasts has increased from 11% in 2006 to 40% in 2017– an estimated 112 million potential audience members (Edison Research 2017). Drama podcasts have increased in number – enough for Neil Verma to explore 43 of them in his aesthetic survey (Verma 2017: 2) – and in prominence: Gimlet Media's *Homecoming* (2017), for example, featured the talents of A-listers Catherine Keener and David Schwimmer. Companies such as Bafflegab and Big Finish Productions take advantage of the demand provided by cult following of popular culture icons such as Tom Baker and Doctor Who, respectively, to create regular radio drama productions with prominent casts such as Brian Blessed (Bafflegab Productions 2009) and David Tennant (Big Finish 2017). The BBC's monopoly on radio drama is therefore challenged. Although new institutions of power can emerge – indeed, as Berry points out, the professionalization of podcasting creates such a possibility – the increasing accessibility of radio drama production means that dramaturgy is not in danger of being monopolised (2016:15).

With the increased diversity and multiplicity of methods of distribution, practical conventions also have the potential for diversification, as the institutionalised practices of radio dramaturgy – in Britain, represented by the

semantic paradigm – are open to experimentation, facilitated by the fact that radio production is now almost universally digital (McLeish 2005: 117). Digital sound production, of course, is nothing new: as far back as 1979, the BBC's research and development division was developing digital audio recorders that would '[result] in a system which is virtually distortionless and noise-free – a performance unattainable with conventional analogue techniques' (Handbook 1979: 64). Digital production, however, has now become accessible not just to institutions, but to any radio drama enthusiast, professional or amateur; whereas Gielgud lamented the lack of an experimental laboratory at the BBC (1957: 26), any personal computer can now be equipped with such a laboratory in the form of freeware digital audio workstations such as Audacity (Audacity 2017) and Ardour (Davis 2015), sound effects provided by sources such as FreeSound – a project supported by Universitat Pompeu Fabra, which aims to 'create a huge collaborative database of audio […]' (FreeSound n.d.) – and a receptive audience in online radio drama enthusiast communities such as the Radio Drama Revival, a podcast that has, since 2007, published over 450 hours of new radio drama created by a variety of individual contributors (Radio Drama Revival 2017). Furthermore, digital production facilitates sonic experimentation greatly; while McWhinnie's experiments with tape may have been time-consuming, labour-intensive, and uneconomical, digital interfaces allow for the alteration of sounds, the use of software synthesisers – both to create new sounds and to replicate traditional musical instruments – and control of mixes and balances at the press of a button, meaning that production roles require a lower degree of specialisation. Conventional methods and hierarchies of practice, such as a separation of writing and production, timed single-studio production, spot effects, and other practices of the semantic paradigm, therefore may not exist in such productions, allowing for new approaches to dramaturgy, and new radio-bodies.

The conditions of distribution and production in the contemporary era, therefore, have changed some of the key factors that underlie the dominance of the semantic paradigm. Perhaps the most important shift in the context of radio drama, however, is changing modes in the listener's attention, which I discuss in the next section.

4.5.2. The new listener

The effects of the contemporary developments of distribution, both technological and cultural, is not limited to challenging institutional dominance over dramaturgy – they have also facilitated the adoption of new modes of consumption by audiences. Portable technologies play an increasing role in listener experiences. Richard Berry's survey of listeners to the *Serial* podcast testifies to this:

> [T]he majority of listeners have now migrated to smartphones. Only two people in my survey listened on an iPod, against the 80% who were using a smartphone as part of their devices. The series itself reported similar numbers with 71% of iTunes downloads going direct to mobile devices […] (Berry 2015: 176).

Podcast and internet radio listener constitute a growing but still small minority of radio audiences: in 2015, '[l]ive radio [reached] 90% of the population across the week, 48.3 million adults[;][…] the volume of listening to catch up radio and podcasts [was] relatively low […] 8% and 7% respectively use this type of audio at least once a week' (RAJAR 2015: 6); by 2017, 25% of listeners used internet radio services once a month (RAJAR 2017). The listening behaviours of this group of listeners, nevertheless, is different from the general make-up of radio audiences. They are mostly young, interested in speech programmes – rather than music, which constitutes the majority content of radio listening – and listening in 'spaces where radio is not always present or convenient' (RAJAR 2015: 12). In 2014, for example, As Berry's review reveals, internet and podcast listeners select their schedule of listening, and have control over the flow of programmes – in that they can pause, rewind, and repeat it – which allows them to be 'not only less distracted [than radio listeners] but also potentially more engaged in the experience' (Berry 2016: 12). These listeners are, in other words, not the background audience for whom the BBC of *Broadcasting in the Seventies* catered; the focused nature of their listening allows for a more directed encounter with radio drama and the radio-body.

Most significantly, these new listening practices are 'more often than not […] [listened to] using headphones' (Berry 2016: 13); in 2017, 9 million listeners used earphones to listen to radio (RAJAR 2017). This is important because through headphones, the distance between the listener and the radio-body is eliminated: the dramatic world is encountered not as a sound within the auditory field – a *hole in the wall* – but as the auditory field *itself*. This constitutes a radical difference to previously-discussed modes of listening to radio: to encounter the radio-body, the

listener does not need to attend to the sounds of the radio in synecdoche and bring the rest of her auditory field under asyndeton; instead, all that is required of her is to hearken the sounds of the dramatic world. Unlike the bodily-restrictive listening advocated by the directions given by Sieveking (1934: 97) and the announcer of *The Revenge*, the headphone listener, armed with a portable media player, can encounter the radio-body in optimal conditions, on demand. The modes of listening to radio drama and encountering the radio-body, then, are also undergoing radical change.

4.5.3. A paradigm in crisis

While the picture of current conditions represented above implies diversification and change, a critic may argue that the dramaturgical solutions of the semantic paradigm are still functional in this context: after all, radio plays still can be, and are, produced with conventional practices. The BBC is still a leading drama producer, and semantic exemplars dominate practical approaches. While changing modes of distribution, production, and listening can open the way for dramaturgical experiments – as they have indeed done throughout the history of radio drama, as discussed in this chapter – this does not necessarily translate into a need for a paradigm shift. Furthermore, predictions of paradigm shifts in radio drama are nothing new; Verma observes that 'over the past half-century, the only thing more reliable than the constant revival of radio drama is the insistence that what ensues is not really a revival, but something utterly new, instead' (Verma 2017a: 5). Why then, one might ask, do I posit that the semantic paradigm is in crisis?

I have three responses to this question. Firstly, it is important to note that the changes outlined above are occurring at a much higher pace and volume than any time since the early years of radio, and institutional, practical, technological and experiential aspects of radio drama are undergoing simultaneous changes. As noted in the historical analyses of this chapter, throughout the existence of the semantic paradigm, challenges to the semantic paradigm arising from one of these aspects would be diffused by others: Sieveking's practical innovations were hindered by technologies of production and reception, McWhinnie's dramaturgy was constrained by the practical conventions of the day, experiments supported by changing modes of listening in the 1970s were marginalised by institutional attitudes, and so on. In the current era, however, all of these contexts are undergoing

change, and thus a space opens for a redefinition of their interrelations and structures.

Secondly, the focused, bodily mode of headphone listening described above represents a fundamental shift in the listener's encounter with the radio-body. Listening to radio drama through portable devices and headphones is, of course, nothing new; Sony Walkmans, available since 1978 (Moran 2010: 277), allowed listeners almost the same level of control on the auditory field. Nevertheless, when coupled with the control over listening times and locations afforded by digital media, this new mode allows for a focused, bodily encounter with radio drama. The semantic mode of dramaturgy, which, as discussed in Chapter 1, directs its sound structure toward the mind, is therefore limited in the range of experiences that it can provide for a listener engaged in this type of listening.

This issue also brings me to the third, most important – and rather politically-ambiguous – point: the conditions outlined above ultimately emerge from the current neoliberal cultural milieu. Headphone listening, for example, is not simply a technological development, but emerges out of cultural conditions; as Bull argues, the use of personal stereos 'creates a form of accompanied solitude for its users' (2005: 353) while also opening this solitude to consumer products, including radio drama. Taylor also links it with the 'decline of the public, [with] the headphone – or earbud – clad individual, cocooned in her own sonic world' (2016: 47) an emblem of neoliberal individualisation. The growth of podcasting as a rival to institutions of radio drama relies not just on enthusiasts and communities, but on the commercial infrastructure of the Apple Corporation; indeed, the space of podcasting is seeing rapid commercialisation, with companies such as Gimlet Media and Amazon's audiobook arm Audible producing high-end radio drama featuring stars of stage and screen. Considering that the commodity of this developing market is *experience*, the constraints of the semantic paradigm in engaging the listener's body mean that semantic dramaturgy cannot meet the demands of this market, meaning that the semantic paradigm is in crisis. I discuss a potential response to this crisis in the final chapter of this thesis.

4.6. Closing remarks

In this chapter, I examined the historical trajectory of the semantic paradigm, arguing that the domination of British radio dramaturgy, and the marginalisation of

a resonant alternative, emerged out of a set of historically-contingent cultural, institutional, and technological factors, which I traced three distinct historical periods. I then explored the contemporary context of radio in the digital era, arguing that the current conditions create a crisis in the semantic paradigm, and that resonant dramaturgy can address these problems.

The question remains, however, of how a resonant approach to dramaturgy would function practically. How does one create a resonant radio-body? In the next chapter, I explore this question in detail by examining a number of case studies, arguing that a resonant dramaturgy is characterised by a move away from the conventions and hierarchies of the semantic paradigm.

CHAPTER 5:

‘RADIO LISTENS TO ITSELF’: RESONANT RADIO DRAMATURGIES

5.1. Opening remarks

In the previous chapter, I examined the history of British radio drama to argue that the semantic paradigm is not the only possible shape of the art form, but is open to change; in fact, as modes of production and listening shift with new technologies and cultural contexts, new modes of dramaturgy are required. In this chapter, I argue that a resonant dramaturgy is particularly well-positioned to address the current context of radio. : in what follows, I examine five case studies in which the radio-body listens to itself; in each case, I argue that a broad approach characterised by flexibility, experimentation, and use of technology, has enabled a resonant dramaturgy – one that is well-placed to become the dominant paradigm of the digital age.

5.2. An emerging paradigm?

What happens when a paradigm is in crisis? As Kuhn remarks, ‘the significance of crises is the indication they provide that an occasion for *retooling* has arrived’ (1996: 76, italics mine). The crisis of the semantic paradigm, rooted in its inefficiency addressing the shifts in listenership, production, and distribution in the current era, could therefore be resolved with a retooling of dramaturgical solutions and practices. How, then, can radio dramaturgy re-tool itself to adapt to the new conditions, and resolve the crisis? It is here that the strands of my arguments meet: I posit that the crisis of the semantic paradigm can be resolved with a shift toward a resonant mode of dramaturgy.

The advantage of a resonant approach is its dramaturgical use of the embodied nature of radio drama. After all, as discussed in Section 3.5, a resonant radio-body engages the listener’s body in a much more extensive manner when compared to the semantic radio-body, because the former allows her to resonate with the shifts in the structure of the dramatic world, and be constituted by it. The

contemporary listener's culturally and technologically-mediated mode of listening to radio drama – a root cause of the crisis in the semantic paradigm – is already characterised by bodily immersion, focused engagement, and a demand for experience; in the absence of other sounds, and physically connected to the radio-body through headphones or high-fidelity reproduction, her phenomenal field is occupied by, and resonates with, the radio-body's expression, and thus her perception of the dramatic world. Whereas listeners in the historical eras explored previously would encounters the radio-body as one source of sound competing against others in her auditory field, the contemporary listener is herself *constituted* entirely in resonance with the radio-body when encountering the dramatic world. A radio-body that listens to itself, therefore, is more conducive to contemporary modes of listening: in expressing its resonant encounter with the world, it allows the listener, whose auditory field is shared with the radio-body's perception, to be constituted bodily by the dramatic world in resonance. In contrast, a radio-body that listens semantically, and thus presupposes its own transcendence from the dramatic world, does not utilise the dramaturgical possibilities of such an experience; the contemporary listener's auditory field is occupied entirely by the radio-body's perception of the dramatic world, but her encounter with the world is static, and her bodily stance in relation to the world remains unchanged by what occurs. Resonant dramaturgy, then, can engage the contemporary listener more, because her conditions of listening require a drama that *plays*, rather than one that *tells*. It can, therefore, be the basis for a retooling of radio dramaturgy.

The question, however, still remains: what does a resonant dramaturgy sound like? The radio-body only becomes a perceiving, experiencing, resonant body – as opposed to the technological apparatus of radio – because its sound structures are formed by the process of dramaturgy in order to be encountered and perceived by the listener as the experience of the radio-body listening. The expressions that could be perceived as the radio-body listening to itself, then, would need to be implemented through the same structure. What would this structure need to do in order to express the dynamic resonance of the radio-body's engagement in the dramatic world? What, in other words, what would one have to do to create a radio-body that listens to itself? It should be noted that also Chapter 4 explored a number of historical dramaturgical approaches that can be labelled resonant, such approaches are historically contingent: the radio-bodies of Sieveking's *Intimate*

Snapshot and McWhinnie's *All That Fall*, discussed in 4.2.2. and 4.3.1. respectively, are constructed and encountered through specific technological means and within particular aesthetic and cultural contexts that simply do not apply to the current era of digital production and distribution. While these approaches may provide aesthetic inspiration, the practices, techniques and methods that can address the crisis of the semantic dramaturgy in order to instigate a paradigm shift.

Here, I contend, one need not hypothesise, but simply examine what is already happening in the field of radio practice. There are signs that a paradigm shift is occurring in British radio dramaturgy, with writers, producers and sound designers challenging conventional hierarchies and accepted methods and practices, equipped with new tools of production and distribution; the result of such challenges is a move away from the construction of radio-bodies that listen semantically, and the emergence of resonant radio-bodies. Of course, it cannot be said that a new paradigm is in place – after all, semantic exemplars, guidelines, educational material, theories, and conventions of production are extant. A paradigm shift requires a theoretical basis, the identification of key exemplars, and a consensus over conventional ideas and practices. While this thesis may not achieve the latter, the aim of this chapter is to identify and theorise a number of dramaturgical approaches in contemporary radio, in order to propose them as exemplars that show how a resonant dramaturgy can function.

What follows is an exploration of five case studies of moments in radio programmes where specific dramaturgical *effects* are achieved, allowing the radio-body to listen to itself; here, I am using the word *effect* to describe the resonant shift that is perceived by the listener as a result of a particular mode of listening adopted by the radio-body, which itself results from dramaturgical practices. I begin by theorising each effect through a phenomenological framework. Then, I open each study with a phenomenological description of the perceptual experience of the piece, followed by an analysis of its sonic structure, showing that certain arrangements of sound create the conditions for the possibility of my experience. In each case, I cite a number of pieces that demonstrate similar structures and effects, and also, where possible, a limit case – that is, an example where such structures do not function, and thus can show the boundaries of the possibility of their effects. At the end of each section, I highlight the fact that these structures and resulting effects

are made possible through new approaches to the practices of dramaturgy, and to listening practices that emerge from contemporary conditions. The aim in doing so is not to map out all possible approaches to resonant dramaturgy, but to show how any desired resonant effect may be theorised, and realised in practice by moving away from the conventions of the semantic paradigm.

5.3. Radio listens to itself in music

In the following subsections, I inspect three different dramaturgical uses of music, each of which creates a radio-body that listens to its own resonance with the dramatic world. Before proceeding, however, a brief exploration of music is required; by examining the definition of music from a phenomenological angle, I want to argue that radio can listen to its encounter with the world through it. To do this, I draw from two the two concepts of musicking, coined by Smalls (1998), and groove, as conceptualised by Roholt (2014), to argue that while there are many ways to encounter, perceive and understand music, a key way in which radio can listen to itself through music is when the radio-body expresses the tensions of bodily perception in its encounter with the listener.

What is music? Despite extensive theorisations of music in various contexts such as semiotics (see DeNora 2000, Tarasti 1994, Monelle 2010), politics (see Adorno 2007, Attali 1985, Blacking 1973), aesthetics (see Sharpe 2000, Scruton 1997), neuroscience (see Levitin 2006, Rose 2010), and more, it is still a challenge to delineate a definition of music that can link the various manifestations of the phenomenon under the different cultural and historical conditions within which it appears. The broadest of definitions, which understand all organisations of sound as music (Attali 1985: 6, Blacking 1973: 32) is open enough to accommodate anything from Beethoven to radio drama to urban noise – a fact that makes it difficult to posit a separation between musical and non-musical organisations of sound. At the other end of the spectrum, understanding music through its cultural heritage – such as specific ranges of sounds, instruments, genres, styles and practices – limits the range of sounds and organising systems that can be understood in terms of music; this is particularly problematic as since the early 20th century, such practices have changed radically, with new instruments, modes of music-making, and spaces and modes of listening. It is important to note, however, that both of these approaches understand music through what is manifested in

musical works: music is assumed to be the quality shared by what is accepted as a piece of music. Following this definition, it would be rather difficult to discuss dramaturgical uses of music in general, without considering the dramaturgical function of particular musical pieces.

On the other hand, while certainly suitable for understanding music from aesthetic and cultural perspectives, this definition suffers from a degree of what Merleau-Ponty labels *experience error,* discussed previously in Chapter 1: because it can be observed reflectively that musical experience happens in encounter with the musical piece, it is assumed that the organised sound of the piece of music *is* the experience of music. It can be argued, nevertheless, that music is instead experienced through different sounds, in different modes of listening, and within different social and cultural contexts; in other words, not all musical pieces are necessarily experienced *as* music, and not all experiences of music emanate from musical pieces. Such a perspective is put forward by Christopher Small, who argues that 'the fundamental nature and meaning of music lie not in objects, nor in musical works at all, but in action, in what people do' (1998: 8). For this, Small coins the verb 'musicking […] [;] *to music is to take part, in any capacity, in a musical performance, whether by performing, by listening, by rehearsing or practicing, by providing material for performance (what is called composing), or by dancing*' (1998: 9). In other words, Smalls posits that the experience of music does not derive from objects and sound structures, but from bodily and worldly actions. Musicking, he argues, is fundamentally communal, functioning to 'explore, affirm, and celebrate the relationships of the living world' (1998: 142) – even solitary experience of music, such as that of a flute player in the wilderness, is only made possible through existing in a world that is already inhabited by others (Small 1998: 201). Music, then, is manifested not in the properties of musical works, but in a type of worldly experience.

While Small bases his arguments on anthropological and sociological arguments, the idea of musicking can be easily translated into phenomenological terms: music is not necessarily experienced through encounters with objects that have certain musical properties, but is instead a mode of bodily intention and perception. The communality of musical experience, and its emphasis on understanding and sharing the possible patterns of relations between things – in

other words, phenomenal worlds – implies that musicking is another form of expression of worldly perception, with a function similar to that of radio drama and other forms of perceptual disclosure between perceptible beings. In other words, music as understood here is not simply any organisation of sound, but organisations of sound expressing patterns of specific relationships in the referential totality of the world, created through bodily engagement with the world. The experience of musicking is also not limited to the sounds of music, but to the entire set of holistic relationships that exist around it: sedimented bodily habits, social and cultural factors, and so on. [56]

Small's concept of musicking is therefore more open to explorations of the function of music in radio drama: while it may be difficult to understand how any particular musical work may function dramaturgically depending on context, it can be argued that musical sounds contained within radio drama can work to express the relationships between the various interconnected elements of the dramatic world to the audience; in other words, musical sound can be a dramaturgical tool because they allow the radio-body to *musick* with the listener: in listening to music, the radio-body can explore the shifting dynamics in the pattern of its relationship to the dramatic world, and affirm them by expressing them to the listener.

But what about *celebration*, which, according to Small is the third function of music after exploration and affirmation? The concept is defined explicitly by Small, but the clearest articulation of the idea comes when he describes listening with others, where he writes:

> [T]o affirm and celebrate our relationships through musicking […] is to explore and celebrate our sense of who we are, to make us feel more fully ourselves. […] We feel that this is how the world *really* is when all the dross is stripped away, and this is where we *really* belong in it. […] The exploration and the affirmation need not be […] conscious and certainly cannot be expressed in words, but the celebration can be, and usually is, so expressed, if not during the performance then after it (Small 1998: 142).

[56] Attali's (1985) conception of music also takes it to be the expression of the organisations of contextual relationships – mainly, political and economic ones. Attali goes further than Small, however, arguing that music itself can predict and express the possibilities of future organisations of economy and politics. Here, Small's broader framework is more applicable.

Of course, based on this description, the radio-body's musicking would not include celebration, as it would not verbalise its own appreciation of the ideal nature of musical patterns. Here, however, I would contend that the fact that the radio-body listens to music is itself an act of celebration. As I have argued throughout the last few chapters, the radio-body is constituted through its expression of the perception of the dramatic world. Any form of non-diegetic music, then, appears to the radio-body not due to its physical locatedness within the world and subsequent encounter with vibrations, but as a result of an *act* of listening and expression. In listening to itself through music, then, the radio-body, in essence, *plays* the dramatic world for the listener, expressing the patterns of – to use Small's term – *what it really is*; while the radio-body does not exist beyond the moment of musicking, and thus cannot express its celebration verbally after the performance, its act of listening to music can open the dramatic world to celebration by the listener – in particular, by engaging her bodily with the dramatic world.

To pursue the bodily aspects of musicking, it is important to highlight that Small's concept, while useful in understanding music as worldly expression, is open to critique on one key ground: he argues that musicking is achieved through the mind, rather than immediately, while encountering musical relationships through the body; relationships, he argues, 'are made in our minds, and it is our minds that place the sounds we hear into […] relationships with one another' (1998: 112) – he then moves on to say that 'without a prepared mind, ready and able to create meaning from the sound relations, a musical work cannot exist' (1998: 112). This is analogous to the idea of the *theatre of the mind*, which I have critiqued throughout this thesis on the basis that from a phenomenological perspective, perceptual experience of the world cannot be understood as mental and deliberative, but holistic, pre-reflective, and accessible through bodily existence. Here, too, I want to point out that while deliberative listening modes can be directed toward music, the primary experience of musicking occurs not through listening-*écouter* rather than *listening-entendre*; in other words, the basic intentional content of the experience of musicking is not *music*, or any interpretations of music, but bodily experience of the patterns of worldly relationships. While this primary experience can emanate from, and be a foundation for a reflective understanding and theorisation of, textual, cultural, and historical contexts, such factors are not directly present in the bodily act of musicking.

One idea that might shine some light on the links between musicking and bodily experience is *groove*, a concept explored phenomenologically by Tiger Roholt. A *groove* is a phenomenon that exists to different extent in various types of musical practice, comprised of a piece of music created by a musician through the manipulation of the nuances of rhythm, which is both generated by, and generative of, a 'feel', pulling, pushing, and grabbing both the musician and the listener (Roholt 2014: 133); Roholt draws from Merleau-Ponty's idea of the bodily grasp on the world to argue that the feel of the groove, which expresses 'the affective dimension of the relevant motor-intentional movements' (Roholt 2014: 134), can also be grasped by the perceiving body of the listener, not through reflective analysis or passive listening, but in active engagement: '[t]he nuances are experienced not as (say) slightly late notes – as they would be perceived, if approached analytically – but rather, as pulls against the [main beat], motor intentional tensions, [and] bodily feelings of disequilibrium […]' (Roholt 2014: 136-7). A groove, in other words, allows those engaged with the phenomenon – the musician and the listener – to experience worldly relationships not through representational structures or abstract analytics, but through a bodily grasp of the expression presented in the organisation of performed musical sounds. Indeed, Roholt argues that to grasp a groove, the listener's body also needs to move: one's bodily attitudes and directions toward the world change in grasping the groove, whether through actual physical movement, such as dancing, or through the adjustment of one's directedness toward the world, in order 'to hear a performance's rhythm and timing nuances *as* pushes, its late notes *as* pulls, and so on' (2014: 107). A groove, then, is very similar in properties to musicking: it is a communal phenomenon occurring only when realised – that is, in concrete performance rather than abstract notation – which expresses worldly patterns.

In fact, I posit that the two concepts of musicking and groove can inform each other to present a definition of music which can help clarify its dramaturgical function in enabling radio to listen to itself. We can understand the groove far beyond Roholt's limited description of it as an aspect of the rhythm of certain musical genres, and instead as part of the general experience of musicking; the bodily encounter with the myriad of relationships between elements which occur in the musical event creates the potential for engaging in the groove of such relationships. This, of course, is by no means the only possible mode of intention

when engaged in musicking: one can equally listen analytically or passively. Nevertheless, if the body schema of the listener is equipped to grasp the groove of music, then she can encounter music as bodily experience. This, in turn, allows us to understand musicking as carrying the possibility of a perceptual and bodily encounter, in which the listener does not listen-*entendre* to worldly relations, but instead embodies them in listening-*écouter*. Here, too, other modes of listening are possible: one may listen to music in a deliberative manner, to seek metaphors, authorial intentions, metatextual references, conceptual interpretations, and other specification; these, however, do not express resonant experience in the same manner as engaged grasping of the groove.

This conception of music can reveal the mechanism through which music may function in radio drama: the radio-body can express its resonant encounter with the dramatic world by musicking the groove of the patterns of its changing modes of direction toward the world, allowing the listener to perceive them as expressions of such resonance through her body. While the generic, sonic, cultural, and referential qualities of the organised sounds that govern *how* the radio-body musicks can vary radically, they can function dramaturgically to allow the radio to listen to itself, as long as they are encountered as tensions and movements in the listener's bodily direction toward the world, rather than as musical pieces.

It should be noted that the functioning of the musical effect relies on a chain of musicking acts. Firstly, the dramaturge musicks her understanding of the radio-body's resonant relationship with the dramatic world during the process of creating the sound structure. The radio-body that results from this process then listens to its own changing relationship to the dramatic world, expressing this to the listener by musicking; she, in turn, musicks with the dramatic world by grasping its groove, experiencing the radio-body's expressions through her own body. Therefore, the success of the dramaturgical process in creating a radio-body that listens to itself depends on a shared cultural and experiential context of musical awareness between the dramaturge and the listener, and also on a degree of musical sensibility and skill on the part of the dramaturge in order to begin the chain of acts that lead to the sharing. A musical dramaturgy, in other words, requires not just cultural knowledge of music and the referential and interpretative connotations of musical works and sound, but an affinity with the act of musicking itself.

Each of the next three subsections explores a case in which the radio-body's mode of musicking is directed toward enabling the listener to grasp the music as specific dramaturgical elements. In each case, I point out that certain attitudes and modes of practice are involved in enabling such an effect to take place. Such practices, I argue, are made possible by a move away from the conventional paradigm.

5.3.1. Musicking background: the case of *The Stroma Sessions*

In this section, I want to argue that by employing a number of dramaturgical techniques, the radio-body can listen to musical sounds in the background in a manner that allows it to listen to itself. To do so, I explore an excerpt from *The Stroma Sessions* (2016), a horror drama series broadcast on BBC Radio 3, presenting a phenomenology of the encounter with its radio-body, and positing that the radio-body musicks the shifts in its encounter with the dramatic world through a structure that puts musical sounds in the background.

Let us begin with a description of the example. *The Stroma Sessions* tells the story of a group of musicians who travel to a remote Scottish island to record an album, encounter mysterious incidents, and gradually become more disturbed. It uses the narrative trope of presenting the drama as a series of 'recovered' sound files from recordings made on the island. The narrator of the play explains that a number of devices have recorded the sounds of various spaces on the island – music studio, cliffside, living quarters – and that what the listener hears is the synchronised juxtaposition of these recordings; as such, many of the dramatic scenes set outside are mixed with the intradiegetic sounds of the music being recorded by the band. The excerpt which this section explores begins at minute 12:10 of Episode 2 of the series and continues until the end of the episode. [57] It depicts the character of 'Riley' as she encounters a strange man on a clifftop. Riley, who is there searching for a friend, notices the man from afar and tries to gain his attention while moving toward him. The man, who becomes increasingly distressed, rejects her attempts at communication with the eerie insistence 'I won't speak to you; you are not there' (Atack 2016: 32) before abruptly jumping from the cliff to Riley's horror.

[57] Appendix A-17.

The entire duration of the scene is accompanied by the sounds of the band practicing, purportedly occurring simultaneously; indeed, the scene is preceded by the orchestra rehearsing, where the characters of musicians Nico and Hilde discuss the tonality of it in the studio:

HILDE
Sam... try modulating up a
Third maybe. Play around. Try
some kind of descant.

And the cello does exactly that.

(Atack 2016: 31)

The diegetic nature of the music is therefore signposted to the listener. Despite this clear signposting, however, when describing my experience of the scene, the music does not feature in it *as* music. When I encounter the radio-body in this scene, it listens to Riley's interactions with the strange man. Should I pause to reflect, I can remind myself of the fact that the music is being generated within the dramatic world, by the orchestra, in a different space, but neither that space, nor the instruments, not the musicians feature in the experience of the drama itself; the radio-body is focused toward the clifftop dialogue and not the source of music. Despite the clear diegetic origin, the music remains firmly in the background of the radio-body's auditory field, and subsequently, in the background of my experience of the dramatic world.

Of course, this description does not mean that the music has no effects simply because I am not aware of it directly; while the music is not a figure in the radio-body's auditory field, it performs an essential function as part of the background of its listening and expression, influencing my perspective on every figure in the field. Should I pause to reflect, and direct my attention away from the dramatic world and toward the tones of the background, I can easily identify parallels between the groove of music and some of the features of my bodily encounter with the dramatic world expressed by the radio-body. My experience of the scene includes a sense of eeriness; for example, the scene opens with Riley mistaking the man for his missing friend, but even as she says '[…] there he is – panic over everyone! (*Calls out*) NIC-O!' (Atack 2016: 32), I am aware that what is occurring is not the solution to Riley's problem, but something out of the ordinary, and perhaps ominous. On reflection,

the screeching, droning background music, with strong similarities to horror film scores which I have experienced in the past, influences this awareness. Furthermore, there is a mounting sense of tension in the scene; this is despite the fact that the pace is relatively slow, the characters are quite calm for most of the duration, and even when the man's mannerisms gradually become stranger, Riley appears oblivious to this for some time. The tension peaks when the man hurls himself down from the cliff, but appears somewhat resolved by the time the man's body lands on the ground below. On reflection, the music does increase in intensity, volume and pitch as the scene moves on, and resonates with my experience of the tension. The music stops abruptly halfway through the man's fall, and the sound of the body crashing on the beach is heard in relative silence. The music in the background, then, is a key component of my experience, despite not being a figure in the radio-body's auditory field.

How then, one might ask, does music perform its function in enabling my particular experience of the scene? As I have noted before, it cannot be understood in terms of semiotics, in that my relationship to it is not one of reflective interpretation. After all, to interpret the music within the broader sign structure of which I am culturally aware, I would first need to be aware of it *as* music; for example, to arrive at the signified 'horror-film eeriness', I would first need to be aware of the signifier of musical drones and screeches – whereas in my description of the experience reveals no such direct awareness: I do not think of horror films and then experience the eeriness; it is there as soon as I experience the scene. Indeed, as the description shows, to be in a position to identify any relationship between the music and the sense of eeriness in the dramatic world, I first need to draw my attention away from the world and toward the music. Interestingly, before the clifftop scene begins, during the rehearsal scene, where I am aware of the music *as* music, the eeriness and mounting tension are not present as clearly in my experience. Furthermore, while I sense the eeriness and the mounting tension, I am by no means aware of them as elements *within* the dramatic world, but as essential, foundational aspects of the totality my experience of it; while I can identify the music as a contributing factor upon reflection, I cannot ascribe specific aspects of my experience to particular features of the music. By virtue of being in the background, the music cannot be regarded as a functional representation of aspects of the dramatic world.

It would also be problematic to describe the music as part of the background 'atmos' of the scene. While the radio-body also listens to the sound of the waves of the stormy sea in the background against which the figures of Riley and the strange man appear, I am aware of the dynamics of its shifting spatial perspective toward the sea: as Riley approaches the man, the sea and the man appear closer and closer to the listening point within the auditory field. Furthermore, I perceive the sea as a part of the dramatic world: as the radio-body listens of the sound of the sea, I am instantly aware of its position within the interconnected totality of my encounter, and its many links to other aspects: Riley, the man, the possibility of drowning, the isolation of the island, etc. The music, however, does not allow me the same perspective in spatial or contextual terms: the music occupies a constant point in the auditory field, regardless of the shifts in the perspective of the radio-body. As it has been noted before, this is despite the fact that on reflection, as it has been signposted by the characters, the music does have a spatial and contextual origin: it arises from the simultaneous recordings of the band. Nevertheless, the radio-body does not listen to it as such when the clifftop scene occurs.

I posit that here, the music is not a part of the dramatic world, but instead the expression of the radio-body listening to itself as it encounters the entirety of the scene; the mounting tension and eeriness are not located within the world, but are part of the quality of the radio-body's – and therefore, my – experience of what occurs. The radio-body does not listen to music *as* music, despite the fact that in the context of the play, the music has a diegetic, worldly source – instead, it is musicking the otherwise-inaudible tensions of its experience of the scene. For example, the radio-body listens to the mounting tension – a non-auditory event – by expressing it through the increasing pitch and volume of the music, so that when I encounter its expression, I perceive the dramatic world as increasingly tense, without being aware that the groove of music in the background is the means through which I experience the increasing tension. The music, in other words, does not *stand for* the quality of the encounter; instead, it *is* the encounter, as experienced by a resonant radio-body. By grasping the groove of music, I grasp the radio-body's grasp of the dramatic world.

It is essential to note that on reflection, the radio-body has to establish a certain auditory relationship with the music in order for me to perceive it as the

expression of it listening to itself, rather than as a piece of music or an element in the dramatic world – in other words, it too has to grasp the groove of music. In the sound structure of the piece, the music is present without breaks throughout the scene, audible but with considerably less volume compared to the voices of Riley and the man, and relatively equal to the sound effects of the sea; in other words, it is part of the asyndeton against which the synecdoche of the dialogue can be heard. This asyndeton is also facilitated by the structure of the music to which the radio-body listens. The musical underscore is relatively stable and does not display melodic complexity: it consists of a bass drone note that remains unaltered and continuous throughout, and a number of high drones that alter tones throughout the scene without becoming a lengthy melody, as the notes are dissonant and arrhythmic, and do not settle into motifs. The pace of the changes in the high drones is relatively slow: only 41 notes occur in the 77-seconds-long scene, which puts the tempo at roughly 32 beats per minute. The music is unaffected by the changes in the radio-body's perspective: while the volumes of the background atmosphere and the voices of Riley and the man change with their movements and the progression of the scene, the music remains relatively constant despite subtle changes in pitch. The reverberation of the music, too, remains constant and low, displaying the acoustic qualities of small spaces rather than the open space in which the radio-body is situated. The music and the dialogue also demonstrate a degree of synchronicity: 37 of the 41 tonal changes occur in the silence between lines of dialogue, meaning that the key musical incidents do not compete with foreground sounds. The music cuts off exactly halfway through the man's fall, meaning that the sound of the crash, too, exists in a rhythmic relationship with the music. [58] Such a relationship between the background music and the events of the scene creates a musical groove that nevertheless does not join the synecdoche and remains in the background. These qualities in the sound structure, created in the process of dramaturgy, enable the radio-body to listen to the music *as* itself rather than as music, which in turn allows me to experience the qualities of its expressed relationship to the dramatic world in the form of the groove.

The example of *The Stroma Sessions* is of particular interest because the music becomes an expression of the radio listening to itself despite its diegetic

[58] This change could also be understood as a change in the radio-body's relationship with the world in reaction to dramatic events; I discuss this effect in 6.3.1.3.

origin; the effect created by the dramaturgical structure detailed above, however, functions equally with musical sounds of an extradiegetic nature. At the other end of the genre spectrum, for example, almost all sketches in the sketch show *Small Scenes* (2013) are accompanied by music, with the radio-body listening to itself through music in the same manner. For instance, in a sketch about a financial advisor facing an assassin, which begins at 4:34 in Series 2 Episode 1, the dialogue is accompanied by a piece of music with a lower volume in comparison with a dialogue. [59] Although fast in pace, the music – which consists of a rhythmic cello beat and a repeating piano motif – shows very little change in pace, beat, and melody, contributing to the effect of asyndeton. The pace of the music is also mirrored by the dialogue, which establishes a musical relationship between the two. In the experience of the piece, I perceive the music not as music, but as part of the radio-body's relationship with the world. Similar background music effects can also be found, among many others, in *Dirk Gently's Holistic Detective Agency* (2008, Episode 1, 2:07), where a telephone conversation appears against the background of a repetitive cello, [60] and throughout *The Tragical Comedy or Comical Tragedy of Mr Punch* (2005), where a melancholy, reverberating piano underlies many scenes. In each case, the music is structured to be non-intrusive, simple, repetitive, continuous, low in volume, and in a musical and rhythmic relationship with the sounds and events of the dramatic world; these qualities allow the music to remain in the background and form part of the expression of the radio-body listening to itself.

The effectiveness of the structural qualities enumerated above becomes apparent once we examine the qualities of musical underscores that are experienced as music, rather than in the background of the dramatic world. For instance, let us examine a case in which the underscore does not occupy the background: the 1992 thriller *Only the Good Die Young.* In Episode 2 of the series, a phone conversation takes place, beginning at 7:06, between a hacker and a hotel receptionist. [61] The scene is accompanied by a piece of electronic music entitled *Pocket Calculator*, by the German band Kraftwerk. As the scene begins, I do indeed encounter music as an underscore; it is lower in volume than the sounds of the phone conversation, and appear to share a rhythmic structure first with the sound

[59] Appendix A-18.
[60] Appendix A-19.
[61] Appendix A-20.

of the phone ringing, and then with the dialogue between the characters. At 7:27, however, as the conversation continues, some drums suddenly enter the musical soundscape at a slightly higher volume, and after a pause in the conversation at 7:33, it becomes the only sound present in the auditory field. As these changes occur, I no longer perceive the music as the background against which the conversation takes place; its volume, dynamics, melodic complexity, and vocals all serve to create the effect of synecdoche, with the result that the music now appears to me *as* music. By the time the conversation resumes at 7:39, the music now competes with the sounds of the foreground, until it is silenced by the conversation as it fades out. This example demonstrates that without the necessary auditory qualities in the sound structure, the music is experienced not as the radio-body listening to itself, but as the radio-body listening to a piece of music.

The creation of a sound structure with such necessary qualities requires certain practical approaches. The music, for example, either needs to be composed specifically to suit different timespans of the dramatic world, depending on the course of the drama, in order to have a musical relationship with the rest of the sounds of the piece; while it would be hypothetically possible to select a pre-recorded piece of music which could establish such a relationship with dialogue and sound effects, those sounds would need to be manipulated skilfully to synchronise with the music. As the texture, tone and effects of the music have a direct bearing on how the radio-body listens to itself in the encounter with the dramatic world, these sounds would also need to have a direct link with dramatic events, contexts, and themes of the world; establishing such links would need to occur both during the process of writing and dramatisation, and in musical composition – indeed, it would be difficult to create the dramaturgical links without blurring the boundaries of the two. As it has been noted before, these requirements would diverge from the standard practices of the semantic paradigm of radio dramaturgy.

Looking at the process behind the production of *The Stroma Sessions,* all of these non-paradigmatic practices can be observed. The piece's writer Timothy X. Atack, himself a musician and sound designer, points out that in his creative process 'for radio, I hear sound-images first, before the words' (Atack n.d). The script for the play is not written in the conventional formatting, and includes descriptions of, and directions for, sounds. For example, the droning music is described thus at the start

of its duration a few scenes before the excerpt explores in this section: "*a wash of see-sawing notes. Weird, woozy, autumnal. Long pause as the music continues, constant like the sea*" (Atack 2016: 25). The description changes throughout the next few scenes as the music continues; by the time the clifftop scene begins, the music '*shifts gear into something properly dark*' (Atack 2016: 30), then '*begins to screech and twist*' (Atack 2016: 31) as the conversation becomes rather strange, and '*twists into a horrible resolution and stops'* (Atack 2016: 31) as the body lands. As the play's producer Nicolas Jackson points out, this unconventional scripting allows for 'building sound direction into the script with [the writer's input] from the very start' (Jackson 2017). This built-in sound direction means that the writing and the composition, far from being isolated processes, are in fact simultaneous, as the events of the dramatic world are linked to the soundscapes against which they occur. Indeed, this blurring of the processes continues in the later stages of the production, as the producer and the sound designer work together with the actors to block according to the envisioned soundscape rather than the script, and then 'work side by side' (Jackson 2017) during the edit, and discuss the soundscapes necessary to achieve the effects required. Jackson further remarks about the precision required in creating the desired effect in music:

> [I]t should be quite hard to distinguish where the line is between music and sound design. They hopefully blend into each other quite a lot. Whether the music is selected or specifically composed for the piece, it still needs to be adapted to the millisecond to fit the space and tone of the scene or moment it's going into.
>
> (Jackson 2017)

This necessity of precision may explain why the process is lengthier than a conventional production; as Jackson himself notes: 'we spend four or five times longer recording, editing and mixing than some BBC in-house productions' (2017). The effects of music described above, then, would not be possible without this shift away from the conventions of the semantic paradigm.

It is also important to note that such a sound structure, created in detailed layers during the meticulous dramaturgical process outlined above, would perhaps not be experienced in the manner I have described above if my listening encounter with the radio-body is subject to interference by auditory intrusion, poor sound quality, or similar factors. For example, while my encounter with the radio-body in

an ideal listening environment allows me to encounter the dialogue against the background of the music, a low-quality playback device with a low bandwidth may blur the sounds together to the extent that the background and the foreground merge, or may lead to the removal of the detail which form part of the rhythmic relationship between the music and other sounds. Furthermore, encountering the radio-body in a noisy environment may lead to the merging of the background music expressed by the radio-body with the background of the listening environment, and thus disrupt the synchronicity of the music and the dramatic world. Thus, the function of music in forming my experience of the scene is made possible not just through the process of dramaturgy which creates the radio-body that listens to it, but the new technology that allows me to encounter it with minimal interference: digital distribution, and headphones. Indeed, the producer concurs:

> Listening with headphones wins every time over speakers […] Headphones obviously tend to capture movement, nuance and sonic detail much better. The more detail you create the more you are interested in the listener being able to hear it […] We try to make it really sonically layered and detailed although it's true that if you then listen to it on tinny speakers, in mono, with cheap headphones, in an old car with one broken speaker and lots of engine noise, you are going to miss most of the detail we put in.
>
> (Jackson 2017)

Thus, through changes in the process of dramaturgy, and with the aid of changing listening conditions, it is possible to create a sound structure through which the radio-body listens to the changing stances of its experience of the world through background music. In the next section, I make similar arguments about how music can express the experience of movement in the dramatic world.

5.3.2. Musicking movement: the case of *The Trial of Superman*

While the musical accompaniment discussed in the previous section appears as part of the background, examples can be observed of music occurring in the auditory field, where it is encountered by the radio-body not as music, but as the expression of the radio-body's relationship with movement occurring in the dramatic world. In this section, I explore an excerpt from *The Trial of Superman* (1988), an hour-long BBC Radio 1 docu-drama feature based on the long-running comic book superhero, in order to argue that through a particular set of non-

conventional dramaturgical processes, the radio-body can listen to music as movement.

The Trial of Superman tells the Superman mythos through the narrative trope of a trial in which real-life contributors to the comic book participate, in the form of interviews, along with fictional characters from the dramatic world. In a parallel narrative, Superman himself reflects on his past and origins in the form of flashbacks accompanied by a voice-over. The excerpt under analysis in this section is taken from one such flashback, beginning at 21:02, where Superman recalls his first experience of flight:

SUPERMAN:	What kind of perfect child finds himself hopping over a gate, only to gain altitude 'til the whole of Smallville is spread thousand feet beneath?
(FX:	SWOOSHES FROM ONE SIDE TO ANOTHER).
(ATMOS:	WIND BLOWING).
(GRAMS:	ORCHESTRAL MUSIC SWELLS). [62]

Nonetheless, my experience of this scene, features neither the swooshes nor the music, despite the fact that I can easily identify them in reflection when transcribing the excerpt. When I listen to the scene, I instead experience what Superman is describing: he jumps over a gate, and then suddenly lifts off and flies into the skies, moving from one direction to the other. I encounter the jump with particular clarity, and am aware of a sudden movement occurring within the dramatic world, and a fundamental change in the perspective of the radio-body toward it. Should I pause to reflect, I recognise the moment of sudden lift-off at 21:11 as the exact moment that Superman falls silent, and the crescendo in the background music, which has been present and increasing in volume since the beginning of the voice-over, peaks and gives way to a fanfare-like brass melody with a volume equal to Superman's voice which no longer occurs in the background; it remains as the key sound figure for two seconds before returning to the

[62] Appendix A-21.

background, as the swooshes and the howls of the wind appear. My recognition of this, however, requires me to direct my experience at the structure of the piece of music, and away from the dramatic world perceived and expressed by the radio-body. The radio-body, then, does not listen to music *as* music.

What then, one might ask, is the function of the music? Following the previous section, it does not function as an object of interpretation based on my contextual awareness of genres and styles of music, as it does not appear to me *as* music. Furthermore, it would be problematic to understand it as a representative of, or a metaphor for, Superman jumping and flying. After all, although the music can indeed be observed to have parallels with the acts of jump and flight – for example, the increase in volume and pitch could be said to mirror the ascent of the body – listening to the piece of music itself, outside my perspective toward the dramatic world, will not lead to a perceptual encounter with Superman in flight, although I may be able to interpret it as such reflectively. Furthermore, the radio-body's– and therefore, my – perspective toward the flying object within the dramatic world does not extend to the music: when Superman flies, the radio-body and I listen to him from a relatively static perspective as he moves against the wind, and flies from the left to the right and then back again. The music, however, does not occur within this spatial relationship, even during the two seconds when it is occupying the foreground of the auditory field – it remains completely static. In other words, the music itself does not move, even though I perceive movement in the figure of Superman.

Yet, the music seems to be a key component of the expression of the radio-body's perception, and an essential element in making my experience of the movements of Superman's flight possible; although the dialogue and the sound effects of wind and swooshes are of equal importance, my experience of the piece may not be the same without the musical accompaniment. This can be observed, for example, in a relatively similar scene in the Invisible Theatre Company's production of *I Can See My House from Here* (2013). The play concerns an elderly couple on a skydive, and features a moment – beginning at 2:04 – involving an equally sudden movement when the couple jump out of the airplane. [63] The movement is signposted through dialogue as the character screams 'Happy anniversaryyyyyyyy' (Patel

[63] Appendix A-22.

2013: 2) during the jump, and the wind swooshes in a manner similar to *The Trial of Superman* while the sound of the airplane fades away. Despite this, my experience of this scene does not feature the experience of movement which characterised the encounter with Superman's flight; while I am aware that the spatial configuration involving the character, the space, and the listening point has changed, I experience all of these as new positions rather than ongoing movements: the woman appears not as falling, but as static within the wind. The music in the Superman scene, which is the key difference between the sound structures of the two pieces, could be said to be essential in creating the effect of movement absent from the skydive scene.

I posit that the music in this scene functions as an expression of the radio-body listening to itself as it encounters Superman's movement; the act of flight changes not just elements in the dramatic world – for example, movement in space, objects, and perspective – but the state of the radio-body and its perceptual relationship to the totality of the dramatic world as the flight resonates with it, and the radio-body expresses this by musicking it: shifts in the intensity, consistency and rhythm of the radio-body's relationship with the world appear in the auditory field in the form of shifts in the intensity, consistency and rhythm of the music, meaning that as I encounter the radio-body's expression of its perception, I perceive the shifts in its relationship to the world as Superman moves. The music, then, is neither a sign nor a metaphor for the movement: it *is* the movement as encountered by the resonant radio-body. By grasping the groove of the music, I grasp the radio-body's changing states.

Much like in the previous section, here too it can be observed that the sound-structure of the radio-play is devised to establish a specific auditory relationship between the music, the radio-body, and the other elements of the scene, to enable the radio-body to listen to itself experiencing the movement, and music the groove that I grasp in the encounter. As the scene begins and Superman begins to speak, the music which had accompanied previous scenes – a brass drone in the background, similar to the examples discussed in the previous scene – gives way to a higher pitched tremolo, which gradually builds up with the addition of woodwind cascades as it increases in volume. The entrance and build-up of the music occur in synchronicity with the rest of the sounds; the music does not begin before or with the dialogue, but immediately with the words that narrate the beginning of the

actions: the music from the previous scene continues under the words "what kind of perfect child", and the music enters at very low volume with the words "finds himself hopping". The music is higher in volume compared to the sounds of the background, but does not compete or distort the sounds of speech, wind, and swoosh effects. At its peak, the music changes structure completely: the cascade gives way to a dominant, slow brass section and percussion beats, rhythmically synchronised with the swooshes. The music the gradually becomes slower and lower as the sound of winds increase, before giving way to the cello ensemble that underlies the next scene. The music, then, consists of two sections with differing rhythms, linked by a climactic moment, with distinct moments of entrance, build-up, climax and exit occurring in synchronicity with the other sounds within the structure; in other words, it is structured according to the unfolding of the dramatic world. In this way, the radio-body is able to listen to itself through the music, which in turn enables me to encounter its reaction to the movement as I grasp the groove of its expressed perception of the dramatic world.

Musical structures with similar qualities can be found in many other pieces of radio drama, expressing movements; a few instances of these can be explored in brief here. One example can be observed in the comedy adventure *Scarifyers: The Curse of the Black Comet* (2009), in a scene occurring at 1:40:10, where the character of Lionheart aims to use a catapult to throw gelignite at a hovering spaceship while standing in a wooden raft on the sea. [64] The music – a fact-paced staccato of woodwind and ensemble – begins relatively loudly at the exact moment that the scene begins, settles into the background, and approximates the rhythm of the footsteps of Lionheart as he rotates to throw; the music then stops noticeably on the beat, in sync with the throw, leaving the background sound of the sea waves. Here, too, the radio-body listens to the music as its encounter with the movement; subsequently, as I encounter the piece, my experience is of Lionheart's movement as he gears up, throws, and then stops to await the income. Similar structures can be found in *Batman: Knightfall* (1994) – incidentally, also created by Dirk Maggs, the producer of *The Trial of Superman* – where the final scene of Episode 3 presents a lengthy fight between Batman and the supervillain Bane, accompanied by four different peaks in the musical accompaniment, and in Episode 4 of Series 5 of BBC

[64] Appendix A-23.

detective drama *Stone* (2015), where a chase scene beginning 39:25 is accompanied from beginning to end by repetitive electronic music, [65] or many similar examples. In each case, the music has a pronounced beginning and end, occurring in sync with the movement and with a volume higher than the background atmosphere, allowing the radio-body to listen to itself through it and express its resonant encounter with the world for my perception.

The significance of these structural qualities becomes apparent once we examine an example in which they are absent. Such an example can be found, for instance, in Episode 4 of the online drama *The Flickerman* (2009), a conspiracy thriller accompanied by links to images on the internet imaging service Flickr. [66] Beginning at 16:53, the character of Cornelius and his acquaintance Travis are chased by two strangers in a two-minute section which is accompanied by fast-paced electronic music throughout. In this scene, the music is not entirely synchronised with the occurrence of the movement: it keeps to the same beat, intensity, and melodic tone with a high degree of consistency throughout the different movements occurring in the scene. For example, Cornelius jumps onto a train at 17:59, and jumps off as the train slows down at 18:24, all the while accompanied by a musical track that keeps the same pace and volume. A moment of relative decrease in intensity occurs as Cornelius says: "I'm running again", while a gradual increase peaking at a complex and pronounced drum break and an expansion in the tone of the music occurs at 18:46 but does not accompany any new events in the dramatic world; the break arrives during the relatively insignificant line "I see that the wall is on an island, surrounded with water", and peaks and subsides as the sentence continues naturally and without any interruption or synchronicity: "and standing next to two huge concrete dishes". The music also begins slightly earlier than the action – after Cornelius' warning for Travis to run, but one second before Travis himself says 'we begin to run'. Furthermore, the music track has a much lower volume than all of the sounds present in the auditory field, to the extent that its sound are obscured at 18:12 by the sounds of the wind and the narrator. These structural features create a relationship with the music and the radio-body that is different from the examples outline above, meaning that when I experience the scene, the music remains rather detached from my experience of the

[65] Appendix A-24
[66] Appendix A-25.

events in the dramatic world, and at times even appears to me *as* music; in other words, I cannot grasp the groove of the dramatic world due to the structure of the music: should I grasp the groove of music, my grasp of the dramatic world is lost. The criteria of dramatic and musical synchronicity and sufficient volume, then, are important in creating the radio-body's ability to listen to its resonant encounter with movement through musicking.

The dramaturgical processes through which such dynamic sound structures are created would also necessarily need to diverge from standard practice. The music would need to be composed specifically, or chosen and edited with care for details, to match the groove of the scene, and to express the specific dramaturgical shifts required for any given dramatic situation. The creation of a radio-body that musicks its encounter with the world is also not a simple mechanical, mathematical and analytical act: the process of dramaturgy, too, requires an act of musicking: the changing patterns and grooves of movement within the dramatic world need to be explored according to dramaturgical requirement, and then affirmed and expressed through the organisation of musical sounds. The roles involved in the process of matching music to drama – writers, producers, actors and composers – therefore require a degree of co-ordination or integration; the composer, for example, needs to be aware of the nuances of the scene's groove in order to be able to music the movement, while the actors may require to know more about the eventual sound of the scene so that they can navigate its rhythmic nuances. This integration and reliance on through-composition is at odds with the semantic paradigm.

The Trial of Superman is an early but nevertheless characteristic example of the works of Dirk Maggs, whose long career – with highlights such as three series of *The Hitch-hiker's Guide to the Galaxy* (BBC R4, 2004-5), *Dirk Gently's Holistic Detective Agency* (BBC R4, 2007), and *Aliens: Out of Shadows* (Audible Studios, 2016) – is characterised by a move away from the semantic paradigm. Maggs' distinctive style of dramaturgy, which he labels 'audio movies' (Hunt 2013) due to their grand scales of production, often uses music as a tool to allow the radio-body to listen to itself; in particular, as mentioned above, his comic book adaptations – *Batman: Knightfall* (1994), *The Adventures of Spider-Man* (1995) and *Superman: Doomsday and Beyond* (1993) – frequently use musical sounds to express movement. Maggs' move away from semantic sound structures is also mirrored by a shift away from

paradigmatic practices. The processes of writing and production are not separate: while Maggs has produced conventional works written by others – such as the Marx Brothers remake *Flywheel, Shyster and Flywheel* – those that fit into the "audio movie" category are both written – or adapted – and produced by him. Asked which role he prefers, he points out: 'I like "writer-director". Before I can direct, I like to write, because then I've got a handle on it. If I can adapt something, I know I can make it sound good' (Hunt 2013); in other words, the integration of the processes of creating the script and the sonic structure opens the space for better orchestration of dramaturgy. Maggs's style of mixing also differs in the volume ratio between voices and other sounds: as he points out, when producing conventional pieces, 'the mix is more conservative with speech: a good 3 [decibels] higher relative to speech' (Power 2005) than more stylistic "audio movies"; the careful manipulation of volume of music and sound effects in the latter is, as pointed out, necessary for the representation of movement through music. His approach to the mix is much more elaborate than conventional techniques. He critiques traditional drama studios at the BBC for their attitude toward sound, pointing out that because the props, Foley objects and spaces are 'prepared for you, and because of such a short schedule […] if there's a kitchen scene, you do it in the kitchen area, which means that all the kitchen scenes in all the plays going out on BBC radio drama sound like the same kitchen' (Greenhalgh 2013). Instead, he approaches dramaturgy from a detailed and sonically-focused perspective; he narrates, for example, that when producing *The Trial of Superman*:

> I realised halfway through that I'd made a rod for my own back, because it had to sound like that all the way through. Cloth rustling, objects on desks, the Foley track, the background noise, then the music... And I thought "this is going to sound great, but it's going to be a slow business". I was right, but it sounded exactly the way I wanted to sound (Hunt 2013).

Also, importantly for the purposes of this section, Maggs is a musician himself; in response to the question of what inspires him, he points to 'music. Every time, music. I am a drummer, it's an immediate connection with your emotions' (Fortune 2013). As argued previously, the dramaturge's process of creating the musical expression of movement is in fact an act of musicking, and having the experience of establishing the feel of grooves in other contexts – a function notably associated with the drums in many genres – can assist in finding the right modes of musical expression for specific movements. Through a convergence of these practices, Maggs' personal style is able to utilise music to create radio-bodies that listen to themselves.

The practices outlined above are made possible through technological shifts, in both production and reception. Maggs himself points out that when he began working on *Superman*, the reel-to-reel tape used for BBC productions 'was never built to be that cutting edge' (Hunt 2013), and that it was rather difficult to create the layered complexities and nuances required for the desired expressive structures – indeed, he reminisces about having to take the tape editing machine home to continue editing (Greenhalgh 2013). The sonic range of the BBC's equipment, too, was rather problematic; Maggs narrates that 'I [was] trying to make subwoofers happen, […] [but] we didn't really have such a thing in those days, so we were really trying to cheat the gear into giving us responses we didn't have' (Greenhalgh 2013). It is perhaps for these reasons that Maggs has pioneered the use of Surround Sound and digital audio workstations in radio production. Early in 1993, while planning to produce the third series of *The Hitch-hiker's Guide to the Galaxy*, he requested 'to use Macintosh-based digital sound editing and Dolby Pro Logic Surround Sound' (Maggs 2005), even though very few listeners at the time had access to equipment that could play this. I shall discuss digital production in the next section; here, I want to emphasise the fact that using technologies such as surround sound, high fidelity digital recording and reproduction, and other tools that enable a more focused mode of listening allows for a better grasp of the movement expressed in music.

After all, if the groove of music lies in the nuances of the organisation of sound, then such technologies, by allowing the listener to experience a wider range of nuances with less chance of interference, make the movement of music easier to grasp. The contrast of this approach to the paradigmatic conditions of listening manifests itself, for instance, in the BBC's concern that the use of new technologies might mean that, in Maggs' words, 'grannies in Orkney would not be able to hear the words' (Maggs 2005) – that is, that older technologies may not be able to handle new modes of listening. Maggs himself believes that even his analogue work is more accessible through digital technology, where 'you can get the full quality we built in so long ago. And hear some of the dodgier edits more clearly' (Power 2005), implying that the nuances are more accessible through new technologies. By gearing the work toward such listening conditions, then, Maggs is able to constructs a radio-body that listens to itself though music.

Overall, Magg's style of dramaturgy, channelled through appropriate technologies, enable the listener to experience the musicking of the radio-body as an expression of movement within the dramatic world. In the next section, I explore another piece by Maggs, in which the radio-body listens to music to react to the dramatic world; this effect, I argue, is achieved through a musicking involving both conventional musical instruments and non-musical elements of the dramatic world.

5.3.3. Musicking reaction: the case of *Dirk Gently's Holistic Detective Agency*

Whereas the previous section explored music as an expression of dynamic movement that occur physically within the dramatic world, a similar but distinct effect can also occur where the radio-body musicks its reaction to events that *move* it, in the metaphorical sense of the word: important moments, actions, revelations and so on that affect the radio-body can also be musicked. To explore this, in this section, I examine a moment form another of Dirk Maggs' works, the six-episode adaptation of Douglas Adams *Dirk Gently's Holistic Detective Agency* (2007), arguing that the producer's approach to practice – already explored previously – can produce the effect described.

The opening scene of the first episode of *Dirk Gently's*… occurs on pre-historic earth, where a robot – an e*lectric monk*, whose main task within the world of the story is to believe and reassure its owners – is performing repairs on the

exterior of a spaceship, communicating throughout with the chief engineer on the inside; the monk assures the engineer that the ship is fine, despite the fact that a computerised voice is repeatedly declaring that the systems are overloading. The first minute of the scene, occurring outside, is underscored with a low, simple, and repetitive harp melody in the background, creating the effect described in Section 5.3.1. When the monk returns to the interior of the spaceship at 1:07, however, the soundscape changes, as this transcript of the next 30 seconds shows:

(ATMOS [1:15]	A SWOOSH OF WHITE NOISE, SLOWLY INCREASING IN VOLUME, CONTINUING THROUGHOUT THE SCENE).
(GRAMS	HARP MUSIC CONTINUES.)
ENGINEER [1:16]	(Begins to speak in an alien language, rhythmically and in monotone, as if counting down. This continues until 1:19).
COMPUTER [1:16]	OVERLOAD. OVERLOAD.
(F/X [1:19]	A SERIES OF RHYTHMIC DOUBLE BEEPS, CONTINUING UNTIL 1:25).
ENGINEER [1:20]	(One final alien word).
(GRAMS	MUSIC STOPS.)
COMPUTER [1:21]	OVERLOAD. OVERLOAD. OVERLOAD. OVERLOAD.
(ATMOS [1:21]	THE WHITE NOISE BEGINS TO INCREASE IN PITCH. THE INCREASE IN VOLUME ALSO GATHERS SPEED. THIS CONTINUES UNTIL 1:25).
(ATMOS [1:25]	ALL SOUNDS FALLS SILENT).
COMPUTER [1:25]	OVERLOAD.
(F/X [1:26]	ONE LAST DOUBLE BEEP).

(F/X [1:26] A MASSIVE EXPLOSION, WITH FALLING DEBRIS).

(F/X [1:34] A LONG, UNEARTHLY SCREAM).

(GRAMS [1:41] TITLE MUSIC BEGINS). [67]

The experience of this scene, of course, is not of these individual elements, but of the holistic world expressed by the radio-body created through them. When I encounter this short scene, I become aware of mounting tensions: first, the suspense as the countdown begins, and then, when the alarm begins to beep, the anticipation of something approaching, although I am yet unaware of what it might be. This is later revealed to be the explosion, in a moment that seems emphatic: the explosion is not simply heard; instead, I brace myself for it, and am still taken aback by its force. I experience all of these sounds and attitudes as a whole, without directing my attention toward the auditory structure itself. When the white noise swoosh begins to pick up speed and pitch, for example, my experience is not of the sonic qualities of the sound, or of its musical properties – I simply perceive it as part of the holistic fabric of the scene.

Still, should I pause to reflect analytically, it can be observed the way that the sounds of the scene are organised has a direct bearing on what I perceive. The mounting tensions of the scene are mirrored by its soundscape: as the scene builds up, more sounds enter the auditory field, and the ones already present increase in volume, pitch, and frequency. The white noise swoosh begins to increase in pitch just as I become aware of the alarm and begin to anticipate an outcome, and stops at the exact moment that I brace myself for the explosion, allowing for a few moments of relative quiet, which creates a contrast with the loudness of the explosion, pushing it into the foreground of the auditory field. The beeps of the alarm also appear during both the period of increasing tension and the moment of quiet, while the systems warning is also repeated more as the tension rises. During the moment of bracing, these two last sounds continue as before, meaning that they remain somewhat in the background of the auditory field, leaving the foreground rather empty and quiet – in fact, it could be argued that silence is the key figure of this auditory field. This could be said to mirror the inactive, anticipatory quality of

[67] Appendix A-26.

the bodily act of bracing oneself. The sonic structure of the scene, then, demonstrates certain parallels with my experience of the scene.

Once more, it should be noted that the parallels outlined above do not function as representations. To interpret the swoosh as a sign of mounting tensions, for example, I would first need to direct my perception toward it, whereas my description of the experience does not feature such a mode of attention; instead, I experience the sound as part of my holistic encounter with the scene – indeed, it remains chiefly in the background. Furthermore, it would be difficult to draw a representational link between the sound and the experience of increasing tensions: in the cultural context of my experience, the same sound could also easily be manipulated to represent a siren, or the wind blowing in the trees, or a kettle boiling, or music in the Jungle genre. Also, while the individual sounds in my auditory field do demonstrate similarities to my experience of mounting tensions and bracing, the experience itself cannot be described in terms of changes in the individual elements of the world toward which I have a perspective; instead, it arises from the shifts in the totality of the perspective itself. For example, while the auditory field becomes relatively quiet during the bracing moment, I do not necessarily perceive this as the actual sounds in the dramatic world falling silent, but as a general quality of my bodily relationship to the totality of the dramatic world. It is not the elements of the scene within my perspective that anticipate the explosion and braces itself for it, but my perception of it as a whole.

How, then, does the sonic structure of the scene enable my experience as described? Here, I posit that my anticipation and bracing are the result of the radio-body musicking its reactions to the developments within the dramatic world. It is the radio-body that becomes aware of the rising tensions, and braces itself for the explosion; at each juncture, it listens to its own shifting stances toward the dramatic world, expressing it through an act of musicking. The organisation of the sounds of the scene, while not necessarily musical in a conventional sense, nevertheless *musicks*, allowing the radio-body to express its reaction to the events in the dramatic world, which I then perceive by grasping the changing feel of the groove of the scene.

There are a two points to unpick regarding this position. Firstly, let us distinguish the effect of musicking reaction from the previously-discussed effect of musicking movement. In the examples explored in the previous section, while the

radio-body is expressing its shifting relationships through music, those relationships are nevertheless directed toward elements in the perceptual field of the dramatic world: the music serves to express the radio-body's experience of movements within its perceptual field, and the listener's experience is therefore of those elements moving in certain ways – in the examples of the previous scene, the moving objects are Superman, Lionheart, Batman, and Stone, rather than the holistic totality of the world. On the other hand, the reaction effect as observed in the example of *Dirk Gently's…* does not occur in the dramatic world, but in the radio-body's stance toward it; unlike the movements of Superman's flight, the building tensions in the spaceship scene are present in the radio-body's perception of the world, rather than within the world itself: the people in the scene do not anticipate the explosion. Hence, the nature of the reaction is governed not simply by the elements of the dramatic world, but according to those events that draw the radio-body's attention and elicit its response. After all, as discussed in Section 2.5. the radio-body is actively engaged with the dramatic world with the concern of listening to specific people, incidents, and narratives; therefore, the radio's stance toward the world can change significantly with any new development in its engagement, even if such a development does not occur in space, time, or between the figures of the perceptual field. The reaction effect, then, is both dependent upon, and expressive of, moments of concern for the radio-body, which in turn means that the dramaturge can emphasise the importance of any moment, by allowing the radio-body to music in response to them, expressing a range of reactions limited only by what can be musicked.

The second point to unpick is that the scene contains little of the sounds that are traditionally recognised as music. After the harp in the background stops early in the scene, out of the sounds present, only the white noise can be considered as fitting within the cultural lexicon of (electronic) music, and even so, it may be too brief and simple to be understood as a musical composition, rather than a mere sound effect; furthermore, it could easily be perceived as part of the mechanism of the spaceship. Yet, the radio-body in the scene still can be understood as engaging in a process of musicking. Of course, in the modern and contemporary era, and with the advent of new technologies and auditory the definition of music has moved away from its traditional understanding of sonorous, aesthetically-pleasant sounds created with recognised instruments, and embraced new modes of composition,

instrumentation, and production, leading to a wider understanding of what is and is not musical. Exploring this in depth would require an extensive dive into the history of 20th century music, which is outside the remit of this section. A brief detour through the ideas of Pierre Schaeffer (2012), however, may help clarify the issue of musicality in the scene. Schaeffer, a composer and theorist active in the post-war era, argues that Western musical practice generally begins by composing a series of abstract relationships between sounds – pitch, timing, source, and so on; the composition then becomes the basis on which the musical work is created. Through both theorisation and practical experiments, and by engaging with new technologies of the day – tape loops, synthesisers, and electronic effects – Schaeffer proposes an alternative to this abstract method, which he names *concrete music*, which he defines as the form of musical composition that depends 'no longer on preconceived sound abstractions, but on sound fragments that exist in reality and are considered as discrete and complete sound objects' (2012: 14). Such sounds, he argues, can still have the same types of relationships that are present in the abstract sound formations of traditional music: a concrete music constructed out of sound-objects – be they clean or altered recordings, noises, notes, and so on – can still create rhythm, pitch, melody, harmony, dissonance, dynamics and so forth; indeed, this is why a concrete music is possible. Following Schaeffer, then, the fact that the radio-body musicks in the exemplary scene of this section is determined by whether its sound-objects establish musical relationships with each other, rather than by assessing whether they can be recognised culturally as a piece of musical composition. This, of course, is not to say that the example explored here *is* concrete music – after all, as I have emphasised, it is not heard *as* music – but that it constitutes a form of musicking. It should also be emphasised musicality of non-musical sounds is not limited to the radio-body's expression of reaction; the radio-body can use the musicality of concrete sound objects to express movement or to express the background of the world. Conversely, as mentioned further in this section, the radio-body can musick its reactions through sounds traditionally identified as musical. The fact that the idea of concrete music is explored here emanates solely from the fact that is can be observed clearly in this particular case study.

To allow the radio-body to listen to itself by musicking the scene, the sound structure of the drama has to establish certain relationships between its elements –

in other words, to grasp the groove of the world. The opening of *Dirk Gently's...* manifests such a structure. The scene can be divided into three different formations of musical relationships: in the first phase, spanning 1:15 to 1:21, the harp music is constant and in the background, along with the 'atmos' of the spaceship; the white noise gradually increases in volume, but is still relatively low compared to the sound of the countdown. The warning is repeated twice, but with no particular rhythmic or tonal relationship with the other sound elements; indeed, it has been present throughout the previous scene at irregular intervals. The countdown, although rhythmic, is also not synchronised with either the increasing volume of the white noise, or the notes of the harp. The elements of the scene, then, have not yet established a clear groove. These relationships change when the alarm effect begins, leading to the second phase, which occurs at 1:21 to 1:26: the alarm's beep occur at regular intervals with a constant speed of 60 beats per minute, establishing a rhythm. The harp falls silent, leaving the beep as the base pulse of the scene. The final number of the countdown occurs at the exact point between the two beats of the beep, thereby adhering to the beat of the pulse. When the warning resumes, the word 'OVERLOAD' is repeated constantly and at equal intervals, building up a rhythm of approximately 120 beats per minute, which is synchronised to the base pulse of the beep, occurring at half-beat intervals, contributing to the groove. The white noise then builds up, its increase in pitch gathering speed through a flange effect. The increase is noticeable within the timescale of the section and in relation to the building rhythm: while during the initial five seconds of the scene, the noise has gradually increased in pitch by about one semitone, the next five seconds see an increase of seven semitones. The third phase lasts about one second, beginning at 1:26, and is characterised by a sudden fall in the white noise, occurring on the beat of the pulse. The rhythm continues, but the sudden change in the background creates a new nuance in its feel; the groove holds still for a moment, creating a break, while the main pulse continues. The final beat of the beep is slightly louder than what precedes, and is followed by a fraction of a second where the auditory field is empty. Then, on the next beat, the explosion occurs, concluding and breaking the rhythm of the groove with a series of irregular debris sounds and a slowly-subsiding bass note. The three phases correspond with my experience of the scene: I feel tensions rising and increasing, and I brace myself for what follows, before the tension is resolved. Furthermore, each phase also occurs at key moment during the

dramatic events of the scene: the relative calm of the first phase transforms into the building groove of the second just as the alarm begins to ring, and the third section occurs just before the resulting explosion. The musicality of the relationship between the elements, then, allows the radio-body to express its changing relationship to the dramatic world in reaction to the events through different phases of musicking.

The opening scene of *Dirk Gently's...* is of course by no means the only example of the radio-body musicking its reaction to the dramatic world. Various instances of such an effect can be found in a number of moments in radio productions, using a variety of musical sounds. Further on in the same episode of *Dirk Gently's...* at 6:42, one of the main characters in the story, Richard Macduff, encounters a silent figure on the road while driving, pauses to inquire about the situation, and drives away when he does not receive a response. [68] Macduff in unaware that the figure he has just encountered is the Electric Monk from the opening scene, but the radio-body reacts to this otherwise innocuous scene with two short piano melodies, bracketing Macduff's lines as whether the figure is okay; the music can then be experienced not as music, but as the radio-body's changing relationship to the world as the Electric Monk is encountered within it. Similar effects can be observed in various pieces by Maggs; for example, a mix of orchestral bass and a rhythmically-rattling door in *Neverwhere* (2013, Episode 4, 20:48) create an anticipation which ends with the door opening. [69] The radio-body in Jack Thorne-penned *People Snogging in Public Places* (2009, 19:01) goes as far as to musick its reaction to a family fight with a rendition of *There's No One Quite Like Grandma*, which establishes a groove that lies in relative dissonance with the sounds of kicks, screams, and plates breaking – the nonchalant reaction of the radio-body contrasting the tensions in the scene. [70] In each of these cases, too, the sounds of the scene are structured in order to establish integrative rhythmic, tonal, and musical relationships, however brief, between the sonic elements, to musick a certain dramaturgical reaction.

The importance of such an integration becomes apparent if we examine a case where this does not materialise. A scene in the first episode of BBC's adaptation

[68] Appendix A-27.
[69] Appendix A-28.
[70] Appendix A-29.

of *The Kraken Wakes* (2016) is one such example. [71] The play, which was recorded in front of a live audience, is underscored throughout with a specially-composed orchestral music track. The scene occurs halfway through the play, and is set on board a ship on a mission to investigate strange phenomena occurring in the Mariana Trench; a submarine vessel, which has been lowered from the ship using cables and chains, has encountered a mysterious being before falling silent, and the chain is now being pulled up. As the characters question why the cables appears easy to pull, the orchestra begins to play a brief musical interlude as the background atmos fades out; this begins with a xylophone drone (at 29:33), rather resembling the sound of the chains being pulled, quickly followed by a few beats of timpani (at 29:36), and then developing into a powerful crescendo of a decreasing scale of brass, strings, which are later joined by percussions at the peak (at 29:41). This ends with a soft timpani stroke and a violin hum (at 229:43), as the atmos effect fades back in. Finally, as the orchestra shifts to a cello hum, the chains loudly fall down on board: the cable has been cut and the vessel has disappeared. Although this moment is of key dramatic significance to the radio-body, however, my experience of it is not of the radio-body's changing bodily relationship with the dramatic world at it reacts, but of the piece of music itself. The sound structure of the play can reveal some clues about this: the piece of music shows little integration with the elements of the scene. As noted, the background sounds fade out as the music begins – a fact that shifts the radio-body's auditory perspective away from the dramatic world and toward the music itself. The intensity of the interlude is also rather out of tune with the rest of the scene; the relative quiet of the on-board atmos gives way to a loud and intense cascade within three seconds. The groove of the music is rather difficult to grasp, as it presents three different changes in tempo and beat within the short length of time. Most importantly, the third phase of the musical interlude slows down and return to a normal pace before the critical dramatic incident of the chains landing on the ships' board, meaning that the key event to which the radio-body is reacting is not part of the musical relationship. These structural features mean that although the radio-body of the scene listens to the orchestral music, it does not itself musick with it; the interlude is thus perceived by the listener as a piece of music, rather than as an expression of perceptual bodily shifts in the radio-body's direction toward the

[71] Appendix A-30.

world. The integration of musicking sounds and the elements of the dramatic world, then, is key in achieving a reacting radio-body.

Creating a sound structure of this kind, of course, demands certain practical approaches which go beyond the conventions of the semantic paradigm. The various musical arrangements, progressions, and juxtapositions of rhythm, tonality, and groove must be maintained through a careful process of sonic organisation, in order to integrate the elements of the scene and sustain its musicking. This means that the process of producing and mixing the sounds of the drama occurs at the level of grooves, beats, textures, and volumes, rather than focusing merely on the structuring of sound elements such as voices and effects; in other words, it involves composition in addition to editing. Consequently, a higher level of attention to sonic details is required in directing the voices, recording and producing the effects, and creating or curating the music, to ensure that they can be integrated to create a reacting radio-body. As the reaction effect relies solely on dramaturgical necessity, in that the radio-body can react in any number of ways to the events of the dramatic world, limited only by the dramaturge's creative choices, the decision to music a reaction may need to be considered and built in at the writing stage, meaning that, once again, there has to be a degree of integration between the different creative processes. By shifting away from the semantic paradigm of dramaturgy, then, the radio-body can musick its reactions to the dramatic world.

In the previous section, I discussed how Dirk Maggs' style of dramaturgy allows for a more musical radio-body to be created; the practices and approaches outlined there in relation to movement in *The Trial of Superman* are equally applicable to the reaction effect in the case of *Dirk Gently's...* One key difference between the dramaturgy of the two pieces is that the latter has been edited digitally. Digital editing interfaces of course have the advantage of facilitating and speeding the process of editing, allowing the dramaturge more time to create elaborate sound layers, textures and structures. I posit, however, that the difference made by such technologies is significant far beyond the ease and pace of production; digital editing is not simply an improvement upon old models, but that it instead offers practitioners a radically new way of creating sound structures that engage in musicking. Unlike its two preceding dominant modes of producing the sound structure of radio drama, analogue tape editing and live performance, digital editing

allows for a non-linear process. Whereas a linear mode of editing would require the dramaturge to first decide on a sound structure, and then enact and actualise it, either by playing and splicing recorded tapes together, or by directing the performers and studio assistants, through digital technology, the producer is able to move within the timeline of the structure at will, and crucially, to create and change it while listening to it simultaneously; she can add or remove voices, sound effects, musical melodies and rhythms, and other sounds with immediate effect, and alter the timing relationships, relative volumes, sonic qualities, and spatial properties of elements. Such actions are performed not indirectly through abstraction, conceptualisation, and subsequent execution or communication as in the case of linear modes of production, but via immediate bodily engagement with the sounds of the dramatic world, using the digital interface. The producer, in other words, engages with the sound structure in the same manner as that of a musician approaching a musical instrument, rather than as a composer envisioning musical abstractions yet to be realised; she is thus able to improvise with the dramatic world as it unfolds and appears to her simultaneously. Non-linear editing technology, then, allows the dramaturge to musick with the dramatic world through her own body's musical sensibility, opening up a much wider variety of possibilities in the organisation of the sounds appearing to the radio-body. The new technologies of radio production, one can thus conclude, enable the creation of a radio-body that listens to itself musically.

The radio-body's modes of listening to itself through music are, of course, not limited to the musicking of background, movements, and reactions; the aim here is not to outline all possible uses of music, but to present exemplars. Any process of dramaturgy may, through experimenting with modes of musicking, create effects that can express a myriad of other possible shifts in relationship between the radio-body and its dramatic world. The point of the three case studies presented here is that a shift away from the practices of the semantic paradigm and toward more integrated and sonically-minded modes of dramaturgy is a key condition for the discovery, realisation, and conceptualisation of such resonant effects. Through changes in modes of practice, and by utilising new technologies of production and listening, the dramaturgical possibilities of the radio-body listening to itself through music can be explored and exploited.

5.4. Radio listens to itself in ambiguity

In the subsections that follow, I examine two more exemplars that utilise ambiguities in sound and space to create a radio-body that listens to itself. First, however, a definition of ambiguity is in order; by relating Merleau-Ponty's idea of the bodily grip on the world, and Nancy's idea of resonance as what constitutes the body – two ideas that that been discussed and utilised previously – I posit that the radio-body can express its resonance with the dramatic world by listening to the ambiguities that do not appear to perception due to its grip on the world.

As discussed in Section 2.3.1, for Merleau-Ponty, the perception of the world arises from one's bodily *grasp* on it. It is this grasp that allows me to perceive objects, spaces and the world *as* themselves despite the fact that my perspective on them, and how they appear to my senses, are constantly changing and never definite; in other words, while 'ambiguity is the essence of human existence, and everything we live or think has always several meanings' (Merleau-Ponty 2002: 196), my bodily grip on the world makes sense of this ambiguity in a pre-reflective manner, allowing me to intend toward the world, experience things in the phenomenal field, and exist in the *natural attitude*. For example, my bodily grip on the world allows me to see objects in the world as they are despite shifts in perspective: a man walking away from me becomes smaller and smaller in my vision, and yet my body schema allows me to have a grip on the word in visual perspective – a fact that allows me to see the man as 'neither smaller nor indeed equal in size: he is anterior to equality and inequality; he is *the same man seen from farther away*' (Merleau-Ponty 2002: 304). Against the pre-reflective grounds of my body's constant adjustments to this grip, I can perceive the figures and grounds of my phenomenal field as givens, despite the ambiguity of their perception.

Merleau-Ponty uses the term *anchorage* to describe how one maintains its grip: 'the body is our *anchorage* in the world' (Merleau-Ponty 2002: 167, italics mine) – it establishes a pre-reflective relationship with the rest of the world, anchoring itself in it, and in doing so, allows me to have a perspective on the world. This anchorage, of course, is not a deliberate act – and 'not an explicit perception' (Merleau-Ponty 2002: 326) – but is presupposed in every perceptual encounter: to have a grip on the otherwise-ambiguous world, perception needs an anchorage in the form of the body. This also applies to the case of radio drama: the fact that the

radio-body is able to encounter sounds *as* sounds of the dramatic world reveals that it, too, is anchored in the world.

Nancy's idea of listening-*écouter*, however, allows for the problematisation and expansion of the idea of anchorage: [72] as discussed in Section 3.5, the body is only constituted through the resonant encounter with the world. My point of anchorage, in other words, is also constantly shifting and ambiguous as it is changed by what it encounters; my grip on the world is not constant, but only exists during the constitution of a *me* as the world and I meet and resonate. To illustrate this, let us go back to the example of the explosion in the park previously examined in Section 3.5. When I sit in peace in the park on a summer's day, reading my book, my body is anchored in the world, resonating with the birds and the breeze and my intention toward the text of the book. The explosion reconstitutes me: my body is no longer situated where it once was, as the resonance of the explosion in me has dislocated and distressed me – I lose my anchorage and no longer have a grip in the world; I am lost in the ambiguity of the possible perspectives that current constitution of my resonant body could assume. Then, through the pre-reflective workings of my body, I regain my grip, re-anchor myself, and experience the post-explosion world. From the perspective of listening-*écouter*, then, the anchorage itself is also always constituted ambiguously. As Merleau-Ponty points out, however, the resonant readjustments and reconstitutions of the body themselves do not feature in my experience. While my body may be constantly at work to get a grip on the world through its ambiguity, my experience in the *natural attitude* itself is rarely ambiguous to me. The moment of readjustment does not occur in my experience, as it is the prerequisite of experience: without being anchored in the world, I cannot perceive it. Of course, there may be objects in the world that I cannot have a grip on without adjusting my body – sometimes even reflectively – but doing so is only possible if I am anchored in, and have a grip on, the world itself. Much like me, the radio-body, too, maintains its grip on the world despite its constant reconstitution by it: its intentional acts of auditions are rarely ambiguous.

It is here that the reasoning behind another possible manner of resonant listening becomes apparent: by listening to the ambiguities of the dramatic world at

[72] Indeed, in his later work, Merleau-Ponty's proposed terms of *flesh* and *chiasm* were an attempt to resolve this problem.

its moment of reconstitution, the radio-body can listen to itself as it resonates with the dramatic world, losing and readjusting its grip. The radio-body has the ability to listen to sounds on which it cannot get a grip, and in doing so, express the resonance of its encounter. In the next two sections, I examine two examples where a dramaturgical effect is created through sound structures that employ ambiguous, unplaceable sounds and sonic spaces. In each case, I argue, the radio-body is not listening to particular sounds, but to its own resonance.

5.4.1. Ambiguous space: the case of *Seaburn*

Let us begin examining resonant listening through spatial ambiguity with a moment in *Seaburn* (2015), a play written, directed and produced by Sunderland-based radio producer Jay Sykes. *Seaburn*, originally a final project for a Master's degree, has won the award for Best Student Radio Programme at the New York Festivals Awards (2015), and has been nominated for a Radio Production Award (2015) alongside radio professionals. It tells the story of a young woman struggling with depression, relationships, and the death of her father. The play contains several moments where the radio-body's anchorage on the world becomes ambiguous – here I focus on a scene beginning at 8:22, where the main character, Pippa, leaves the bed after a bad dream to get some water. The scene proceeds as follows:

ATMOS	THE SLOW HUM OF A FRIDGE.
F/X	PIPPA PICKS UP A GLASS, FILLS IT FROM THE TAP, AND SHUTS IT.
PIPPA:	(*breathes*) I hate these dreams. I absolutely hate them! (*sighs*) Come on Pippa, pull yourself together.
	(Pippa screams.)
F/X	THE GLASS FALLS ON THE FLOOR.

SAM: Pips, it's me! [73]

On paper, this can seem a conventional scene with clear referential sounds and open to a radio-body that listens semantically, but the production does not follow this path. When this scene begins, the radio-body listens to Pippa from an unconventional, rather unclear, perspective: to me, she is distant and faint, perhaps even behind a door or curtains – although it is difficult to determine whether this is the case or not. When she speaks, her voice appears to me not as an internal monologue, but as speech; the kitchen, however, seems far away from her despite the fact that she has not moved. When Pippa screams, she suddenly seems to jump far away, with the glass falling on the floor closer to the radio-body. Throughout the scene, I am rather confused about the position of elements, and of myself. By the time that Sam begins to speak, my perspective is clearer: the couple are standing in the kitchen, talking.

When reflecting on my experience of the piece, I can easily notice that the sounds of the scene are structured in a manner that closely parallels my experience. The sounds of the kitchen are faint, and seem to have been recorded from afar and in low quality. The sound of Pippa's screams is indeed in a different position that her lines of dialogue: they are slightly to the right of the audio channel, and relatively loud and sharp, whereas the scream is centred, low in volume, and rather dull in tone as the result of the higher frequencies being less pronounced. The glass falls down slightly to the left of the scream, and is separated from the scream by silence, rather than the continued hum of the fridge. Thus, the sounds of the dramatic world do not constitute a single perspective, but a number of different points of listening. The jumps in my perception and the resulting sense of confusion, then, can be ascribed to the spatial ambiguity within this sound structure.

Of course, one should not assume that in my experience of the scene, I am directly conscious of this ambiguity, as it does not figure in my phenomenal field, but remains in the ground. For example, when Pippa begins to speak against the backdrop of the kitchen, I do perceive the difference in the perspectives of the two sounds, but do not direct myself toward the difference; my experience is still of Pippa in the kitchen, although the space of the kitchen has changed. Similarly, when

[73] Appendix A-31.

Pippa screams and the glass falls down, although the perspective changes rapidly, I am directed toward Pippa's scream, rather than the change in perspective, although the moment has led to my slight confusion about my perspective – confusion that is resolved moments later when Sam begins to speak. The confusion is not interpreted: I do not become conscious of the shifts in perspective and interpret them as confusion; I am simply confused, and detached from the dramatic world.

Here, I posit that the effect described above occurs because the radio-body is listening to itself in a resonant manner. The radio-body, constituted by and resonating with Pippa's state, listens for the disruption of its anchorage in the dramatic world, utilising its body schema's ability to perceive the auditory world from perspectives inaccessible to my body. As a result of this, its position in, and perspective of, space – and thus, the dramatic world – becomes ambiguous. I, in turn, perceive the radio-body's ambiguous experience of the dramatic world, and my own anchorage in it is disrupted. The radio-body forces me to readjust my perspective on the space by listening to itself. [74]

The sound structure that enables my experience is, on closer scrutiny, not simply a series of sounds from different perspectives, but follows a certain organisational logic. While the spatial qualities of some sounds are ambiguous and are at times contradictory, one spatial anchor – first the sounds of the kitchen, and then the sound of Sam's voice – is present almost constantly; the brief moment of the scream and the glass falling are the only instances where such a sound does not appear. After all, without an anchored perspective, the sounds of the dramatic world would cease to be located in a perceived world, and would instead become merely sounds appearing in an auditory field. The sounds that have different perspectives are either brief or occurring in the backgrounds, momentarily disrupting, rather than providing a constant contradictory presence next to, the anchor sound. Their

[74] A detractor may argue that what I describe here is not the resonance of the radio-body's experience in the dramatic world, but simply Pippa's perspective. The two, however, are not mutually exclusive: to perceive the resonance of Pippa's experience, the radio-body still has to listen in a resonant manner. If the radio-body is listening for Pippa's perspective, then this perspective is what constitutes, and resonates with, the radio-body. Pippa's perspective, in turn, is constituted by a resonant encounter with the dramatic world. In this way, the radio-body can listen to its resonance with Pippa's resonance with the dramatic world.

continuation or prominence could provide the listener with yet another way of anchoring herself in the dramatic world, reducing spatial ambiguity.

Such a manner of structuring sound can be observed in several moments in *Seaburn*. Following the excerpt examined above, Sam and Pippa have a row, leading to Sam storming out of the kitchen (at 9:22) and closes the door; the door, once again, appears far away and muffled in comparison with Sam's last line of dialogue. [75] Later, at 28:03, Pippa and her lover find themselves by the sea. The dialogue is underlined with the sound of sea waves, loud and up close. Pippa's lover, however, informs her and the listener that the sea is in fact far away and barely audible. Here, too, a perspective on space – this time, through dialogue – disrupts the radio-body's anchorage in the space through the sounds of the sea. Similar effects can be found in *Scherzo* (2003,), where a being composed of sound alone constantly changes direction and shifts perspective, [76] and in Peter Strickland's *The Stone Tape* (2016), where screams with reverberations occur in a space where other sounds are flattened and contain little reverb. In each case, the radio-body listens for sounds that are spatially ambiguous within an otherwise-unified space.

To construct a radio-body that listens to space in an ambiguous manner, certain practical issues have to be taken into account. The mode of structuring sounds described above requires processing and organising sounds in ways that are not accessible to the auditory schema of those producing it; unlike the radio-body, the producer cannot perceive sounds belonging to different spaces in the same space. Therefore, achieving the effect requires experimentation in order to find those ambiguities in space which function dramaturgically. This, in turn, requires an integration of the creative process through which the dramaturgical logic of the effect is determined, with the technical process of recording and mixing it – processes which are separated in the conventions of the semantic paradigm. Furthermore, to use spatial distortions dramaturgically, there needs to be a carefully-established relationship between the spatial qualities of all the sounds produced. As such, the recording and processing of sounds would need to be tailored to fit within the parameters of specific dramaturgical and spatial uses of them, rather than treating all sounds with the same approach.

[75] Appendix A-32.
[76] Appendix A-33.

In examining the processes that have created *Seaburn*, these practices can indeed be observed. Sykes has written, recorded, produced and directed the drama, which means that dramaturgically significant moments and situations can be identified and conceived in sonic terms from the outset. Furthermore, this independent approach allows Sykes full control over all aspects of the sound structure. For example, Sykes states that 'all the sounds that you hear are my own sounds, that have been manipulated' (2017) and goes on to say that when working with actors, 'throughout the time I was recording [,] I was thinking about the nuances of each sound and the interplay of character' (2017). Regarding his editing method, he is open to improvisation and flexibility:

> With everything I do, there's a cadence to it, and there's a rhythm, and there's a mindset, and there's character to convey […] And the only way I could properly interplay these things is through utilising sounds and experimenting with them. So at some point during the editing I'd have thought "I'll throw in some music" and that comes to me during the editing, rather than the scripting (Sykes 2017).

Such an approach can open the way for the creation of sonic structures such as ambiguous space, which, after all, cannot be scripted, but require experimentation and trial and error in order to make sure that the simultaneous continuity and disruption of the anchorage in space is maintained.

The site of the listener's encounter with the sound structure of ambiguous space is as important as these practices in achieving the effect described above. The ambiguous nature of the sound structure relies on sounds of contrasting perspectives being present in the same auditory field; should these appear in the listener's auditory field alongside other sounds that do not belong to the dramatic world, then the ambiguous relationships between the sounds of the dramatic world may not appear to the listener, as they would be perceived not just in relation to other sounds in the dramatic world, but all of the sounds in the listener's phenomenal field. More focused modes of listening afforded by new technology such as headphones, then, can allow the listener to encounter the ambiguity of space as the radio-body listening to its own resonance with the dramatic world.

5.4.2. Ambiguous sound: the case of *Scherzo*

In the example of the previous section, while the radio-body experienced space in an ambiguous manner, its grip on the sounds that were perceived in the space remained intact. In this section, however, I examine a case where the sounds themselves become ambiguous: *Scherzo* (2003), a Big Finish Productions audio drama, written by Robert Shearman and directed by Gary Russel, based on the long-running science fiction series *Doctor Who*. *Scherzo* is a two-hander between the main character of the series, The Doctor – an eccentric alien time-traveller – and his companion Charley, as they navigate their way around a maze in a timeless and sightless universe. In this maze, they encounter a creature made of sound, who attempts to communicate with the characters by repeating their own sounds to them in different tones. At the end of Episode 3 (22:28), the character of Charley cuts The Doctor's throat to rescue him from this creature. [77] As The Doctor screams loudly, a faint siren-like sound begins to build up. This is followed by the word "music" uttered in different tones and from different directions, and out-of-tune orchestral crescendo begins to form and increase in volume, although it does not establish a rhythm. The increase in volume continues until the scream falls silent. Then, the episode ends as the theme music begins. My perception of this piece, of course, is not of these individual elements. Instead, as The Doctor's throat is cut, I encounter an otherworldly scream – diegetically, that of the "sound-creature"; indeed, I perceive all sounds as coming from a single source despite their spatial differences. My experience, however, is not merely that of the scream itself, but a kind of startled confusion: the sound catches me by surprise and becomes all that I hear; as The Doctor's screams fade, I lose my perspective on the dramatic world: I no longer know whether The Doctor and Charley are there, or whether The Doctor is still screaming. I simply experience the scream, expecting it to stop, until the theme music begins and I no longer experience the dramatic world.

Listening analytically to this moment, I can observe similarities between the structure of the sound and my experience. When The Doctor screams, the volume and reverberations are initially consistent with his voice throughout the scene that precedes this moment; its location it the dramatic world, therefore, is apparent to me. As the scream moves on and other sounds enter the auditory field, this begins to disappear. The repeated, arrhythmic, and electronically-manipulated iterations

[77] Appendix A-34.

of the world "music", however, occur in seemingly-random locations on the stereophonic spectrum, meaning that they appear as sounds from different sources. The orchestra itself, by virtue of its out-of-tune tones and arrhythmia, does not appear to me as musical, although it has a degree of musicality; furthermore, its juxtaposition with the scream, the fluctuations of its volume, and its reverberation, means that it occupies a space within the dramatic world, rather than underscoring it. Similarly, although the orchestra resembles the scream in its texture and increasing volume, and even taking into account my diegetic awareness of the fact that this may be the scream of the "sound-creature", I cannot perceive it as part of the scream. The loudness of the sound in comparison to what has come before, and the fact that all other sounds from the scene have ceased means that I cannot relate the combination of sounds to the context dramatic world as it was before The Doctor's throat was cut; indeed, I am not even aware of whether this is the "sound-creature" or simply music. The structure of the sound, then, makes it ambiguous, and therefore it is difficult for me to place it within the dramatic world.

This, of course, should not be understood as interpretation. It cannot be said that when I encounter the sound structure, I understand it to be ambiguous and confusing, and therefore a sign of startled confusion. After all, my perception is not knowledge of the fact that what I hear is ambiguous, or that I cannot make sense of it. Instead, I experience the sound itself, and try to make sense of it. Any metaphorical or representational links that I may be able to identify between my experience of the scene and the structure of sounds can only be observed reflectively. When I listen to the scene, I do not realise that it is startling and confusing – I simply get startled and confused. Furthermore, despite the musical origin of sounds, it would not be correct to say that my experience is musical, in that unlike the examples described in Section 5.3. – and in particular, the reaction effect explored in 5.3.3. – I do not grasp the groove of the music. Rather than pulling me and engaging me with the world, the scream disrupts my grip on it.

Here, I posit that my experience of this scene can be described as my perception of the radio-body's resonant encounter with the world: as The Doctor screams, the radio-body resonates with the scream, and loses its anchorage in, and grip on, the world. Instead of listening to the scream semantically – by focusing on the voice of The Doctor to make it recognisably a scream, for example – it listens to

itself, expressing the loss of its grip on the world, and the struggle with the ambiguity that follows, in an ambiguously-structured sound that the listener cannot grasp unless she loses her grip on the dramatic world. The listener, too, then loses her anchorage in the dramatic world as a result of the particular structuring of sounds, and needs to readjust her relationship with the world. Thus, the listener embodies the radio-body's experience in the dramatic world.

To create a radio-body that listens to this ambiguity, the sounds of the piece require a particular structure. After all, due to the fact that the radio-body – and therefore, the listener – has a grip on the dramatic world in the *natural attitude*, all sounds become part of this world as they appear in the phenomenal field; even the most out-of-place sound can become integrated into the world when the listener has a grip on it. If I listen to a scene set in ancient Egypt which suddenly includes the sound of a motorcycle, I am still able to perceive a motorcycle in the scene despite its unexpected appearance. On the other hand, if the sound is too ambiguous or disruptive to the listener's grip on the world, her attempts at readjusting her bodily positions and attitudes in order to regain the grip may not be enough, and require an act of reflective identification – which can draw my attention away from the dramatic world and toward perceiving the sound *as* sound: should I hear a continuous loud noise that remains constant despite changes in the scene, I may ignore the scene and instead attempt to understand the noise. An ambiguous sound, then, should be structured to be disruptive, but not too disruptive, to the relationships already established between the elements of the dramatic world. The scream of the "sound-creature" of Scherzo, for example, is less startling and confusing when it occurs a second time (Episode 4, 22:20) during the scene of the creature's death. [78] There, unlike the example discussed here, the position of the source of the scream is clear – both because the characters discuss it, and because the sounds of the previous scene are maintained throughout. Furthermore, the scream is shorter, less loud, and with a more sustained orchestral note, in contrast to the haphazard arrhythmia of the first scream. The second scream, therefore, is not an ambiguous sound, and the radio-body's grip on the world is maintained throughout. On the other hand, another Doctor Who audio drama by Big Finish, *Relative Dimensions* (2010, 13:05), provides an example of a moment where the

[78] Appendix A-35.

extent of the ambiguity of sound means that the listener's readjustments of her bodily perspective cannot give her a new grip on the sound: [79] at the end of the scene, after all characters have left the room, a series of electric buzzes and whistles are heard, extending for 15 seconds. These remain unexplained, with the result that after a few seconds of listening to them, I become aware of them as buzzes and whistles, rather than something occurring in the dramatic world – it is only a few scenes later that I am informed that the sounds were of an electric fish forming in mid-air. As these two cases show, then, the creation of ambiguous sounds means maintaining a balance between disruption and integration.

Similar examples of dramaturgical uses of ambiguous sound can be found elsewhere. For example, *Adventures of the Soul* (2012), a paranormal thriller, makes extensive use of electronic voice phenomena – electrical noises which at times appear to resemble human speech. The plot revolves around recordings of such phenomena, which are revealed to be the ghosts of victims of identity theft. While the second half of the play distinguishes clearly between voice phenomena that belong to the dead and those that are simply noise, this distinction does not appear in the first half, with the result that the experience of them is, initially, one of eeriness. In this, and other examples such as *The Stone Tape* (2016), where the resonance of the sound of a scream in a stone cellar becomes gradually unrecognisable, [80] or the reversed sound of a ticking clock in *The Exorcist* (2014), [81] the sound structure maintains a balance between integration and disruption in order to create ambiguous sounds.

The creation of ambiguous sounds require a move away from the practices of the semantic paradigm, which instead aim for referential clarity. Such sounds, after all, cannot be scripted directly as their defining characteristic is a lack of direct reference; approaching radio as a writer's medium, then, cannot apply here. The writer may indicate the sound's texture, or describe it as a collection or mixture of sounds, or write about it poetically, or even use phonetic; all of these approaches, however, will certainly require creative realisation – by a producer, director, or sound designer – rather than direct translation of script into sound. Furthermore, this creative realisation needs to be tailored to individual production, and moments,

[79] Appendix A-36.
[80] Appendix A-37.
[81] Appendix A-38.

to create a sound that neither fits nor stands completely outside the dramatic world. Any directly-recognisable sounds may require manipulation, or integration into a structure with other sounds, to render them ambiguous – a process that necessitates creative and individually-tailored use of technology. It is through such alteration of practical conventions that ambiguous sounds can feature in radio drama.

Such practical approaches can indeed be observed in the production of *Scherzo*. The writer, Robert Shearman, acknowledges the openness of the script and the fundamental role of sound design in shaping moments such as the scream:

> I wanted to offer [the script] as a sort of thank-you note to the guys at [sound design studio] ERS […] So I thought I'd write a story for [sound designers] Andy Hardwick and Russell Stone to have some fun with, almost like an ambient music album where there are words, but it's more about the soundscape that the words create (Saint 2004).

In other words, the script opens itself to sonic interpretation, experimentation and different modes of realisation. Sound designer Hardwick himself highlights the fact that his work has emphasised the bodily aspect of the experience, in particular relating an anecdote about one of the "sound-creature's" early appearances in *Scherzo*: 'I absolutely love the bit where it suddenly screams, "Help me!" I tried to make that sound as loud, violent and unexpected as I possibly could. I tried it out on a friend and he spilt his coffee all over his trousers, so I knew we'd got it right' (Smith 2012: 21). Another key significant factor in making *Scherzo*'s use of ambiguous sound possible is its mode of distribution. The production company behind the drama, Big Finish, is an independent production company rather than a broadcaster, and although their productions have been broadcast on Radio – for example, *The Eighth Doctor Adventures* series – they originate outside the broadcast system, and are intended primarily for sale on retail CDs, downloads, and subscriptions. This means that the listener to a Big Finish production establishes a different relationship with it than the casual listener to a broadcast: she has control over the curated experience, and thus attends to the dramatic world with more focus; especially, if the listener is listening through headphones – the prevalent mode of consuming downloaded radio drama, as discussed in Section 4.5. – then she has the dramatic world in almost all of her phenomenal field. This can allow the balance of ambiguity to be maintained: as

mentioned previously, in order for a sound structure to remain ambiguous, it needs to avoid integration into the listener's perception of the world, without being removed from it completely and perceived *as* a sound; retaining this balance becomes more difficult if the ambiguous sound is presented not only within the sound structure that creates the radio-body's perception of the dramatic world, but also within the listener's own world. After all, if the scream of *Scherzo* is one of many competing sounds in my auditory field, not all of which belong to the dramatic world, then the balancing of its ambiguity has to take into account not only the sounds of the dramatic world, but any possible sound that may change its context and its relationship to me and draw me to it *as* a sound.

In summary, a practical approach characterised by openness and attention to sound, and a mode of listening that limits auditory interference in the encounter, allow the radio-body to listen to itself in a resonant manner by listening to ambiguous sounds.

5.6. Closing Remarks

In this chapter, I argued that an alternative mode of dramaturgy can be conceived that listens in a resonant manner, instead of a semantic mode, and that such a dramaturgy is beginning to emerge as a paradigm. I began by arguing that resonant dramaturgy can respond to the crisis of the semantic paradigm because it engages the listener's body. I then presented five examples of moments in radio plays in which dramaturgical use of music and ambiguity allow the radio-body to listen to its resonant encounter with the dramatic world. I proposed these as exemplars to demonstrate that a resonant dramaturgy becomes possible through a move away from the practices of the semantic paradigm, and through more integration and experimentation in the production process, with the assistance of new technologies.

Before moving on to the conclusion of this thesis, I should emphasise that the case studies examined in the previous five sections are by no means exhaustive; these are not the only effects that can be achieved through dramaturgical use of music and ambiguity. Neither are they the only dramaturgical approaches that may result in a resonant radio-body. The aim here is not to present a taxonomy of resonant effects, but to demonstrate that a resonant dramaturgy begins to emerge only by moving away from the rigidity of the semantic paradigm and embracing

dramaturgical flexibility. Will resonant listening one day form the new paradigm of radio drama? I have argued that the conditions for such a possibility are rife, and that examples of resonant dramaturgy can be found. If a resonant paradigm is to emerge, however, it can only be possible if modes of dramaturgy are not conventionalised, but expanded, integrated, and diversified.

CONCLUSION

A. A summary

Here, I conclude this thesis by first summarising its key arguments and findings, then highlighting its key contributions to knowledge, and finally highlighting some areas for further exploration.

I began by setting up the key problem of the thesis in the introduction: the definition of radio drama – a purely auditory presentation of a dramatic world – becomes problematic in an ocularcentric context, in that the mere possibility of its existence requires an explanation; I posited that theories and practices of radio drama are both concerned with providing a solution to this problem by proposing theories of how radio drama works. I then highlighted the link between ocularcentrism and a representational understanding of the experience of the world, proposing that approaching the problem of radio drama from the perspective of phenomenology can allow us to conceive of a better response to the problem of radio drama from both theoretical and practical perspectives.

In Chapter 1, I examined available theoretical responses to the problem of radio drama, focusing mainly on the most common understanding of how the art form works: the concept of the *theatre of the mind*. I critiqued the idea, and the two most common explanations for how it works – namely, semiotics and visual imaginations. My critique relied on phenomenology's problematisation of the idea of mental representation, making the key point that contrary to common characterisation, radio drama cannot be understood simply as an act of the mind, but should instead be comprehended as the bodily experience of a holistic, pre-reflective dramatic world. I then addressed a number of theoretical lenses that went beyond the representationalist confines of the *theatre of the mind*, arguing that their limits and flaws means that a more comprehensive phenomenological framework is needed.

In Chapter 2, I proposed such a phenomenological framework – in effect, a philosophy of radio drama – through a systematic description of the experience of listening to radio drama. Drawing from Merleau-Ponty, I argued that the radio drama is encountered in the *natural attitude*, as the experience of a world that I perceive as a world, although it is not *my* world. After assessing some alternative

descriptions of the phenomenon, I instead posited my key finding: that the encounter with radio drama is one of *listening to listening*; the combination of dramaturgy and technological mediation, I argued, allow me to direct myself toward the radio as an *other* that shares my auditory schema and is expressing its perception of the dramatic world. Drawing from film theory, I posited that the technological apparatus that creates and transmits the sound structure of named this perceptual entity the *radio-body*. I posited that the radio-body is engaged bodily within the dramatic world through active and purposeful listening, and I, in turn, listen to it in order to perceive what it perceives and expresses through the technological apparatus of the radio.

In Chapter 3, I used my phenomenological framework to analyse the conventions of British radio dramaturgy, arguing that they follow what I termed the *semantic paradigm*. Where a theoretical framework would argue that the sound structure created by conventional practices of British radio is the natural, ultimate form that the unisensory quality of the medium dictates, I posited that these conventions instead simply create a radio-body that listens to the dramatic world in one particular mode. In this mode of listening, which I termed *semantic* following Chion, the radio-body directs itself toward those aspects of sounds that relate it to a particular sign or element. I explored various conventional British practices in writing, performing, and producing radio drama to posit that this type of radio-body emerges out of particular accepted practices, which together form a paradigm; I termed this, the key finding of the chapter, the *semantic paradigm*. I then critiqued this paradigm for its assumption that the radio-body is itself unaffected by the dramatic world, positing that by foregoing this assumption and taking into account the fact that changes in the dramatic world can affect the radio-body, a *resonant* mode of listening emerges. In this mode, I posited, the radio-body listens to sounds for their bodily and worldly qualities, rather than simply to note what they stand for.

In Chapter 4, I traced the genealogy of semantic and resonant listening through the history of British radio dramaturgy. I began with the early years of British radio, arguing that two competing ideas about the nature of radio drama existed during the formative period when conventions are being tested and established. I made the key point that contingent historical, cultural, and

technological factors made one idea – that of the radio drama as a semantic art form – became dominant, while the more resonant conception of the medium found its place in semi-dramatic feature programmes. I then revisited the paradigm in two different periods – the so-called "golden age" of post-war radio, and the Radio 4 era beginning in the late 60s – to posit that despite some changes and a number of avant-garde experiments, the basic tenets of the semantic paradigm remained extant. Finally, I examined the state of the semantic paradigm in the contemporary era, presenting another key finding: that the contingent contexts out of which the semantic paradigm emerged are rapidly changing in entirely new ways. I posited that as a result of changes in modes of production, distribution, and listening, a paradigm shift is beginning to occur.

In Chapter 5, I examined a number of case studies of moments in radio productions that manifested this mode of listening; I argued that the experience of each of these moments can be understood as the radio-body listening to its own resonant encounter with the world. Furthermore, I argued that the possibility of creating the sound structure that enables the radio-body to listen in this resonant mode rests on a shift in the conventional practices of the semantic paradigm of dramaturgy; the integration of creative roles, the use of new – and particularly digital – technology, and flexibility in the process of production can allow for a more resonant mode of listening. In short, my final key finding is that a new resonant paradigm is possible, and indeed, shows signs of emerging.

B. Contributions to new knowledge

The main contribution of this thesis is to the field of radio drama theory and practice, where its input is fourfold. Firstly, I have critiqued the common idea of radio as the *theatre of the mind*, and highlighted its limitations in understanding and criticising varying forms of dramaturgy. While the basis of the critique itself has been hinted at, as I acknowledged in the second part of Chapter 1, I have built on available literature to present it in a systematic and extensive manner. While my alternative to the *theatre of the mind* was draw from phenomenology, the critique can also open the way for other framing contexts through which the workings of radio drama can be understood and analysed.

Secondly, by providing my own response to the problem of radio drama, I have proposed a phenomenological framework for the study and analysis of radio

drama, presenting and conceptualising the encounter with the radio-body as the phenomenological description of listening to radio drama. The concepts and terms that I have developed and utilised in this thesis – namely, the radio-body, and modes of dramaturgical listening – can be used as analytical tools, applied to individual productions or modes of dramaturgy in order to determine and critique their respective listening attitudes, and the corresponding dramaturgical techniques. Furthermore, this phenomenological framework may also be useful for practitioners; understanding radio dramaturgy as the practice of shaping the radio-body can provide the dramaturge with a new perspective on her own practice, and may even be used as a heuristic tool in the creative process.

My third contribution to the field of radio drama is my conception and critique of the semantic paradigm of British radio dramaturgy. While the paradigmatic status of the semantic mode is, as I have posited, already showing signs of a shift, a number of the arguments I have posed in this thesis can be useful in supporting this shift. Firstly, I have problematised the idea that radio's unisensory qualities necessitate a semantic mode of dramaturgy, which opens the paradigm for critique. Secondly, I have established a link between the conventions of practice and the radio-body's semantic mode of listening; this can allow individual techniques and methods to be questioned, altered, or adopted in order to move the dramaturgical toolkit of radio drama toward new grounds and away from semantic listening. Thirdly, I have traced the history of the semantic paradigm, and posited that it was shaped by contingent historical factors. Finally, I have argued that the digital era has led to a crisis in the semantic paradigm, and has provide unique possibilities for a paradigm shift.

Finally, the assessment of the workings of the possible new paradigm in radio dramaturgy is my fourth contribution to the field of radio drama. Through the application of the phenomenological lens developed in this thesis, I have proposed a framework with which a resonant mode of dramaturgy can be explored, expanded, and even formulated. I have posited that the emerging paradigm is one when the bodily qualities of sound are utilised dramaturgically, creating a resonant radio-body; this conceptualisation of the new dramaturgy can lend it theoretical support, while also presenting a new angle for practitioners with which to approach their own practices. Furthermore, I have established a link between changes in the

conventional practices of the semantic paradigm, and a move toward a more resonant radio-body; my proposal for new practices, processes and methods can be a starting point through which the new paradigm may emerge.

Beyond the contributions to its field, the findings of this thesis can also be useful in other disciplines. The most important of such contributions is to the field of Sound Studies: my proposal that the sound structure of radio drama shares an auditory schema with its listener means that, in essence, radio drama can be studied and analysed as a model for auditory perception and subjectivity; it would, for example, be possible to examine the mode of listening available in different cultural and historical contexts by studying how a radio-body listens in such contexts. While the likes of Verma (2012) and Hendy (2013) have undertaken studies that could be considered similar in approach, the phenomenological framework that I have formulated can allow for a more systematic understanding of radio sound as a document of auditory experience.

C. Areas for further research

This thesis is – like any other research project – is simply the beginning of the way. The arguments posited in the previous five chapters can raise new questions and open up new areas for research, some of which I have enumerated here.

Firstly, while in this thesis I have argued that the radio-body's perspective is different from the perspective of the dramaturge who creates it, this by no means indicates that the two are independent – in fact, one area for further research is to identify parallels between the radio-body and those influential in its dramaturgy; for example, is there a particular link between how a producer listens – that is, the modes of auditory attention sedimented in her body schema, which are in turn affected by background and cultural contexts – and the radio-body that she creates. It could be asked, for example, whether the mode of listening manifest in the conventional British radio-body is related to the social background of production staff.

Secondly, while this thesis focused on the British dramaturgical tradition, many other traditions and developmental trajectories exist that can be explored through a phenomenological lens, and compared with the conventional dramaturgy

of the UK. It would be enlightening to see if the development of radio drama in other historical and cultural contexts also results in something similar to the semantic paradigm; a negative response would also bolster my problematisation of the argument that semantic listening is inherent in radio drama. Furthermore, there is room to examine, for example, what factors led to the development of something closer to what I have described as a resonant dramaturgy in Germany: could it have something to do with the auditory culture of the era, or is it a result of institutional structures? [82]

Thirdly, if a new paradigm of radio drama is emerging, its cultural politics should be scrutinised. Bull (2007) has already written at length about the neoliberal, overtly-individualistic nature of the new modes of consumption that, as I have argued, have been crucial in facilitating new dramaturgies, but the modes of dramaturgy themselves, and the institutions that create them, should also be questioned. The political implications of resonant modes of listening are open for exploration, as is the effects of large-scale commercialisation and commodification of radio drama through companies such as Audible and Gimlet Media. While the possibility of moving away from the semantic paradigm is beneficial from a dramaturgical perspective, the same might not apply from the perspective of politics.

Finally, there is more to be said about the nature of the experience of drama *as* a world from a phenomenological – and in particular, Heideggerian – perspective. In this thesis, I posited that on the radio, dramatic experience arises when I direct myself toward it as an expression of an embodied, worldly perception; a position that is largely shared by Sobchack's film phenomenology. This would suggest that a phenomenology of *drama* in general may be possible, and would be linked to bodily perception of fictitious worlds. Such a phenomenology, however, could do more than describe the structures of the experience of dramatic worlds: it could provide an opportunity to reframe what we understand to be drama. The idea of drama as mimesis, from which I have drawn in this thesis, reaches us from Aristotle, and has changed relatively little – as evidenced by the fact that key guidelines for dramatists in media as varied as film (McKee 1997, Tierno 2002), television (Smith 2009,

[82] Daniel Gilfillan has traced the history of this type of German experimental radio in *Pieces of Sound* (2009).

Morton 2013), theatre (Egri 1972, Edgar 2009), and even videogames (Ince 2006) all present Aristotelian ideas about tragedy, such as plot, characters, action, and climax – that is, catharsis – as key tools for the craft of writing. A phenomenological approach can question the idea of drama as imitation, and instead highlight the direct, pre-reflective, and worldly qualities of dramatic experience. A phenomenological framework for understanding drama is possible.

The potential of such a framework, however, can go beyond a mere change of terminology: Aristotle, interestingly, ascribed the workings of drama to two causes, both in human nature: the innate ability to imitate – in this case, to imitate actions that, in turn, arise from the nature of characters – and the desire to create harmony and rhythm (Aristotle 1898: 15); in other words, his idea of drama derives from his conception of human beings. This conception, of course, can be – and has been – questioned extensively throughout the history of philosophy, and yet the idea of drama has remained somewhat constant. Phenomenology, as a philosophical school, has also proposed ideas about human life; most prominently, Heidegger's philosophical project investigates the nature of being in the world, and in doing so sheds light on structures of existence that could be as illuminating about the nature, structure, and possibilities of the dramatic form as Aristotle's idea of human was to drama as formulated in the Poetics. Such a framework, which could have an impact far beyond radio drama, is worthy of much further expansion; this is an endeavour that, should I remain in academia after this thesis, I plan to undertake as my next project.

D. Final remarks

In the beginning of this thesis, I promised that it would be about radio drama, philosophy, sound, and practice. In what followed, I explored how a sonically-minded philosophy of radio drama can help us change the way radio dramaturgy is practiced. It is my hope that I have successfully made the philosophical argument that radio drama does not need to limit its use of sound; if practiced well, radio can *play*.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adorno, T. (2007) *Philosophy of Modern Music*. New York, NY and London: Continuum Books.

Adventures of the Soul (2012) [Radio broadcast, writer: Mickery, L. producer: Harris, M.] BBC Radio 3, 27 October 2012: 21:00-21:45.

Aliens: Out of Shadows (2016) [Online release, writer and producer: Maggs, D.] Audible Studios. Available at <https://www.audible.co.uk/pd/Sci-Fi-Fantasy/Alien-Out-of-the-Shadows-Audiobook/B01D0FHRQQ> (accessed 11.12.17).

All That Fall (1957) [CD released 1996; writer: Beckett, S. producer: McWhinnie, D.] in *Samuel Beckett: Works for Radio*. British Broadcasting Corporation.

Angus, J. and Howard, D. (2017) *Acoustics and Psychoacoustics*. New York, NY and Abingdon: Routledge.

Aristotle (1898) *The Poetics of Aristotle* [trans. Butcher, S. H]. London and New York, NY: Macmillan.

Aristotle (1998) *Poetics.* [trans. McLeish, K]. London: Phoenix.

Arnheim, R. (1936) *Radio.* [Trans. Ludwig, M. and Read, H]. London: Faber & Faber.

Ash, W. (1985) *The Way to Write Radio Drama.* London: Elm Tree.

Atack, T. X. (2016) *The Stroma Sessions*. Available at <http://www.societyofauthors.org/SOA/MediaLibrary/SOAWebsite/Prizes/The-Stroma-Sessions_Timothy-X-Atack_Broadcast-script.pdf> (accessed 13.11.17).

Atack, T. X. (n. d.) *Write: Different*. Available at <http://www.timatack.co.uk/?p=236> (accessed 13.11.17).

Attali, J. (1985) *Noise: The Political Economy of Music* [trans. Massumi, B]. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Audacity (2017) *Audacity ® Free, Open Source, Cross-Platform Audio Software for Multi-tracking Recording and Editing*. Available at <http://www.audacityteam.org/> (accessed 13.11.17).

Augoyard, J. F. and Torgue, H. (2014). Sonic Experience: a Guide to Everyday Sounds. Montreal: McGill-Queen's Press-MQUP.

Batman: Knightfall (1994) [CD released 2007; writer and producer: Maggs, D.] BBC Audio.

Beck, A (2005) *Radio drama – directing, acting, technical, learning & teaching, researching, styles, genres.* Available at <www.savoyhill.co.uk> (accessed 13.11.16).

Beck, A. (1997) *Radio Acting.* London: A & C Black.

Beck, A. (1998) 'Point of listening in radio plays' in *Sound Journal*. Available at<http://www.savoyhill.co.uk/pointoflistening/pointoflistening.htm> (accessed 29.11.16).

Beck, A. (1999) 'Is radio blind or invisible? A call for wider debate on listening-in' <http://www.savoyhill.co.uk/blindorinvisible/blindorinvisible.html> (accessed 29.11.16).

Beck, A. (2000) 'Cognitive Mapping and radio drama' in *Consciousness, Literature and the Arts* Vol 1 No.2. Available at <http://www.savoyhill.co.uk/cognitive/index.html> (accessed 13.11.16).

Beck, A. (2001) *The Invisible Play: BBC Radio Drama 1922-1928*. Available at < http://www.savoyhill.co.uk/invisibleplay/> (accessed 13.11.17).

Beckwith, R. (2013) 'Broadcasting House in the 1930s' in *Old BBC Radio Broadcasting Equipment and Memories*. Available at < http://www.orbem.co.uk/bh32/bh32_i.htm> (accessed 13.11.17).

Berry, R. (2016), 'Podcasting: Considering the evolution of the medium and its association with the word "radio"' in *The Radio Journal – International Studies in Broadcast & Audio Media* Vol 14 No 1: pp. 7–22.

Big Finish (2017) *Doctor Who: the Tenth Doctor Collected*. Available at <https://www.bigfinish.com/ranges/v/doctor-who---the-collected-10th-doctor> accessed (13.11.17).

Big Finish Productions (2013) *Doctor Who – Eighth Doctor Adventures – Ranges – Big Finish*. Available at <http://www.bigfinish.com/ranges/v/eighth-doctor-adventures> (accessed 13.11.17).

Blacking, J. (1973) *How Musical Is Man?* Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press.

Bourdieu, P. (1990) *The Logic of Practice* [trans. Nice, R]. Stanford,CA: Stanford University Press.

Bray, J. and Gray, F. (1985) 'The Mind as a Theatre: Radio Drama since 1971' in *New Theatre Quarterly* Vol 1 No 3. pp 292-300.

Bregman, A. S. (1994) *Auditory Scene Analysis: the Perceptual Organization of Sound*. Cambridge, MA and London: The MIT Press.

Briggs, A. (1961) *The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom. Volume 1: the Birth of Broadcasting.* London: Oxford University Press.

Briggs, A. (1965) *The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom. Volume 2: the Golden Age of Wireless.* London: Oxford University Press.

Briggs, A. (1970) *The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom. Volume 3: the War of Words.* London: Oxford University Press,

Briggs, A. (1979) *The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom. Volume 4: Sound and Vision.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Briggs, A. (1995) *The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom. Volume 5: Competition.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Brown, R. (2010) *Sound: a Reader in Theatre Practice.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Brown, R. (2011) 'Towards Theatre Noise' in Kendrick, L. and Roesner, D. (eds.) *Theatre Noise: the sound of performance*. Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. pp 1-14.

Brown, R. (2016) 'Fix Your Eyes on the Horizon and Swing Your Ears About: Corwin's Theatre of Sound' in Smith, J. and Verma, N. (ed.) *Anatomy of Sound: Norman Corwin and Media Authorship.* Oakland, CA: University of California Press. pp 171-194.

Bull, M. (2005) 'No dead air! The iPod and the Culture of Mobile Listening' in *Leisure Studies* Vol 24 No 4. pp 343-355.

Bull, M. (2007*) Sound Moves: iPod Culture and Urban Experience.* London and New York, NY: Routledge.

Cage, J. (1961*) Silence: Lectures and Writing by John Cage.* Hanover, NH: Wesleyan University Press.

Cardiff, D. and Scannel, P. (1991) *A Social History of British Broadcasting. Volume 1 – 1922-1939, Serving the Nation.* London: Wiley Blackwell.

Carless, M. (2004) *BBC Radio Format: Cue Style*. Available at < http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/writersroom/scripts/bbcradiocue.pdf> (accessed 11.13.17).

Carman, T. (1999) 'The Body in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty' in *Philosophical Topics* Vol 27 No 2. pp 205-226.

Carman, T. (2008) *Merleau-Ponty*. Oxford: Routledge.

Cazeaux, C. (2005) 'Phenomenology and radio drama' in *British Journal of Aesthetics* Vol. 45 No. 2: 157-174.

Chandler, D. and Munday, R. (2011) *Dictionary of Media and Communication*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chion, M. (1994) *Audio-visual: Sound on Screen*. New York, NA: Columbia University Press.

Cleverdon, D. (1969) *The Growth of Milk Wood*. New York, NY: New Direction Publishing.

Clough, P. T. and Haley, J. (2007) *The Affective Turn: Theorising the Social.* Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Collini, S. (2006) *Absent Minds: Intellectuals in Britain.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Connor, S. (2000) 'Sounding Out Film' in The Institute of English Studies [conference organisers] *Film, Literature and Modernity*. London, 13-15 January 2000. Available at < http://www.stevenconnor.com/soundingout/> (accessed 13.11.17).

Crary, J. (1992) *Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Crisell, A. (1994) *Understanding Radio*. London: Routledge.

Crisell, A. (2000) 'Better Than Magritte: how drama on the radio became radio drama' in *Journal of Radio Studies* Vol 7 No 2. pp 464-473.

Crisell, A. (2005) *An Introductory History of British Broadcasting*. London and New York,NY: Routledge.

Crook, T. (1999) *Radio Drama: Theory and Practice*. London: Routledge.

Crook, T. (1999a) *British Radio Drama: A Cultural Case History*. Available at < http://www.irdp.co.uk/britrad.htm> (accessed 13.11.17).

Curtin, A. (2013) 'Recalling the Theatrephone' in Reilly, K. (ed.) *Theatre, Performance and Analogue Technology: Historical Interfaces and Intermedialities*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. pp 214-232.

Davis, P. (2015) *Ardour – the Digital Audio Workstation*. Available at <https://ardour.org/> (accessed 13.11.17).

DeNora, T. (2000) *Music in Everyday Life*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Derrida, J. (1973) *Speech and Phenomena, and Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs* [trans. Allen, D. B]. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.

Dickens Confidential: Why Are We in Afghanistan? (2008) [Radio broadcast; writer: Walker: M.] BBC Radio 4, 14 July 2008, 14:15-15:00.

Dirk Gently's Holistic Detective Agency (2007) [iTunes release; writer and producer: Maggs, D.] BBC Worldwide. Available at <https://itunes.apple.com/us/audiobook/dirk-gentlys-holistic-detective-agency-dramatised/id323643307> (accessed 12.13.17).

doyouwishtocontinue (2015) [Radio broadcast; writer: Entwisle, C. producer: Williams, K.] BBC Radio 4, June 8th 2015: 14:15-15:00.

Drakakis, J. (1981) 'Introduction' in Drakakis, J. (ed.) *British Radio Drama*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp 1-37.

Dubber, A. (2013) *Radio in the Digital Age*. Oxford, Wiley.

Edgar, D. (2009) *How Plays Work*. London: Nick Hern Books.

Edison Research (2017) *The Infinite Dial 2017*. Available at <http://www.edisonresearch.com/infinite-dial-2017>, accessed 24.04.17.

Egri, L. (1972) *The Art of Dramatic Writing: Its Basis in the Creative Interpretation of Human Motives*. New York, NY: Touchstone.

Elam, K. (2002) *The Semiotics of Theatre and Drama*. London and New York, NY: Routledge.

Embers (1959) [Writer: Beckett, S. Producer: McWhinne, D.] in 'Samuel Beckett: Works for Radio' [CD published 1996]. British Broadcasting Corporation.

Entwisle, C. (2015) *doyouwishtocontinue*. available at < http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/writersroom/scripts/Doyouwishtocontinue.pdf> (accessed 13.11.17).

Erlmann, V. (2010) *Reason and resonance: a history of modern aurality.* Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Esslin, M. (1971) 'The Mind as a Stage' in *Theatre Quarterly* Vol 1 No 3: 5-11.

Evans, F. and Lawlor, L. (2000) *Chiasm: Merleau-Ponty's Notion of the Flesh*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Fastl, H. and Zwicker, E. (2007) *Psychoacoustics: Facts and Models*. Berlin, Heidelberg and New York, NY: Springer.

Fischer, M. (2003) *Ezra Pound's Radio Operas: The BBC Experiments 1931-33*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Fortune, E. (2013) 'Interview with Dirk Maggs' in *Starburst Magazine*. Available at <https://www.starburstmagazine.com/features/interview-dirk-maggs-hitchikers-guide-to-the-galaxy-radio-dramas> (accessed 03.01.2017).

Foucault, M. (1971) 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History' in Rabinow, P. (ed.) *The Foucault Reader*. New York, NY: Pantheon.

FreeSound (n.d.) *Freesound – Help – Frequently Asked Questions*. Available at <https://freesound.org/help/faq/> (accessed 13.11.17).

Gaver, W. W. (1993) 'How Do We Hear the World?: explorations in ecological acoustics' in *Ecological Psychology* Vol 5 No 4. pp 285-313.

Gielgud, V. (1931) *How to Write Broadcast Plays*. London: Hurst & Blackett.

Gielgud, V. (1946) *Radio Theatre: Plays Written Specifically for Broadcasting*. London: Macdonald and Co.

Gielgud, V. (1948) *The Right Way of Radio Playwriting*. Surrey: Kingswood.

Gielgud, V. (1957) *BBC Radio Drama, 1922-1956: a Survey*. Edinburgh: Harrap.

Gilfillan, D. (2009) *Pieces of Sound: German Experimental Radio.* Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Gimlet Media (2017) *The Homecoming*. Available at <https://gimletmedia.com/homecoming/>, accessed 12.01.17.

Greenhalgh, F (2013) *Radio Drama Revival* [podcast]. Episode 268. Available at <http://www.radiodramarevival.com/episode-268-a-tour-of-the-galaxy-with-dirk-maggs>.

Gregg, M. and Seigworth, G. J. (2010) *The Affect Theory Reader*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Grove, C. and Wyatt, S. (2013) *So You Want to Write Radio Drama?* London: Nick Hern Books.

Gulick, W. L., Gescheider, G. A. and Frisina, R. D. (1989) *Hearing: Physiological Acoustics, Neural Coding, Psychoacoustics.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Guthrie, T. (1931) *The Squirrel's Cage and Two Other Microphone Plays*. London: Cobden-Sanderson.

Guthrie, T. (1961) *A Life in the Theatre*. London: Readers Union/Hamish Hamilton.

Hajkowski, T. (2010) *The BBC and National Identity in Britain, 1922-1953*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Hall, M. (2015) 'Radio after Radio: Redefining radio art in the light of new media technology through expanded practice'. PhD Thesis, University of the Arts London. Available at < http://ualresearchonline.arts.ac.uk/8748/1/Hall-PhD-thesis-2015.pdf> (accessed 12.02.17).

Hand, R. (2017) 'Radio adaptations' in Leach, T. (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Adaptation Studies.* Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp 340-355.

Hand, R. J. and Traynor, M. (2011) *The Radio Drama Handbook: Audio Drama in Context and Practice.* London: Continuum.

Harris, M. (2007) 'Writing for Radio' in Earnshaw, S. (ed.) *Handbook of Creative Writing.* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. pp 273-281.

Heidegger, M (1962) *Being and Time* [trans. Macquarrie, J. and Robinson, E]. Cambridge, MA and Oxford: Blackwell.

Hendy, D. (2007) *Life on Air: a History of Radio 4*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hendy, D. (2012) 'Biography and the emotions as a missing "narrative" in media history: a case study of Lance Sieveking and the early BBC' in *Media History* Vol 18 No 3-4. pp 361-278.

Hendy, D. (2013) 'Representing the fragmented mind: reinterpreting a classic radio feature as "sonic psychology"' in *Radio Journal* Vol 11 No 1. pp 29-45.

Hendy, D. (2014) 'The Great War and British broadcasting: emotional life in the creation of the BBC' in *New Formations* No 82. pp 82-99.

Hill, C. W. (2015) *Writing for Radio*. London: Bloomsbury.

Hill, M. L (2000) 'Developing a Blind Understanding: a feminist revision of radio semiotics' in Weiss, A. (ed.) *Experimental Sound and Radio*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Holme, C. (1981) 'The radio drama of Louis McNeice' in Drakakis, J. (ed.) *British Radio Drama*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp 37-71.

Home-Cook, G. (2015) *Theatre and Aural Attention: Stretching Ourselves*. London and New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hughes, R. (1924) *A Comedy of Danger*. [transcript of radio play broadcast 15.01.1924, BBC London]. Available at <http://emruf.webs.com/british/danger.htm> (accessed 28.01.17).

Hunt, J. (2013) 'Dirk Maggs Interview: Hitchhiker's, Douglas Adams, Superman, Batman, & More' in *Den of Geek*. Available at <http://www.denofgeek.com/other/dirk-maggs/26039/dirk-maggs-interview-hitchhikers-douglas-adams-superman-batman-more> (accessed 13.11.17).

Huwiler, E. (2005) 'Storytelling by sound: a theoretical framework for radio drama analysis' in *The Radio Journal* Vol 3 No 1. pp 45-61.

I Can See My House From Here (2013) [Online release; writer: Patel, V.] The Invisible Theatre Company. Available at <https://soundcloud.com/invisible-theatre/i-can-see-my-house-from-here> (accessed 11.11.17).

Ihde, D. (1986) *Experimental Phenomenology: an Introduction*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Ihde, D. (2007) *Listening and Voice: Phenomenologies of Sound*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Ince, S. (2006) *Writing for Video Games*. London: A & C Black.

IRDP (2003) *About IRDP*. Available at <http://www.irdp.co.uk/page1.htm> (accessed 13.11.17).

Jackson, N. (2017) *Nicolas Jackson in Interview with Farokh Soltani Shirazi*. Nov 2016 – Jan 2017, online.

Jay, M. (1988) 'The rise of hermeneutics and the crisis of ocularcentrism' in *Poetics Today* Vol. 9 No. 2: 307-326.

Jay, M. (1994) *Downcast Eyes: the Denigration of Vision in 20th Century French Thought.* Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Jeffreys, R. E. (1926) 'Seeing with the Mind's Eye' in *Radio Times* Issue 162, 5th November 1926. p 325.

Jonas, H. (2001) *The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology*. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.

Kavanagh, D. (2013) 'The limits of visualisation: ocularcentrism and organisation' in E. Bell, S. Warren and J. Schroeder (eds.) *The Routledge Companion to Visual Organization*. London: Routledge: 64-77.

Kisner, D. (2013) *Theatre of the Mind: Writing and Producing Radio Dramas in the Classroom*. Sanger, CA: Balance Publishing Company.

Kosslyn, S. M. (1996) *Image and Brain: the Resolution of the Imagery Debate*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Kuhn, T. (1996) *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Chicago, IL and London: Chicago University Press.

Langford-Smith, F. (1953) *Radiotron Designers Handbook*. Harrison, NJ: RCA Victor.

Lastra, J. (2012) 'Fidelity versus intelligibility' in Sterne, J. (ed*.) The Sound Studies Reader*. London and New York, NY: Routledge. pp 248-253.

Lawlor, L. (1998) 'The end of Phenomenology: Expressionism in Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty' in *Continental Philosophy Review* Vol 31 no 1. pp 15-34.

Laws, C. (2017) 'Imagining Radio Sound: Interference and Collaboration in the BBC Radio Production of Beckett's All That Fall' in Addyman, D. Feldman, M. and Tonning, E. (eds.) *Samuel Beckett and BBC Radio: a Reassessment*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Lea, G. (1926) *Radio Drama and How to Write It.* London: George Allen and Unwin.

Levitin, D. (2006) *This Is Your Brain on Music: the Science of a Human Obsession*. New York, NY: Dutton.

Lewis, P. E. (1981) 'Introduction' in Lewis, P. E. (ed.) *Radio Drama*. London: Longman. pp 1-11.

Louie, G. J. and White, G. D. (2005) *The Audio Dictionary*. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press.

Luckhurst, M. (2006) *Dramaturgy: a Revolution in Theatre*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lutostanski, B. (2016) 'A Narratology of Radio Drama: Voice, Perspective, Space' in Mildorf, J. and Kinzel, T. (eds.) *Audionarratology: Interfaces of Sound and Narrative*. pp 117-132.

Maggs, D. (2005) 'Director Dirk Maggs Tells the Story of the Tertiary Phase' in *BBC Radio 4 – The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy*. Available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/hitchhikers/scenes.shtml> (Accessed 12.11.17).

McGovern, C. (1940) *Junction X*. London: BBC.

McInerney, V. (2001) *Writing for Radio*. Manchester and New York, NY: Manchester University Press.

McKee, R. (1997) *Story: Substance, Structure, and the Principles of Screenwriting*. New York, NY: HarperCollins.

McLeish, R. (1978) *The Technique of Radio Production*. London and Boston, MA: Focal Press.

McLeish, R. (1994) *Radio Production*. Oxford: Focal Press.

McLeish, R. (1999) *Radio Production*. Oxford: Focal Press.

McLeish, R. (2005) *Radio Production*. Oxford: Focal Press.

McLeish, R. (2016) *Radio Production*. New York, NY: Focal Press.

McLuhan, M. (1962) *The Gutenberg Galaxy: the Making of the Typographic Man*. Ontario: University of Toronto Press.

Merleau-Ponty, M. (1964) *Sense and Non-Sense* [trans. Dreyfus, H. and Dreyfus, P]. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.

Merleau-Ponty, M. (1968) *The Visible and the Invisible* [trans. Lingis, A]. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.

Merleau-Ponty, M. (2002) *Phenomenology of Perception*. [Trans. Smith, C]. London: Routledge.e

Mitchison, G. (1996) 'Visual perception: Where is the mind's eye?' in *Current Biology* Vol 6 No 5. pp 508-510.

Monelle, R. (2010) *The Sense of Music: Semiotic Essays*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Moran, T. P. (2010) *Introduction to the History of Communication: Evolutions and Revolutions.* Bern: Peter Lang Publications.

Morton, R. (2013) *A Quick Guide to Television Writing*. Milwaukee, WI: Limelight Editions.

Nancy, J. L. (2007) *Listening* [trans. Mandel, C]. New York, NY: Fordham University Press.

Napier, F. (1936) *Noises Off: a Handbook of Sound Effects*. London: Frederick Muller.

Neverwhere (2013) [iTunes release. Writer and producer: Maggs, D.] BBC Worldwide. Available at <https://itunes.apple.com/gb/audiobook/neverwhere-adaptation/id690286512> (accessed 11.12.17).

New York Festivals Awards (2015) *New York Festivals World's Best Radio Programs*. Available at <http://www.newyorkfestivals.com/radio/main.php?p=rp2015> (accessed 12.11.17).

Niebur, L. (2010) *Special Sound: the Creation and Legacy of the BBC Radiophonic Workshop*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Only the Good Die Young (1992) [Repeat radio broadcast, episode 2 of 6; writer: Prendergast, S.] Radio 4 Extra, 19 September 2015: 01:00-01:30.

Parr, A. (2010) *The Deleuze Dictionary*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Patel, V. (2013) *I Can See My House From Here*. Available at <https://vinayskpatel.files.wordpress.com/2013/11/i-can-see-my-house-from-here.pdf> (accessed 13.11.17).

Pepler, C. S. L. (1988) *Discovering the Art of the Wireless: a Critical History of Radio Drama at the BBC*. 1922-1928. PhD thesis, University of Bristol.

People Snogging in Public Places (2009) [Radio broadcast; writer: Thorne, J. producer: Canny, S.] BBC Radio 7, 15th January 2011: 23:00-00:00.

Pinker, S. (1984) 'Visual Cognition: an Introduction' in *Cognition* Vol 18 No 1-3. pp 1-63.

Pitt, S. (2009) *The state of the afternoon play*. ImageDissectors.com. Available at <http://www.imagedissectors.com/article/40> (accessed 13.11.17).

Plato (2008) *Theaetetus* [trans. Jowett, B]. Available at <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1726/1726-h/1726-h.htm> (accessed 13.11.17).

Plato (2009) *Plato's Timaeus*. [trans. Jowett, B] Rockville, MD: Serenity Publishers.

Power, T. (2005) 'Dirk Maggs' in *Sci Fi Online*. Available at <http://www.sci-fi-online.com/Interview/05-11-15_DirkMaggs.htm> (accessed 12.11.17).

Pownall, D. (2011) *Sound Theatre: Thoughts on the Radio Play*. London: Oberon.

Raban, J. (1981) 'Icon or symbol: the writer and the 'medium'' in Lewis, P. E. (ed) *Radio Drama*: 78-91. London: Longman.

Radio Drama Revival (2017) *Radio Drama Revival Podcast – Free Audio Story Downloads*. <http://www.radiodramarevival.com/> (accessed 13.11.17).

Radio Production Awards (2015) *2015 Nominees*. Available at <http://www.audioproductionawards.co.uk/index.php/archive/rpas-2015/nominees-2015> (accessed 12.11.17).

RAJAR (2015) *Audio Time: What the RAJAR Midas Audio Survey tells us about listening in the digital age*. Available at <http://www.rajar.co.uk/docs/news/Audio_Time%20_FINAL.pdf> (accessed 13.11.17).

RAJAR (2016) *MIDAS Measurement of Internet Delivered Audio Services Spring 2016.* Available at <http://www.rajar.co.uk/docs/news/MIDAS_Spring_2016_FINAL.pdf> (accessed 23.03.17).

RAJAR (2017) *RAJAR MIDAS Audio Survey.* Available at < http://www.rajar.co.uk/docs/news/MIDAS_Spring_2017.pdf> (accessed 24.03.17).

Rattigan, D. (2002) *The Theatre of Sound: Radio and the Dramatic Imagination*. Dublin: Carysfort Press.

Relative Dimensions (2010) [Online release; writer: Platt, M. producer: Edwards, B.] Big Finish Productions. Available at <https://www.bigfinish.com/releases/v/relative-dimensions-545> (accessed 11.11.17).

Reynolds, J. and Rolfe, J. (2006) 'Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty: Immanence, Univocity and Phenomenology' in *Journal of the British Society of Phenomenology*. Vol 37 No 3. pp 228-51.

Rodger, I. (1982) *Radio Drama*. London: Macmillan.

Roholt, T. (2014) *Groove: a Phenomenology of Rhythmic Nuance*. New York, NY and London: Bloomsbury Academic.

Rose, F. C. (2010) *Neurology of Music*. London: Imperial College Press.

Ryle, G. (1949) *The Concept of Mind*. London: Hutchinson.

Saint, D. (2004) 'Script Doctors: Robert Shearman 2004' in *What Noise Productions*. Available at <http://www.whatnoise.co.uk/DEEJSAINT/WORDS/Entries/2004/4/30_ROBERT_SHEARMAN_2004.html> (accessed 12.11.17).

Sartre, J. P. (2004) *The Imaginary: A Phenomenological Psychology of the Imagination* [trans. Webber, J]. London: Routledge.

Sayers, D. L. (1943) *The Man Born to Be King*. London: Victor Gollancz.

Scannell, P. (1996) *Radio, Television and Modern Life: a Phenomenological Approach.* Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell.

Schaeffer, P (2012) *In Search of a Concrete Music* [trans. Dack, J. and North, C]. Oakland, CA: University of California Press.

Scherzo (2003) [Online release; writer: Shearman, R. producer: Russell, G.] Big Finish Productions. Available at <https://www.bigfinish.com/releases/v/scherzo-218> (accessed 11.11.17).

Schlesinger, H. J. (1994) 'How the analyst listens: the pre-stages of interpretation' in *The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* Vol 75 No 1. pp 31-37.

Schnupp, J., Nelken, I. and King, A. J. (2010) *Auditory Neuroscience: Making Sense of Sound*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Scruton, R. (1997) *The Aesthetics of Music*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Seaburn (2015) [Online release; writer and producer: Sykes, J.] Available at <https://soundcloud.com/jaysykesmedia/seaburn> (accessed 11.11.17).

Searle, J. (2000) 'The Limits of Phenomenology' in Malpas, J. E. and Wrathall, M. A. (eds.) *Essays in Honor of Hubert L. Dreyfus*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. pp 71-92.

Sharpe, R. A. (2000) *Music and Humanism: an Essay in the Aesthetics of Music*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Shingler, M. and Wieringa, C. (1998) *On Air: Methods and Meanings of Radio*. London: Arnold.

Sieveking, L. (1934) *The Stuff of Radio*. London: Casell.

Small Scenes (2013) [Radio broadcast; writer: various, producer: Mayhew-Archer, S.] BBC Radio 4 Extra, 7th June 2017: 05:30-06:00.

Small, C. (1998) *Musicking: the Meaning of Performing and Listening to Music*. Hanover, NH: Wesleyan University Press.

Smethurst, W (2016) *How to Write for Television: a Guide to Writing and Selling TV and Radio Scripts*. London: Robinson.

Smith, E. S. (2009) *Writing Television Sitcoms*. New York, NY: Perigee.

Smith, K. (2012) 'Listen Again: Scherzo' in *Vortex* No 43. Available at <https://www.bigfinish.com/vortex/v/43> (accessed 12.11.13). pp 20-22.

Sobchack, V. (1992) *Address of the Eye: A Phenomenology of Film Experience.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Somers-Hall (2006) 'Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty: An Aesthetics of Difference' in *Symposium: the Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy* Vol 10 No 1. pp 213-222.

Stanton, W. (2004) 'The Invisible Theatre of Radio Drama' in *Critical Quarterly* Vol 46 No 4. pp 94-107.

States, B. O. (1987) *Great Reckonings in Little Rooms: On the Phenomenology of Theatre.* Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Sterne, J. (2003) *The Audible Past: Origins of Sound Reproduction*. London: Duke University Press.

Stone (2015) [Radio broadcast; writer: Ganley, A. producer: Molinari, N.] BBC Radio 4, 28th May 2015: 14:15-15:00.

Street, S. (2002) *A Concise History of British Radio, 1922-2002*. Tiverton: Kelly Publications.

Street, S. (2006) *The A to Z of British Radio*. Lanham, MD, Toronto and Plymouth: The Scarecrow Press.

The Trial of Superman (1988) [CD released 2010; writer and producer: Maggs, D.] BBC Audio.

Superman: Doomsday and Beyond (1994) [CD released 2006; writer and producer: Maggs, D.] BBC Audio.

Sykes, J. (2017) *Jay Sykes in Interview with Farokh Soltani Shirazi*. 28th April 2017, London.

Tarasi, E. (1994) *Semiotics of Classical Music: How Mozart, Brahms and Wagner Talk to Us.* Boston, MA and Berlin: Walter de Gruyter GmbH and Co.

Taylor, T. D. (2015) *Music and Capitalism: a History of the Present*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

The Adventures of Sexton Blake (2007) [iTunes release; writer and producer: Maggs, D.] BBC Worldwide. Available at <https://itunes.apple.com/gb/audiobook/the-adventures-of-sexton-blake-unabridged/id329737927> (accessed 11.11.17).

The Amazing Spider-Man (1995) [Audio cassette released 1995; writer and producer, Maggs, D.] BBC Audiobooks.

The British Broadcasting Corporation (1928) *B.B.C. Hand Book 1928*. London: The British Broadcasting Corporation.

The British Broadcasting Corporation (1929*) B.B.C. Handbook 1929*. London: The British Broadcasting Corporation.

The British Broadcasting Corporation (1934) *The B.B.C. Year-Book 1934*. London: The British Broadcasting Corporation.

The British Broadcasting Corporation (1937*) B.B.C Annual 1937*. London: The British Broadcasting Corporation.

The British Broadcasting Corporation (1938) *BBC Handbook 1938*. London: The British Broadcasting Corporation.

The British Broadcasting Corporation (1940) *BBC Handbook 1940*. London: The British Broadcasting Corporation.

The British Broadcasting Corporation (1941) *BBC Handbook 1941*. London: The British Broadcasting Corporation.

The British Broadcasting Corporation (1942) *BBC Handbook 1942*. London: The British Broadcasting Corporation.

The British Broadcasting Corporation (1944) *BBC Year Book 1944*. London: The British Broadcasting Corporation.

The British Broadcasting Corporation (1945) *BBC Year Book 1945*. London: The British Broadcasting Corporation.

The British Broadcasting Corporation (1947) *BBC Year Book 1947*. London: The British Broadcasting Corporation.

The British Broadcasting Corporation (1948) *BBC Year Book 1948*. London: The British Broadcasting Corporation.

The British Broadcasting Corporation (1969) *Broadcasting in the Seventies*. Available at < https://ukfree.tv/article/1107052145/Broadcasting_in_the_Seventies> (accessed 13.11.17).

The British Broadcasting Corporation (1978) *BBC Handbook 1978 Incorporating the Annual Report and Accounts from 1976-1977*. London: British Broadcasting Corporation.

The British Broadcasting Corporation (1979) *BBC Handbook 1978 Incorporating the Annual Report and Accounts 1977-78*. London: British Broadcasting Corporation.

The Disagreeable Oyster (1957) [CD Released 2016; writer: Cooper, G. producer: McWhinnie, D.] in Giles Cooper: Four Radio Dramas. Centre for Media History, University of Bournemouth.

The Exorcist (2014) [Repeat radio broadcast; writer: Forrest, R. producer: McFarlane, G.] BBC Radio 4 Extra, 1st Nov 2015: 00:00-01:00.

The Flickerman (2009) [Online release; writer and producer: Dann, L]. Available at <http://www.theflickerman.com/audio/> (accessed 11.11.17).

The Hitch-Hiker's Guide to the Galaxy (1978) [CD released 2005; writer: Adams, D. producer: Lloyd, J.] in The Hitch-Hiker's Guide to the Galaxy: The Complete Radio Series. BBC Audio.

The Kraken Wakes (2016) [Radio broadcast; writer: McDermid, V. producer: Potter, J.] BBC Radio 4, 28th May 2016: 14:30-15:30.

The Revenge (1978) [Repeat radio broadcast; writer, Sachs, A. producer: Dearman, G.] BBC Radio 4 Extra, 20th February 2016: 01:00-01:30.

The Scarifyers: Curse of the Black Comet (2009) [Online release; writer: Barnard, S. and Morris, P, producer: Barnard, S.] Available at <http://shop.bafflegab.co.uk/album/the-scarifyers-the-curse-of-the-black-comet> (accessed 13.11.17).

The Stone Tape (2016) [Radio broadcast; writer: Graham, M. and Strickland, P. producer: Finch, R. and Strickland, P.] BBC Radio 4 Extra, 30th October 2016: 00:00-01:00.

The Stroma Sessions (2016) [Radio broadcast, episode 2 of 5; Writer: Atack, T. X. Producer, Jackson, N.] BBC Radio 3, 25th October 2016: 22:45-23:00.

The Tragical Comedy or Comical Tragedy of Mr Punch (2005) [Radio broadcast; writer: McKean, D. and Slater, A. producer: Kemp, L.] BBC Radio 3, 3rd March 2005: 22:00-23:00.

Thorne, J (2009) *People Snogging in Public Places.* Available at <http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/writersroom/scripts/people snogging in public places.pdf> (accessed 20.11.17).

Tierno, M. (2002) *Aristotle's Poetics for Screenwriters: Storytelling Secrets from the Greatest Minds in Western Civilization*. New York, NY: Hyperion.

Tuuri, K., Mustonen, M. and Pirhonen, A. (2007). 'Same Sound – Different Meanings: A Novel Scheme for Modes of listening' in Fraunhofer Institute for Digital Media Technology [conference organisers] *Proceedings of Audio Mostly 2007*, Ilmenau, Germany. Available at < http://www.auditorysigns.com/kai/papers/Tuuri_etal_2007_Same_sound_different_meanings.pdf> (accessed 13.11.17).

Tye, M. (1991) *The Imagery Debate*. London and Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Under Milk Wood (1954) [iTunes Release; writer: Thomas, D. Producer: Cleverdon, D.] Decca Records. Available at <https://itunes.apple.com/gb/album/under-milk-wood/457753446> (accessed 13.11.17).

Verma, N. (2012) *Theatre of the Mind: Imagination, Aesthetics, and American Radio Drama*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Verma, N. (2017) "The Arts of Amnesia: The Case for Audio Drama, Part One", *RadioDoc Review* Vol 3 No 1.

Verma, N. (2017a) "The Arts of Amnesia: The Case for Audio Drama, Part Two", *RadioDoc Review*, Vol 3 No 1.

Wade, D. (1981) 'British radio drama since 1960' in Drakakis, J. (ed.) *British Radio Drama*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp 218-243.

Whitehead, K. (1989) *The Third Programme: a Literary History*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Willett, A. (2013) *Media Production: a Practical Guide to Radio and TV.* Oxford and New York, NY: Routledge.

Wittkower, D. E. (2001) 'A Preliminary Phenomenology of the Audiobook' in Rubery, M. (ed.) *Audiobooks, Literature, and Sound Studies.* New York, NY: Routledge. pp 216-232.

Wood, R. (2008) *Radio Drama at the Crossroads: the History and Contemporary Context of Drama at the BBC.* PhD Thesis, De Montfort University.

Yost, W. (2013) *Fundamentals of Hearing: an Introduction*. Leiden and Boston, MA: Brill.

APPENDIX A: CLIP REPOSITORY LINK AND INDEX

A number of the arguments in this thesis are based on structural and phenomenological analyses of excerpts from radio programmes, which I have presented through scripts or programme transcripts, and descriptions of the sounds and spaces of the drama. As the thesis argues, however, this mode of presentation is simply a derivative abstraction of the dramatic world that these pieces present I have therefore collected the excerpts to which I refer in an online repository, so that the reader can access them, and listen to the corresponding clip while reading the analysis. The repository can be found at <http://www.soltani.cc/AppendixA/> and is designed to be user-friendly; readers need only to click the appropriate link where indicated in the footnotes. Here is a list of the clips that the repository contains, and the relevant page of the thesis.

Number	Page	Source	Description
1	112	*Doyouwishtocontinue* (2015: 0:00 – 0:58).	Radio-body listening in the semantic mode in the opening scene.
2	132	*Dickens Confidential* Series 2 Episode 6 (2008: 35:28-35:58).	Radio-body listening in the semantic mode to a fight scene on a hot air balloon.
3	175	*All That Fall* (1957: 0:00 – 1:40).	An example of resonant listening: farmyard animals and Mrs Rooney walking.
4	175	*All That Fall* (1957: 8:40 – 9:12).	An example of resonant listening: Mrs Rooney Walking.
5	175	*All That Fall* (1957: 42:03 – 42: 34).	An example of resonant listening: Mr and Mrs Rooney Walking.
6	175	*All That Fall* (1957: 7:06 – 7:34).	An example of resonant listening: the bicycle bell.
7	175	*All That Fall* (1957: 1: 01:56 – 1:02:12).	An example of resonant listening: the whistling wind.
8	175	*All That Fall* (1957: 14:30 – 14:50).	An example of resonant listening: the truck approaches screaming.

9	176	*All That Fall* (1957: 19:08 – 19:38).	An example of semantic influences: the truck avoids a hen.
10	176	*All That Fall* (1957: 21:50 – 22:10).	An example of semantic influences: the truck drives away.
11	177	*The Disagreeable Oyster* (1957: 7:51-8:10).	An example of semantic influence: cartoonish voices.
12	177	*The Disagreeable Oyster* (1957: 18:50 – 19:25).	An example of semantic influence: cartoonish voices.
13	184	*The Revenge* (1979: 4:50 – 5:25).	An example of semantic influence: expositional listening to the setting.
14	185	*The Revenge* (1979: 9:00 – 10:00).	An example of semantic influence: arranging the sounds of the fight according to semantic significance.
15	185	*The Revenge* (1979: 9:05 – 9:30).	An example of semantic influence: expositional stereo listening.
16	185	*The Revenge* (1979: 16:27 – 16:50).	An example of semantic influence: expositional stereo listening.
17	202	*The Stroma Sessions* Episode 2 (2016: 12:10 – 13:26).	An example of resonant listening: music as background.
18	207	*Small Scenes* Series 2 Episode 1 (2013: 4:34 – 6:42).	An example of resonant listening: music as background.
19	207	*Dirk Gently's Holistic Detective Agency* Episode 1 (2008: 2:07 – 3:00).	An example of resonant listening: music as background.
20	207	*Only the Good Die Young* Episode 2 (1992: 6:52 – 7:55).	An example of failure in resonant listening: music emerges from the background.

21	211	*The Trial of Superman* (1988: 18:10 – 18:50).	An example of resonant listening: music expresses movement.
22	212	*I Can See My House From Here* (2013: 01:56 – 2:32).	An example of failure in resonating with movement through effects alone.
23	214	*Curse of the Black Comet* (2009: 1:40:08 – 1:40:48).	An example of resonant listening: music resonating with movement.
24	215	*Stone* Series 4 Episode 5 (2015: 39:25 – 40:02).	An example of resonant listening: music resonating with chase.
25	215	*Flickerman* Episode 4 (2009: 16:50 – 19:18).	An example of failure in resonant listening: music is detached from movement.
26	221	*Dirk Gently's Holistic Detective Agency* Episode 1 (2008: 0:32 – 1:44).	An example of resonant listening: music as reaction.
27	226	*Dirk Gently's Holistic Detective Agency* Episode 1 (2008: 6:42 – 7:14).	An example of resonant listening: music as reaction.
28	226	*Neverwhere* Episode 1 (2008: 28:24 – 29:00).	An example of resonant listening: music as reaction.
29	226	*People Snogging in Public Places* (2009: 19:01 – 194:44.	An example of resonant listening: music as reaction.
30	227	*The Kraken Wakes* Episode 1 (2016: 29:25 – 29:53).	An example of failure in resonance: music emerges into the foreground.

31	233	*Seaburn* (2015: 8:18 – 8:53).	An example of resonant listening: ambiguous space.
32	235	*Seaburn* (2015: 9:20 – 10:04).	An example of resonant listening: ambiguous space.
33	235	*Scherzo* Episode 1 (2003: 14:55 – 15: 30).	An example of resonant listening: ambiguous space.
34	237	*Scherzo* Episode 3 (2003: 22:20 – 22:50).	An example of resonant listening: ambiguous sound.
35	239	*Scherzo* Episode 4 (2003: 22:15 – 22:50).	An example of resonant listening: ambiguous sound.
36	240	*Relative Dimensions* (2010: 13:01 – 13:33).	An example of failure to resonate: ambiguity leads to abstraction.
37	240	*The Stone Tape* (2016: 56:20 – 58:00).	An example of resonant listening: ambiguous sound.
38	240	*The Exorcist* Episode 1 (2014: 0:53 – 1:12).	An example of resonant listening: ambiguous sound.